Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2012 with funding from
University of Toronto
http://archive.org/details/worldcrisisOOchur
THE WORLD CRISIS
THE
WORLD CRISIS
BY
THE RT. HON. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL
FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY
1911 to 1915
nil!!-!
4, $\ a -*>
TORONTO
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY OF CANADA, Ltd.
At Martin's House
MCMXXIII
D
521
Copyright, 1923, by
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
Printed in the United States of America
Published April, 1923
PREFACE
T7R0M October 25, 191 1, to May 28, 191 5, I was, in the
-*• words of the Royal Letters Patent and Orders in Council,
" responsible to Crown and Parliament for all the business of
the Admiral ty." This period comprised the final stage in the
preparation against a war with Germany; the mobilisation and
concentration of the Fleet before the outbreak; the organisa-
tion of the Blockade; the gathering in 1914 of the Imperial
forces from all over the world; the clearance from the oceans
of all the German cruisers and commerce destroyers; the rein-
forcement of the Fleet by new construction in 1914 and 1915;
the frustration and defeat of the first German submarine at-
tack upon merchant shipping in 1915; and the initiation of the
enterprise against the Dardanelles. It was marked before
the war by a complete revision of British naval war plans;
by the building of a fast division of battleships armed with
15-inch guns and driven by oil fuel; by the proposals, rejected
by Germany, for a naval holiday; and by the largest supplies
till then ever voted by Parliament for the British Fleet. It
was distinguished during the war for the victories of the
Heligoland Bight, of the Falkland Islands and the Dogger
Bank; and for the attempt to succour Antwerp. It was mem-
orable for the disaster to the three cruisers off the Dutch
Coast; the loss of Admiral Cradock's squadron at Coronel;
and the failure of the Navy to force the Dardanelles.
Many accounts of these matters have been published both
here and abroad. Most of the principal actors have unfolded
their story. Lord Fisher, Lord Jellicoe, Lord French, Lord
Kitchener's biographer, Lord Haig's Staff, and many others
vi PREFACE
of less importance, have with the utmost fullness and free-
dom given their account of these and other war-time events
and of the controversies arising out of them. The German
accounts are numerous and authoritative. Admirals von
Tirpitz and Scheer have told their tales. Sir Julian Corbett,
the Official Historian, has in a thousand pages recorded the
conduct of the naval war during the whole of my adminis-
tration. Eight years have passed since I quitted the Ad-
miralty.
In all these circumstances I feel it both my right and my
duty to set forth the manner in which I endeavoured to dis-
charge my share in these hazardous responsibilities. In doing
so I have adhered to certain strict rules. I have made no
important statement of fact relating to naval operations or
Admiralty business, on which I do not possess unimpeachable
documentary proof. I have made or implied no criticism of
any decision or action taken or neglected by others unless I
can prove that I had expressed the same opinion in writing
before the event.
Many of the accounts which I have mentioned above
enjoy the great advantage of having been written some con-
siderable time after the events with which they deal, when
the results of schemes and operations set on foot in the early
days of the war could be clearly seen, and when the ideas
and impressions of 19 14 and 191 5 could be reviewed in the
broad and certain experience and science of 19 18 and after.
There are no doubt obvious conveniences in this way of
treating the subject. Actors in these great situations are
able to dwell with certainty upon those of their opinions and
directions which have effectively been vindicated by the
subsequent course of the war, and they are not, on the other
hand, obliged to disturb the public mind by dwelling on any
errors of neglect or commission into which they may possibly
have been betrayed. I have followed a different method.
In every case where the interests of the State allow, I have
PREFACE vii
printed the actual memoranda, directions, minutes, tele-
grams or letters written by me at the time, irrespective of
whether these documents have been vindicated or falsified
by the march of history and of time. The only excisions
of relevant matter from the documents have been made to
avoid needlessly hurting the feelings of individuals, or the
pride of friendly nations. For such reasons here and there
sentences have been softened or suppressed. But the whole
story is recorded as it happened, by the actual counsels of-
fered and orders given in the fierce turmoil of each day.
The principal minutes by which Admiralty business was
conducted embody in every case decisions for which, as the
highest executive authority in the department, I was directly
responsible, and are in all cases expressed in my own words.
I am equally accountable, together with the First Sea Lord
at the time, for the principal telegrams which moved fleets,
squadrons and individual ships, all of which (unless the con-
trary appears) bear my initials as their final sanction.
The number of minutes and telegrams published in these
volumes is, of course, only a fraction of the whole. Re-
stricted space and the fear of wearying the reader have ex-
cluded much. But lest it should be thought that there have
been any material suppressions, or that what is published
does not truly represent what occurred, or the way things
were done, I affirm my own willingness to see every docu-
ment of Admiralty administration for which I am responsible
made public provided it is presented in its fair context.
Sometimes a dozen or even a score of important decisions had
to be taken in a single day. Complicated directions and rec-
ommendations were given in writing as fast as they could
be dictated, and were acted upon without recall thereafter.
Nothing of any consequence was done by me by word of
mouth. A complete record therefore exists both of execu-
tive and administrative action.
If in the great number of decisions and orders which these
viii PREFACE
pages recount and which deal with so many violent and
controversial affairs, mistakes can be found which led to
mishap, the fault is mine. If, on the other hand, favourable
results were achieved, that should be counted to some extent
as an offset. Where the decision lay outside my powers
and was taken contrary to my advice, I rest on the written
record of my warning. Should it be objected that in any of
these matters, many of them so highly technical, a lands-
man and layman could form no valuable opinion, I point to
the documents themselves. They can be judged as they stand,
but lest, on the other hand, it should be thought that I am
seeking to claim credit whch is not mine, it must be remem-
bered that throughout this period I enjoyed the assistance,
loyal, spontaneous and unstinted, of the best brains of the
Royal Navy, that every treasure of every branch of the Ad-
miralty and the Fleet was lavished upon my instruction, and
that I had only to apply my own reason and instinct to the
arguments of those who I believe stood in the foremost rank
of the naval experts of the world.
Taking a general view in after years of the transactions
of this terrific epoch, I commend with some confidence the
story as a whole to the judgment of my countrymen. It has
long been the fashion to disparage the policy and actions of
the Ministers who bore the burden of power in the fateful
years before the War, and who faced the extraordinary perils
of its outbreak and opening phases. Abroad, in Allied, in
neutral, and above all, in enemy States, their work is regarded
with respect and even admiration. At home, criticism has
been its only meed. I hope that this account may be agree-
able to those at least who wish to think well of our country,
of its naval service, of its governing institutions, of its po-
litical life and public men; and that they will feel that perhaps
after all Britain and her Empire have not been so ill-guided
through the great convulsions as it is customary to declare.
Lastly, I must record my thanks to Vice-Admiral Thomas
PREFACE ix
Jackson and others who have aided me in the preparation
and revision of this work, especially in its technical aspect,
and to those who have given me permission to quote corre-
spondence or conversations in which they were concerned.
*yisi^9 e^*vO . LsC4*++~><s&is6£
London, January, 1923.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER
I The Vials of Wrath .
page
i
II
Milestones to Armageddon
. 19
III
The Crisis of Agadir .
• 38
IV
Admirals All
. 68
V
The German Navy Law .
• 95
VI
The Romance of Design .
• 125
VII
The North Sea Front .
. 149
VIII
Ireland and the European Balance
. 179
IX
The Crisis
. 203
X
The Mobilisation of the Navy
. 228
XI
War: The Passage of the Army
• 247
XII
The Battle in France .
. 281
XIII
On the Oceans
• 305
XIV
In the Narrow Seas .
• 33o
XV
Antwerp .......
• 355
XVI
The Channel Ports
■ 39i
XVII
The Grand Fleet and the Submarine Ala
RM . 413
XI
Xll
CONTENTS
CHAPTER
XVIII CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS .
XIX With Fisher at the Admiralty
PAGE
442
479
XX The Bombardment of Scarborough and Har-
tlepool 502
XXI Turkey and the Balkans
Appendix A
Appendix B
Appendix C
Appendix D
Appendix E
Index
. 522
Naval Staff Training 552
Tables of Fleet Strength 558
. Trade Protection 562
Mining 566
First Lord's Minutes 570
• 579
TABLE OF MAPS
I Home Waters
II The Escape of the "Goeben"
III On the Oceans
IV Antwerp and the Belgium Coast
V CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS
VI The i 6th December, 1914
AT PAGE
224
274
328
360
476
518
OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS
The Seventeen Points of the First Lord
206
Facsimile of Admiralty's Instructions to the Com-
mander-in-Chief at Devonport . . facing page 474
CHAPTER I
THE VIALS OF WRATH
i 870-1904
"To put on record what were their grounds of feud."
Herodotus.
The Unending Task — Ruthless War — The Victorian Age — National
Pride — National Accountability — The Franco-German Feud —
Bismarck's Apprehension — His Precautions and Alliances — The
Bismarckian Period and System — The Young Emperor and
Capri vi — The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1892 — The Balance of
Power — Anglo-German Ties — Anglo-German Estrangement —
Germany and the South African War — The Beginnings of the
German Navy — The Birth of a Challenge — The Anglo- Japanese
Alliance — The Russo-Japanese War — Consequences — The Anglo-
French Agreement of 1904 — Lord Rosebery's Comment — The
Triple Entente — Degeneration in Turkey and Austria — The Long
Descent — The Sinister Hypothesis.
FT was the custom in the palmy days of Queen Victoria for
■*■ statesmen to expatiate upon the glories of the British Em-
pire, and to rejoice in that protecting Providence which had
preserved us through so many dangers and brought us at
length into a secure and prosperous age. Little did they
know that the worst perils had still to be encountered and
that the greatest triumphs were yet to be won.
Children were taught of the Great War against Napoleon as
the culminating effort in the history of the British peoples,
and they looked on Waterloo and Trafalgar as the supreme
achievements of British arms by land and sea. These prodi-
gious victories, eclipsing all that had gone before, seemed the
fit and predestined ending to the long drama of our island race,
which had advanced over a thousand years from small and
weak beginnings to a foremost position in the world. Three
2 THE WORLD CRISIS
separate times in three different centuries had the British peo-
ple rescued Europe from a military domination. Thrice had
the Low Countries been assailed; by Spain, by the French
Monarchy, by the French Empire. Thrice had British war
and policy, often maintained single-handed, overthrown the
aggressor. Always at the outset the strength of the enemy
had seemed overwhelming, always the struggle had been pro-
longed through many years and across awful hazards, always
the victory had at last been won: and the last of all the vic-
tories had been the greatest of all, gained after the most ruin-
ous struggle and over the most formidable foe.
Surely that was the end of the tale as it was so often the
end of the book. History showed the rise, culmination,
splendour, transition and decline of States and Empires. It
seemed inconceivable that the same series of tremendous
events through which since the days of Queen Elizabeth we
had three times made our way successfully, should be repeated
a fourth time and on an immeasurably larger scale. Yet
that is what has happened, and what we have lived to see.
The Great War through which we have passed differed
from all ancient wars in the immense power of the combatants
and their fearful agencies of destruction, and from all modern
wars in the utter ruthlessness with which it was fought. All
the horrors of all the ages were brought together, and not
only armies but whole populations were thrust into the midst
of them. The mighty educated States involved conceived
with reason that their very existence was at stake. Germany
having let Hell loose kept well in the van of terror; but she
was followed step by step by the desperate and ultimately
avenging nations she had assailed. Every outrage against
humanity or international law was repaid by reprisals often
on a greater scale and of longer duration. No truce or par-
ley mitigated the strife of the armies. The wounded died
THE VIALS OF WRATH 3
between the lines: the dead mouldered into the soil. Mer-
chant ships and neutral ships and hospital ships were sunk on
the seas and all on board left to their fate, or killed as they
swam. Every effort was made to starve whole nations into
submission without regard to age or sex. Cities and monu-
ments were smashed by artillery. Bombs from the air were
cast down indiscriminately. Poison gas in many forms stifled
or seared the soldiers. Liquid fire was projected upon their
bodies. Men fell from the air in flames, or were smothered,
often slowly, in the dark recesses of the sea. The fighting
strength of armies was limited only by the manhood of their
countries. Europe and large parts of Asia and Africa became
one vast battlefield on which after years of struggle not ar-
mies but nations broke and ran. When all was over, Torture
and Cannibalism were the only two expedients that the civil-
ised, scientific, Christian States had been able to deny them-
selves: and these were of doubtful utility.
But nothing daunted the valiant heart of man. Son of the
Stone Age, vanquisher of nature with all her trials and mon-
sters, he met the awful and self-inflicted agony with new re-
serves of fortitude. Freed in the main by his intelligence
from mediaeval fears, he marched to death with sombre
dignity. His nervous system was found in the twentieth
century capable of enduring physical and moral stresses be-
fore which the simpler natures of primeval times would have
collapsed. Again and again to the hideous bombardment,
again and again from the hospital to the front, again and
again to the hungry submarines, he strode unflinching. And
withal, as an individual, preserved through these torments
the glories of a reasonable and compassionate mind.
In the beginning of the twentieth century men were every-
where unconscious of the rate at which the world was grow-
ing. It required the convulsion of the war to awaken the na-
4 THE WORLD CRISIS
tions to the knowledge of their strength. For a year after
the war had begun hardly anyone understood how terrific,
how almost inexhaustible were the resources in force, in sub-
stance, in virtue, behind every one of the combatants. The
vials of wrath were full: but so were the reservoirs of power.
From the end of the Napoleonic Wars and still more after
1870, the accumulation of wealth and health by every civilised
community had been practically unchecked. Here and there
a retarding episode had occurred. The waves had recoiled
after advancing: but the mounting tides still flowed. And
when the dread signal of Armageddon was made, mankind
was found to be many times stronger in valour, in endurance,
in brains, in science, in apparatus, in organisation, not only
than it had ever been before, but than even its most audacious
optimists had dared to dream.
The Victorian Age was the age of accumulation; not of a
mere piling up of material wealth, but of the growth and
gathering in every land of all those elements and factors
which go to make up the power of States. Education spread
itself over the broad surface of the millions. Science had
opened the limitless treasure-house of nature. Door after
door had been unlocked. One dim mysterious gallery after
another had been lighted up, explored, made free for all: and
every gallery entered gave access to at least two more. Every
morning when the world woke up, some new machinery had
started running. Every night while the world had supper, it
was running still. It ran on while all men slept.
And the advance of the collective mind was at a similar
pace. Disraeli said of the early years of the nineteenth cen-
tury, "In those days England was for the few — and for the
very few." Every year of Queen Victoria's reign saw those
limits broken and extended. Every year brought in new
thousands of people in private stations who thought about
their own country and its story and its duties towards other
countries, to the world and to the future, and understood the
THE VIALS OF WRATH 5
greatness of the responsibilities of which they were the heirs.
Every year diffused a wider measure of material comfort
among the higher ranks of labour. Substantial progress was
made in mitigating the hard lot of the mass. Their health
improved, their lives and the lives of their children were bright-
ened, their stature grew, their securities against some of their
gravest misfortunes were multiplied, their numbers greatly
increased.
Thus when all the trumpets sounded, every class and rank
had something to give to the need of the State. Some gave
their science and some their wealth, some gave their bus-
iness energy and drive, and some their wonderful personal
prowess, and some their patient strength or patient weak-
ness. But none gave more, or gave more readily, than the
common man or woman who had nothing but a precarious
week's wages between them and poverty, and owned little
more than the slender equipment of a cottage, and the gar-
ments in which they stood upright. Their love and pride of
country, their loyalty to the symbols with which they were
familiar, their keen sense of right and wrong as they saw it,
led them to outface and endure perils and ordeals the like of
which men had not known on earth.
But these developments, these virtues, were no monopoly
of any one nation. In every free country, great or small, the
spirit of patriotism and nationality grew steadily; and in
every country, bond or free, the organisation and structure
into which men were fitted by the laws, gathered and armed
this sentiment. Far more than their vices, the virtues of
nations ill-directed or mis-directed by their rulers, became the
cause of their own undoing and of the general catastrophe.
And these rulers, in Germany, Austria, and Italy; in France,
Russia or Britain, how far were they to blame? Was there
any man of real eminence and responsibility whose devil heart
conceived and willed this awful thing? One rises from the
study of the causes of the Great War with a prevailing sense
6 THE WORLD CRISIS
of the defective control of individuals upon world fortunes.
It has been well said, " there is always more error than
design in human affairs. " The limited minds even of the
ablest men, their disputed authority, the climate of opinion
in which they dwell, their transient and partial contributions
to the mighty problem, that problem itself so far beyond their
compass, so vast in scale and detail, so changing in its aspect
— all this must surely be considered before the complete con-
demnation of the vanquished or the complete acquittal of the
victors can be pronounced. Events also got on to certain
lines, and no one could get them off again. Germany clanked
obstinately, recklessly, awkwardly towards the crater and
dragged us all in with her. But fierce resentment dwelt in
France, and in Russia there were wheels within wheels.
Could we in England perhaps by some effort, by some sac-
rifice of our material interests, by some compulsive gesture,
at once of friendship and command, have reconciled France
and Germany in time and formed that grand association on
which alone the peace and glory of Europe would be safe ? I
cannot tell. I only know that we tried our best to steer our
country through the gathering dangers of the armed peace
without bringing her to war or others to war, and when these
efforts failed, we drove through the tempest without bringing
her to destruction.
There is no need here to trace the ancient causes of quarrel
between the Germans and the French, to catalogue the con-
flicts with which they have scarred the centuries, nor to ap-
praise the balance of injury or of provocation on one side or
the other. When on the 18th of January, 187 1, the triumph of
the Germans was consolidated by the Proclamation of the
German Empire in the Palace of Versailles, a new volume of
European history was opened. " Europe," it was said,
"has lost a mistress and has gained a master." A new and
THE VIALS OF WRATH 7
mighty State had come into being, sustained by an overflow-
ing population, equipped with science and learning, organised
for war and crowned with victory. France, stripped of Alsace
and Lorraine, beaten, impoverished, divided and alone, con-
demned to a decisive and increasing numerical inferiority, fell
back to ponder in shade and isolation on her departed glories.
But the chiefs of the German Empire were under no illusions
as to the formidable character and implacable resolves of their
prostrate antagonist. "What we gained by arms in half a
year," said Moltke, "we must protect by arms for half a cen-
tury, if it is not to be torn from us again." Bismarck, more
prudent still, would never have taken Lorraine. Forced by
military pressure to assume the double burden against his
better judgment, he exhibited from the outset and in every
act of his policy an extreme apprehension. Restrained by the
opinion of the world, and the decided attitude of Great
Britain, from striking down a reviving France in 1875, he
devoted his whole power and genius to the construction of
an elaborate system of alliances designed to secure the con-
tinued ascendancy of Germany and the maintenance of her
conquests. He knew the quarrel with France was irrecon-
cilable except at a price which Germany would never con-
sent to pay. He understood that the abiding enmity of a
terrific people would be fixed on his new-built Empire. Every-
thing else must be subordinated to that central fact. Ger-
many could afford no other antagonisms. In 1879 he formed
an alliance with Austria. Four years later this was expanded
into the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria and
Italy. Roumania was brought into this system by a secret
alliance in 1883. Not only must there be Insurance; there
must be Reinsurance. What he feared most was a counter-
alliance between France and Russia; and none of these ex-
tending arrangements met this danger. His alliance with
Austria indeed, if left by itself, would naturally tend to draw
France and Russia together. Could he not make a league of
8 THE WORLD CRISIS
the three Emperors — Germany, Austria, and Russia united ?
There at last was overwhelming strength and enduring
safety. When in 1887 after six years, this supreme ideal of
Bismarck was ruptured by the clash of Russian and Austrian
interests in the Balkans, he turned — as the best means still
open to him — to his Reinsurance Treaty with Russia. Ger-
many, by this arrangement, secured herself against becoming
the object of an aggressive combination by France and Rus-
sia. Russia on the other hand was reassured that the Austro-
German alliance would not be used to undermine her posi-
tion in the Balkans.
All these cautious and sapient measures were designed with
the object of enabling Germany to enjoy her victory in peace.
The Bismarckian system, further, always included the princi-
ple of good relations with Great Britain. This was necessary,
for it was well known that Italy would never willingly commit
herself to anything that would bring her into war with Great
Britain, and had, as the world now knows, required this fact
to be specifically stated in the original and secret text of the
Triple Alliance. To this Alliance in its early years Great
Britain had been wholly favourable. Thus France was left
to nurse her scars alone; and Germany, assured in her pre-
dominance on the Continent, was able to take the fullest ad-
vantage of the immense industrial developments which char-
acterised the close of the nineteenth century. The policy of
Germany further encouraged France as a consolation to de-
velop her colonial possessions in order to take her thoughts
off Europe, and incidentally to promote a convenient rivalry
and friction with Great Britain.
This arrangement, under which Europe lived rigidly but
peacefully for twenty years, and Germany waxed in power and
splendour, was ended in 1890 with the fall of Bismarck. The
Iron Chancellor was gone, and new forces began to assail the
system he had maintained with consummate ability so long.
There was a constant danger of conflagration in the Balkans
THE VIALS OF WRATH 9
and in the Near East through Turkish misgovernment. The
rising tides of pan-Slavism and the strong an ti- German cur-
rents in Russia began to wash against the structure of the Re-
insurance Treaty. Lastly, German ambitions grew with Ger-
man prosperity. Not content with the hegemony of Europe,
she sought a colonial domain. Already the greatest of mili-
tary Empires, she began increasingly to turn her thoughts
to the sea. The young Emperor, freed from Bismarck and
finding in Count Caprivi, and the lesser men who succeeded
him, complacent coadjutors, began gaily to dispense with the
safeguards and precautions by which the safety of Germany
had been buttressed. While the quarrel with France remained
open and undying, the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia was
dropped, and later on the naval rivalry with Britain was be-
gun. These two sombre decisions rolled forward slowly as
the years unfolded. Their consequences became apparent in
due season. In 1892 the event against which the whole
policy of Bismarck had been directed came to pass. The
Dual Alliance was signed between Russia and France. Al-
though the effects were not immediately visible, the Euro-
pean situation was in fact transformed. Henceforward, for
the undisputed but soberly exercised predominance of Ger-
many, there was substituted a balance of power. Two vast
combinations, each disposing of enormous military resources,
dwelt together at first side by side but gradually face to face.
Although the groupings of the great Powers had thus been
altered sensibly, to the disadvantage of Germany, there was in
this alteration nothing that threatened her with war. The
abiding spirit of France had never abandoned the dream of
recovering the lost provinces, but the prevailing temper of the
French nation was pacific, and all classes remained under the
impression of the might of Germany and of the terrible conse-
quences likely to result from war.
io THE WORLD CRISIS
Moreover, the French were never sure of Russia in a purely
Franco- German quarrel. True, there was the Treaty; but
the Treaty to become operative required aggression on the
part of Germany. What constitutes aggression? At what
point in a dispute between two heavily armed parties,
does one side or the other become the aggressor? At any
rate there was a wide field for discretionary action on the
part of Russia. Of all these matters she would be the judge,
and she would be the judge at a moment when it might
be said that the Russian people would be sent to die in mil-
lions over a quarrel between France and Germany in which
they had no direct interest. The word of the Tsar was indeed
a great assurance. But Tsars who tried to lead their nations,
however honourably, into unpopular wars might disappear.
The policy of a great people, if hung too directly upon the
person of a single individual, was liable to be changed by his
disappearance. France, therefore, could never feel certain
that if on any occasion she resisted German pressure and war
resulted, Russia would march.
Such was the ponderous balance which had succeeded the
unquestioned ascendancy of Germany. Outside both systems
rested England, secure in an overwhelming and as yet unchal-
lenged, naval supremacy. It was evident that the position of
the British Empire received added importance from the fact
that adhesion to either Alliance would decide the predomi-
nance of strength. But Lord Salisbury showed no wish to
exploit this favourable situation. He maintained steadily the
traditional friendly attitude towards Germany combined with
a cool detachment from Continental entanglements.
It had been easy for Germany to lose touch with Russia;
but the alienation of England was a far longer process. So
many props and ties had successively to be demolished. British
suspicions of Russia in Asia, the historic antagonism to France,
memories of Blenheim, of Minden and of Waterloo, the con-
THE VIALS OF WRATH n
tinued disputes with France in Egypt and in the Colonial
sphere, the intimate business connexions between Germany
and England, the relationship of the Royal Families — all these
constituted a profound association between the British Empire
and the leading State in that Triple Alliance. It was no part
of British policy to obstruct the new-born Colonial aspirations
of Germany, and in more than one instance, as at Samoa, we
actively assisted them. With a complete detachment from
strategic considerations, Lord Salisbury exchanged Heligoland
for Zanzibar. Still even before the fall of Bismarck the Ger-
mans did not seem pleasant diplomatic comrades. They ap-
peared always to be seeking to enlist our aid and reminding
us that they were our only friend. To emphasise this they
went even farther. They sought in minor ways to embroil us
with France and Russia. Each year the Wilhelmstrasse looked
inquiringly to the Court of St. James's for some new service or
concession which should keep Germany's diplomatic goodwill
alive for a further period. Each year they made mischief for
us with France and Russia, and pointed the moral of how un-
popular Great Britain was, what powerful enemies she had,
and how lucky she was to find a friend in Germany. Wftiere
would she be in the councils of Europe if German assistance
were withdrawn, or if Germany threw her influence into the
opposing combination ? These manifestations, prolonged for
nearly twenty years, produced very definite sensations of
estrangement in the minds of the rising generation at the
British Foreign Office.
But none of these woes of diplomatists deflected the steady
course of British policy. The Colonial expansion of Germany
was viewed with easy indifference by the British Empire.
In spite of their rivalry in trade, there grew up a far more
important commercial connexion between Britain and Ger-
many. In Europe we were each other's best customers.
Even the German Emperor's telegram to President Kruger
on the Jameson Raid in 1896, which we now know to have
been no personal act but a decision of the German Gov-
12 THE WORLD CRISIS
ernment, produced only a temporary ebullition of anger. All
the German outburst of rage against England during the Boer
War, and such attempts as were made to form a European
coalition against us, did not prevent Mr. Chamberlain in 1901
from advocating an alliance with Germany, or the British
Foreign Office from proposing in the same year to make the
Alliance between Britain and Japan into a Triple Alliance in-
cluding Germany. During this period we had at least as seri-
ous differences with France as with Germany, and sufficient
naval superiority not to be seriously disquieted by either. We
stood equally clear of the Triple and of the Dual Alliance. We
had no intention of being drawn into a Continental quarrel.
No effort by France to regain her lost provinces appealed to
the British public or to any political party. The idea of a
British Army fighting in Europe amid the mighty hosts of the
Continent was by all dismissed as utterly absurd. Only a
menace to the very life of the British nation would stir the
British Empire from its placid and tolerant detachment from
Continental affairs. But that menace Germany was destined
to supply.
*****
" Among the Great Powers/' said Moltke in his Military
Testament, " England necessarily requires a strong ally on
the Continent. She would not find one which corresponds
better to all her interests than a United Germany, that can
never make claim to the command of the sea."
From 1873 to 1900 the German Navy was avowedly not in-
tended to provide for the possibility of "a naval war against
great naval Powers." Now in 1900 came a Fleet Law of a
very different kind. "For the protection of trade and the Col-
onies," declared the preamble of this document, " there is only
one thing that will suffice, namely, a strong Battle Fleet."
In order to protect German trade and commerce under
existing conditions, only one thing will suffice, namely, Ger-
many must possess a battle fleet of such a strength that,
THE VIALS OF WRATH 13
even for the most powerful naval adversary, a war would
involve such risks as to make that Power's own supremacy
doubtful.
For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the
German Fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest
naval Power, for, as a rule, a great naval Power will not be
in a position to concentrate all its forces against us. Even if
it were successful in bringing against us a much superior
force, the defeat of a strong German Fleet would so consid-
erably weaken the enemy that, in spite of the victory that
might be achieved, his own supremacy would no longer be
assured by a fleet of sufficient strength.
For the attainment of this object, viz., protection of our
trade and colonies by assuring peace with honour, Germany
requires, according to the strength of the great naval Powers
and with regard to our tactical formations, two double squad-
rons of first-class battleships, with the necessary attendant
cruisers, torpedo boats, etc. Since the Fleet Law provides
for only two squadrons, the construction of third and fourth
squadrons is proposed. Two of these four squadrons will
form one fleet. The tactical formation of the second fleet
should be similar to that of the first as provided for in the
Fleet Law.
And again : —
In addition to the increase of the Home Fleet an increase
of the foreign service ships is also necessary. ... In order
to estimate the importance of an increase in our foreign ser-
vice ships, it must be realised that they represent the German
Navy abroad, and that to them often falls the task of gather-
ing fruits which have ripened as a result of the naval strength
of the Empire embodied in the Home Battle Fleet.
And again: —
If the necessity for so strong a Fleet for Germany be
recognised, it cannot be denied that the honour and welfare of
the Fatherland authoritatively demand that the Home Fleet
be brought up to the requisite strength as soon as possible.
*****
The determination of the greatest military Power on the
Continent to become at the same time at least the second
14 THE WORLD CRISIS
naval Power was an event of first magnitude in world affairs.
It would, if carried into full effect, undoubtedly reproduce
those situations which at previous periods in history had
proved of such awful significance to the Islanders of Britain.
Hitherto all British naval arrangements had proceeded on
the basis of the two-Power standard, namely, an adequate
superiority over the next two- strongest Powers, in those
days France and Russia. The possible addition of a third
European Fleet more powerful than either of these two would
profoundly affect the life of Britain. If Germany was going
to create a Navy avowedly measured against our own, we
could not afford to remain "in splendid isolation'' from the
European systems. We must in these circumstances find a
trustworthy friend. We found one in another island Empire
situated on the other side of the globe arid also in danger.
In 1901 the Alliance was signed between Great Britain and
Japan. Still less could we afford to have dangerous causes
of quarrel open both with France and Russia. In 1902 the
British Government, under Mr. Balfour and Lord Lansdowne,
definitely embarked upon the policy of settling up our differ-
ences with France. Still, before either of these steps were
taken the hand was held out to Germany. She was invited
to join with us in the alliance with Japan. She was invited
to make a joint effort to solve the Moroccan problem. Both
offers were declined.
In 1904, the war between Russia and Japan broke out.
Germany sympathised mainly with Russia; England stood
ready to fulfil her treaty engagements with Japan, while at
the same time cultivating good relations with France. In
this posture the Powers awaited the result of the Far East-
ern struggle. It brought a surprise to all but one. The mili-
tary and naval overthrow of Russia by Japan and the internal
convulsions of the Russian State produced profound changes
in the European situation. Although German influence had
leaned against Japan, she felt herself enormously strength-
THE VIALS OF WRATH 15
ened by the Russian collapse. Her Continental predominance
was restored. Her self-assertion in every sphere became sensi-
bly and immediately pronounced. France, on the other hand,
weakened and once again, for the time being, isolated and
in real danger, became increasingly anxious for an Entente
with England. England, whose statesmen with penetrating
eye alone in Europe had truly measured the martial power of
Japan, gained remarkably in strength and security. Japan,
her new ally, was triumphant: France, her ancient enemy,
sought her friendship: the German fleet was still only
a-building, and meanwhile all the British battleships in
China seas could now be safely brought home.
The settlement of outstanding differences between England
and France proceeded, and at last in 1904 the Anglo-French
Agreement was signed. There were various clauses; but the
essence of the compact was that the French desisted from op-
position to British interests in Egypt, and Britain gave a
general support to the French views about Morocco. This
agreement was acclaimed by the Conservative forces in Eng-
land, among whom the idea of the German menace had al-
ready taken root. It was also hailed somewhat short-sight-
edly by Liberal statesmen as a step to secure general peace
by clearing away misunderstandings and differences with our
traditional enemy. It was therefore almost universally wel-
comed. Only one profound observer raised his voice against
it. "My mournful and supreme conviction," said Lord
Rosebery, "is that this agreement is much more likely to
lead to complications than to peace." This unwelcome com-
ment was indignantly spurned from widely different stand-
points by both British parties, and general censure fell upon
its author.
Still, England and all that she stood for had left her isola-
tion, and had reappeared in Europe on the opposite side to
1 6 THE WORLD CRISIS
Germany. For the first time since 1870 Germany had to take
into consideration a Power outside her system which was in
no way amenable to threats, and was not unable if need be
to encounter her single-handed. The gesture which was to
sweep Delcasse from power in 1905, the apparition "in shining
armour " which was to quell Russia in 1908, could procure no
such compliance from the independent Island girt with her
Fleet and mistress of the seas.
Up to this moment the Triple Alliance had on the whole
been stronger than France and Russia. Although war against
these two Powers would have been a formidable undertaking
for Germany, Austria and Italy, its ultimate issue did not
seem doubtful. But if the weight of Britain were thrown into
the adverse scale and that of Italy withdrawn from the other,
then for the first time since 1870 Germany could not feel cer-
tain that she was on the stronger side. Would she submit
to it? Would the growing, bounding ambitions nad asser-
tions of the new German Empire consent to a situation in
which, very politely no doubt, very gradually perhaps, but
still very surely, the impression would be conveyed that her
will was no longer the final law of Europe ? If Germany and
her Emperor would accept the same sort of restraint that
France, Russia and England had long been accustomed to,
and would live within her rights as an equal in a freer and
easier world, all would be well. But would she ? Would she
tolerate the gathering under an independent standard of
nations outside her system, strong enough to examine her
claims only as the merits appealed to them, and to resist
aggression without fear ? The history of the next ten years
was to supply the answer.
Side by side with these slowly marshalling and steadily
arming antagonisms between the greatest Powers, processes
of degeneration were at work in weaker Empires almost
equally dangerous to peace. Forces were alive in Turkey
which threatened with destruction the old regime and its
THE VIALS OF WRATH 17
abuses on which Germany had chosen to lean. The Christian
States of the Balkans, growing stronger year by year, awaited
an opportunity to liberate their compatriots still writhing
under Turkish misrule. The growth of national sentiment in
every country created fierce strains and stresses in the uneasily
knit and crumbling Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Balkan
States saw also in this direction kinsmen to rescue, territory
to recover, and unities to achieve. Italy watched with ardent
eyes the decay of Turkey and the unrest of Austria. It was
certain that from all these regions of the South and of the
East there would come a succession of events deeply agitating
both to Russia and to Germany.
To create the unfavourable conditions for herself in which
Germany afterwards brought about the war, many acts of
supreme unwisdom on the part of her rulers were never-
thelesss .still necessary. France must be kept in a state of
continued apprehension. The Russian nation, not the Rus-
sian Court alone, must be stung by some violent affront in-
flicted in their hour of weakness. The slow, deep, restrained
antagonism of the British Empire must be roused by the con-
tinuous and repeated challenge to the sea power by which it
lived. Then and then only could those conditions be created
under which Germany by an act of aggression would bring
into being against her, a combination strong enough to resist
and ultimately to overcome her might. There was still a long
road to travel before the Vials of Wrath were full. For ten
years we were to journey anxiously along that road.
It was for a time the fashion to write as if the British Gov-
ernment during these ten years were either entirely uncon-
scious of the approaching danger or had a load of secret
matters and deep forebodings on their minds hidden al-
together from the thoughtless nation. In fact, however,
neither of these alternatives, taken separately, was true;
1 8 THE WORLD CRISIS
and there is a measure of truth in both of them taken
together.
The British Government and the Parliaments out of which
it sprang, did not believe in the approach of a great war, and
were determined to prevent it; but at the same time the sin-
ister hypothesis was continually present in their thoughts,
and was repeatedly brought to the attention of Ministers by
disquieting incidents and tendencies.
During the whole of those ten years this duality and dis-
j cordance were the keynote of British politics; and those whose
I duty it was to watch over the safety of the country lived
/ simultaneously in two different worlds of thought. There
was the actual visible world with its peaceful activities and
cosmopolitan aims; and there was a hypothetical world, a
world " beneath the threshold," as it were, a world at one mo-
ment utterly fantastic, at the next seeming about to leap into
reality — a world of monstrous shadows moving in convulsive
combinations through vistas of fathomless catastrophe.
CHAPTER II
MILESTONES TO ARMAGEDDON
1905-1910
1 Enmities which are unspoken and hidden are more to be feared
than those which are outspoken and open.'
Cicero.
A Narrower Stage — The Victorian Calm — The Chain of Strife — Lord
Salisbury Retires — Mr. Balfour and the End of an Epoch — Fall
of the Conservative Government — The General Election of 1906
— The Algeciras Conference — Anglo-French Military Conversa-
tions— Mr. Asquith's Administration — The Austrian Annexations
— The German Threat to Russia — The Admiralty Programme of
1909 — The Growth of the German Navy — German Finance and
its Implications — The Inheritance of the New German Chancellor.
TF the reader is to understand this tale and the point of
view from which it is told, he should follow the author's
mind in each principal sphere of causation. He must not only
be acquainted with the military and naval situations as they
existed at the outbreak of war, but with the events which led
up to them. He must be introduced to the Admirals and to
the Generals; he must study the organisation of the Fleets
and Armies and the outlines of their strategy by sea and
land; he must not shrink even from the design of ships and
cannon; he must extend his view to the groupings and slow-
growing antagonisms of modern States; he must contract it to
the humbler but unavoidable warfare of parties and the inter-
play of political forces and personalities.
The dramatis persona of the previous Chapter have been
great States and Empires and its theme their world-wide bal-
ance and combinations. Now the stage must for a while be
narrowed to the limits of these islands and occupied by the
19
20 THE WORLD CRISIS
political personages and factions of the time and of the hour.
In the year 1895 I had the privilege, as a young officer, of
being invited to lunch with Sir William Harcourt. In the
course of a conversation in which I took, I fear, none too mod-
est a share, I asked the question, " What will happen then ?"
"My dear Winston," replied the old Victorian statesman, " the
experiences of a long life have convinced me that nothing ever
happens." Since that moment, as it seems to me, nothing has
ever ceased happening. The growth of the great antago-
nisms abroad was accompanied by the progressive aggrava-
tion of party strife at home. The scale on which events have
shaped themselves, has dwarfed the episodes of the Victorian
era. Its small wars between great nations, its earnest dis-
putes about superficial issues, the high, keen intellectualism of
its personages, the sober, frugal, narrow limitations of their ac-
tion, belong to a vanished period. The smooth river with its
eddies and ripples along which we then sailed, seems incon-
ceivably remote from the cataract down which we have been
hurled and the rapids in whose turbulence we are now strug-
gling.
I date the beginning of these violent times in our country
from the Jameson Raid, in 1896. This was the herald, if not
indeed the progenitor, of the South African War. From the
South African War was born the Khaki Election, the Protec-
tionist Movement, the Chinese Labour cry and the conse-
quent furious reaction and Liberal triumph of 1906. From this
sprang the violent inroads of the House of Lords upon popular
Government, which by the end of 1908 had reduced the im-
mense Liberal majority to virtual impotence, from which con-
dition they were rescued by the Lloyd George Budget in 1909.
This measure became, in its turn, on both sides, the cause of
still greater provocations, and its rejection by the Lords was a
constitutional outrage and political blunder almost beyond
compare. It led directly to the two General Elections of 19 10,
to the Parliament Act, and to the Irish struggle, in which our
MILESTONES TO ARMAGEDDON 21
country was brought to the very threshold of civil war. Thus
we see a succession of partisan actions continuing without in-
termission for nearly twenty years, each injury repeated with
interest, each oscillation more violent, each risk more grave,
until at last it seemed that the sabre itself must be invoked
to cool the blood and the passions that were rife.
In July, 1902, Lord Salisbury retired. With what seems
now to have been only a brief interlude, he had been Prime
Minister and Foreign Secretary since 1885. ^n au< those sev-
enteen years the Liberal Party had never exercised any effec-
tive control upon affairs. Their brief spell in office had only
been obtained by a majority of forty Irish Nationalist votes.
During thirteen years the Conservatives had enjoyed homoge-
neous majorities of 100 to 150, and in addition there was the
House of Lords. This long reign of power had now come to
an end. The desire for change, the feeling that change was
impending, was widespread. It was the end of an epoch.
Lord Salisbury was followed by Mr. Balfour. The new
Prime Minister never had a fair chance. He succeeded
only to an exhausted inheritance. Indeed, his wisest course
would have been to get out of office as decently, as quietly,
and, above all, as quickly as possible. He could with great
propriety have declared that the 1900 Parliament had been
elected on war conditions and on a war issue; that the war
was now finished successfully; that the mandate was ex-
hausted and that he must recur to the sense of the electors
before proceeding farther with his task. No doubt the Lib-
erals would have come into power, but not by a large majority;
and they would have been faced by a strong, united Conserva-
tive Opposition, which in four or five years, about 1907, would
have resumed effective control of the State. The solid ranks
of Conservative members who acclaimed Mr. Balfour's ac-
cession as First Minister were however in no mood to be dis-
22 THE WORLD CRISIS
missed to their constituencies when the Parliament was only
two years old and had still four or five years more to run.
Mr. Balfour therefore addressed himself to the duties of Gov-
ernment with a serene indifference to the vast alienation of
public opinion and consolidation of hostile forces which were
proceeding all around him.
Mr. Chamberlain, his almost all-powerful lieutenant, was
under no illusions. He felt, with an acute political sensi-
tiveness, the ever-growing strength of the tide setting against
the ruling combination. But instead of pursuing courses
of moderation and prudence, he was impelled by the ardour
of his nature to a desperate remedy. The Government was
reproached with being reactionary. The moderate Con-
servatives and the younger Conservatives were all urging
Liberal and conciliatory processes. The Opposition was
advancing hopefully towards power, heralded by a storm
of angry outcry. He would show them, and show doubting
or weary friends as well, how it was possible to quell indigna-
tion by violence, and from the very heart of reaction to draw
the means of popular victory. He unfurled the flag of Pro-
tection.
Time, adversity and the recent Education Act had united
the Liberals; Protection, or Tariff Reform as it was called,
split the Conservatives. Ultimately, six Ministers resigned
and fifty Conservative or Unionist members definitely with-
drew their support from the Government. Among them were
a number of those younger men from whom a Party should
derive new force and driving power, and who are specially
necessary to it during a period of opposition. The action of
the Free Trade Unionists was endorsed indirectly by Lord
Salisbury himself from his retirement, and was actively sus-
tained by such pillars of the Unionist Party as Sir Michael
Hicks-Beach and the Duke of Devonshire. No such formi-
dable loss had been sustained by the Conservative Party since
the expulsion of the Peelites.
MILESTONES TO ARMAGEDDON 23
But if Mr. Balfour had not felt inclined to begin his reign
by an act of abdication, he was still less disposed to have power
wrested from his grasp. Moreover, he regarded a Party split
as the worst of domestic catastrophes, and responsibility for
it as the unforgivable sin. He therefore laboured with amaz-
ing patience and coolness to preserve a semblance of unity,
to calm the tempest, and to hold on as long as possible in the
hope of its subsiding. With the highest subtlety and ingenu-
ity he devised a succession of formulas designed to enable
people who differed profoundly, to persuade themselves they
were in agreement. When it came to the resignation of Min-
isters, he was careful to shed Free Trade and Protectionist
blood as far as possible in equal quantities. Like Henry
VIII, he decapitated Papists and burned hot Gospellers on
the same day for their respective divergencies in opposite
directions from his central, personal and artificial compro-
mise.
In this unpleasant situation Mr. Balfour maintained him-
self for two whole years. Vain the clamour for a general
election, vain the taunts of clinging to office, vain the solici-
tations of friends and the attempts of foes to force a crucial
issue. The Prime Minister remained immovable, inexhausti-
ble, imperturbable; and he remained Prime Minister. His
clear, just mind, detached from small things, stood indifferent
to the clamour about him. He pursued, as has been related,
through the critical period of the Russo-Japanese War, a pol-
icy in support of Japan of the utmost firmness. He resisted
all temptations, on the other hand, to make the sinking of
our trawlers on the Dogger Bank by the Russian Fleet an
occasion of war with Russia. He formed the Committee of
Imperial Defence — the instrument of our preparedness. He
carried through the agreement with France of 1904, the mo-
mentous significance of which the last chapter has explained.
But in 1905 political Britain cared for none of these things.
The credit of the Government fell steadily. The process of
24 THE WORLD CRISIS
degeneration in the Conservative Party was continuous.
The storm of opposition grew unceasingly, and so did the uni-
fication of all the forces opposed to the dying regime.
Late in November, 1905, Mr. Balfour tendered his resigna-
tion as Prime Minister to the King. The Government of Sir
Henry Campbell-Bannerman was formed, and proceeded in
January to appeal to the constituencies. This Government
represented both the wings into which the Liberal Party had
been divided by the Boer War. The Liberal Imperialists, so
distinguished by their talents, filled some of the greatest offices.
Mr. Asquith went to the Exchequer; Sir Edward Grey to
the Foreign Office; Mr. Haldane became Secretary of State
for War. On the other hand the Prime Minister, who him-
self represented the main stream of Liberal opinion, ap-
pointed Sir Robert Reid, Lord Chancellor and Mr. John
Morley, Secretary of State for India. Both these statesmen,
while not opposing actual war measures in South Africa, had
unceasingly condemned the war; and in Mr. Lloyd George and
Mr. John Burns, both of whom entered the Cabinet, were found
democratic politicians who had gone even farther. The dig-
nity of the Administration was enhanced by the venerable fig-
ures of Lord Ripon, Sir Henry Fowler, and the newly returned
Viceroy of India, Lord Elgin. L i ht C- ft ^
The result of the polls in January, 1906, was a Conservative-
landslide. Never since the election following the great Re-
form Bill, had anything comparable occurred in British parlia-
mentary history. In Manchester, for instance, which was one
of the principal battle-grounds, Mr. Balfour and eight Con-
servative colleagues were dismissed and replaced by nine
Liberals or Labour men. The Conservatives, after nearly
twenty years of power, crept back to the House of Commons
barely a hundred and fifty strong. The Liberals had gained
a majority of more than one hundred over all other parties
combined. Both great parties harboured deep grievances
against the other; and against the wrong of the Khaki Elec-
MILESTONES TO ARMAGEDDON 25
tion and its misuse, was set the counter-claim of an unfair
Chinese Labour cry.
*****
Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was still receiving the re-
sounding acclamations of Liberals, peace-lovers, anti-jingoes,
and anti-militarists, in every part of the country, when he
was summoned by Sir Edward Grey to attend to business
of a very different character. The Algeciras Conference was
in its throes. When the Anglo-French Agreement on Egypt
and Morocco had first been made known, the German Gov-
ernment accepted the situation without protest or complaint.
The German Chancellor, Prince Bulow, had even declared in
1904 that there was nothing in the Agreement to which Ger-
many could take exception. "What appears to be before
us is the attempt by the method of friendly understanding
to eliminate a number of points of difference which exist be-
tween England and France. We have no objection to make
against this from the standpoint of German interest." A
serious agitation most embarrassing to the German Govern-
ment was, however, set on foot by the Pan- German and
Colonial parties. Under this pressure the attitude of the
Government changed, and a year later Germany openly chal-
lenged the Agreement and looked about for an opportunity
to assert her claims in Morocco. This opportunity was not
long delayed.
Early in 1905 a French mission arrived in Fez. Their
language and actions seemed to show an intention of treating
Morocco as a French Protectorate, thereby ignoring the in-
ternational obligations of the Treaty of Madrid. The Sul-
tan of Morocco appealed to Germany, asking if France was
authorised to speak in the name of Europe. Germany was
now enabled to advance as the champion of an international
agreement, which she suggested France was violating. Be-
hind this lay the clear intention to show France that she
could not afford in consequence of her agreement with Britain,
26 THE WORLD CRISIS
to offend Germany. The action taken was of the most drastic
character. The German Emperor was persuaded to go to
Tangiers, and there, against his better judgment, on March
31, 1905, he delivered, in very uncompromising language chosen
by his ministers, an open challenge to France. To this speech
the widest circulation was given by the German Foreign Of-
fice. Hotfoot upon it (April 11 and 12) two very threatening
despatches were sent to Paris and London, demanding a con-
ference of all the Signatory Powers to the Treaty of Madrid.
Every means was used by Germany to make France under-
stand that if she refused the conference there would be war;
and to make assurance doubly sure a special envoy1 was sent
from Berlin to Paris for that express purpose.
France was quite unprepared for war; the army was in a
bad state; Russia was incapacitated; moreover, France had
not a good case. The French Foreign Minister, Monsieur
Delcasse, was, however, unwilling to give way. The German
attitude became still more threatening; and on June 6 the
French Cabinet of Monsieur Rouvier unanimously, almost at
the cannon's mouth, accepted the principle of a conference,
and Monsieur Delcasse at once resigned.
So far Germany had been very successful. Under a di-
rect ^threat of war she had compelled France to bow to
her will, and to sacrifice the Minister who had negotiated
the Agreement with Great Britain. The Rouvier Cabinet
sought earnestly for some friendly solution which, while
sparing France the humiliation of a conference dictated in
such circumstances, would secure substantial concessions to
Germany. The German Government were, however, deter-
mined to exploit their victory to the full, and not to make
the situation easier for France either before or during the con-
ference. The conference accordingly assembled at Algeciras
in January, 1906.
Great Britain now appeared on the scene, apparently quite
1 Prince Henckel von Donnesmarck.
*1
MILESTONES TO ARMAGEDDON 27
unchanged and unperturbed by her domestic convulsions.
She had in no way encouraged France to refuse the confer-
ence. But if a war was to be fastened on France by Ger-
many as the direct result of an agreement made recently in
the full light of day between France and Great Britain, it was
held that Great Britain could not remain indifferent. Sir
Henry Campbell-Bannerman therefore authorised Sir Edward
Grey to support France strongly at Algeciras. He also au-
thorised, almost as the first act of what was to be an era of ,
Peace, Retrenchment, and Reform, the beginning of military
conversations between the British and French General Staffs
with a view to concerted action in the event of war. This
was a step of profound significance and of far-reaching re-
actions. Henceforward the relations of the two Staffs be-
came increasingly intimate and confidential. The minds of
our military men were definitely turned into a particular
channel. Mutual trust grew continually in one set of military
relationships, mutual precautions in the other. However
explicitly the two Governments might agree and affirm to
each other that no national or political engagement was in-
volved in these technical discussions, the fact remained that
they constituted an exceedingly potent tie.
The attitude of Great Britain at Algeciras turned the scale
against Germany. Russia, Spain and other signatory Powers
associated themselves with France and England. Austria
revealed to Germany the limits beyond which she would not
go. Thus Germany found herself isolated, and what she
had gained by her threats of war evaporated at the Council
Board. In the end a compromise suggested by Austria, en-
abled Germany to withdraw without open loss of dignity.
From these events, however, serious consequences flowed.
Both the two systems into which Europe was divided, were
crystallised and consolidated. Germany felt the need of
binding Austria more closely to her. Her open attempt to
terrorise France had produced a deep impression upon French
28 THE WORLD CRISIS
public opinion. An immediate and thorough reform of the
French Army was carried out, and the Entente with England
was strengthened and confirmed. Algeciras was a milestone
on the road to Armageddon.
The illness and death of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman at
the beginning of 1908 opened the way for Mr. Asquith. The
Chancellor of the Exchequer had been the First Lieutenant of
the late Prime Minister, and, as his chief's strength failed,
had more and more assumed the burden. He had charged
himself with the conduct of the new Licensing Bill which was
to be the staple of the Session of 1908, and in virtue of this
task he could command the allegiance of an extreme and doc-
trinaire section of his Party from whom his Imperialism had
previously alienated him. He resolved to ally to himself the
democratic gifts and rising reputation of Mr. Lloyd George.
Thus the succession passed smoothly from hand to hand. Mr.
Asquith became Prime Minister; Mr. Lloyd George became
Chancellor of the Exchequer and the second man in the Gov-
ernment. The new Cabinet, like the old, was a veiled coali-
tion. A very distinct line of cleavage was maintained between
the Radical-Pacifist elements who had followed Sir Henry
Campbell-Bannerman and constituted the bulk both of the
Cabinet and the Party on the one hand, and the Liberal
Imperialist wing on the other. Mr. Asquith, as Prime Min-
ister, had now to take an impartial position; but his heart
and sympathies were always with Sir Edward Grey, the
War Office and the Admiralty, and on every important oc-
casion when he was forced to reveal himself, he definitely
sided with them. He was not, however, able to give Sir Ed-
ward Grey the same effectual countenance, much as he might
wish to do so, that Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman had
done. The old chief's word was law to the extremists of
his Party. They would accept almost anything from him.
MILESTONES TO ARMAGEDDON 29
They were quite sure he would do nothing more in matters
of foreign policy and defence than was absolutely necessary,
and that he would do it in the manner least calculated to
give satisfaction to jingo sentiments. Mr. Asquith, however,
had been far from "sound" about the Boer War, and was the
lifelong friend of the Foreign Secretary, who had wandered
even further from the straight path into patriotic pastures.
He was therefore in a certain sense suspect, and every step
he took in external affairs was watched with prim vigilance
by the Elders. If the military conversations with France
had not been authorised by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman,
and if his political virtue could not be cited in their justifica-
tion, I doubt whether they could have been begun or con-
tinued by Mr. Asquith.
Since I had crossed the Floor of the House in 1904 on the
Free Trade issue, I had worked in close political association
with Mr. Lloyd George. He was the first to welcome me.
We sat and acted together in the period of opposition preced-
ing Mr. Balfour's fall, and we had been in close accord
during Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's administration, in
which I had served as Under-Secretary of State for the Col-
onies. This association continued when I entered the new /
Cabinet as President of the Board of Trade, and in general,^/
though from different angles, we leaned to the side of those
who would restrain the froward both in foreign policy and in
armaments. It must be understood that these differences of
attitude and complexion, which in varying forms reproduce
themselves in every great and powerful British Administration,
in no way prevented harmonious and agreeable relations be-
tween the principal personages, and our affairs proceeded amid
many amenities in an atmosphere of courtesy, friendliness
and goodwill.
*****
It was not long before the next European crisis arrived.
On October 5, 1908, Austria, without warning or parley,
30 THE WORLD CRISIS
proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
These provinces of the Turkish Empire had been admin-
istered by her under the Treaty of Berlin, 1878; and the an-
nexation only declared in form what already existed in fact.
The Young Turk Revolution which had occurred in the
summer, seemed to Austria likely to lead to a reassertion of
Turkish sovereignty over Bosnia and Herzegovina, and this
she was concerned to forestall. A reasonable and patient
diplomacy would probably have secured for Austria the ease-
ments which she needed. Indeed, negotiations with Russia,
the Great Power most interested, had made favourable prog-
ress. But suddenly and abruptly Count Aerenthal, the Aus-
trian Foreign Minister, interrupted the discussions by the
announcement of the annexation, before the arrangements
for a suitable concession to Russia had been concluded. By
this essentially violent act a public affront was put upon
Russia, and a personal slight upon the Russian negotiator,
Monsieur Isvolsky.
A storm of anger and protest arose on all sides. England,
basing herself on the words of the London Conference in
187 1, "That it is an essential principle of the law of nations
that no Power can free itself from the engagements of a
Treaty, nor modify its stipulations except by consent of the
contracting parties," refused to recognise either the annexa-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the declaration of Bul-
garian independence which had synchronised with it. Turkey
protested loudly against a lawless act. An effective boycott
of Austrian merchandise was organised by the Turkish Gov-
ernment. The Serbians mobilised their army. But it was
the effect on Russia which was most serious. The bitter
animosity excited against Austria throughout Russia became
a penultimate cause of the Great War. In this national quar-
rel the personal differences of Aerenthal and Isvolsky played
also their part.
Great Britain and Russia now demanded a conference,
MILESTONES TO ARMAGEDDON 31
declining meanwhile to countenance what had been done.
Austria, supported by Germany, refused. The danger of
some violent action on the part of Serbia became acute. Sir
Edward jfrrpy^ q.ftpr making if- clear that Great Britain would
~hot be drawn into a war on a Balkan quarrel, laboured to re-
"stfain Serbia, to pacify Turkey, and to give full diplomatic
support to Russia. The controversy dragged on till April,
1909, when it was ended in the following remarkable manner.
The Austrians had determined, unless Serbia recognised the
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to send an ultimatum
and to declare war upon her. At this point the German
Chancellor, Prince von Biilow, intervened. Russia, he in-
sisted, should herself advise Serbia to give way. The Powers
should officially recognise the annexation without a confer-
ence being summoned and without any kind of compensation
to Serbia. Russia was to give her consent to this action, with-
out previously informing the British or French Governments.
If Russia did not consent, Austria would declare war on
Serbia with the full and complete support of Germany. Russia,
thus nakedly confronted by war both with Austria and Ger-
many, collapsed under the threat, as France had done three
years before. England was left an isolated defender of the
sanctity of Treaties and the law of nations. The Teutonic
triumph was complete. But it was a victory gained at a
perilous cost. France, after her treatment in 1905, had begun
a thorough military reorganisation. Now Russia, in 19 10,
made an enormous increase in her already vast army; and
both Russia and France, smarting under similar experiences,
closed their ranks, cemented their alliance, and set to work
to construct with Russian labour and French money the new
strategic railway systems of which Russia's western frontier
stood in need.
*****
It was next the turn of Great Britain to feel the pressure
of the German power.
32 THE WORLD CRISIS
In the spring of 1909, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr.
McKenna, suddenly demanded the construction of no less
than six Dreadnought battleships. He based this claim on
the rapid growth of the German Fleet and its expansion and
acceleration under the new naval law of 1908, which was
causing the Admiralty the greatest anxiety. I was still a
sceptic about the danger of the European situation, and not
convinced by the Admiralty case. In conjunction with the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, I proceeded at once to canvas
this scheme and to examine the reasons by which it was sup-
ported. The conclusions which we both reached were that a
programme of four ships would sufficiently meet our needs.
In this process I was led to analyse minutely the character
and composition of the British and German Navies, actual
and prospective. I could not agree with the Admiralty con-
tention that a dangerous situation would be reached in the
year 191 2. I found the Admiralty figures on this subject
were exaggerated. I did not believe that the Germans were
building Dreadnoughts secretly in excess of their published
Fleet Laws. I held that our margin in pre-Dreadnought ships
would, added to a new programme of four Dreadnoughts, as-
sure us an adequate superiority in 191 2, "the danger year"
as it was then called. In any case, as the Admiralty only
claimed to lay down the fifth and sixth ships in the last month
of the financial year, i. e., March, 19 10, these could not af-
fect the calculations. The Chancellor of the Exchequer and
I therefore proposed that four ships should be sanctioned for
1909, and that the additional two should be considered in
relation to the programme of 19 10.
Looking back on the voluminous papers of this controversy
in the light of what actually happened, there can be no doubt
whatever that, so far as facts and figures were concerned, we
were strictly right. The gloomy Admiralty anticipations were
in no respect fulfilled in the year 191 2. The British margin
was found to be ample in that year. There were no secret
MILESTONES TO ARMAGEDDON 33
German Dreadnoughts, nor had Admiral von Tirpitz made
any untrue statement in respect of major construction.
The dispute in the Cabinet gave rise to a fierce agitation
outside. The process of the controversy led to a sharp rise of
temperature. The actual points in dispute never came to an
issue. Genuine alarm was excited throughout the country
by what was for the first time widely recognised as a German
menace. In the end a curious and characteristic solution was
reached. The Admiralty had demanded six ships: the econ-
omists offered four: and we finally compromised on eight.
However, five out of the eight were not ready before "the
danger year" of rg)i2 had passed peacefully away.
But although the Chancellor of the Exchequer and I were
right in the narrow sense, we were absolutely wrong in rela-
tion to the deep tides of destiny. The greatest credit is due
to the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. McKenna, for the
resolute and courageous manner in which he fought his case
and withstood his Party on this occasion. Little did I think,
as this dispute proceeded, that when the next Cabinet crisis
about the Navy arose our roles would be reversed; and little
did he think that the ships for which he contended so stoutly
would eventually, when they arrived, be welcomed with open
arms by me.
Whatever differences might be entertained about the exact
number of ships required in a particular year, the British
nation in general became conscious of the undoubted fact
that Germany proposed to reinforce her unequalled army by
a navy which in 1920 would be far stronger than anything up
to the present possessed by Great Britain. To the Navy
Law of 1900 had succeeded the amending measure of 1906;
and upon the increases of 1906 had followed those of 1908.
In a flamboyant speech at Reval in 1904 the German Emperor
had already styled himself, "The Admiral of the Atlantic."
All sorts of sober-minded people in England began to be pro-
foundly disquieted. What did Germany want this great
y
34 THE WORLD CRISIS
navy for? Against whom, except us, could she measure it,
match it, or use it ? There was a deep and growing feeling,
no longer confined to political and diplomatic circles, that
the Prussians meant mischief, that they envied the splendour
of the British Empire, and that if they saw a good chance at
our expense, they would take full advantage of it. Moreover
it began to be realised that it was no use trying to turn Ger-
many from her course by abstaining from counter measures.
Reluctance on our part to build ships was attributed in Ger-
many to want of national spirit, and as another proof that
the virile race should advance to replace the effete over-
civilised and pacifist society which was no longer capable of
sustaining its great place in the world's affairs. No one
could run his eyes down the series of figures of British and
German construction for the first three years of the Liberal
Administration, without feeling in presence of a dangerous,
if not a malignant, design.
In 1905 Britain built 4 ships, and Germany 2.
In 1906 Britain decreased her programme to 3 ships, and
Germany increased her programme to 3 ships.
In 1907 Britain further decreased her programme to 2 ships,
and Germany further increased her programme to 4 ships.
These figures are monumental.
It was impossible to resist the conclusion, gradually forced
on nearly every one, that if the British Navy lagged behind,
the gap would be very speedily filled.
As President of the Board of Trade I was able to obtain a
general view of the structure of German finance. In 1909 a
most careful report was prepared by my direction on the
whole of this subject. Its study was not reassuring. I cir-
culated it to the Cabinet with the following covering min-
ute:—
MILESTONES TO ARMAGEDDON 35
November 3, 1909.
BELIEVING that there are practically no checks upon
German naval expansion except those imposed by the in-
creasing difficulties of getting money, I have had the enclosed
report prepared with a view to showing how far those limita-
tions are becoming effective. It is clear that they are becom-
ing terribly effective. The overflowing expenditure of the
German Empire strains and threatens every dyke by which
the social and political unity of Germany is maintained.
The high customs duties have been largely rendered inelastic
through commercial treaties, and cannot meet the demand.
The heavy duties upon food-stuffs, from which the main pro-
portion of the customs revenue is raised, have produced a
deep cleavage between the agrarians and the industrials, and
the latter deem themselves quite uncompensated for the high
price of food-stuffs by the most elaborate devices of protec-
tion for manufactures. The splendid possession of the State
railways is under pressure being continually degraded to a
mere instrument of taxation. The field of direct taxation is
already largely occupied by State and local systems. The
prospective inroad by the universal suffrage Parliament of
the Empire upon this depleted field unites the propertied
classes, whether Imperialists or State-right men, in a com-
mon apprehension, with which the governing authorities are
not unsympathetic. On the other hand, the new or increased
taxation on every form of popular indulgence powerfully
strengthens the parties of the Left, who are themselves the
opponents of expenditure on armaments and much else be-
sides.
Meanwhile the German Imperial debt has more than dou-
bled in the last thirteen years of unbroken peace, has risen
since the foundation of the Empire to about £220,000,000,
has increased in the last ten years by £105,000,000, and
practically no attempt to reduce it has been made between
1880 and the present year. The effect of recurrent borrow-
ings to meet ordinary annual expenditure has checked the
beneficial process of foreign investment, and dissipated the
illusion, cherished during the South African War, that Berlin
might supplant London as the lending centre of the world.
The credit of the German Empire has fallen to the level of
that of Italy. It is unlikely that the new taxes which have
36 THE WORLD CRISIS
been imposed with so much difficulty this year will meet the
annual deficit.
These circumstances force the conclusion that a period of
severe internal strain approaches in Germany. Will the ten-
sion be relieved by moderation or snapped by calculated vio-
lence? Will the policy of the German Government be to
soothe the internal situation, or to find an escape from it in
external adventure ? There can be no doubt that both courses
are open. Low as the credit of Germany has fallen, her bor-
rowing powers are practically unlimited. But one of the two
courses must be taken soon, and from that point of view it is
of the greatest importance to gauge the spirit of the new
administration from the outset. If it be pacific, it must soon
become markedly pacific, and conversely. w 9 r
This is, I think, the first sinister impression that I was ever
led to record.
* * • * * *
We have now seen how within the space of five years
Germany's policy and the growth of her armaments led her
to arouse and alarm most profoundly three of the greatest
Powers in the world. Two of them, France and Russia, had
been forced to bow to the German will by the plain threat
of war. Each had been quelled by the open intention of a
neighbour to use force against them to the utmost limit with-
out compunction. Both felt they had escaped a bloody or-
deal and probable disaster only by submission. The sense of
past humiliation was aggravated by the fear of future af-
fronts. The third Power — unorganised for war, but inac-
cessible and not to be neglected in the world's affairs — Britain,
had also been made to feel that hands were being laid upon
the very foundation of her existence. Swiftly, surely, me-
thodically, a German Navy was coming into being at our
doors which must expose us to dangers only to be warded off
by strenuous exertions, and by a vigilance almost as tense as
that of actual war. As France and Russia increased their
armies, so Britain under the same pressure increased her
MILESTONES TO ARMAGEDDON 37
fleet. Henceforward the three disquieted nations will act
more closely together and will not be taken by their adver-
sary one by one. Henceforward their military arrangements
will be gradually concerted. Henceforward they will con-
sciously be facing a common danger.
Ah ! foolish-diligent Germans, working so hard, thinking
so deeply, marching and counter-marching on the parade
grounds of the Fatherland, poring over long calculations,
fuming in new found prosperity, discontented amid the splen-
dour of mundane success, how many bulwarks to your peace
and glory did you not, with your own hands, successively tear
down !
"In the year 1909," writes von Bethmann-Hollweg, then
the successor of Prince von Biilow, "the situation was based
on the fact that England had firmly taken its stand on the
side of France and Russia in pursuit of its traditional policy
of opposing whatever Continental Power for the time being
was the strongest; and that Germany held fast to its naval
programme, had given a definite direction to its Eastern
policy, and had moreover to guard against a French antag-
onism that had in no wise been mitigated by its policy in
later years. And if Germany saw a formidable aggravation
of all the aggressive tendencies of Franco-Russian policy in
England's pronounced friendship with this Dual Alliance,
England on its side had grown to see a menace in the strength-
ening of the German Fleet and a violation of its ancient rights
in our Eastern policy. Words had already passed on both
sides. The atmosphere was chilly and clouded with distrust."
Such, in his own words, was the inheritance of the new Ger-
man Chancellor.
He was now to make his own contribution to the anxieties
of the world.
CHAPTER III
THE CRISIS OF AGADIR
1911
On the idle hill of summer,
Sleepy with the sound of streams,
Far I hear the steady drummer
Drumming like a noise in dreams.
Far and near and low and louder,
On the roads of earth go by,
Dear to friends and food for powder,
Soldiers marching, all to die.
The Shropshire Lad, XXXV.
Agadir — The Panther — The Alarm Bells of Europe — Sir Edward
Grey's Warning — The Period of Silence — Situation in the Cabinet
— Decision of the Chancellor of the Exchequer — His Mansion
House Speech — The German Rejoinder — Naval Precautions —
Effect of the Mansion House Speech on German Policy — British
Apprehensions of Attack — The Naval Magazines — Vulnerable
Points — The Military Situation — Sir Henry Wilson — A Talk
with the German Ambassador — Count Metternich — The Old
Diplomacy — Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence,
August 23 — Sir Henry Wilson's Forecast — Admiralty Views —
Divergences Between the Generals and Admirals — My Memo-
randum of August 13 — The Twentieth Day — The Fortieth Day
— Plans for Army Expansion — Continued Anxiety — My Letter
to Sir Edward Grey, August 30 — End of the Crisis — Conse-
quences in Germany — The Prime Minister Invites Me to Go to
the Admiralty — The Ninth Chapter of Deuteronomy.
TN the spring of 191 1 a French expedition occupied Fez.
■*• This action, added to the growing discontent in Ger-
many over the Moroccan question, tempted the German
Government at the beginning of July to an abrupt act. The
Brothers Mannesmann, a German firm at that time very
active in European financial circles, claimed that they had
38
THE CRISIS OF AGADIR 39
large interests in a harbour on the Atlantic seaboard of the
Moroccan Coast and in the hinterland behind it. This har-
bour bore the name of Agadir. Herr von Kiderlen-Wachter,
the German Foreign Minister, raised this point with the
French. The French Government fully realised that the ad-
vantages they were gaining in Morocco, justified Germany in
seeking certain colonial compensations in the Congo area.
The German press on the other hand was indignant at ex-
changing German interests in the moderate climate of Mo-
rocco for unhealthy tropical regions of which they had already
more than enough. The questions involved were complicated
and intrinsically extremely unimportant. The French pre-
pared themselves for a prolonged negotiation. So far as the
harbour and hinterland of Agadir were concerned, there
seemed to be no difficulty. They denied altogether the exist-
ence of any German interests there. They said there was only
a sandy bay untouched by the hand of man; there was no
German property on the shore, not a trading establishment,
not a house; there were no German interests in the interior.
But these facts could easily be ascertained by a visit of ac-
credited representatives of both countries. Such a visit to
ascertain the facts they professed themselves quite ready to
arrange. They also courted a discussion of the frontier of the
Congo territories.
Suddenly and unexpectedly, on the morning of July 1, with-
out more ado, it was announced that His Imperial Majesty
the German Emperor had sent his gunboat the Panther to
Agadir to maintain and protect German interests. This small
ship was already on its way. All the alarm bells throughout
Europe began immediately to quiver. France found herself
in the presence of an act which could not be explained, the
purpose behind which could not be measured. Great Britain,
having consulted the atlas, began to wonder what bearing
a German naval base on the Atlantic coast of Africa would
have upon her maritime security, "observing/' as the sailors
40 THE WORLD CRISIS
say when they have to write official letters to each other,
that such a fact must be taken in conjunction with Ger-
man activities at Madeira and in the Canaries and with the
food routes and trade routes from South America and South
Africa which converged and passed through these waters.
Europe was uneasy. France was genuinely alarmed. When
Count Metternich apprised Sir Edward Grey of the German
action, he was informed that the situation was so important
that it must be considered by the Cabinet. On July 5th, after
the Cabinet, he was told that the British Government could
not disinterest themselves in Morocco, and that until Ger-
many's intentions were made known their attitude must re-
main one of reserve. From that date until July 21 not one
word was spoken by the German Government. There is no
doubt that the decided posture of Great Britain was a great
surprise to the German Foreign Office. There ensued between
the Governments what was called at the time "the period
of silence." Meanwhile the French and German newspapers
carried on a lively controversy, and the British press wore a
very sombre air.
It was difficult to divine from the long strings of telegrams
which day after day flowed in from all the European Chan-
celleries, what was the real purpose behind the German
action. I followed attentively the repeated discussions on
the subject in the British Cabinet. Was Germany looking
for a pretext of war with France, or was she merely trying by
pressure and uncertainty to improve her colonial position ?
In the latter case the dispute would no doubt be adjusted after
a period of tension, as so many had been before. The great
Powers marshalled on either side, preceded and protected by
an elaborate cushion of diplomatic courtesies and formalities,
would display to each other their respective arrays. In the
forefront would be the two principal disputants, Germany and
France, and echeloned back on either side at varying distances
and under veils of reserves and qualifications of different
THE CRISIS OF AGADIR 41
density, would be drawn up the other parties to the Triple Al-
liance and to what was already now beginning to be called the
Triple Entente. At the proper moment these seconds or sup-
porters would utter certain cryptic words indicative of their
state of mind, as a consequence of which France or Germany
would step back or forward a very small distance or perhaps
move slightly to the right or to the left. When these delicate
rectifications in the great balance of Europe, and indeed of
the world, had been made, the formidable assembly would
withdraw to their own apartments with ceremony and saluta-
tions and congratulate or condole with each other in whispers
on the result. We had seen it several times before.
But even this process was not free from danger. One must
think of the intercourse of the nations in those days not as if
they were chessmen on the board, or puppets dressed in finery
and frillings grimacing at each other in a quadrille, but as pro-
digious organisations of forces active or latent which, like
planetary bodies, could not approach each other in space with-
out giving rise to profound magnetic reactions. If they got
too near, the lightnings would begin to flash, and beyond a
certain point they might be attracted altogether from the or-
bits in which they were restrained and draw each other into
dire collision. The task of diplomacy was to prevent such dis-
asters; and as long as there was no conscious or subconscious
purpose of war in the mind of any Power or race, diplomacy
would probably succeed. But in such grave and delicate con-
junctions one violent move by any party would rupture and de-
range the restraints upon all, and plunge Cosmos into Chaos.
I thought myself that the Germans had a certain grievance
about the original Anglo-French agreement. We had re-
ceived many conveniences in Egypt. France had gained great
advantages in Morocco. If Germany felt her relative posi-
tion prejudiced by these arrangements, there was no reason
why patiently and amicably she should not advance and press
her own point of view. And it seemed to me that Britain,
42 THE WORLD CRISIS
the most withdrawn, the least committed of the Great Powers,
might exercise a mitigating and a modifying influence and pro-
cure an accommodation; and that of course was what we tried
to do. But if Germany's intention were malignant, no such
process would be of the slightest use. In that event a very
decided word would have to be spoken, and spoken before it
was too late. Nor would our withdrawing altogether from the
scene have helped matters. Had we done so all our restrain-
ing influence would have vanished, and an intenser aggrava-
tion of the antagonistic forces must have occurred. There-
fore I read all the papers and telegrams which began to pass
with a suspicion, and I could see beneath the calm of Sir
Edward Grey a growing and at some moments a grave anxiety.
The sultry obscurity of the European situation was compli-
cated by the uncertain play of forces within our own council
chamber. There again in miniature were reproduced the bal-
ances and reserves of the external diplomatic situation. The
Ministers who were conducting the foreign policy of Britain,
with the ponderous trident of sea power towering up behind
them, were drawn entirely from the Liberal Imperialist sec-
tion of the Government. They were narrowly watched and
kept in equipoise by the Radical element, which included the
venerable figures of Lord Morley and Lord Loreburn, on whose
side the Chancellor of the Exchequer and I had usually leaned.
It was clear that this equipoise might easily make it impossible
for Great Britain to speak with a decided voice either on one
side or the other if certain dangerous conditions supervened.
We should not, therefore, either keep clear ourselves by with-
drawing from the danger nor be able by resolute action to
ward it off in time. In these circumstances the attitude of the
Chancellor of the Exchequer became of peculiar importance.
For some weeks he offered no indication of what his line
would be, and in our numerous conversations he gave me the
impression of being sometimes on one side and sometimes on
the other. But on the morning of July 21, when I visited him
THE CRISIS OF AGADIR 43
before the Cabinet, I found a different man. His mind was
made up. He saw quite clearly the course to take. He knew
what to do and how and when to do it. The tenor of his state-
ment to me was that we were drifting into war. He dwelt on
the oppressive silence of Germany so far as we were concerned.
He pointed out that Germany was acting as if England did
not count in the matter in any way; that she had completely
ignored our strong representation; that she was proceeding to
put the most severe pressure on France; that a catastrophe
might ensue; and that if it was to be averted we must speak
with great decision, and we must speak at once. He told me
that he was to address the Bankers at their Annual Dinner
that evening, and that he intended to make it clear that if
Germany meant war, she would find Britain against her. He
showed me what he had prepared, and told me that he would
show it to the Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey after the
Cabinet. What would they say ? I said that of course they
would be very much relieved; and so they were, and so was I.
The accession of Mr. Lloyd George in foreign policy to the
opposite wing of the Government was decisive. We were able
immediately to pursue a firm and coherent policy. That
night at the Bankers' Association the Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer used the following words: —
I believe it is essential in the highest interests not merely cf
this country, but of the world, that Britain should at all haz-
ards maintain her place and her prestige amongst the Great
Powers of the world. Her potent influence has many a time
been in the past, and may yet be in the future, invaluable to
the cause of human liberty. It has more than once in the past
redeemed continental nations, who are sometimes too apt to
forget that service, from overwhelming disaster and even from
national extinction. I would make great sacrifices to preserve
peace. I conceive that nothing would justify a disturbance of
international goodwill except questions of the gravest national
moment. But if a situation were to be forced upon us in
which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the
44 THE WORLD CRISIS
great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of
heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated
where her interests were vitally affected as if she were of no
account in the Cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that
peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a
great country like ours to endure.
His City audience, whose minds were obsessed with the
iniquities of the Lloyd George Budget and the fearful hard-
ships it had inflicted upon property and wealth — little did
they dream of the future — did not comprehend in any way the
significance or the importance of what they heard. They took
it as if it had been one of the ordinary platitudes of ministerial
pronouncements upon foreign affairs. But the Chancelleries
of Europe bounded together.
Four days later, at about 5.30 in the afternoon, the Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer and I were walking by the fountains
of Buckingham Palace. Hot-foot on our track came a mes-
senger. Will the Chancellor of the Exchequer go at once to
Sir Edward Grey ? Mr. Lloyd George stopped abruptly and
turning to me said, "That's my speech. The Germans may
demand my resignation as they did Delcasse's." I said,
"That will make you the most popular man in England" (he
was not actually the most popular at that time) . We returned
as fast as we could and found Sir Edward Grey in his room at
the House of Commons. His first words were: "I have just
received a communication from the German Ambassador so
stiff that the Fleet might be attacked at any moment. I have
sent for McKenna to warn him !" He then told us briefly of
the conversation he had just had with Count Metternich. The
Ambassador had said that after the speech of the Chancellor
of the Exchequer no explanation could be made by Germany.
In acrid terms he had stated that if France should repel the
hand offered her by the Emperor's Government, the dignity
of Germany would compel her to secure by all means full re-
spect by France for German treaty rights. He had then read
THE CRISIS OF AGADIR 45
a long complaint about Mr. Lloyd George's speech " which to
say the least could have been interpreted as a warning to Ger-
many's address and which as a matter of fact had been inter-
preted by the presses of Great Britain and France as a warning
bordering on menace." Sir Edward Grey had thought it
right to reply that the tone of the communication which had
just been read to him, rendered it inconsistent with the dignity
of His Majesty's Government to give explanations with regard
to the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The First
Lord arrived while we were talking, and a few minutes later
hurried off to send the warning orders. —
They sound so very cautious and correct, these deadly
words. Soft, quiet voices purring, courteous, grave, exactly-
measured phrases in large peaceful rooms. But with less
L warning cannons had opened fire and nations had been struck^
down by this same Germany. So now the Admiralty wireless
whispers through the ether to the tall masts of ships, and cap-
tains pace their decks absorbed in thought. It is nothing. It
is less than nothing. It is too foolish, too fantastic to be
thought of in the twentieth century. Or is it fire and murder
leaping out of the darkness at our throats, torpedoes ripping
the bellies of half-awakened ships, a sunrise on a vanished
naval supremacy, and an island well guarded hitherto, at last
defenceless ? No, it is nothing. No one would do such things.
Civilisation has climbed above such perils. The interdepen-
dence of nations in trade and traffic, the sense of public law, the
Hague Convention, Liberal principles, the Labour Party, high
finance, Christian charity, common sense have rendered such
nightmares impossible. Are you quite sure ? It would be a
pity to be wrong. Such a mistake could only be made once —
once for all.
The Mansion House speech was a surprise to all countries:
it was a thunder-clap to the German Government. All their
information had led them to believe that Mr. Lloyd George
would head the peace party and that British action would be
46 THE WORLD CRISIS
neutralised. Jumping from one extreme to another, they
now assumed that the British Cabinet was absolutely united,
and that the Chancellor of the Exchequer of all others had
been deliberately selected as the most Radical Minister by
the British Government to make this pronouncement.1 They
could not understand how their representatives and agents in
Great Britain could have been so profoundly misled. Their
vexation proved fatal to Count Metternich, and at the first
convenient opportunity he was recalled. Here was an Ambas-
sador who, after ten years' residence in London, could not even
forecast the action of one of the most powerful Ministers on a
question of this character. It will be seen from what has been
written that this view was hard on Count Metternich. How
could he know what Mr. Lloyd George was going to do ? Un-
til a few hours before, his colleagues did not know. Working
with him in close association, I did not know. No one knew.
Until his mind was definitely made up, he did not know him-
self.
It seems probable now that the Germans did not mean war
on this occasion. But they meant to test the ground; and in
so doing they were prepared to go to the very edge of the
precipice. It is so easy to lose one's balance there: a touch,
a gust of wind, a momentary dizziness, and all is precipitated
into the abyss. But whether in the heart of the German State
there was or was not a war purpose before England's part
had been publicly declared, there was no such intention after-
wards.
After the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and its
1 Von Tirpitz's account is quite direct. "At his [von Kiderlen-
Wachter's] suggestion the Chancellor dispatched the gunboat Pan-
ther to the Moroccan port Agadir on July i, ion, and left the British
Government, when it asked the reason, completely in the dark and
without a reply for many weeks. The result was that on July 21 Lloyd
George delivered a speech which had been drawn up in the British
Cabinet, in which he warned Germany that she would End British
power on the side of France in the event of a challenge."
THE CRISIS OF AGADIR 47
sequel the German Government could not doubt that Great
Britain would be against them if a war was forced upon France
at this juncture. They did not immediately recede from their
position, but they were most careful to avoid any fresh act
of provocation; and all their further conduct of the negotia-
tions with France tended to open in one direction or another
paths of accommodation and of retreat. It remained ex-
tremely difficult for us to gauge the exact significance of the
various points at issue, and throughout the months of July,
August and September the situation continued obscure and
oppressive. The slight yet decisive change which came over
the character of German diplomacy, was scarcely perceptible,
and at the same time certain precautionary military measures
which were taken behind the German frontiers, so far as they
were known to us, had the effect of greatly increasing our
anxiety. In consequence the atmosphere in England became
constantly more heavily charged with electricity as one hot
summer's day succeeded another.
Hitherto as Home Secretary I had not had any special part
to play in this affair, though I had followed it with the utmost
attention as a Member of the Cabinet. I was now to receive
a rude shock. On the afternoon of July 27 th, I attended a
garden party at 10 Downing Street. There I met the Chief
Commissioner of Police, Sir Edward Henry. We talked about
the European situation, and I told him that it was serious. He
then remarked that by an odd arrangement the Home Office
was responsible, through the Metropolitan Police, for guard-
ing the magazines at Chattenden and Lodge Hill in which all
the reserves of naval cordite were stored. For many years
these magazines had been protected without misadventure by
a few constables. I asked what would happen if twenty deter-
mined Germans in two or three motor cars arrived well armed
upon the scene one night. He said they would be able to do
what they liked. I quitted the garden party.
A few minutes later I was telephoning from my room in the
48 THE WORLD CRISIS
Home Office to the Admiralty. Who was in charge ? The
First Lord was with the Fleet at Cromarty; the First Sea
Lord was inspecting. Both were, of course, quickly accessible
by wireless or wire. In the meantime an Admiral (he shall
be nameless) was in control. I demanded Marines at once to
guard these magazines, vital to the Royal Navy. I knew there
were plenty of marines in the depots at Chatham and Ports-
mouth. The admiral replied over the telephone that the
Admiralty had no responsibility and had no intention of as-
suming any; and it was clear from his manner that he resented
the intrusion of an alarmist civilian Minister. "You refuse
then to send the Marines ? " After some hesitation he replied,
"I refuse." I replaced the receiver and rang up the War
Office. Mr. Haldane was there. I told him that I was rein-
forcing and arming the police that night, and asked for a
company of infantry for each magazine in addition. In a
few minutes the orders were given: in a few hours the troops
had moved. By the next day the cordite reserves of the navy
were safe.
The incident was a small one, and perhaps my fears were
unfounded. But once one had begun to view the situation in
this light, it became impossible to think of anything else. All
around flowed the busy life of peaceful, unsuspecting, easy-
going Britain. The streets were thronged with men and wo-
men utterly devoid of any sense of danger from abroad. For
nearly a thousand years no foreign army had landed on British
soil. For a hundred years the safety of the homeland had
never been threatened. They went about their business, their
sport, their class and party fights year after year, generation
after generation, in perfect confidence and considerable igno-
rance. All their ideas were derived from conditions of peace.
All their arrangements were the result of long peace. Most of
them would have been incredulous, many would have been
very angry if they had been told that we might be near a
tremendous war, and that perhaps within this City of London,
THE CRISIS OF AGADIR 49
which harboured confidingly visitors from every land, resolute
foreigners might be aiming a deadly blow at the strength of
the one great weapon and shield in which we trusted.
I began to make inquiries about vulnerable points. I found
the far-seeing Captain Hankey, then Assistant Secretary to the
Committee of Imperial Defence, already on the move classi-
fying them for the War Book, which project had actually been
launched.1 I inquired further about sabotage and espionage
and counter-espionage. I came in touch with other officers
working very quietly and very earnestly but in a small way
and with small means. I was told about German spies and
agents in the various British ports. Hitherto the Home Secre-
tary had to sign a warrant when it was necessary to examine
any particular letter passing through the Royal Mails. I now
signed general warrants authorising the examination of all
the correspondence of particular people upon a list, to which
additions were continually made. This soon disclosed a regu-
lar and extensive system of German paid British agents. It
was only in a very small part of the field of preparation that
the Home Secretary had any official duty of interference, but
once I got drawn in, it dominated all other interests in my
mind. For seven years I was to think of little else. Liberal
politics, the People's Budget, Free Trade, Peace, Retrench-
ment and Reform — all the war cries of our election struggles
began to seem unreal in the presence of this new pre-occupa-
tion. Only Ireland held her place among the grim realities
which came one after another into view. No doubt other
Ministers had similar mental experiences. I am telling my
own tale.
I now began to make an intensive study of the military
position in Europe. I read everything with which I was sup-
plied. I spent many hours in argument and discussion. The
Secretary of State for War told his officers to tell me every-
one work had been begun by Lieutenant-Colonel Adrian Grant-
Duff, afterwards killed on the Aisne.
50 THE WORLD CRISIS
thing I wanted to know. The Chief of the General Staff, Sir
William Nicholson, was an old friend of mine. I had served
with him as a young officer on Sir William Lockhart's staff
at the end of the Tirah Expedition in 1988. He wrote fine
broad appreciations and preached a clear and steady doctrine.
But the man from whom I learned most was the Director of
Military Operations, General Wilson (afterwards Field-Mar-
shal Sir Henry Wilson). This officer had extraordinary vision
and faith. He had acquired an immense and, I expect, an un-
equalled volume of knowledge about the Continent. He knew
the French Army thoroughly. He was deeply in the secrets
of the French General Staff. He had been Head of the British
Staff College. For years he had been labouring with one ob-
ject, that if war came we should act immediately on the side
of France. He was sure that war would come sooner or later.
All the threads of military information were in his hands.
The whole wall of his small room was covered by a gigantic
map of Belgium, across which every practicable road by which
the German armies could march for the invasion of France,
was painted clearly. All his holidays he spent examining
these roads and the surrounding country. He could not do
much in Germany: the Germans knew him too well.
One night the German ambassador, still Count Metternich,
whom I had known for ten years, asked me to dine with him.
We were alone, and a famous hock from the Emperor's cellars
was produced. We had a long talk about Germany and how
she had grown great; about Napoleon and the part he had
played in uniting her; about the Franco- German War and how
it began and how it ended. I said what a pity it was that Bis-
marck had allowed himself to be forced by the soldiers into
taking Lorraine, and how Alsace-Lorraine lay at the root of
all the European armaments and rival combinations. He said
these had been German provinces from remote antiquity until
one day in profound peace Louis XIV had pranced over the
frontier and seized them. I said their sympathies were
THE CRISIS OF AGADIR 51
French: he said they were mixed. I said that anyhow it kept
the whole thing alive. France could never forget her lost
provinces, and they never ceased to call to her. The conver-
sation passed to a kindred but more critical subject. Was he
anxious about the present situation ? He said people were
trying to ring Germany round and put her in a net, and that
she was a strong animal to put in a net. I said, how could she
be netted when she had an alliance with two other first-class
Powers, Austria-Hungary and Italy? We had often stood
quite alone for years at a time without getting flustered. He
said it was a very different business for an island. But when
you had been marched through and pillaged and oppressed so
often and had only the breasts of your soldiers to stand be-
tween you and invasion, it ate into your soul. I said that
Germany was frightened of nobody, and that everybody was
frightened of her.
Then we came to the Navy. Surely, I said, it was a great
mistake for Germany to try to rival Britain on the seas. She
would never catch us up. We should build two to one or
more if necessary, and at every stage antagonism would grow
between the countries. Radicals and Tories, whatever they
might say about each other, were all agreed on that. No
British Government which jeopardised our naval supremacy
could live. He said Mr. Lloyd George had told him very
much the same thing; but the Germans had no thought of
naval supremacy. All they wanted was a Fleet to protect
their commerce and their colonies. I asked what was the
use of having a weaker Fleet ? It was only another hostage
to fortune. He said that the Emperor was profoundly at-
tached to his Fleet, and that it was his own creation. I could
not resist saying that Moltke had pronounced a very differ-
ent opinion of Germany's true interest.
I have recorded these notes of a pleasant though careful
conversation, not because they are of any importance, but
because they help to show the different points of view. I
52 THE WORLD CRISIS
learned afterwards that the Chancellor of the Exchequer in
similar circumstances had spoken more explicitly, saying that
he would raise a hundred millions in a single year for the Brit-
ish Navy if its supremacy were really challenged.
Count Metternich was a very honourable man, serving his
master faithfully but labouring to preserve peace, especially
peace between England and Germany. I have heard that
on one occasion at Berlin in a throng of generals and princes,
some one had said that the British Fleet would one day make
a surprise and unprovoked attack upon Germany. Where-
upon the Ambassador had replied that he had lived in Eng-
land for nearly ten years, and he knew that such a thing was
absolutely impossible. On this remark being received with
obvious incredulity, he had drawn himself up and observed
that he made it on the honour of a German officer and that
he would answer for its truth with his honour. This for a
moment had quelled the company.
It is customary for thoughtless people to jeer at the old
diplomacy and to pretend that wars arise out of its secret
machinations. When one looks at the petty subjects which
have led to wars between great countries and to so many dis-
putes, it is easy to be misled in this way. Of course such small
matters are only the symptoms of the dangerous disease, and
are only important for that reason. Behind them lie the in-
terests, the passions and the destiny of mighty races of men ;
and long antagonisms express themselves in trifles. " Great
commotions," it was said of old, " arise out of small things,
but not concerning small things." The old diplomacy did
its best to render harmless the small things: it could not do
more. Nevertheless, a war postponed may be a war averted.
Circumstances change, combinations change, new groupings
arise, old interests are superseded by new. Many quarrels
that might have led to war have been adjusted by the old
diplomacy of Europe and have, in Lord Melbourne's phrase,
" blown over." . If the nations of the world, while the sense
THE CRISIS OF AGADIR 53
of their awful experiences is still fresh upon them, are able
to devise broader and deeper guarantees of peace and build
their houses on a surer foundation of brotherhood and inter-
dependence, they will still require the courtly manners, the
polite and measured phrases, the imperturbable demeanour,
the secrecy and discretion of the old diplomatists of Europe.
This is, however, a digression.
On August 23rd, after Parliament had risen and Ministers
had dispersed, the Prime Minister convened very secretly a
special meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence. He
summoned the Ministers specially concerned with the foreign
situation and with the fighting services, including of course
the Chancellor of the Exchequer. There were also the prin-
cipal officers of the Army and the Navy. I was invited to at-
tend, though the Home Office was not directly concerned.
We sat all day. In the morning the Army told its tale: in
the afternoon, the Navy.
General Wilson, as Director of Military Operations, stated
the views of the General Staff. Standing by his enormous
map, specially transported for the purpose, he unfolded, with
what proved afterwards to be extreme accuracy, the German
plan for attacking France in the event of a war between Ger-
many and Austria on the one hand and France and Russia
on the other. It was briefly as follows: —
In the first place the Germans would turn nearly four-fifths
of their strength against France and leave only one-fifth to
contain Russia. The German armies would draw up on a
line from the Swiss frontier to Aix-la-Chapelle. They would
then swing their right wing through Belgium, thus turning
the line of fortresses by which the eastern frontiers of France
were protected. This enormous swinging movement of the
German right arm would require every road which led through
Belgium from Luxembourg to the Belgian Meuse. There
were fifteen of these roads, and three divisions would prob-
ably march along each. The Belgian Meuse flowed parallel
54 THE WORLD CRISIS
to the march of these divisions and protected their right flank.
Along this river were three important fortified passages or
bridgeheads. First, nearest Germany, Liege; the last, nearest
France, Namur; and midway between the two, the fort of
Huy. Now arose the question, Would the Germans after
seizing these bridgeheads confine themselves to the eastern
side of the Belgian Meuse and use the river for their protec-
tion, or would they be able to spare and bring a large body of
troops to prolong their turning movement west of the Belgian
Meuse and thus advance beyond it instead of inside it ? This
was the only part of their plan which could not be foreseen.
Would they avoid the west side of the Belgian Meuse alto-
gether ? Would they skim along it with a cavalry force only,
or would they march infantry divisions or even army corps
west of that river ? When the time came, as we now know,
they marched two whole armies. At that date, however, the
most sombre apprehension did not exceed one, or at the out-
side two, army corps.
Overwhelming detailed evidence was adduced to show that
the Germans had made every preparation for matching
through Belgium. The great military camps in close prox-
imity to the frontier, the enormous depots, the reticulation
of railways, the endless sidings, revealed with the utmost clear-
ness and beyond all doubt their design. Liege would be taken
within a few hours of the declaration of war, possibly even
before it, by a rush of motor cars and cyclists from the camp
at Elsenborn. That camp was now (August, 191 1) crowded
with troops, and inquisitive persons and ordinary country-
folk were already being roughly turned back and prevented
from approaching it.
What would Belgium do in the face of such an onslaught ?
Nothing could save Liege, but French troops might reach
Namur in time to aid in its defence. For the rest the Belgian
army, assuming that Belgium resisted the invader, would
withdraw into the great entrenched camp and fortress of
THE CRISIS OF AGADIR 55
Antwerp. This extensive area, intersected by a tangle of
rivers and canals and defended by three circles of forts, would
become the last refuge of the Belgian monarchy and people.
The position of Holland was also examined. It was not
thought that the Germans would over-run Holland as they
would Belgium, but they might find it very convenient to
march across the curiously shaped projection of Holland which
lay between Germany and Belgium, and which in the British
General Staff parlance of that time was called "the Maestricht
Appendix." They would certainly do this if any considerable
body of their troops was thrown west of the Belgian Meuse.
The French plans for meeting this formidable situation
were not told in detail to us; but it was clear that they hoped
to forestall and rupture the German enveloping movement
by a counter-offensive of their own on the greatest scale.
The number of divisions available on both sides and on
all fronts when mobilisation was completed were estimated
as follows: —
French 85
German no
It was asserted that if the six British divisions were sent to
take position on the extreme French left, immediately war
was declared, the chances of repulsing the Germans in the first
great shock of battle were favourable. Every French soldier
would fight with double confidence if he knew he was not
fighting alone. Upon the strength of Russia General Wilson
spoke with great foresight, and the account which he gave
of the slow mobilisation of the Russian Army swept away
many illusions. It seemed incredible that Germany should
be content to leave scarcely a score of divisions to make head
against the might of Russia. But the British General Staff
considered that such a decision would be well-founded. We
shall see presently how the loyalty of Russia and of the Tsar,
found the means by prodigious sacrifices to call back to the
56 THE WORLD CRISIS
East vital portions of the German Army at the supreme mo-
ment. Such action could not be foreseen then, and most peo-
ple have forgotten it now.
There was of course a considerable discussion and much
questioning before we adjourned at 2 o'clock. When we began
again at three, it was the turn of the Admiralty, and the First
Sea Lord, Sir Arthur Wilson, with another map expounded
his views of the policy we should pursue in the event of our
being involved in such a war. He did not reveal the Admiralty
war plans. Those he kept locked away in his own brain, but
he indicated that they embodied the principle of a close block-
ade of the enemy's ports. It was very soon apparent that a
profound difference existed between the War Office and the
Admiralty view. In the main the Admiralty thought that we
should confine our efforts to the sea; that if our small Army
were sent to the Continent it would be swallowed up among
the immense hosts conflicting there, whereas if kept in ships
or ready to embark for counterstrokes upon the German coast,
it would draw off more than its own weight of numbers from
the German fighting line. This view, which was violently
combated by the Generals, did not commend itself to the bulk
of those present, and on many points of detail connected with
the landings of these troops the military and naval authori-
ties were found in complete discord. The serious disagree-
ment between the military and naval staffs in such critical
times upon fundamental issues was the immediate cause of
my going to the Admiralty. After the Council had separated,
Mr. Haldane intimated to the Prime Minister that he would
not continue to be responsible for the War Office unless a
Board of Admiralty was called into being which would work
in full harmony with the War Office plans, and would begin
the organisation of a proper Naval War Staff. Of course I
knew nothing of this, but it was destined soon to affect my
fortunes in a definite manner.
I thought that the General Staff took too sanguine a view
THE CRISIS OF AGADIR 57
of the French Army. Knowing their partisanship for France,
I feared the wish was father to the thought. It was inevi-
table that British military men, ardently desirous of seeing
their country intervene on the side of France, and convinced
that the destruction of France by Germany would imperil
the whole future of Great Britain, should be inclined to over-
rate the relative power of the French Army and accord it
brighter prospects than were actually justified. The bulk of
their information was derived from French sources. The
French General Staff were resolute and hopeful. The prin-
ciple of the offensive was the foundation of their military art
and the mainspring of the French soldier. Although accord-
ing to the best information, the French pre-war Army when
fully mobilised was only three-fourths as strong as the Ger-
man pre-war Army, the French mobilisation from the ninth
to the thirteenth day yielded a superior strength on the fight-
ing front. High hopes were entertained by the French Gen-
erals that a daring seizure of the initiative and a vigorous
offensive into Alsace-Lorraine would have the effect of rup-
turing the carefully thought out German plans of marching
through Belgium on to Paris. These hopes were reflected in
the British General Staff appreciations.
I could not share them. I had therefore prepared a memo-
randum for the Committee of Imperial Defence which embodied
my own conclusions upon all I had learned from the General
Staff. It was Dated August 13, 191 1. It was, of course, only
an attempt to pierce the veil of the future; to conjure up in
the mind a vast imaginary situation; to balance the incal-
culable; to weigh the imponderable. It will be seen that I
named the twentieth day of mobilisation as the date by which
"the French armies will have been driven from the line of
the Meuse and will be falling back on Paris and the South,"
and the fortieth day as that by which " Germany should be
extended at full strain both internally and on her war fronts,"
and that "opportunities for the decisive trial of strength
58 THE WORLD CRISIS
may then occur." I am quite free to admit that these were
not intended to be precise dates, but as guides to show what
would probably happen. In fact, however, both these fore-
casts were almost literally verified three years later by the
event.
I reprinted this memorandum on the 2nd of September,
1 9 14, in order to encourage my colleagues with the hope that
if the unfavourable prediction about the twentieth day had
been borne out, so also would be the favourable prediction
about the fortieth day. And so indeed it was.
MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE CONTINENTAL
PROBLEM
Memorandum by Mr. Churchill
August 13, ion.
The following notes have been written on the assumption
. . . that a decision has been arrived at to employ a British
military force on the Continent of Europe. It does not pre-
judge that decision in any way.
It is assumed that an alliance exists between Great Britain,
France, and Russia, and that these Powers are attacked by
Germany and Austria.
1. The decisive military operations will be those between
France and Germany. The German army is at least equal
in quality to the French, and mobilises 2,200,000 against
1,700,000. The French must therefore seek for a situation of
more equality. This can be found either before the full
strength of the Germans has been brought to bear or after
the German army has become extended. The first might be
reached between the ninth and thirteenth days; the latter
about the fortieth.
2. The fact that during a few days in the mobilisation
period the French are equal or temporarily superior on the
frontiers is of no significance, except on the assumption that
France contemplates adopting a strategic offensive. The
Germans will not choose the days when they themselves have
least superiority for a general advance; and if the French ad-
vance, they lose at once all the advantages of their own internal
THE CRISIS OF AGADIR 59
communications, and by moving towards the advancing Ger-
man reinforcements annul any numerical advantage they may
for the moment possess. The French have therefore, at the
beginning of the war, no option but to remain on the defen-
sive, both upon their own fortress line and behind the Belgian
frontier; and the choice of the day when the first main collision
will commence rests with the Germans, who must be credited
with the wisdom of choosing the best possible day, and can-
not be forced into decisive action against their will, except by
some reckless and unjustifiable movement on the part of the
French.
3. A prudent survey of chances from the British point of
view ought to contemplate that, when the German advance
decisively begins, it will be backed by sufficient preponder-
ance of force, and developed on a sufficiently wide front to
compel the French armies to retreat from their positions be-
hind the Belgian frontier, even though they may hold the
gaps between the fortresses on the Verdun-Belfort front. No
doubt a series of great battles will have been fought with
varying local fortunes, and there is always a possibility of a
heavy German check. But, even if the Germans were brought
to a standstill, the French would not be strong enough to ad-
vance in their turn; and in any case we ought not to count on
this. The balance of probability is that by the twentieth
day the French armies will have been driven from the line of
the Meuse and will be falling back on Paris and the south.
All plans based upon the opposite assumption ask too much of
fortune.
4. This is not to exclude the plan of using four or six British
divisions in these great initial operations. Such a force is a
material factor of significance. Its value to the French would
be out of all proportion to its numerical strength. It would
encourage every French soldier and make the task of the
Germans in forcing the frontier much more costly. But the
question which is of most practical consequence to us is what
is to happen after the frontier has been forced and the invasion
of France has begun. France will not be able to end the war
successfully by any action on the frontiers. She will not be
strong enough to invade Germany. Her only chance is to
conquer Germany in France. It is this problem which should
be studied before any final decision is taken.
60 THE WORLD CRISIS
5. The German armies in advancing through Belgium and
onwards into France will be relatively weakened by all or any
of the following causes: —
By the greater losses incidental to the offensive (especially
if they have tested unsuccessfully the French fortress lines);
By the greater employment of soldiers necessitated by act-
ing on exterior lines;
By having to guard their communications through Belgium
and France (especially from the sea flank) ;
By having to invest Paris (requiring at least 500,000 men
against 100,000) and to besiege or mask other places, espe-
cially along the sea-board;
By the arrival of the British army;
By the growing pressure of Russia from the thirtieth day;
And generally by the bad strategic situation to which their
right-handed advance will commit them as it becomes pro-
nounced.
All these factors will operate increasingly in proportion as
the German advance continues and every day that passes.
6. Time is also required for the naval blockade to make
itself felt on German commerce, industry, and food prices,
as described in the Admiralty Memorandum, and for these
again to react on German credit and finances already bur-
dened with the prodigious daily cost of the war. All these
pressures will develop simultaneously and progressively. [The
Chancellor of the Exchequer has drawn special attention to
this and to the very light structure of German industry and
economic organisations.]
7. By the fortieth day Germany should be extended at full
strain both internally and on her war fronts, and this strain
will become daily more severe and ultimately overwhelming,
unless it is relieved by decisive victories in France. If the
French army has not been squandered by precipitate or des-
perate action, the balance of forces should be favourable after
the fortieth day, and will improve steadily as time passes. For
the German armies will be confronted with a situation which
combines an ever-growing need for a successful offensive, with
a battle-front which tends continually towards numerical
equality. Opportunities for the decisive trial of strength
may then occur.
8. Such a policy demands heavy and hard sacrifices from
THE CRISIS OF AGADIR 61
France, who must, with great constancy, expose herself to
invasion, to having her provinces occupied by the enemy, and
to the investment of Paris, and whose armies may be com-
mitted to retrograde or defensive operations. Whether her
rulers could contemplate or her soldiers endure this trial may
depend upon the military support which Great Britain can
give; and this must be known beforehand, so that the French
war-plans can be adjusted accordingly, and so that we may
know, before we decide, what they would be prepared to do.
9. The following measures would appear to be required to
enable Great Britain to take an effective part in the decisive
theatre of the war: —
Men
(Approximate).
The four divisions of the expeditionary army,
with their auxiliary troops, should be sent
on the outbreak of war to France . . . 107,000
To these should be added the two remaining di-
visions as soon as the naval blockade is effec-
tively established 53, 000
And the 7th Division from South Africa and the
Mediterranean (as soon as the colonial forces
in South Africa can be embodied) . . . 15,000
And 5,000 additional Yeomanry cavalry or light
horse, with 10,000 volunteer cyclist Terri-
torials 15,000
As we should be allies of Russia, the Anglo-
Indian Army could be drawn upon so long as
two native regiments were moved out of India
for every British regiment. Lord Kitchener
has stated that it would be possible in so grave
a need, to withdraw six out of the nine field
divisions from India, and this should be done
immediately. This force could be brought
into France by Marseilles by the fortieth day 100,000
Thus making a total force of . 290,000
This fine army, almost entirely composed of professional
soldiers, could be assembled around (say) Tours by the for-
tieth day, in rear of the French left (instead of being frittered
into action piecemeal), and would then become a very impor-
tant factor in events. The Russian army would also by then
62 THE WORLD CRISIS
be engaged in full force on the eastern frontiers of Germany
and Austria, and the power of the three allies should then be
sufficient either to hold the Germans in a position of growing
difficulty or, if desirable, to assume the offensive in concert.
10. To provide meanwhile for the security of Great Britain,
for unforeseeable contingencies, and for sustaining the expe-
ditionary army with a continuous supply of volunteer drafts,
it would be necessary on the outbreak —
(a) To embody the whole Territorial force.
(b) To call for volunteers for Home defence from all persons
possessing military experience.
(c) To raise a compulsory levy of 500,000 men for Home
defence.
This levy should be formed upon the cadres of the Territorial
divisions, so as to enable a proportion of the Territorial army
to be released at the end of the sixth month. The question of
sending any part of the compulsory levy by compulsion to
the Continent would not arise until after this force had
been trained. The steady augmentation of British military
strength during the progress of the war would, however, put
us in a position by the end of the twelfth month to secure or
re-establish British interests outside Europe, even if, through
the defeat or desertion of allies, we were forced to continue
the war alone.
No lesser steps would seem adequate to the scale of events.
w. s. c.
The Conference separated. Apprehension lay heavy on the
minds of all who had participated in it.
The War Office hummed with secrets in those days. Not
the slightest overt action could be taken. But every prepara-
tion by forethought was made and every detail was worked
out on paper. The railway time-tables, or graphics as they
were called, of the movement of every battalion — even where
they were to drink their coffee — were prepared and settled.
Thousands of maps of Northern France and Belgium were
printed. The cavalry manoeuvres were postponed "on ac-
count of the scarcity of water in Wiltshire and the neighbour-
ing counties." The press, fiercely divided on party lines,
THE CRISIS OF AGADIR 63
overwhelmingly pacific in tendency, without censorship, with-
out compulsion, observed a steady universal reticence. Not
a word broke the long drawn oppressive silence. The great
railway strike came to an end with mysterious suddenness.
Mutual concessions were made by masters and men after hear-
ing a confidential statement from the Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer.
In the middle of August I went to the country for a few
days. I could not think of anything else but the peril oi
war. I did my other work as it came along, but there was
only one field of interest fiercely illuminated in my mind.
Sitting on a hilltop in the smiling country which stretches
round Mells, the lines I have copied at the top of this
chapter kept running through my mind. Whenever I recall
them, they bring back to me the anxieties of those Agadir
days.
From Mells I wrote the following letter to Sir Edward Grey.
It speaks for itself.
Mr. Churchill to Sir Edward Grey.
30 August, 191 1.
Perhaps the time is coming when decisive action will be
necessary. Please consider the following policy for use if and
when the Morocco negotiations fail.
Propose to France and Russia a triple alliance to safe-
guard {inter alia) the independence of Belgium, Holland, and
Denmark.
Tell Belgium that, if her neutrality is violated, we are pre-
pared to come to her aid and to make an alliance with France
and Russia to guarantee her independence. Tell her that
we will take whatever military steps will be most effective for
that purpose. But the Belgian Army must take the field in
concert with the British and French Armies, and Belgium must
immediately garrison properly Liege and Namur. Otherwise
we cannot be responsible for her fate.
Offer the same guarantee both to Holland and to Denmark
contingent upon their making their utmost exertions.
64 THE WORLD CRISIS
We should, if necessary, aid Belgium to defend Antwerp
and to feed that fortress and any army based on it. We
should be prepared at the proper moment to put extreme pres-
sure on the Dutch to keep the Scheldt open for all purposes.
If the Dutch close the Scheldt, we should retaliate by a block-
ade of the Rhine.
It is very important to us to be able to blockade the Rhine,
and it gets more important as the war goes on. On the other
hand, if the Germans do not use the "Maestricht Appendix"
in the first days of the war, they will not want it at all.
Let me add that I am not at all convinced about the wisdom
of a close blockade, and I did not like the Admiralty state-
ment. If the French send cruisers to Mogador and Saffi, I
am of opinion that we should (for our part) move our main
fleet to the north of Scotland into its war station. Our in-
terests are European, and not Moroccan. The significance of
the movement would be just as great as if we sent our two
ships with the French.
Please let me know when you will be in London; and will
you kindly send this letter on to the Prime Minister.
My views underwent no change in the three years of peace
that followed. On the contrary they were confirmed and
amplified by everything I learned. In some respects, as in
the abolition of the plan of close blockade and the sending
of the Fleet to its war station, I was able to carry them out.
In other cases, such as the defence of Antwerp, I had not the
power to do in time what I believed to be equally necessary.
But I tried my best, not, as has frequently been proclaimed,
upon a foolish impulse, but in pursuance of convictions
reached by pondering and study. I could not help feeling
a strong confidence in the truth of these convictions, when I
saw how several of them were justified one after the other
in that terrible and unparalleled period of convulsion. I had
no doubts whatever what ought to be done in certain mat-
ters, and my only difficulty was to persuade or induce
others.
*****
THE CRISIS OF AGADIR 65
The Agadir crisis came however peacefully to an end. It
had terminated in the diplomatic rebuff of Germany. Once
more she had disturbed all Europe by a sudden and menacing
gesture. Once more she had used the harshest threats towards
France. For the first time she had made British statesmen
feel that sense of direct contact with the war peril which was
never absent from Continental minds. The French, how-
ever, offered concessions and compensations. An intricate
negotiation about the frontiers of French and German terri-
tory in West Africa, in which the "Bee de Canard" played
an important part, had resulted in an agreement between
the two principals. To us it seemed that France had won a
considerable advantage. She was not, however, particularly
pleased. Her Prime Minister, Monsieur Caillaux, who had
presided during those anxious days, was dismissed from office
on grounds which at the time it was very difficult to appre-
ciate here, but which viewed in the light of subsequent events
can more easily be understood. The tension in German gov-
erning circles must have been very great. The German
Colonial Secretary, von Lindequist, resigned rather than
sign the agreement. There is no doubt that deep and violent
passions of humiliation and resentment were coursing be-
neath the glittering uniforms which thronged the palaces
through which the Kaiser moved. And of those passions the
Crown Prince made himself the exponent. The world has
heaped unbounded execrations upon this unlucky being. He
was probably in fact no better and no worse than the aver-
age young cavalry subaltern who had not been through the
ordinary mill at a public school nor had to think about earn-
ing his living. He had a considerable personal charm, which
he lavished principally upon the fair sex, but which in darker
days has captivated the juvenile population of Wieringen.
His flattered head was turned by the burning eyes and gut-
tural words of great captains and statesmen and party leaders.
He therefore threw himself forward into this strong favouring
66 THE WORLD CRISIS
current, and became a power, or rather the focus of a power,
with which the Kaiser was forced to reckon. Germany once
more proceeded to increase her armaments by land and sea.
"It was a question," writes von Tirpitz, "of our keeping
our nerve, continuing to arm on a grand scale, avoiding all
provocation, and waiting without anxiety until our sea power
was established1 and forced the English to let us breathe in
peace." Only to breathe in peace ! What fearful apparatus
was required to secure this simple act of respiration !
Early in October Mr. Asquith invited me to stay with him
in Scotland. The day after I had arrived there, on our way
home from the links, he asked me quite abruptly whether
I would like to go to the Admiralty. He had put the same
question to me when he first became Prime Minister. This
time I had no doubt what to answer. All my mind was full of
the dangers of war. I accepted with alacrity. I said, "In-
deed I would." He said that Mr. Haldane was coming to see
him the next day and we would talk it over together. But
I saw that his mind was made up. The fading light of eve-
ning disclosed in the far distance the silhouettes of two battle-
ships steaming slowly out of the Firth of Forth. They seemed
invested with a new significance to me.
That night when I went to bed, I saw a large Bible lying
on a table in my bedroom. My mind was dominated by the
news I had received of the complete change in my station
and of the task entrusted to me. I thought of the peril of
Britain, peace-loving, unthinking, little prepared, of her power
and virtue, and of her mission of good sense and fair play. I
thought of mighty Germany, towering up in the splendour
of her imperial state and delving down in her profound, cold,
patient, ruthless calculations. I thought of the army corps
I had watched tramp past, wave after wave of valiant man-
hood, at the Breslau manoeuvres in 1907; of the thousands of
strong horses dragging cannon and great howitzers up the
1 The italics are mine.
THE CRISIS OF AGADIR 67
ridges and along the roads around Wurzburg in 19 10. I
thought of German education and thoroughness and all that
their triumphs in science and philosophy implied. I thought
of the sudden and successful wars by which her power had
been set up. I opened the Book at random, and in the 9th
Chapter of Deuteronomy I read —
l?ear, SD Israel; {Ebou art to pass ober Jordan tbis
Hap, to go in to possess nation* greater and tniQititt
tban tbpself , cities great and fenced up to beaben,
2, a people great and tall, tit cbildren of tbe flnakims.
toiom tbou knotoest, and of tobom tfiou bast Jeard sap,
Sfllfio can Stand before tit children ot &nakt
3, {Understand therefore tbis dap, tbat tfie Eord t5p (Bod
is fit tofurt) ffottft ober before tbee; a* a consuming tire
je Sball destroy tbem, and 6c sball bring tbem doton
betore tbp face: 00 sbalt t&ou dribe tbem out, and destroy
tbem quicklp, as tit Eord batj) said unto tbee.
4, &peak not tbou in tbine fjeart, after tbat tbe Eord tbp
(Bod jatb cast titm out from before tittt saying, 3ffor mp
rigbteousness tbe Eord batb brought me in to possess
tbis land: but tor tlje toickedness ot tbese nations tit
Eord dotb bribe tbem out from before tbee,
5, |5ot for tfip rigbteousness or for tit uprigbtness of
tbine Jeart, dost tbou go to possess tbeir land; but for tit
toickedness of tbese nations tbe Eord tiv (Bod dotb bribe
tbem out from before tbee, and tbat be map perform tbe
toord tobicb tit Eord stoare unto tbp fathers, flbrabam,
Isaac, and Jacob.
It seemed a message full of reassurance.
CHAPTER IV
ADMIRALS ALL
"Concerning brave Captains
Our age hath made known."
Rudyard Kipling.
At the Admiralty — The State of Business — Immediate Measures — The
Two Leading Sailors — Lord Fisher of Kilverstone — His Great Re-
forms— His Violent Methods — The Schism in the Fleet — Difficul-
ties of His Task — The Bacon Letters — Our Conference at Reigate
Priory — A Fateful Decision — Lord Fisher's Correspondence — Sir
Arthur Wilson, the First Sea Lord — Deadlock Concerning the War
Staff Policy — Formation of a New Board of Admiralty — The
Command of the Home Fleets — Sir Arthur Wilson's Retirement —
A Digression Forward — Captain Pakenham's Sea-going Record —
Rear-Admiral Beatty — The Naval Secretary — Prince Louis of
Battenberg Becomes Second Sea Lord — The War Staff — Military
Education and Staff Training — Captains of Ships and Captains of
War — Fifteen Years and Only Thirty Months.
TV/fR- McKENNA and I changed guard with strict punc-
***• tilio. In the morning he came over to the Home Office
and I introduced him to the officials there. In the afternoon
I went over to the Admiralty; he presented his Board and
principal officers and departmental heads to me, and then
took his leave. I knew he felt greatly his change of office,
but no one would have divined it from his manner. As soon
as he had gone I convened a formal meeting of the Board, at
which the Secretary read the new Letters Patent constituting
me its head, and I thereupon in the words of the Order-in-
Council became "responsible to Crown and Parliament for
all the business of the Admiralty." I was to endeavour to
discharge this responsibility for the four most memorable
years of my life.
68
ADMIRALS ALL 69
The state of Admiralty business was as follows: — The Esti-
mates and plans for the financial year 191 2-13 were far ad-
vanced: the programme had been settled and the designs of
the vessels only awaited final approval. We were to lay down
three battleships, one battle-cruiser, two light cruisers (" Dart-
mouths"), one smaller light cruiser (a "Blonde"), the usual
flotilla of twenty destroyers and a number of submarines and
ancillary craft. The Estimates embodying this policy had to
be passed by the Cabinet at the latest by the end of February,
and presented to the House of Commons in the utmost detail
in March.
But a great uncertainty hung over all these plans. A con-
tinued succession of rumours and reports from many sources,
and of hints and allusions in the German Press, foreshadowed
a further German naval increase. This, following upon all
that had gone before and coming at a moment when relations
were so tense, must certainly aggravate the situation. It
would inevitably compel us to take important additional
counter-measures. What these counter-measures would have
to be, could not be decided till the text of the new German
Navy Law was known to us. It was clear, however, from the
information received, that it was not only to be an increase
in new construction but in the number of squadrons or vessels
maintained in a state of instant and constant readiness.
In addition to these complications were a number of naval
questions of prime importance which I conceived required
new treatment. First, the War Plans of the Fleet, which up to
that moment had been based upon the principle of close block-
ade. Second, the organisation of the fleets with a view to
increasing their instantly ready strength. Third, measures
to guard against all aspects of surprise in the event of a sud-
den attack. Fourth, the formation of a Naval War Staff.
Fifth, the concerting of the War Plans of the Navy and the
Army by close co-operation of the two departments. Sixth,
further developments in design to increase the gun power of
70 THE WORLD CRISIS
our new ships in all classes. Seventh, changes in the high
commands of the Fleet and in the composition of the Board
of Admiralty.
To all these matters I addressed myself in constant secret
consultations with the principal persons concerned in each.
For the present, however, I arrived at no important decisions,
but laboured continually to check and correct the opinions
with which I had arrived at the Admiralty by the ex-
pert information which on every subject was now at my
disposal.
With the agreement of the Sea Lords I gave certain direc-
tions on minor points immediately. The flotilla of destroyers
sanctioned in the 1911-12 Estimates would not have been let
out to contract till the very end of the financial year. We
now accelerated these twenty boats (the "L's") by four
months, and thus, though we could not possibly foresee it,
they were almost all fully commissioned just in time for the
great review and mobilization of the Fleet which preceded
the outbreak of war. I gave, moreover, certain personal di-
rections to enable me "to sleep quietly in my bed." The
naval magazines were to be effectively guarded under the
direct charge of the Admiralty. The continuous attendance of
naval officers, additional to that of the resident clerks, was
provided at the Admiralty, so that at any hour of the day
or night, weekdays, Sundays, or holidays, there would never
be a moment lost in giving the alarm; and one of the Sea
Lords was always to be on duty in or near the Admiralty
building to receive it. Upon the wall behind my chair I had
an open case fitted, within whose folding doors spread a large
chart of the North Sea. On this chart every day a Staff Officer
marked with flags the position of the German Fleet. Never
once was this ceremony omitted until the War broke out, and
the great maps, covering the whole of one side of the War
Room, began to function. I made a rule to look at my chart
once every day when I first entered my room. I did this less
ADMIRALS ALL 71
to keep myself informed, for there were many other channels
of information, than in order to inculcate in myself and those
working with me a sense of ever-present danger. In this
spirit we all worked.
I must now introduce the reader to the two great Admirals-
of-the-Fleet, Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson, whose out-
standing qualities and life's work, afloat and at the Admiralty,
added to and reacted upon by the energies and patriotism of
Lord Charles Beresford, had largely made the Royal Navy
what it was at this time. The names of both Fisher and Wil-
son must often recur in these pages, for they played decisive
parts in the tale I have to tell.
I first met Lord Fisher at Biarritz in 1907. We stayed for
a fortnight as the guests of a common friend. He was then
First Sea Lord and in the height of his reign. We talked all
day long and far into the nights. He told me wonderful stories
of the Navy and of his plans — all about Dreadnoughts, all
about submarines, all about the new education scheme for
every branch of the Navy, all about big guns, and splendid
Admirals and foolish miserable ones, and Nelson and the
Bible, and finally the island of Borkum. I remembered it
all. I reflected on it often. I even remembered the island of
Borkum when my teacher had ceased to think so much of it.
At any rate, when I returned to my duties at the Colonial
Office I could have passed an examination on the policy of
the then Board of Admiralty.
For at least ten years all the most important steps taken
to enlarge, improve or modernise the Navy had been due to
Fisher. The water-tube boiler, the aall big gun ship," the in-
troduction of the submarine (" Fisher's toys," as Lord Charles
Beresford called them), the common education scheme, the
system of nucleus crews for ships in reserve, and latterly — to
meet the German rivalry — the concentration of the Fleets in
Home Waters, the scrapping of great quantities of ships of
little fighting power, the great naval programmes of 1908
i
72 THE WORLD CRISIS
and 1909, the advance from the 12-inch to the 13.5-inch gun
— all in the main were his.
In carrying through these far-reaching changes he had
created violent oppositions to himself in the Navy, and his
own methods, in which he gloried, were of a kind to excite
bitter animosities, which he returned and was eager to re-
pay. He made it known, indeed he proclaimed, that officers
of whatever rank who opposed his policies would have their
professional careers ruined. As for traitors, i. e., those who
struck at him openly or secretly, "their wives should be
widows, their children fatherless, their homes a dunghill. "
This he repeated again and again. " Ruthless, relentless and
remorseless " were words always on his lips, and many grisly
examples of Admirals and Captains eating out their hearts
"on the beach,, showed that he meant what he said. He did
not hesitate to express his policy in the most unfavourable
terms, as if to challenge and defy his enemies and critics.
"Favouritism," he wrote in the log of Dartmouth College,
" is the secret of efficiency." What he meant by " favouritism "
was selection without regard to seniority by a discerning genius
in the interests of the public; but the word "favouritism"
stuck. Officers were said to be "in the fish-pond" — unlucky
for them if they were not. He poured contempt upon the
opinions and arguments of those who did not agree with his
schemes, and abused them roundly at all times both by word
and letter.
In the Royal Navy, however, there were a considerable num-
ber of officers of social influence and independent means,
many of whom became hostile to Fisher. They had access
to Parliament and to the Press. In sympathy with them,
though not with all their methods, was a much larger body
of good and proved sea officers. At the head of the whole
opposition stood Lord Charles Beresford, at that time Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Channel or principal Fleet. A de-
plorable schism was introduced into the Royal Navy, which
ADMIRALS ALL 73
spread to every squadron and to every ship. There were
Fisher's men and Beresford's men. Whatever the First Sea
Lord proposed the Commander-in-Chief opposed, and through
the whole of the Service Captains and Lieutenants were en-
couraged to take one side or the other. The argument was
conducted with technicalities and with personalities. Neither
side was strong enough to crush the other. The Admiralty
had its backers in the Fleet, and the Fleet had its friends in
the Admiralty: both sides therefore had good information as to
what was passing in the other camp. The lamentable situa-
tion thus created might easily have ruined the discipline of
the Navy but for the fact that a third large body of officers
resolutely refused, at whatever cost to themselves, to par-
ticipate in the struggle. Silently and steadfastly they went
about their work till the storms of partisanship were past.
To these officers a debt is due.
There is no doubt whatever that Fisher was right in nine-
tenths of what he fought for. His great reforms sustained
the power of the Royal Navy at the most critical period in its
history. He gave the Navy the kind of shock which the Brit-
ish Army received at the time of the South African War.
After a long period of serene and unchallenged complacency,
the mutter of distant thunder could be heard. It was Fisher
who hoisted the storm-signal and beat all hands to quarters.
He forced every department of the Naval Service to review
its position and question its own existence. He shook them
and beat them and cajoled them out of slumber into intense
activity. But the Navy was not a pleasant place while this
was going on. The "Band of Brothers" tradition which Nel-
son had handed down was for the time, but only for the time,
discarded; and behind the open hostility of chieftains flour-
ished the venomous intrigues of their followers.
I have asked myself whether all this could not have been
avoided; whether we could not have had the Fisher reforms
without the Fisher methods ? My conviction is that Fisher
74 THE WORLD CRISIS
was maddened by the difficulties and obstructions which he
encountered, and became violent in the process of fighting
so hard at every step. In the government of a great fighting
service there must always be the combination of the political
and professional authorities. A strong First Sea Lord, to
carry out a vigorous policy, needs the assistance of a Minister,
who alone can support him and defend him. The authority of
both is more than doubled by their union. Each can render
the other services of supreme importance when they are both
effective factors. Working in harmony, they multiply each
other. By the resultant concentration of combined power, no
room or chance is given to faction. For good or for ill what
they decide together in the interests of the Service must be
loyally accepted. Unhappily, the later years of Fisher's efforts
were years in which the Admiralty was ruled by two Ministers,
both of whom were desperately and even mortally ill. Al- i
though most able and most upright public men, both Lord
Cawdor and Lord Tweedmouth, First Lords from 1904 to 1908,
were afflicted with extreme ill-health. Moreover, neither was
in the House of Commons and able himself, by exposition in
the responsible Chamber, to proclaim in unquestioned ac-
cents the policy which the Admiralty would follow and which
the House of Commons should ratify. When in 1908 Mr..
McKenna became First Lord, there was a change.* Gifted
with remarkable clearness of mind and resolute courage,
enjoying in the prime of life the fullest vigour of his facul-
ties, and having acquired a strong political position in the
House of Commons, he was able to supply an immediate
steadying influence. But it was too late for Fisher. The
Furies were upon his track. The opposition and hatreds
had already grown too strong. The schism in the Navy
continued, fierce and open.
The incident which is most commonly associated with the
end of this part of his career is that of the " Bacon letters."
Captain Bacon was one of the ablest officers in the Navy and
ADMIRALS ALL 75
a strong Fisherite. In 1906 he had been serving in the Medi-
terranean under Lord Charles Beresford. Fisher had asked
him to write to him from time to time and keep him informed
of all that passed. This he did in letters in themselves of much
force and value, but open to the reproach of containing criti-
cisms of his immediate commander. This in itself might have
escaped unnoticed; but the First Sea Lord used to print in
beautiful and carefully considered type, letters, notes and
memoranda on technical subjects for the instruction and
encouragement of the faithful. Delighted at the cogency of
the arguments in the Bacon letters, he had them printed in
1909 and circulated fairly widely throughout the Admiralty.
A copy fell at length into hostile hands and was swiftly con-
veyed to a London evening newspaper. The First Sea Lord
was accused of encouraging subordinates in disloyalty to their
immediate commanders, and Captain Bacon himself was so
grievously smitten in the opinion of the Service that he with-
drew into private life and his exceptional abilities were lost
to the Navy, though, as will be seen, only for a time. The
episode was fatal, and at the beginning of 1910 Sir John
Fisher quitted the Admiralty and passed, as every one be-
lieved, finally into retirement and the House of Lords, crowned
with achievements, loaded with honours, but pursued by
much obloquy, amid the triumph of his foes.
As soon as I knew for certain that I was to go to the Ad-
miralty I sent for Fisher: he was abroad in sunshine. We
had not seen each other since the dispute about the Naval
Estimates of 1909. He conceived himself bound in loyalty
to Mr. McKenna, but as soon as he learned that I had had
nothing to do with the decision which had led to our changing
offices, he hastened home. We passed three days together
in the comfort of Reigate Priory.
Although my education had been mainly military, I had
followed closely every detail of the naval controversies of
the previous five years in the Cabinet, in Parliament, and
76 THE WORLD CRISIS
latterly in the Committee of Imperial Defence; and I had
certain main ideas of what I was going to do and what, indeed,
I was sent to the Admiralty to do. I intended to prepare for
an attack by Germany as if it might come next day. I in-
tended to raise the Fleet to the highest possible strength
and secure that all that strength was immediately ready. I
was pledged to create a War Staff. I was resolved to have
all arrangements made at once in the closest concert with the
military to provide for the transportation of a British Army
to France should war come. I had strong support from the
War Office and the Foreign Office: I had the Prime Minister
and the Chancellor of the Exchequer at my back. Moreover,
every one who knew the crisis through which we had passed
had been profoundly alarmed. In these circumstances it
only remained to study the methods, and to choose the men.
I found Fisher a veritable volcano of knowledge and of
inspiration; and as soon as he learnt what my main purpose
was, he passed into a state of vehement eruption. It must in-
deed have been an agony to him to wait and idly watch from
the calm Lake of Lucerne through the anxious weeks of the
long-drawn Agadir crisis, with his life's work, his beloved
Navy, liable at any moment to be put to the supreme test.
Once he began, he could hardly stop. I plied him with ques-
tions, and he poured out ideas. It was always a joy to me to
talk to him on these great matters, but most of all was he
stimulating in all that related to the design of ships. He
also talked brilliantly about Admirals, but here one had to
make a heavy discount on account of the feuds. My inten-
tion was to hold the balance even, and while adopting in the
main the Fisher policy, to insist upon an absolute cessation
of the vendetta.
Knowing pretty well, all that has been written in the pre-
ceding pages, I began our conversations with no thought of
Fisher's recall. But by the Sunday night the power of the
man was deeply borne in upon me, and I had almost made
ADMIRALS ALL 7;7
up my mind to do what I did three years later, and place hirc i
again at the head of the Naval Service. It was not the outcry
that I feared; that I felt strong enough at this time to face
But it was the revival and continuance of the feuds; and it
was clear from his temper that this would be inevitable. Then,
too, I was apprehensive of his age. I could not feel complete
confidence in the poise of the mind at 71. All the way up
to London the next morning I was on the brink of saying
"Come and help me," and had he by a word seemed to wish
to return, I would surely have spoken. But he maintained
a proper dignity, and in an hour we were in London. Other
reflections supervened, adverse counsels were not lacking, and
in a few days I had definitely made up my mind to look else-
where for a First Sea Lord. I wonder whether I was right or
wrong.
For a man who for so many years filled great official posi-
tions and was charged with so much secret and deadly busi-
ness, Lord Fisher appeared amazingly voluminous and reck-
less in correspondence. When for the purposes of this work
and for the satisfaction of his biographers I collected all the
letters I had received from the Admiral in his own hand,
they amounted when copied to upwards of 300 closely type-
written pages. In the main they repeat again and again
the principal naval conceptions and doctrines with which
his life had been associated. Although it would be easy to
show many inconsistencies and apparent contradictions, the
general message is unchanging. The letters are also pre-
sented in an entertaining guise, interspersed with felicitous
and sometimes recondite quotations, with flashing phrases
and images, with mordant jokes and corrosive personal-
ities. All were dashed off red-hot as they left his mind, his
strong pen galloping along in the wake of the imperious
thought. He would often audaciously fling out on paper
thoughts which other people would hardly admit to their
own minds. It is small wonder that his turbulent passage
8 THE WORLD CRISIS
htit so many foes foaming in his wake. The wonder is that
Le did not shipwreck himself a score of times. The buoyancy
c t his genius alone supported the burden. Indeed, in the
process of years the profuse and imprudent violence of his
letters became, in a sense, its own protection. People came
to believe that this was the breezy style appropriate to our
guardians of the deep, and the old Admiral swept forward on
his stormy course.
To me, in this period of preparation, the arrival of his
letters was always a source of lively interest and pleasure. I
was regaled with eight or ten closely- written double pages,
fastened together with a little pearl pin or a scrap of silken
ribbon, and containing every kind of news and counsel, vary-
ing from blistering reproach to the highest forms of inspira-
tion and encouragement. From the very beginning his let-
ters were couched in an affectionate and paternal style. " My
beloved Winston," they began, ending usually with a varia-
tion of "Yours to a cinder," " Yours till Hell freezes," or
"Till charcoal sprouts," followed by a P.S. and two or three
more pages of pregnant and brilliant matter. I have found it
impossible to re-read these letters without sentiments of strong
regard for him, his fiery soul, his volcanic energy, his deep
creative mind, his fierce outspoken hatreds, his love of Eng-
land. Alas, there was a day when Hell froze and charcoal
sprouted and friendship was reduced to cinders; when "My
beloved Winston" had given place to "First Lord: I can no
longer be your colleague." I am glad to be able to chronicle
that this was not the end of our long and intimate relationship.
Sir Arthur Wilson, the First Sea Lord, received me with
his customary dignified simplicity. He could not, of course,
be wholly unaware of the main causes which had brought me
to the Admiralty. In conversation with the other Sea Lords
when the well-kept secret of my appointment first reached the
Admiralty, he said: "We are to have new masters: if they
ADMIRALS ALL 79
wish us to serve them, we will do so, and if not, they will find
others to carry on the work." I had only met him hitherto
at the conferences of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and
my opinions were divided between an admiration for all I
heard of his character and a total disagreement with what
I understood to be his strategic views. He considered the
creation of a War Staff quite unnecessary: I had come to
set one up. He did not approve of the War Office plans
for sending an army to France in the event of war: I con-
sidered it my duty to perfect these arrangements to the
smallest detail. He was, as I believed, still an advocate of
a close blockade of the German ports, which to my lay or
military mind the torpedo seemed already to have rendered
impossible.1 These were large and vital differences. He on
his side probably thought we had got into an unnecessary
panic over the Agadir crisis, and that we did not properly un-
derstand the strength and mobility of the British Fleet nor the
true character of British strategic power. He was due to re-
tire for age from the Service in three or four months, unless his
tenure had been extended, while I, for my part, came to the
Admiralty with a very clear intention to have an entirely
new Board of my own choosing. In these circumstances our
association was bound to be bleak.
This is, however, the moment for me to give an impres-
sion of this striking naval personality. He was, without
any exception, the most selfless man I have ever met or even
read of. He wanted nothing, and he feared nothing — ab-
solutely nothing. Whether he was commanding the British
Fleet or repairing an old motor-car, he was equally keen,
equally interested, equally content. To step from a great
office into absolute retirement, to return from retirement to
the pinnacle of naval power, were transitions which produced
1 The close blockade of the German ports was prescribed in the
war orders of 1909, during Lord Fisher's term of office. Sir Arthur
Wilson did not reveal any modification, which he had made in conse-
quence of new conditions to anyone.
80 THE WORLD CRISIS
no change in the beat of that constant heart. Everything was
duty. It was not merely that nothing else mattered. There
was nothing else. One did one's duty as well as one possibly
could, be it great or small, and naturally one deserved no re-
ward. This had been the spirit in which he had lived his long
life afloat, and which by his example he had spread far and wide
through the ranks of the Navy. It made him seem very un-
sympathetic on many occasions, both to officers and men.
Orders were orders, whether they terminated an officer's pro-
fessional career or led him on to fame, whether they involved
the most pleasant or the most disagreeable work; and he would
snap his teeth and smile his wintry smile to all complaints
and to sentiment and emotion in every form. Never once
did I see his composure disturbed. He never opened up,
never unbent. Never once, until a very dark day for me, did
I learn that my work had met with favour in his eyes.
All the same, for all his unsympathetic methods, "Tug,"
as he was generally called (because he was always working,
i. e., pulling, hauling, tugging), or alternatively "old 'Ard
'Art," was greatly loved in the Fleet. Men would do hard
and unpleasant work even when they doubted its necessity,
because he had ordered it and it was "his way." He had
served as a midshipman in the Crimean War. Every one
knew the story of his V.C., when the square broke at Tamai in
the Soudan, and when he was seen, with the ammunition of
his Gatling exhausted, knocking the Dervish spearmen over
one after another with his fists, using the broken hilt of his
sword as a sort of knuckle duster. Stories were told of his
apparent insensibility to weather and climate. He would
wear a thin monkey-jacket in mid-winter in the North Sea
with apparent comfort while every one else was shivering in
great coats. He would stand bareheaded under a tropical
sun without ill effects. He had a strong inventive turn of
mind, and considerable mechanical knowledge. The system
of counter-mining in use for forty years in the Navy, and
ADMIRALS ALL 81
the masthead semaphore which continued till displaced by
wireless telegraphy, were both products of his ingenuity.
He was an experienced and masterly commander of a Fleet
at sea. In addition to this he expressed himself with great
clearness and thoroughness on paper, many of his documents
being extended arguments of exact detail and widely compre-
hensive scope. He impressed me from the first as a man of
the highest quality and stature, but, as I thought, dwelling
too much in the past of naval science, not sufficiently re-
ceptive of new ideas when conditions were changing so
rapidly, and, of course, tenacious and unyielding in the last
degree.
After we had had several preliminary talks and I found we
were not likely to reach an agreement, I sent him a minute
about the creation of a Naval War Staff, which raised an un-
mistakable issue. He met it by a powerfully reasoned and
unqualified refusal, and I then determined to form a new
Board of Admiralty without delay. The Lords of the Ad-
miralty hold quasi-ministerial appointments, and it was of
course necessary to put my proposals before the Prime Min-
ister and obtain his assent.
Mr, Churchill to the Prime Minister,
H.M.S. Enchantress,
Portsmouth.
November 5, 191 1.
The enclosed memorandum from Sir A. Wilson is decisive in
its opposition, not only to any particular scheme, but against
the whole principle of a War Staff for the Navy. Ottley's1
rejoinder, which I also send you, shows that it would not be
difficult to continue the argument. But I feel that this
might easily degenerate into personal controversy, and would,
in any case, be quite unavailing. I like Sir A. Wilson per-
sonally, and should be very sorry to run the risk of embitter-
JSir Charles Ottley: at that time Secretary to the Committee of
Imperial Defence.
82 THE WORLD CRISIS
ing relations which are now pleasant. I therefore propose to
take no public action during his tenure.
If Wilson retires in the ordinary course in March, I shall
be left without a First Sea Lord in the middle of the passage of
the Estimates, and his successor will not be able to take any
real responsibility for them. It is necessary, therefore, that
the change should be made in January at the latest.
I could, if it were imperative, propose to you a new Board
for submission to the King at once. The field of selection for
the first place is narrow; and since I have, with a good deal of
reluctance, abandoned the idea of bringing Fisher back, no
striking appointment is possible. I may, however, just as
well enjoy the advantage of reserving a final choice for an-
other month. At present, therefore, I will only say that Prince
Louis is certainly the best man to be Second Sea Lord, that I
find myself in cordial agreement with him on nearly every
important question of naval policy, and that he will accept the
appointment gladly. ... I should thus hope to start in the
New Year with a united and progressive Board, and with the
goodwill of both the factions whose animosities have done so
much harm.
Meanwhile I am elaborating the scheme of a War Staff.
Mr. Churchill to the Prime Minister.
November 16, 191 1.
I have now to put before you my proposals for a new Board
of Admiralty, and the changes consequent thereupon. Having
now seen all the principal officers who might be considered
candidates for such a post, I pronounce decidedly in favour
of Sir Francis Bridgeman as First Sea Lord. He is a fine
sailor, with the full confidence of the Service afloat, and with
the aptitude for working with and through a staff, well devel-
oped. If, as would no doubt be the case, he should bring
Captain de Bartolome as his Naval Assistant, I am satisfied
that the work of this office would proceed smoothly and with
despatch. I have discussed the principal questions of strategy,
administration and finance with him, and believe that we are
in general agreement on fundamental principles. If you ap-
prove, I will write to Sir Francis and enter more fully into
these matters in connection with an assumption by him of
these new duties.
ADMIRALS ALL 83
This appointment harmonises, personally and adminis-
tratively, with that of the new Second Sea Lord, Prince
Louis of Battenberg, of whom I have already written to you,
and of whose assistance I have the highest expectations.
Rear-Admiral Briggs, the Controller and Third Sea Lord, has,
after a year, just begun to acquire a complete knowledge of
his very extensive department, and I do not think it necessary
to transfer him at the present time. He will be the only
naval member of the old Board to remain. Rear- Admiral
Madden is, in any case, leaving on January 5, and I am ad-
vised from all quarters, including both the proposed First and
Second Sea Lords, that the best man to fill his place is Captain
Pakenham. This officer, who is very highly thought of for
his intellectual attainments, has also the rare distinction of
having served throughout the Russo-Japanese War, including
the battle of the Tsushima.
The Home Fleet, which becomes vacant, has not, unhappily,
any candidate of clear and pre-eminent qualifications. Ad-
miral Jellicoe is not yet sufficiently in command of the confi-
dence of the Sea Service, to justify what would necessarily be a
very startling promotion. I shall, however, be taking the per-
fectly straightforward and unexceptionable course in placing
Vice-Admiral Sir George Callaghan, the present Second in
Command, who has been in almost daily control of the largest
manoeuvres of the Home Fleet, and who has previously been
Second in Command in the Mediterranean, in the place of Sir
F. Bridgeman. Sir John Jellicoe will be his Second in Com-
mand, and we shall thus be able to see what fitness he will
develop for the succession.
It appears to me not merely important but necessary that
these changes should operate without delay. The draft
Estimates have all arrived for discussion, and a month of the
most severe work, governing the whole future policy of the
next two years, awaits the Board of Admiralty. This task
can only be satisfactorily discharged if it is undertaken by
men who come together with consenting minds, and who will
find themselves responsible to the Cabinet and to Parliament
for the immediate consequences of their decisions. I would
therefore ask you to authorise me to approach all parties
concerned without delay, and unless some unexpected hitch
occurs I shall hope to submit the list to the King not later
84 THE WORLD CRISIS
than Wednesday next. The New Board would thus be fully-
constituted before the end of the present month.
Afloat the decisive appointment was that of Sir John Jellicoe
to be second in command of the Home Fleet. He thus in
effect passed over the heads of four or five of the most impor-
tant senior Admirals on the active list and became virtually
designated for the supreme command in the near future.
The announcement of these changes (November 28) created
a considerable sensation in the House of Commons when,
late at night, they became known. All the Sea Lords, except
one, had been replaced by new men. I was immediately in-
terrogated, "Had they resigned, or been told to go?" and
so on. I gave briefly such explanations as were necessary.
At this time I was very strong, because most of those who
knew the inner history of the Agadir crisis were troubled about
the Fleet, and it was well known that I had been sent to the
Admiralty to make a new and a vehement effort.
Sir Arthur Wilson and I parted on friendly, civil, but at
the same time cool terms. He showed not the least resent-
ment at the short curtailment of his tenure. He was as good-
tempered and as distant as ever. Only once did he show
the slightest sign of vehemence. That was when I told him
that the Prime Minister was willing to submit his name to
the King for a Peerage. He disengaged himself from this
with much vigour. What would he do with such a thing?
It would be ridiculous. However, His Majesty resolved to
confer upon him the Order of Merit, and this he was finally
persuaded to accept. On his last night in office he gave a
dinner to the new Sea Lords in the true "band of brothers"
style, and then retired to Norfolk. I could not help think-
ing uncomfortably of the famous Tenniel cartoon, " Drop-
ping the Pilot," where the inexperienced and impulsive Ger-
man Emperor is depicted carelessly watching the venerable
figure of Bismarck descending the ladder. Nevertheless I
ADMIRALS ALL 85
had acted on high public grounds and on those alone, and
I fortified myself with them.
As will be seen in its proper place, Sir Arthur Wilson came
back to the Admiralty three years later, and worked with
Lord Fisher and me during the six months of our association
in the war. When Lord Fisher resigned in May, 19 15, I in-
vited Sir Arthur to take up the duties of First Sea Lord and
he consented to do so. On learning, however, a few days
later that I was to leave the Admiralty, he wrote to Mr. As-
quith refusing to undertake the task under any other First
Lord but me. Here is his letter: —
Dear Mr. Asquith, — / x9> I9I5-
In view of the reports in the papers this morning as to the
probable reconstruction of the Government, I think I ought
to tell you that although I agreed to undertake the office of
First Sea Lord under Mr. Churchill because it appeared to me
to be the best means of maintaining continuity of policy
under the unfortunate circumstances that have arisen, I am
not prepared to undertake the duties under any new First
Lord, as the strain under such circumstances would be far
beyond my strength.
Believe me,
Yours truly,
A. K. Wilson.
At that time I hardly seemed to have a friend in the official
or Parliamentary world. All the press were throwing the
blame of the Dardanelles entanglement and of many other
things upon me, and I was everywhere represented as a rash,
presumptuous person with whom no Board of Admiralty
could work. Sir Arthur had never previously given me any
sign of approval, though, of course, we had laboured together
day after day. I was, therefore, astounded to learn what he
had done. It came as an absolute surprise to me: and I do
not mind saying that I felt as proud as a young officer men-
86 THE WORLD CRISIS
tioned for the first time in dispatches. I thought it my duty,
however, to try to overcome his objections, as I knew the
Prime Minister wanted him to take the post. But it was all
in vain. He stuck to his opinion that he could do it with me
and with nobody else. I felt deeply touched. There was noth-
ing to be touched about, he observed, "You know all the moves
on the board. I should only have to put the brake on from
time to time. I could not possibly manage with anyone else."
And that was the end of it. He continued working in a sub-
ordinate position at the Admiralty till the end of the war.
I hardly ever saw him afterwards; but I have preserved a
memory which is very precious to me.
The new Fourth Sea Lord was an officer of singular firm-
ness of character. He possessed a unique experience of naval
war. Since Nelson himself, no British naval officer had been so
long at sea in time of war on a ship of war without setting foot
on land. Captain Pakenham had been fourteen months afloat
in the battleship Asahi during the war between Russia and
Japan. Although this vessel was frequently in harbour,
he would not leave it for fear she might sail without him;
and there alone, the sole European in a great ship's company
of valiant, reticent, inscrutable Japanese, he had gone through
the long vigil outside Port Arthur, with its repeated episodes
of minefields and bombardments, till the final battle in the
Sea of Japan. Always faultlessly attired, with stiff white col-
lar and an immovable eye-glass, he matched the Japanese with
a punctilio and reserve the equal of their own, and finally
captivated their martial spirit and won their unstinted and
outspoken admiration. Admiral Togo has related how the
English officer, as the Asahi was going into action at the
last great battle, when the heavy shells had already begun
to strike the ship, remained impassive alone on the open after-
bridge making his notes and taking his observations of the
developing action for the reports which he was to send to his
Government; and acclaiming him, with Japanese chivalry,
ADMIRALS ALL 87
recommended him to the Emperor for the highest honour this
war-like and knightly people could bestow.
The unique sea-going record in time of war on a ship of
war which Captain Pakenham brought to the Admiralty has
been maintained by him to this day, and to fourteen months
of sea-going service with the Japanese Fleet, he may now add
fifty-two months constant service with the Battle-Cruisers,
during which time it is credibly reported that he never on
any occasion at sea lay down to rest otherwise than fully
dressed, collared and booted, ready at any moment of the
night or day.
A few weeks after my arrival at the Admiralty I was told
that among several officers of Flag rank who wished to see
me was Rear- Admiral Beatty. I had never met him before,
but I had the following impressions about him. First, that he
was the youngest Flag Officer in the Fleet. Second, that he
had commanded the white gunboat which had come up the
Nile as close as possible to support the 21st Lancers when
we made the charge at Omdurman. Third, that he had seen
a lot of righting on land with the army, and that consequently
he had military as well as naval experience. Fourth, that
he came of a hard-riding stock; his father had been in my
own regiment, the 4th Hussars, and I had often heard him
talked of when I first joined. The Admiral, I knew, was a
very fine horseman, with what is called "an eye for coun-
try. " Fifth, that there was much talk in naval circles of his
having been pushed on too fast. Such were the impressions
aroused in my mind by the name of this officer, and I record
them with minuteness because the decisions which I had the
honour of taking in regard to him were most serviceable to
the Royal Navy and to the British arms.
I was, however, advised about him at the Admiralty in a
decisively adverse sense. He had got on too fast, he had many
interests ashore. His heart it was said was not wholly in the
Service. He had been offered an appointment in the Atlantic
88 THE WORLD CRISIS
Fleet suited to his rank as Rear-Admiral. He had declined this
appointment — a very serious step for a Naval Officer to take
when appointments were few in proportion to candidates —
and he should in consequence not be offered any further em-
ployment. It would be contrary to precedent to make a
further offer. He had already been unemployed for eigh-
teen months, and would probably be retired in the ordinary
course at the expiration of the full three years' unemploy-
ment.
But my first meeting with the Admiral induced me imme-
diately to disregard this unfortunate advice. He became at
once my Naval Secretary (or Private Secretary, as the ap-
pointment was then styled). Working thus side by side in
rooms which communicated, we perpetually discussed during
the next fifteen months the problems of a naval war with Ger-
many. It became increasingly clear to me that he viewed
questions of naval strategy and tactics in a different light
from the average naval officer: he approached them, as it
seemed to me, much more as a soldier would. His war experi-
ences on land had illuminated the facts he had acquired in his
naval training. He was no mere instrumentalist. He did not
think of materiel as an end in itself but only as a means. He
thought of war problems in their unity by land, sea and air.
His mind had been rendered quick and supple by the situa-
tions of polo and the hunting-field, and enriched by varied ex-
periences against the enemy on Nile gunboats, and ashore.
It was with equal pleasure and profit that I discussed with
him our naval problem, now from this angle, now from that;
and I was increasingly struck with the shrewd and profound
sagacity of his comments expressed in language singularly
free from technical jargon.
I had no doubts whatever when the command of the Battle-
Cruiser Squadron fell vacant in the spring of 19 13, in appoint-
ing him over the heads of all to this incomparable command,
the nucleus as it proved to be of the famous Battle-Cruiser
ADMIRALS ALL 89
Fleet — the strategic cavalry of the Royal Navy, that supreme
combination of speed and power to which the thoughts of
the Admiralty were continuously directed. And when two
years later (February 3, 19 15) I visited him on board the Lion,
with the scars of victorious battle fresh upon her from the
action of the Dogger Bank, I heard from his Captains and his
Admirals the expression of their respectful but intense enthusi-
asm for their leader. Well do I remember how, as I was leav-
ing the ship, the usually imperturbable Admiral Pakenham
caught me by the sleeve, " First Lord, I wish to speak to you
in private/' and the restrained passion in his voice as he said,
"Nelson has come again." Those words often recurred to my
mind.
So much of my work in endeavouring to prepare the Fleet
for war was dependent upon the guidance and help I received
from Prince Louis of Battenberg, who, taking it as a whole,
was my principal counsellor, as Second Sea Lord from Jan-
uary, 1912, to March, 1913 (when Sir Francis Bridgeman's
health temporarily failed), and as First Sea Lord thence-
forward to the end of October, 19 14, that it is necessary to
give some description of this remarkable Prince and British
sailor. All the more is this necessary since the accident of
his parentage struck him down in the opening months of the
Great War and terminated his long professional career.
Prince Louis was a child of the Royal Navy. From his ear-
liest years he had been bred to the sea. The deck of a British
warship was his home. All his interest was centred in the
British Fleet. So far from his exalted rank having helped him
it had hindered his career: up to a certain point no doubt it
had been of assistance, but after that it had been a positive
drawback. In consequence he had spent an exceptionally
large proportion of his forty years' service afloat usually in
the less agreeable commands. One had heard at Malta how
he used to bring his Cruiser Squadron into that small, crowded
harbour at speed and then in the nick of time, with scarcely
9o THE WORLD CRISIS
a hundred yards to spare, by dropping his anchors, checking on
his cables and going full speed astern, bring it safely into sta-
tion. He had a far wider knowledge of war by land and sea
and of the Continent of Europe than most of the other Ad-
mirals I have known. His brother, as King of Bulgaria, had
shown military aptitudes of a very high order at the Battle
of Slivnitza, and he himself was deeply versed in every detail,
practical and theoretic, of the British Naval Service. It was
not without good reason that he had been appointed under Lord
Fisher to be Head of the British Naval Intelligence Depart-
ment, that vital ganglion of our organisation. He was a
thoroughly trained and accomplished Staff Officer, with a gift
of clear and lucid statement and all that thoroughness and
patient industry which we have never underestimated in the
German race.
It was recounted of him that on one occasion, when he
visited Kiel with King Edward, a German Admiral in high
command had reproached him with serving in the British Fleet,
whereat Prince Louis, stiffening, had replied "Sir, when I
joined the Royal Navy in the year 1868, the German Empire
did not exist."
The part which he played in the events with which I am
dealing will be recorded as the story unfolds.
Our first labour was the creation of the War Staff. All the
details of this were worked out by Prince Louis and approved
by the First Sea Lord. I also resorted to Sir Douglas Haig,
at that time in command at Aldershot. The general furnished
me with a masterly paper setting forth the military doctrine
of Staff organisation and constituting in many respects a
formidable commentary on existing naval methods. Armed
with these various opinions, I presented my conclusions to
the public in January, 191 2, in a document of which the first
two paragraphs may be repeated here. They were, as will be
seen, designed so far as possible to disarm the prejudices of
the naval service.
ADMIRALS ALL 91
1. In establishing a War Staff for the Navy it is necessary
to observe the broad differences of character and circum-
stances which distinguish naval from military problems.
War on land varies in every country according to numberless
local conditions, and each new theatre, like each separate
battle-field, requires a special study. A whole series of in-
tricate arrangements must be thought out and got ready for
each particular case; and these are expanded and refined con-
tinuously by every increase in the size of armies, and by
every step towards the perfection of military science. The
means by which superior forces can be brought to decisive
points in good condition and at the right time are no whit less
vital, and involve far more elaborate processes than the stra-
tegic choice of those points, or the actual conduct of the
fighting. The sea, on the other hand, is all one, and, though
ever changing, always the same. Every ship is self-contained
and self-propelled. The problems of transport and supply,
the infinite peculiarities of topography which are the increas-
ing study of the general staffs of Europe, do not affect the
naval service except in an occasional and limited degree.
The main part of the British Fleet in sufficient strength to seek
a general battle is always ready to proceed to sea without any
mobilisation of reserves as soon as steam is raised. Ships or
fleets of ships are capable of free and continuous movement
for many days and nights together, and travel at least as
far in an hour as an army can march in a day. Every vessel
is in instant communication with its fleet and with the Ad-
miralty, and all can be directed from the ports where they
are stationed on any sea points chosen for massing, by a
short and simple order. Unit efficiency, that is to say, the
individual fighting power of each vessel and each man, is in
the sea service for considerable periods entirely independent
of all external arrangements, and unit efficiency at sea, far
more even than on land, is the prime and final factor, without
which the combinations of strategy and tactics are only the
preliminaries of defeat, but with which even faulty disposi-
tions can be swiftly and decisively retrieved. For these and
other similar reasons a Naval War Staff does not require to
be designed on the same scale or in the same form as the
General Staff of the Army.
2. Naval war is at once more simple and more intense
92 THE WORLD CRISIS
than war on land. The executive action and control of fleet
and squadron Commanders is direct and personal in a far
stronger degree than that of Generals in the field, especially
under modern conditions. The art of handling a great fleet
on important occasions with deft and sure judgment is the
supreme gift of the Admiral, and practical seamanship must
never be displaced from its position as the first qualification
of every sailor. The formation of a War Staff does not mean
the setting up of new standards of professional merit or the
opening of a road of advancement to a different class of of-
ficers. It is to be the means of preparing and training those
officers who arrive, or are likely to arrive, by the excellence of
their sea service at stations of high responsibility, for dealing
with the more extended problems which await them there.
It is to be the means of sifting, developing, and applying the
results of actual experience in history and present practice,
and of preserving them as a general stock of reasoned opinion
available as an aid and as a guide for all who are called upon
to determine, in peace or war, the naval policy of the coun-
try. It is to be a brain far more comprehensive than that of
any single man, however gifted, and tireless and unceasing
in its action, applied continuously to the scientific and specu-
lative study of naval strategy and preparation. It is to be
an instrument capable of formulating any decision which has
been taken, or may be taken, by the Executive in terms of
precise and exhaustive detail.
I never ceased to labour at the formation of a true General
Staff for the Navy. In May, 1914, basing myself on the re-
port of a Committee which I had set up a year before, I
drafted a fairly complete scheme for the further development
of Staff training. I quote a salient passage:1
It is necessary to draw a distinction between the measures
required to secure a general diffusion of military knowledge
among naval officers and the definite processes by which
Staff Officers are trained. The first may be called " Military
Education," and the second "War Staff Training." They
require to be treated separately and not mixed together as
*The memorandum abridged can be read in Appendix A.
ADMIRALS ALL 93
in the report of the Committee. Both must again be dis-
tinguished from all questions of administration, of material,
and of non-military education and training. The application
of fighting power can thus be separated from its development.
We are not now concerned with the forging of the weapon,
but only with its use.
'As early as possible in his service the mind of the young
officer must be turned to the broad principles of war by sea
and land. His interest must be awakened. He must be put
in touch with the right books and must be made to feel the
importance of the military aspect of his profession. . . .'
But it takes a generation to form a General Staff. No
wave of the wand can create those habits of mind in seniors
on which the efficiency and even the reality of a Staff depends.
Young officers can be trained, but thereafter they have to
rise step by step in the passage of time to positions of author-
ity in the Service. The dead weight of professional opinion
was adverse. They had got on well enough without it before.
They did not want a special class of officer professing to be
more brainy than the rest. Sea-time should be the main
qualification, and next to that technical aptitudes. Thus
when I went to the Admiralty I found that there was no mo-
ment in the career and training of a naval officer, when he was
obliged to read a single book about naval war, or pass even
the most rudimentary examination in naval history. The
Royal Navy had made no important contribution to Naval
literature. The standard work on Sea Power was written by
an American Admiral.1 The best accounts of British sea
fighting and naval strategy were compiled by an English
civilian.2 'The Silent Service' was not mute because it was
absorbed in thought and study, but because it was weighted
down by its daily routine and by its ever complicating and
diversifying technique. We had competent administrators,
brilliant experts of every description, unequalled navigators,
Admiral Mahan. 2Sir Julian Corbett.
94 THE WORLD CRISIS
good disciplinarians, fine sea-officers, brave and devoted
hearts: but at the outset of the conflict we had more captains
of ships than captains of war. In this will be found the ex-
planation of many untoward events. At least fifteen years of
consistent policy were required to give the Royal Navy that
widely extended outlook upon war problems and of war situa-
tions without which seamanship, gunnery, instrumentalisms
of every kind, devotion of the highest order, could not achieve
their due reward.
Fifteen years ! And we were only to have thirty months !
CHAPTER V
THE GERMAN NAVY LAW
1912
'The young disease, that must subdue at length,
Grows with his growth, and strengthens with his strength.'
Pope, Essay on Man.
The Morrow of Agadir — Mission of Sir Ernest Cassel — The New Ger-
man Navy Law — The Haldane Visit to Berlin — An Imperial
Mare's Nest — The Opening of the Reichstag — A Speech at Glas-
gow— The Luxus Flotte — Mr. Haldane Returns — Attempt to
reach a Settlement — Correspondence with Lord Fisher — Fisher's
Vision — The Navy Estimates — The Naval Holiday — Efforts at
Goodwill — Consequences of German Naval Power — Von Tir-
pitz' Illusions — Anglo-French Naval Conversations — The En-
tente strengthened — Von Tirpitz' Unwisdom — Organisation of
the Navy — The New Structure — With the Fleet — The Enchantress
in Portland Harbour — The Safeguard of Freedom.
HAVE shown how forward the Chancellor of the Ex-
•*- chequer was during the crisis of Agadir in every matter
that could add to the strength of the British attitude. But as
soon as the danger was passed he adopted a different de-
meanour. He felt that an effort should be made to heal any
smart from which Germany might be suffering, and to arrive
at a common understanding on naval strength. We knew
that a formidable new Navy Law was in preparation and
would shortly be declared. If Germany had definitely made
up her mind to antagonise Great Britain, we must take up the
challenge; but it might be possible by friendly, sincere and
intimate conversation to avert this perilous development.
We were no enemies to German Colonial expansion, and we
would even have taken active steps to further her wishes in
this respect. Surely something could be done to break the
chain of blind causation. If aiding Germany in the Colonial
95
96 THE WORLD CRISIS
sphere was a means of procuring a stable situation, it was a %
price we were well prepared to pay. I was in full accord with
this view. Apart from wider reasons, I felt I should be all the
stronger in asking the Cabinet and the House of Commons
for the necessary monies, if I could go hand in hand with
the Chancellor of the Exchequer and testify that we had tried
our best to secure a mitigation of the naval rivalry and
failed. We therefore jointly consulted Sir Edward Grey, and
then with the Prime Minister's concurrence we invited Sir &,
Ernest Cassel to go to Berlin and get into direct touch with the
Emperor. Sir Ernest was qualified for this task, as he knew
the Emperor well and was at the same time devoted to Brit-
ish interests. We armed him with a brief but pregnant mem-
orandum, which cannot be more tersely summarized than in
von Bethmann-Hollweg's own words1: 'Acceptance of English
superiority at sea — no augmentation of the German naval pro-
gramme— a reduction as far as possible of that programme —
and on the part of England, no impediment to our Colonial
expansion — discussion and promotion of our Colonial am-
bitions— proposals for mutual declarations that the two
Powers would not take part in aggressive plans or combina-
tions against one another.' Cassel accepted the charge and
started at once. He remained only two days in Berlin and came
at once to me on his return. He brought with him a cordial
letter from the Emperor and a fairly full statement by von Beth-
mann-Hollweg of the new German Navy Law. We devoured
this invaluable document all night long in the Admiralty, and < &>
in the morning I wrote as follows to Sir Edward Grey : —
January 31, 191 2.
Cassel returned last night, having travelled continuously
from Berlin. At 10 a.m. on Monday he saw Ballin, who
went forthwith to the German Chancellor, and in the after-
noon he saw Ballin, Bethmann-Hollweg and the Emperor to-
gether. They all appeared deeply pleased by the overture.
1 Reflections on the World War, v. Bethmann-Hollweg, p. 48.
THE GERMAN NAVY LAW 97
Bethmann-Hollweg, earnest and cordial, the Emperor 'en-
chanted, almost childishly so.' The Emperor talked a great
deal on naval matters to Cassel, the details of which he was
unable to follow. After much consultation the Emperor
wrote out with Bethmann-Hollweg paper, 'A/ which Ballin
transcribed. The second paper, 'B/ is Bethmann-Hollweg's
statement of the impending naval increases, translated by
Cassel. Cassel says they did not seem to know what they
wanted in regard to colonies. They did not seem to be greatly
concerned about expansion. ' There were ten large companies
in Berlin importing labour into Germany.' Over-population
was not their problem. They were delighted with Cassel's
rough notes of our ideas. They are most anxious to hear
from us soon. . . .
Such is my report.
Observations.
It seems certain that the new Navy Law will be presented
to the Reichstag, and that it will be agreed to, even the So-
cialists not resisting. The naval increases are serious, and
will require new and vigorous measures on our part. The
spirit may be good, but the facts are grim. I had been think-
ing that if the old German programme had been adhered to,
we should have built 4, 3, 4, 3, 4, 3, against their six years'
programme of 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2. If their new programme stands,
as I fear it must, and they build 3, 2, 3, 2, 3, 2, we cannot build
less than 5, 4, 5, 4, 5, 4. This maintains 60 per cent, superi-
ority in Dreadnoughts and Dreadnought Cruisers over Ger-
many only. It will also be 2 keels to 1 on their additional 3
ships.
The creation of a third squadron in full commission is also
a serious and formidable provision. At present, owing to the
fact that in the six winter months the first and second squad-
rons of the High Sea Fleet are congested with recruits, there
is a great relief to us from the strain to which we are put by
German naval power. The addition of the third squadron
will make that strain continual throughout the year. The
maintenance in full commission of 25 battleships, which after
the next four or five years will all be Dreadnoughts, exposes
us to constant danger, only to be warded off by vigilance ap-
proximating to war conditions. A further assurance against
98 THE WORLD CRISIS
attack is at present found in the fact that several of the German
Dreadnoughts are very often the wrong side of the Kiel Canal,
which they cannot pass through and must therefore make a
long detour. The deepening of the Canal by 1913 will extin-
guish this safety signal.1 The fact that the defenders are al-
ways liable to be attacked while only at their ordinary average
strength by an enemy at his selected moment and consequent
maximum strength, means that our margins would have to
be very large. Against 25 battleships we could not keep less
than 40 available within twenty-four hours. This will involve
additional expense.
The German increase in personnel must also be met. I had
intended to ask Parliament for 2,000 more men this year and
2,000 next. I expect to have to double these quotas. On the
whole the addition to our estimates consequent upon German
increases will not be less than three millions a year. This is
certainly not dropping the naval challenge.
I agree with you that caution is necessary. In order to
meet the new German squadron, we are contemplating bring-
ing home the Mediterranean battleships. This means relying
on France in the Mediterranean,2 and certainly no exchange
of system3 would be possible, even if desired by you.
The only chance I see is roughly this. They will announce
their new programme, and we will make an immediate and
effective reply. Then if they care to slow down the ' tempo '
so that their Fleet Law is accomplished in twelve and not in
six years, friendly relations would ensue, and we, though I
should be reluctant to bargain about it, could slow down too.
All they would have to do, would be to make their quotas
biennial instead of annual. Nothing would be deranged in
their plan. Twelve years of tranquillity would be assured in
naval policy. The attempt ought to be made.
We laid these matters before the Cabinet, who decided
that a British Cabinet Minister should go to Berlin and
selected Mr. Haldane for that purpose. The ex-Emperor in
his Memoirs makes a ridiculous story out of this: —
1 It was not in fact completed till August, 1914.
2 By later decision a Squadron of British Battle-cruisers was stationed
in the Mediterranean.
3 i.e. The Entente.
THE GERMAN NAVY LAW 99
'. . . a keen dispute had arisen among Ministers — espe-
cially between Churchill and Grey — as to who should go to
Berlin, in the event of the achievement of the object of mak-
ing Germany abandon the further development of her fleet,
and affix his name to this great historical document. Churchill
considered himself the right man for the job, seeing that he
was the head of the Navy, but Grey and Asquith would not
allow their colleague to reap the glory. Thus for a time,
Grey stood in the foreground — another proof that some po-
litical purpose rather than the number of ships was the lead-
ing factor. After a while, however, it was decided that it
was more fitting to Grey's personal and official importance
that he should appear only at the termination of the nego-
tiations, to affix his name to the agreement, and . . . "to
get his dinner from the Emperor and to come in for his part
of the festivities and fireworks, " which, in good German,
means to enjoy the "Bengal light illumination. " As it had
been decided that in any event Churchill was not to get this,
it was necessary to choose somebody for the negotiations who
was in close accord with Asquith and Grey and who, possess-
ing their complete confidence, was willing to conduct the
negotiations as far as the beginning of the "fireworks"; one,
moreover, who was already known at Berlin and not a stranger
to Germany. Churchill certainly qualified to this extent, for
he had attended the Imperial manoeuvres in Silesia and Wur-
temberg on several occasions as a guest of the Emperor.'
On this it may be observed that there never was any ques- ^
tion of my going to Berlin to negotiate about the Navy; nor
did I at this time wish to go. All the British ministers con-
cerned worked together in the utmost accord. After full dis-
cussions we authorized Sir Ernest Cassel to send the following
telegram: —
Sir E. Cassel to Herr Ballin (drafted by Sir E. Cassel, the First
Lord, Mr. Haldane, Sir Edward Grey).
February 3, 191 2.
spirit in which statements of German Government have
been made is most cordially appreciated here. New German
programme would entail serious and immediate increase of
ioo THE WORLD CRISIS
British naval expenditure which was based on assumption
that existing German naval programme would be adhered to.
If the British Government are compelled to make such
increase, it would make negotiations difficult if not impossi-
ble.
If, on the other hand, German naval expenditure can be
adapted by an alteration of the tempo or otherwise so as to
render any serious increase unnecessary to meet German pro-
gramme, British Government will be prepared at once to
pursue negotiations on the understanding that the point of
naval expenditure is open to discussion and that there is a fair
prospect of settling it favourably.
If this understanding is acceptable, the British Govern-
ment will forthwith suggest the next step, as they think that
the visit of a British Minister to Berlin should in the first
instance be private and unofficial.
All being acceptable, the Secretary of State for War accom-
panied by Sir Ernest Cassel, started accordingly on February
6 for Berlin.
I had undertaken some weeks earlier to make a speech in
support of the Home Rule Bill in Belfast. Violent hostility
to this project developed in the inflammable capital of Ulster.
Being publicly committed, I had no choice but to fulfil my
engagement, though to avoid unnecessary provocation the
meeting-place was changed from the Ulster Hall to a large
tent which was erected in the outskirts of the city. Threats
of violence and riot were loudly proclaimed on every side
and nearly io,ooo troops were concentrated in the area to
keep the peace. I had planned, if all went well at Belfast,
to go on the next day to Glasgow to inspect some of the
shipbuilding works along the Clyde, and to make a speech
on the Naval position, which should state very plainly our
root intentions and be the necessary counterpart of the Hal-
dane mission. As I was waiting for the train for Ireland to
leave the London railway station, I read in the late edition of
the evening papers the German Emperor's speech on the
THE GERMAN NAVY LAW 101
opening of the Reichstag announcing Bills for the increase
both of the Army and the Navy. The new Navy Law was | &
still a secret to the British and German nations alike, but
knowing as I did its scope and character and viewing it in
conjunction with the Army Bill, I sustained a strong impres-
sion at this moment of the approaching danger. One sen-
tence, full of German self-revelation, stood out vividly. 'It
is my constant duty and care to maintain and to strengthen
on land and water, the power of defence of the German people,
which has no lack of young men fit to bear arms.'' It was in-
deed true. One thought of France with her declining birth-
rate peering out across her fortresses into the wide German
lands and silently reflecting on these 'young men fit to bear
arms' of whom there was indeed 'no lack.' My mind, skip-
ping over the day of Irish turmoil and the worry of the
speech that lay before me, fixed upon Glasgow as the place
where some answer to this threat of continental domination
might perhaps be provided. Once again Europe might find
a safeguard against military overlordship in an island which
had never. been and never would be 'lacking in trained and t#
hardy mariners bred from their boyhood up to the service of
the sea.'
Accordingly, after the Irish ordeal was over, I said at
Glasgow: —
'The purposes of British naval power are essentially de-
fensive. We have no thoughts, and we have never had any
thoughts of aggression, and we attribute no such thoughts to
other great Powers. There is, however, this difference be-
tween the British naval power and the naval power of the
great and friendly Empire — and I trust it may long remain the
great and friendly Empire — of Germany. The British Navy
is to us a necessity and, from some points of view, the German ♦ i
Navy is to them more in the nature of a luxury. Our naval
power involves British existence. It is existence to us; it is
expansion to them. \ We cannot menace the peace of a single
Continental hamlet, no matter how great and supreme our
102 THE WORLD CRISIS
Navy may become. But, on the other hand, the whole for-
tunes of our race and Empire, the whole treasure accumu-
lated during so many centuries of sacrifice and achievement,
would perish and be swept utterly away if our naval suprem-
acy were to be impaired. It is the British Navy which makes
Great Britain a great Power. But Germany was a great
Power, respected and honoured all over the world, before she
had a single ship. . . .
1 If to-day our position is eminently satisfactory we owe much
to the foresight and resolution of Mr. McKenna. . . . What-
ever is needed for the safety of the country will be asked for
by the Government, and granted by the representatives of the
nation with universal assent. There is no need for anxiety in
regard to our shipbuilding capacity. There is no chance what-
ever of our being overtaken in naval strength unless we want
to be. . . .
'But what of the men? We have to-day 135,000 men in the
active service ratings of the Navy. The great bulk of them
are long-service men who have begun as boys and have been
trained as a life-long profession to the naval service. We
have no difficulty in recruiting for the Navy . . . and there
is no doubt whatever of our ability to make any increases
which may be necessary, and which I think will be necessary,
in the personnel of the Navy. We have great reserves of
seamen in this country. There are measures which may be
taken to make a greater use of our reserves than has hith-
erto been found possible, and I have given directions for that
part of the subject to be carefully studied by the naval experts
upon whom I rely. Our reserves, both from the Royal Navy
and from the Mercantile Marine, are a great resource, and this
island has never been, and never will be, lacking in trained and
hardy mariners bred from their boyhood up to the service of the
sea.
1 Whatever may happen abroad there will be no whining here,
no signals of distress will be hoisted, no cries for help or suc-
cour will go up. We will face the future as our ancestors would
have faced it, without disquiet, without arrogance, but in
stolid and inflexible determination. We should be the first
Power to welcome any retardation or slackening of naval
rivalry. We should meet any such slackening not by words
but by deeds. ... If there are to be increases upon the
THE GERMAN NAVY LAW 103
Continent of Europe, we shall have no difficulty in meeting
them to the satisfaction of the country. As naval competition
becomes more acute, we shall have not only to increase the number
of the ships we build, but the ratio which our naval strength will
have to bear to other great naval Powers, so that our margin of
superiority will become larger and not smaller as the strain
grows greater. Thus we shall make it clear that other naval
Powers, instead of overtaking us by additional efforts, will
only be more outdistanced in consequence of the measures
which we ourselves shall take.'
This speech created a considerable outcry in Germany,
which was immediately re-echoed by a very large proportion
of our own Liberal press. It appeared that the word " luxury "
had a bad significance when translated into German. The
lLuxus Flotte' became an expression passed angrily from lip
to lip in Germany. As I expected, on my return to Lon-
don I found my colleagues offended. Their congratulations
upon Belfast were silenced by their reproaches about Glas-
gow. Mr. Haldane returned two days later from Berlin, and
the Cabinet was summoned to receive an account of his mis-
sion. Contrary to general expectation, however, the Secre-
tary of State for War declared that so far from being a hin-
drance to him in his negotiations, the Glasgow speech had
v^ been the greatest possible help. He had in fact used almost
identical arguments to von Bethmann-Hollweg the day before.
He had told the Chancellor that if Germany added a third
squadron we should have ' to maintain five or even six squad-
rons in home waters, perhaps bringing ships from the Medi-
terranean to strengthen them'; that if ships were added to
the existing programme we should c proceed at once to lay
down two keels to each of the new German additions'; and
that for the sake of the Navy ' people would not complain
of the addition of another shilling to the income tax.' He
described how he had read the operative passages in my
speech himself to the Emperor and Von Tirpitz in proof and
confirmation of what he had hirnself been saying during their
104 THE WORLD CRISIS
previous discussions. This settled the matter so far as I was
concerned. It was only another instance of the very manly
and loyal part which Mr. Haldane took at all times and on
every question connected with the preparedness of this coun-
try for war with Germany.
Mr. Haldane brought back with him the actual text of ^
the new German Navy Law, or "Novelle" as it was called.
This had been handed to him by the Emperor during the
course of the discussion. It was an elaborate technical docu-
ment. Mr. Haldane had had the prudence to refuse to ex-
press any opinion upon it till it had been examined by the
Admiralty experts. We now subjected this document to a
rigorous scrutiny. The result more than confirmed my first
unfavourable impression.
'The main feature in the new law,' I reported to the Cab-
inet on February 14, 'is the extraordinary increase in the strik-
ing force of ships of all classes immediately available through-
out the year. Whereas formerly we reckoned against 17
battleships, 4 battle cruisers, and 12 small cruisers in the
active battle fleet, demobilised to a great extent during the
winter months, we must in future prepare against 25, 12
and 18, which are not to be subject to anything like the same
degree of temporary demobilisation. . . . Full permanent
crews are to be provided for all, or nearly all, torpedo boat
destroyers, now aggregating 115, and working up to an au-
thorised total of 144, instead of for half the number as at
present. There is to be an increase on the already large
provision of £750,000 in this year's Estimates for submarines.
The numbers are not stated, but from the fact that 121 ad-
ditional executive officers are required for this service alone
by 1920, we may infer that between 50 and 60 submarines
are to be added.1 We know nothing of the rate at which
this construction is to be achieved. The increases in per-
sonnel are also important. Under their existing law, the Ger-
mans are working to a total of 86,500 in 191 7 by annual in-
crements of 3,500. The new law adds 15,000 officers and men,
and raises the total in 1920 to 101,500.'
*The final published text of the law provided for 72.
THE GERMAN NAVY LAW 105
On March 9 I pointed out that the fundamental propo-
sition of the negotiations from the Admiralty point of view
had been that the existing Germany Navy Law should not be
increased, but, if possible, reduced, whereas on the contrary
a new law was certainly to be enacted providing for large
and progressive increases not only in 191 2 but in the five fol-
lowing years. Practically four-fifths of the German Navy
were to be placed permanently upon a war footing. The
German Government would be able to have available at all
seasons of the year twenty-five, or perhaps twenty-nine, fully
commissioned battleships, ' whereas at the present time the
British Government have in full commission in Home Waters
only twenty- two, even counting the Atlantic Fleet.'
Thus on the fundamental proposition we encountered an
unyielding attitude. Nevertheless we persevered and the
discussion was transferred to the question of a mutual dec-
laration against aggressive plans. Here Sir Edward Grey
offered the following formula: ' England will make no un-
provoked attack upon Germany, and pursue no aggressive
policy towards her. Aggression upon Germany is not the
subject, and forms no part of any treaty, understanding, or
combination to which England is now a party, nor will she
become a party to anything that has such an object/ The
German Government considered this formula inadequate and
suggested through their Ambassador the following additional
clause: ' England will therefore observe at least a benevolent
neutrality should war be forced upon Germany'; or, ' Eng-
land will therefore, as a matter of course, remain neutral if
a war is forced upon Germany.'
This last condition would have carried us far beyond our
original intention, and might well have been held to deprive
us of the power to come to the aid of France in a war l forced,'
or alleged to be ' forced,' upon Germany as the result of a
quarrel between Austria and Russia. It would certainly have
been regarded as terminating the Entente. Moreover, even
106 THE WORLD CRISIS
if we had taken this step the new German Navy Law was
not to be withdrawn. At the most it was to be modified.
Thus a complete deadlock was reached at an early stage.
Still, so important did we think it to create at least a friendly
spirit, and so desirous were we of placating Germany and
gratifying her aspirations, that we still persisted in an en-
deavour to come to an arrangement beneficial to Germany in
the colonial sphere. These negotiations were still progress-
ing and had almost reached a conclusion definitely advanta-
geous to Germany, when the war broke out.
Lord Fisher did not like the idea of a naval programme.
On February 13, 191 2, he wrote: —
'I can't support you at all in any way whatever for any two
years' or more programme. Some d d fool has got hold
of you to have made you say that ! The great secret is to
PUT OFF TO THE VERY LAST HOUR THE SHIP (big Or little) that
you mean to build (or perhaps not build her at all!).
You see all your rival's plans fully developed, their vessels
started beyond recall, and then in each individual answer to
each such rival vessel you plunge with a design 50 per cent,
better ! knowing that your rapid shipbuilding and command
of money will enable you to have your vessel fit to fight as soon
if not sooner than the rival vessel. Sometimes, as in one fa-
mous year, you can drop an armoured ship and put the money
into acceleration of those building because you have a new de-
sign coming along, so don't be a d d ass and deliberately
lay down a ship which you know is obsolete by some sudden
vast step in old Watts' brain! " Sufficient for the year is the
programme thereof" For God's sake get that written up some-
where for you to look at when you get out of bed in the morn-
ing! and do please tell me the name of the born fool who
hoaxed you. Is it . . .? He has just got a gold medal in
America for advocating smaller battleships I believe. . . .
You know Archbishop Whately proved that Napoleon Bona-
parte never existed ! . . .
'We are asses now for not building a 16-inch gun as Sir E.
THE GERMAN NAVY LAW 107
Wilmot told you in the letter I sent you — but you can't help
yourself any more than you can help deliberately laying down
ships for the Line of Battle that go less than 30 knots — there
are certain things my beloved Winston that even God Al-
mighty can't help! (let alone you!). He for instance can't
help two added to two being four ! . . .
1 The most damnable thing in the world is a servile copyist I
One of the four Nelsonic attributes is "Power of Initiative" !
and "Plunge" is the watchword of "Progress" ! but I sicken
you with my reiteration, so good-bye.'
I replied on February 19: —
'I am delighted to see your handwriting again. I had be-
gun to fear the well of truth and inspiration was running dry.
Do not, however, shut your mind against a programme. The
Chancellor of the Exchequer and I have been agreed on this
policy ever since 1909, and I am quite certain that it can be
developed so as to secure the greatest advantages without any
sacrifice of elasticity. Such a programme as I have in mind
will cover the whole period of the existing German Navy Law.
It will deal only with the numbers of capital ships. It will
be framed on certain clearly defined assumptions. It will be
capable both of expansion and of diminution, of retardation
and acceleration. It will not necessarily be embodied in an
Act of Parliament. It will probably have to be revised after
four years. It will recite certain definite facts of the existing
shipbuilding situation, particularly in relation to Germany
and Austria. It will be measured in relation to these facts
so as to secure ample margins of superiority both in new con-
struction and in establishment over those Powers. Unfore-
seen contingencies will be met by additions, but it would al-
ways be open within certain limits for England and Germany
to agree upon proportionate reductions. The programme of
minor construction will be entirely flexible and expressed only
in terms of money.
1 At present we suffer every disadvantage: a panic and a row
every year, spasmodic building, hopeless finance, total lack
of foresight in regard to the labour market, and no means of
bargaining with our competitors. At present we have noth-
ing to put against their threats. Nothing, in my opinion,
would more surely dishearten Germany, than the certain proof
108 THE WORLD CRISIS
that as the result of all her present and prospective efforts she
will only be more hopelessly behindhand in 1920. She would
know it was not bluff because if a Liberal Government could
propose it, a Tory Government would a fortiori carry it farther.
The vast financial reserves of which John Bull can dispose
would come into view, and would weigh in the balance with a
direct and real weight. It is the uncertainty as to whether
we shall throw up the sponge or not, on which the German
Navy has lived and fattened. The standard will be 60 per
cent, preponderance in new construction against the present
law, and two keels to one for all increases above it. Sixty
per cent, preponderance in men, 20 to 12 in destroyers, at
least 2 to 1 in armoured cruisers, protected cruisers and their
equivalents, submarines and small fry generally. This is no
new idea of mine. I have been working it out ever since I came
to the Admiralty, and am absolutely convinced that it is the
only way of securing economy, efficiency and moral effect.
Whether the plan when made should be published is a political
question. How Navy Estimates should be financed is for the
Treasury and the House of Commons to decide. What the
Admiralty are concerned with is the maintenance of proper
margins of superiority, the power to look ahead, and the power
within certain prescribed limits to manoeuvre.
'Hopwood1 and Sir Marcus Samuel are hard at it over oil.'
This letter mollified the admiral. On the 25th February,
191 2, he wrote: —
'I hasten to reply to your letter of February 19th just ar-
rived, because if your Programme (which has my enthusiastic
admiration) is not embodied in an Act of Parliament then all
my objections vanish! An Act of Parliament (The Naval
Defence Act) made us build 20 cruisers that had only 48 hours
coal supply. Can I ever forget that ! but Providence came along
and made them useful as "Minelayers." However ocean
" tramps" at £10 a ton would have been cheaper and more
effective. Sir W. White built the "County Class" and forgot
the guns, but Providence came along and has made them use-
ful for commerce protectors with their 6-inch guns and big
1 Sir Francis Hopwood, now Lord Southborough, the Additional
Civil Lord.
THE GERMAN NAVY LAW 109
coal supply and good speed — however a few " Mauretanias "
would be far more effective than a hundred "Countys" ! l
'I can only pray that your Programme will be officially
published — for it is sure to leak out ! It will add immensely to
your reputation and influence and the moral effect will be
prodigious !
' The Key Note is 2 keels to 1 for all increases above the pres-
ent German Law! 2 to 1 in Armoured Cruisers is also vitall
' You don't say a word of your visit to Jellicoe — but he
does I He is "tnuch impressed with your grasp of the whole
business" and as Jellicoe very seldom indeed gives praise I
think you must have talked well ! as well as that night we stum-
bled over the dockyard stores at Devonport returning from
the Lion and the Monarchl (It's a pity we didn't have a
shorthand writer !)
'Don't make any mistake about big submarines being obliga-
toryl . . .
'Big risks bring big success! (It was Napoleon, wasn't
it? "Risk nothing, get nothing I") Increased surface speed
is above all a necessity, and broadside torpedo discharges and
the bigger gun will come automatically with the above two
essentials, and they (the Big Submarines) will be Destroyers
with all the advantages of the present Destroyers and — as
well — the power of submergence during daylight attacks.
Battle tactics will be revolutionised and England's power will
be multiplied not sevenfold but manifold ! and with a radius
of action of 6,000 miles . . . but it wants an Isaiah to pro-
claim this vision !
' For God's sake trample on and stamp out protected Cruisers
and hurry up Aviation. . . .'
For a specimen of Fisher's genius I commend these last
few lines. Ten years of submarine development, spurred on
by war on the greatest scale, were required to overtake in
exact sequence the processes of that amazing vision in tech-
nical affairs. The consequences to Great Britain were, how-
ever, not so satisfactory as he forecasted.
1 A doubtful gem ! They could have coaled only in a few ports
with special appliances.
no THE WORLD CRISIS
Early in March, while the new German Navy Law was
still unannounced, it was necessary to present our Estimates
to the House of Commons. It would of course have been a
breach of faith with the German Emperor to let any sug-
gestion pass my lips that we already knew what the text of
the Navy Law was. I was therefore obliged to make my first
speech on naval matters on a purely hypothetical basis: 'This
is what we are going to do if no further increases are made in
the German Fleet. Should unhappily the rumours which we
hear prove true, I shall have to present a Supplementary Es-
timate to the House, etc.'
In this speech I laid down clearly, with the assent of the
Cabinet, the principles which should govern our naval con-
struction in the next five years, and the standards of strength
we should follow in capital ships. This standard was as fol-
lows: Sixty per cent, in Dreadnoughts over Germany as long
as she adhered to her present declared programme, and two
keels to one for every additional ship laid down by her. Two
complications of these clear principles were unavoidable.
First, the two 'Lord Nelsons' although not Dreadnoughts
were stronger in many ways, particularly in armour and sub-
division, than the original Dreadnought herself. Although
projected earlier, they had actually been completed later.
Acting on the advice of the Naval Staff, I counted these
throughout as 'Dreadnoughts.' On the other hand, any
ships provided by the Dominions were to be additional to
anything we might build ourselves. Otherwise the efforts of
the Dominions would not have resulted in any accession to
our naval strength, and consequently these efforts might have
been discouraged. Proceeding on these lines I set out the
six years of British construction at 4, 3, 4, 3, 4, 3, against a
uniform German construction of 2. These numbers were well
received by the House of Commons. We were not sure
whether the Germans would adhere to an offer made to Mr.
Haldane to drop one of the three extra ships embodied in
their new Navy Law. This, however, proved ultimately to be
THE GERMAN NAVY LAW in
the case and was at any rate a tangible result of the Haldane
mission. In Tirpitz' words: 'He (Haldane) next came out
with a proposal of a certain delay in the building of the three
ships; could we not distribute them over twelve years? . . .
He only wanted a token of our readiness to meet England,
more for the sake of form. . . . Haldane himself proposed
that we should retard the rate of our increase "in order to
lubricate the negotiations,' ' or that we should at least cancel
the first of the three ships. He outlined in writing of his own
accord the same principle which I had previously fixed upon
in my own mind as a possible concession. I therefore sacrificed
the ship.'
We therefore ' sacrificed ' two hypothetical ships, and our
programmes, which would have been increased to 5, 4, 5, 4,
5, 4, were ultimately declared at 4, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4. The splendid
gift of the Malaya by the Federated Malay States raised the
figure of the first year from 4 to 5.
In announcing these decisions to Parliament later in the
same month I made publicly and definitely those proposals
for a Naval Holiday which were fruitless so far as Britain
and Germany were concerned, but the principle of which has
since been adopted by the English-speaking peoples of the
world: —
'Take, as an instance of this proposition I am putting for-
ward for general consideration, the year 1913. In that year,
as I apprehend, Germany will build three capital ships, and
it will be necessary for us to build five in consequence.
'Supposing we were both to take a holiday for that year
and introduce a blank page into the book of misunderstand-
ing; supposing that Germany were to build no ships that year,
she would save herself between six and seven millions sterling.
But that is not all. In ordinary circumstances we should not
begin our ships until Germany had started hers. The three
ships that she did not build would therefore automatically
wipe out no fewer than five British potential super-Dread-
noughts. That is more than I expect they could hope to do
in a brilliant naval action. As to the indirect results within
ii2 THE WORLD CRISIS
a single year, they simply cannot be measured, not only be-
tween our two great brother nations, but to all the world. They
are results immeasurable in their hope and brightness. This
then is the position which we take up — that the Germans will
be no gainers over us so far as naval power is concerned by any
increases they may make, and no losers, on the basis I have
laid down, by any chminution.,
By the beginning of April it became certain that no general
1/ arrangement for a naval holiday could be effected with
Germany. The Emperor sent me a courteous message through
Sir Ernest Cassel expressing his great regret, but adding that
such arrangements would only be possible between allies.
Herr Ballin wrote at this same time to Sir Ernest: —
'I entirely share your opinion of C.'s (Churchill's) speech,
and believe that it is simply the unusual feature of frankness
and honesty which flustered the whole world, and especially
the leading parties here, and has caused a torrent of indig-
nation in the Press. It is not easy to become all at once
accustomed to such a complete change from the mystery
mongering hitherto prevalent; up to now, it was thought that
language was given to British and German Navy Ministers to
conceal their thoughts. Suddenly, some one makes a new de-
parture, and everybody asks disconcertedly, "What does this
man want?"
' A few friendly lines addressed to you about the report I
sent would have a happy effect. [A complaint which we were
reputed to have made about an alleged clandestine visit of
certain German ships to the Shetland Islands.] ... If he
wishes it, C. can make use of this opportunity in a few quite
unofficial lines addressed to you, to brush away the shadows
which were created in high quarters here by the " luxury fleet"
(luxus flotte) and the absence of warmth in his last speech.
This will be a great help in the political negotiations. It
would be too pitiful if, owing to misunderstanding and senti-
ment, the great work of arrangement were to be hindered . . .
etc., etc.'
In compliance I therefore wrote the following letter for the
Emperor's eye: —
THE GERMAN NAVY LAW 113
Mr. Churchill to Sir Ernest C asset, April 14, 191 2.
I am deeply impressed by the Emperor's great considera-
tion. I only mentioned the incident to Ballin as an example
to show the kind of anxieties and the strain to which the naval
situation gives rise. I am very glad to know that it was free
from all sinister significance: and I take this opportunity of
saying again that we have been throughout equally innocent
of any offensive design. I suppose it is difficult for either
country to realise how formidable it appears to the eyes of
the other. Certainly it must be almost impossible for Ger-
many, with her splendid armies and warlike population capa-
ble of holding their native soil against all comers, and situated
inland with road and railway communications on every side,
to appreciate the sentiments with which an island State like
Britain views the steady and remorseless development of a
rival naval power of the very highest efficiency. The more
we admire the wonderful work that has been done in the swift
creation of German naval strength, the stronger, the deeper
and the more preoccupying those sentiments become. Pa-
tience, however, and good temper accomplish much; and as
the years pass many difficulties and dangers seem to settle
themselves peacefully. Meanwhile there is an anxious defile
to be traversed, and what will help more perhaps than any-
thing else to make the journey safe for us all, is the sincere
desire for goodwill and confidence of which Ballin's letter and
its enclosure are a powerful testimony.
The growth of the German Navy produced its inevitable
consequences. The British Fleet for safety's sake had to be
concentrated in Home Waters. The first concentration had
been made by Lord Fisher in 1904. This had effected the
reduction of very large numbers of small old vessels which
were, scattered about the world ' showing the flag' and the
formation in their place of stronger, better, more homogene-
ous squadrons at home. This measure was also a great and
wise economy of money. A few months later the British
battleships were recalled from China. The more distant
ii4 THE WORLD CRISIS
oceans had thus been abandoned. But now a further mea-
sure of concentration was required. We saw ourselves com-
pelled to withdraw the battleships from the Mediterranean.
Only by this measure could the trained men be obtained to
form the Third Battle Squadron in full commission in Home
Waters. It was decided by the Cabinet that we must still
maintain a powerful force in the Mediterranean, and ulti-
mately, four battle cruisers and an armoured cruiser squa-
dron were accordingly based on Malta. It was further decided
that a Dreadnought battle squadron should also be developed
in the Mediterranean by the year 191 6 equal in strength to
that of the growing Austrian battle fleet. These decisions
were taken with the deliberate object of regaining our com-
plete independence. But the withdrawal — even if only for a
few years — of the battleships from the Mediterranean was a
noteworthy event. It made us appear to be dependent upon
the French Fleet in those waters. The French also at the
same time redisposed their forces. Under the growing pres-
sure of German armaments Britain transferred her whole
Battle Fleet to the North Sea, and France moved all her heavy
ships into the Mediterranean. And the sense of mutual re-
liance grew swiftly between both navies.
It is astonishing that Admiral Von Tirpitz should never
have comprehended what the consequences of his policy must
be. Even after the war he could write: —
1 In order to estimate the strength of the trump card which
our fleet put in the hands of an energetic diplomacy at this
time, one must remember that in consequence of the concen-
tration of the English forces which we had caused in the
North Sea, the English control of the Mediterranean and
Far-Eastern waters had practically ceased.'
The only ' trump card' which Germany secured by this pol-
icy was the driving of Britain and France closer and closer
together. From the moment that the Fleets of France and
THE GERMAN NAVY LAW 115
Britain were disposed in this new way our common naval in-
terests became very important. And the moral claims which
France could make upon Great Britain if attacked by Ger-
many, whatever we had stipulated to the contrary, were
enormously extended. Indeed my anxiety was aroused to
try to prevent this necessary recall of our ships from tying us
up too tightly with France and depriving us of that liberty
of choice on which our power to stop a war might well
depend.
When in August, 191 2, the Cabinet decided that naval con-
versations should take place between the French and British
Admiralties, similar to those which had been held since 1906
between the General Staffs, I set forth this point as clearly as
possible in a minute which I addressed to the Prime Minister
and the Foreign Secretary, and we did our utmost to safe-
guard ourselves.
Sir Edward Grey, AuZust 23> i9*a.
Prime Minister.
The point I am anxious to safeguard is our freedom of
choice if the occasion arises, and consequent power to influ-
ence French policy beforehand. That freedom will be sen-
sibly impaired if the French can say that they have denuded
their Atlantic seaboard, and concentrated in the Mediter-
ranean on the faith of naval arrangements made with us.
This will not be true. If we did not exist, the French could
not make better dispositions than at present. They are not
strong enough to face Germany alone, still less to maintain
themselves in two theatres. They therefore rightly concen-
trate their Navy in the Mediterranean where it can be safe
and superior and can assure their African communications.
Neither is it true that we are relying on France to maintain
our position in the Mediterranean. ... If France did not
exist, we should make no other disposition of our forces.
Circumstances might arise which in my judgment would
make it desirable and right for us to come to the aid of France
with all our force by land and sea. But we ask nothing in
return. If we were attacked by Germany, we should not
n6 THE WORLD CRISIS
make it a charge of bad faith against the French that they
left us to fight it out alone; and nothing in naval and mili-
tary arrangements ought to have the effect of exposing us
to such a charge if, when the time comes, we decide to stand
out.
This is my view, and I am sure I am in line with you on
the principle. I am not at all particular how it is to be given
effect to, and I make no point about what document it is set
forth in. But [consider] how tremendous would be the weap-
on which France would possess to compel our intervention,
if she could say, 'On the advice of and by arrangement with
your naval authorities we have left our Northern coasts de-
fenceless. We cannot possibly come back in time.' Indeed
[I added somewhat inconsequently], it would probably be de-
cisive whatever is written down now. Every one must feel
who knows the facts that we have the obligations of an al-
liance without its advantages, and above all without its pre-
cise definitions. „r „ ~
W. b. C
The difficulty proved a real one. The technical naval dis-
cussions could only be conducted on the basis that the
French Fleet should be concentrated in the Mediterranean,
and that in case of a war in which both countries took part,
it would fall to the British fleet to defend the Northern and
Western coasts of France. The French, as I had foreseen,
naturally raised the point that if Great Britain did not take
part in the war, their Northern and Western coasts would be
completely exposed. We however, while recognising the diffi-
culty, steadfastly declined to allow the naval arrangements
to bind us in any political sense. It was eventually agreed that
if there was a menace of war, the two Governments should
consult together and concert beforehand what common action,
if any, they should take. The French were obliged to ac-
cept this position and to affirm definitely that the naval
conversations did not involve any obligation of common
action. This was the best we could do for ourselves and for
them.
THE GERMAN NAVY LAW 117
I commend these discussions and the document I have
printed above to German eyes. The German Naval Minister
exults in a policy which has had the effect of uniting in com-
mon defence against Germany, in spite of themselves, two
powerful Fleets till then rivals. The British Ministers so far
from welcoming this consolidation of forces in the opposite
balance to Germany, are anxious to preserve their freedom
of action and reluctant to become entangled with continental
Powers. Germany was, in fact, forging a coalition against
herself, and Britain was seeking to save her from the conse-
quences of her unwisdom. It is not often that one can show
so plainly the workings of events. But all was lost on Ad-
miral von Tirpitz.
This sincere, wrongheaded, purblind old Prussian firmly
believed that the growth of his beloved navy was inducing
in British minds an increasing fear of war, whereas it simply
produced naval rejoinders and diplomatic reactions which
strengthened the forces and closed the ranks of the Entente.
It is almost pathetic to read the foolish sentences in which
on page after page of his Memoirs he describes how much
Anglo-German relations were improved in 1912, 1913 and
1 9 14 through the realisation by the British people of Ger-
many's great and growing naval power. He notices that the
violent agitations against German naval expansion which
swept England in 1904 and again in 1908 were succeeded
by a comparatively calm period in which both Powers were
building peacefully and politely against each other. This he
thinks was a proof that his treatment was succeeding, and
that all friction was passing away — another dose or two and
it would be gone altogether. The violent agitations in Eng-
land were, however, the symptom of doubt and differences of
opinion in our national life about whether the German men-
ace was real or not, and whether the right measures were
being taken to meet it. As doubts and differences on these
points were gradually replaced by general agreement among
u8 THE WORLD CRISIS
the leading men in all parties to meet a grave danger, the
agitations subsided. The excitement in the Press and in
Parliament, the warning speeches and counter-speeches were
not intended for foreign consumption. England was not
trying to make an impression upon Germany. She was try-
ing to make up her own mind: and in proportion as this mind
arrived at solid and final conclusions, silence was again re-
stored. But it was not the silence of sleep. With every
rivet that von Tirpitz drove into his ships of war, he united
British opinion throughout wide circles of the most powerful
people in every walk of life and in every part of the Empire.
The hammers that clanged at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven were
forging the coalition of nations by which Germany was to be
resisted and finally overthrown. Every threatening gesture
that she made, every attempt to shock or shake the loosely
knit structure of the Entente made it close and fit together
more tightly. Thus Tirpitz: —
'British statesmen naturally did not stress the fact in their
conversations with Germans that it was mainly the presence
of our nearly completed fleet in the North Sea that had pro-
duced their respectful tone, and had lessened the probability
of a British attack. Of course they only spoke of their peaceful
inclinations and not so much of the facts which strengthened
these inclinations.' And again (p. 192) : ' Seventeen years of
fleet-building had, it is true, improved the prospects of an
acceptable peace with England.'
Is it possible to be further from the truth than this ? There
never had been any probability or possibility of a British
attack on Germany. Why should we attack Germany for
building ships when we could ourselves build more ships
quicker and cheaper ? Why incur the guilt, cost and hazard
of war, when a complete remedy was obvious and easy ? But
the ' respectful tone' was that of men who felt how serious
the position had become, and were anxious to avoid any re-
THE GERMAN NAVY LAW 119
sponsibility for causing a crisis. It was not restraint imposed
by fear of the 'nearly completed fleet in the North Sea,' but
the calm resulting from resolve to be prepared.
The organisation of a Fleet differs throughout from that
of an Army. Armies only keep a small proportion of their
soldiers in regular service. These form the framework of
the battalions, train the recruits and keep guard in times of
peace. When the order is given to mobilise, all the men who
have been already trained but are living at home in civil life
are called up as they are wanted: and then and not till then
the Army is ready to fight.
Navies on the other hand were in the main always ready.
The British Navy had all its best ships fully and permanently
manned with whole-time men (called active service rat-
ings). Measured by quality nearly the whole of its power
was therefore constantly available. Measured even by num-
bers nearly three-quarters of the ships could go into action
without calling out the Reserves. Only the oldest and most
obsolete ships were manned in time of war by the Naval
Reserve, i.e. men who had left the Navy and had returned
to civil life. These obsolete vessels were the only part of the
Fleet which had to be ' mobilised' like the armies of Europe.
Thus mobilisation, which is the foundation of all great
armies, plays only a very small part in fleets. Every ship
that really counted was always ready to steam and fight as
soon as an order reached her.
The organisation of the British Home Fleets when I came
to the Admiralty seemed to a mind accustomed to military
symmetry to leave much to be desired. The terminology
was misleading and confused. The word ' Division ' was
used in three different senses, sometimes tactical and some-
times administrative. The battle units were uneven in num-
bers. The degree of readiness and efficiency of the different
120 THE WORLD CRISIS
squadrons was not apparent from the classes in which they
were grouped. In consultation with Sir Francis Bridgeman,
Prince Louis and Admiral Troubridge, the first Chief of the
new War Staff, I designed a new and symmetrical organisa-
tion for the Fleets.
All the ships available for Home Defence were divided
into the First, Second and Third Fleets, comprising eight
battle squadrons of eight battleships each, together with
their attendant cruiser squadrons, flotillas and auxiliaries.
The First Fleet comprised a Fleet Flagship and four battle
squadrons of ships 'in full commission' manned entirely
with active service ratings, and therefore always ready. To
form this Fleet it was necessary to base the former l Atlantic
Fleet' on Home Ports instead of on Gibraltar, and to base
the battleships hitherto in the Mediterranean on Gibraltar
instead of Malta. By this concentration an additional battle
squadron of strong ships {King Edwards) was always ready
in Home waters. The Second Fleet consisted of two battle
squadrons, also fully manned with active service ratings but
having about 40 per cent, of these learning and requalifying
in the gunnery, torpedo and other schools. This Fleet was
termed, 'in active commission' because it could fight at any
moment; but to realise its highest efficiency, it required to
touch at its Home Ports, and march on board its balance
crews from the schools. In all these six battle squadrons,
containing with their cruiser squadrons every modern and
middle-aged ship in the Navy, there was not to be found a
single reservist. No mobilisation was therefore necessary to
bring the whole of this force into action. The Third Fleet
also consisted of two battle squadrons and five cruiser squad-
rons of our oldest ships. These were only manned by care
and maintenance parties and required the Reserves to be
called out before they could put to sea. In order to acceler-
ate the mobilisation of the leading battle squadrons and cer-
tain cruisers of the Third Fleet a special class of the Reserve
THE GERMAN NAVY LAW 121
was now formed called the l Immediate Reserve/ who re-
ceived higher pay and periodical training, and were liable to
be called up in advance of general mobilisation.
Germany was adding a third squadron to the High Sea
Fleet, thus increasing her always ready strength from 17 to
25. We in reply, by the measures set out above and various
others too technical for description here, raised our always
ready Fleet from 3$ battleships to 49, and other forces in like
proportion. On mobilisation the German figures would rise
to 38; and the British at first to 57, and ultimately, as the
new organisation was completed, to 65.
The reader will not be able to understand the issues in-
volved in the completion and mobilisation of the Fleets on
the eve of the war unless this organisation is mastered.
We made a great assembly of the Navy this spring of 191 2
at Portland. The flags of a dozen admirals, the broad pen-
nants of as many commodores and the pennants of a hun-
dred and fifty ships were flying together. The King came in
the Royal Yacht, the Admiralty flag at the fore, the Standard
at the main, and the Jack at the mizzen, and bided among
his sailors for four days. One day there is a long cruise out
into mist, dense, utterly baffling — the whole Fleet steaming
together all invisible, keeping station by weird siren scream-
ings and hootings. It seemed incredible that no harm would
befall. And then suddenly the fog lifted and the distant
targets could be distinguished and the whole long line of
battleships, coming one after another into view, burst into
tremendous flares of flame and hurled their shells with deaf-
ening detonations while the water rose in tall fountains.
The Fleet returns — three battle squadrons abreast, cruisers
and flotillas disposed ahead and astern. The speed is raised
to twenty knots. Streaks of white foam appear at the bows
of every vessel. The land draws near. The broad bay al-
122 THE WORLD CRISIS
ready embraces this swiftly moving gigantic armada. The
ships in their formation already fill the bay. The foreign
officers I have with me on the Enchantress bridge stare
anxiously. We still steam fast. Five minutes more and the
van of the Fleet will be aground. Four minutes, three min-
utes. There! At last. The signal! A string of bright
flags falls from the Neptune's halyards. Every anchor falls
together; their cables roar through the hawser holes; every
propeller whirls astern. In a hundred and fifty yards every
ship is stationary. Look along the lines, miles this way and
miles that, they might have been drawn with a ruler. The
foreign observers gasped.
These were great days. From dawn to midnight, day after
day, one's whole mind was absorbed by the fascination and
novelty of the problems which came crowding forward. And
all the time there was a sense of power to act, to form, to or-
ganise: all the ablest officers in the Navy standing ready,
loyal and eager, with argument, guidance, information; every
one feeling a sense that a great danger had passed very near
us; that there was a breathing space before it would return;
that we must be even better prepared next time. Saturdays,
Sundays and any other spare day I spent always with the
Fleets at Portsmouth or at Portland or Devonport, or with
the Flotillas at Harwich. Officers of every rank came on
board to lunch or dine and discussion proceeded without
ceasing on every aspect of naval war and administration.
The Admiralty yacht Enchantress was now to become
largely my office, almost my home; and my work my sole
occupation and amusement. In all I spent eight months
afloat in the three years before the war. I visited every
dockyard, shipyard and naval establishment in the British
Isles and in the Mediterranean and every important ship.
I examined for myself every point of strategic importance
and every piece of Admiralty property. I got to know what
everything looked like and where everything was, and how
THE GERMAN NAVY LAW 123
one thing fitted into another. In the end I could put my
hand on anything that was wanted and knew thoroughly
the current state of our naval affairs.
I recall vividly my first voyage from Portsmouth to Port-
land, where the Fleet lay. A grey afternoon was drawing to
a close. As I saw the Fleet for the first time drawing out of
the haze a friend reminded me of l that far-off line of storm-
beaten ships on which the eyes of the grand Army had never
looked/ but which had in their day ' stood between Napo-
leon and the dominion of the world.' In Portland harbour the
yacht lay surrounded by the great ships; the whole harbour
was alive with the goings and comings of launches and small
craft of every kind, and as night fell ten thousand lights from
sea and shore sprang into being and every masthead twinkled as
the ships and squadrons conversed with one another. Who
could fail to work for such a service ? Who could fail when
the very darkness seemed loaded with the menace of ap-
proaching war ?
For consider these ships, so vast in themselves, yet so small,
so easily lost to sight on the surface of the waters. Sufficient
at the moment, we trusted, for their task, but yet only a score
or so. They were all we had. On them, as we conceived,
floated the might, majesty, dominion and power of the Brit-
ish Empire. All our long history built up century after cen-
tury, all our great affairs in every part of the globe, all the
means of livelihood and safety of our faithful, industrious,
active population depended upon them. Open the sea-cocks
and let them sink beneath the surface, as another Fleet was
one day to do in another British harbour far to the North,
and in a few minutes — half an hour at the most — the whole
outlook of the world would be changed. The British Empire
would dissolve like a dream; each isolated community strug-
gling forward by itself; the central power of union broken;
mighty provinces, whole Empires in themselves, drifting hope-
lessly out of control and falling a prey to others; and Europe
u^-
124 THE WORLD CRISIS
after one sudden convulsion passing into the iron grip and
rule of the Teuton and of all that the Teutonic system meant.
There wculd only be left far off across the Atlantic unarmed,
unready, and as yet uninstructed America to maintain, single-
handed, law and freedom among men.
Guard them well, admirals and captains, hardy tars and
tall marines; guard them well and guide them true.
CHAPTER VI
THE ROMANCE OF DESIGN
'For a scrutiny so minute as to bring an object under an untrue
angle of vision, is a poorer guide to a man's judgment, than the most
rapid and sweeping glance which sees things in their true propor-
tions.' Kinglake.
The Big Punch — The 15-inch Gun — An Anxious Decision — The De-
sign of a Battleship — Gun-power and Speed — The Argument for
the Fast Division— The Fifth Turret— Liquid Fuel— The Oil
Problem — Financial Entanglements — The Royal Commission on
Oil Supplies — The Anglo-Persian Convention — A Golden Reward
— The Fast Division at Jutland — Swifter Destroyers — Cruiser
Design — Correspondence with Lord Fisher — The'Light Armoured
Cruisers — The Arethusa.
TNTIL I got to the Admiralty I had never properly ap-
^ predated the service which Mr. McKenna and Lord
Fisher had rendered to the Fleet in 1909 by their big leap for-
ward from the 12-inch to the 13' 5-inch gun. To illustrate
this I set out the weight of the shell fired by the principal
guns in the British and German navies: —
The 1 -inch gun fires a 1 -pound shot.
The 2-inch " 6-pound shot.
The 3-inch 12- or 15-pound shot.
The 4-inch 28 to 32-pound shot.
The 5-inch " 50-pound shot.
The 6-inch1 " 100-pound shot.
The 7 5-inch " 200-pound shot.
The 9- 2-inch " 380-pound shot.
The 10-inch " 500-pound shot.
The British 12-inch gun fires a 850-pound shot.
The German 12-inch gun fires approximately a 1,000-pound
shot, but this is asking a lot of the gun.
The 13 -5-inch gun fired a 1,250-pound shot; and its later
marks fired a 1,400-pound shot.
1 This is the biggest gun which can be completely worked by hand,
the shot being lifted by a single man.
125
126 THE WORLD CRISIS
The increase of i^ mch in the calibre of the gun was
enough to raise the British shell from 850 pounds to 1,400
pounds. No fewer than twelve ships were actually building
on the slips for the Royal Navy armed with these splendid
weapons, quite unsurpassed at that time in the world, and
firing a projectile nearly half as heavy again as the biggest
fired by the German Fleet.
I immediately sought to go one size better. I mentioned
this to Lord Fisher at Reigate, and he hurled himself into its
advocacy with tremendous passion. ' Nothing less than the
15-inch gun could be looked at for all the battleships and
battle-cruisers of the new programme. To achieve the sup-
ply of this gun was the equivalent of a great victory at sea;
to shrink from the endeavour was treason to the Empire.
What was it that enabled Jack Johnson to knock out his op-
ponents ? It was the big punch. And where were those miser-
able men with bevies of futile pop-guns crowding up their
ships ? ' No one who has not experienced it has any idea of
the passion and eloquence of this old lion when thoroughly
roused on a technical question. I resolved to make a great
effort to secure the prize, but the difficulties and the risks
were very great, and looking back upon it one feels that they
were only justified by success. Enlarging the gun meant
enlarging the ships, and enlarging the ships meant increasing
the cost. Moreover, the redesign must cause no delay and
the guns must be ready as soon as the turrets were ready.
No such thing as a modern 15-inch gun existed. None had
ever been made. The advance to the i3*5-inch had in itself
been a great stride. Its power was greater; its accuracy was
greater; its life was much longer. Could the British designers
repeat this triumph on a still larger scale and in a still more
intense form ? The Ordnance Board were set to work and
they rapidly produced a design. Armstrongs were consulted
in deadly secrecy, and they undertook to execute it. I had
anxious conferences with these experts, with whose science I
THE ROMANCE OF DESIGN 127
was of course wholly unacquainted, to see what sort of men
they were and how they really felt about it. They were all
for it. One did not need to be an expert in ballistics to dis-
cern that. The Director of Naval Ordnance Rear-Admiral
Moore was ready to stake his professional existence upon it.
But after all there could not be absolute certainty. We knew
the 13 '5-inch well. All sorts of new stresses might develop in
the 15-inch model. If only we could make a trial gun and
test it thoroughly before giving the orders for the whole of
the guns of all the five ships, there would be no risk; but
then we should lose an entire year, and five great vessels
would go into the line of battle carrying an inferior weapon
to that which we had it in our power to give them. Several
there were of the responsible authorities consulted who
thought it would be more prudent to lose the year. For,
after all, if the guns had failed, the ships would have been
fearfully marred. I hardly remember ever to have had more
anxiety about any administrative decision than this.
I went back to Lord Fisher. He was steadfast and even
violent. So I hardened my heart and took the plunge. The
whole outfit of guns was ordered forthwith. We arranged
that one gun should be hurried on four months in front of
the others by exceptional efforts so as to be able to test it
for range and accuracy and to get out the range tables and
other complex devices which depended upon actual firing
results. From this moment we were irrevocably committed
to the whole armament, and every detail in these vessels,
extending to thousands of parts, was redesigned to fit them.
Fancy if they failed. What a disaster. What an exposure.
No excuse would be accepted. It would all be brought home
to me — 'rash, inexperienced/ ' before he had been there a
month/ l altering all the plans of his predecessors' and
producing 'this ghastly fiasco/ 'the mutilation of all the
ships of the year.' What could I have said ? Moreover, al-
though the decision, once taken, was irrevocable, a long period
128 THE WORLD CRISIS
of suspense — fourteen or fifteen months at least — was un-
avoidable. However, I dissembled my misgivings. I wrote
to the First Sea Lord that ' Risks have to be run in peace
as well as in war, and courage in design now may win a battle
later on.'
But everything turned out all right. British gunnery
science proved exact and true, and British workmanship as
sound as a bell and punctual to the day. The first gun was
known in the Elswick shops as 'the hush and push gun/
and was invariably described in all official documents as ' the
14-inch experimental.' It proved a brilliant success. It
hurled a 1,920-pound projectile 35,000 yards; it achieved
remarkable accuracy at all ranges without shortening its ex-
istence by straining itself in any way. No doubt I was
unduly anxious; but when I saw the gun fired for the first
time a year later and knew that all was well, I felt as if I
had been delivered from a great peril.
In one of those nightmare novels that used to appear from
time to time before the war, I read in 1913 of a great battle
in which, to the amazement of the defeated British Fleet, the
German new vessels opened fire with a terrible, unheard-of
15-inch gun. There was a real satisfaction in feeling that
anyhow this boot was on the other leg.
The gun dominated the ship, and was the decisive cause of
all the changes we then made in design. The following was
in those days the recipe in very unexpert language for mak-
ing a battleship: —
You take the largest possible number of the best possible
guns that can be fired in combination from one vessel as a
single battery. You group them conveniently by pairs in
turrets. You put the turrets so that there is the widest pos-
sible arc of fire for every gun and the least possible blast inter-
ference. This regulates the position of the turrets and the
spacing between them. You draw a line around the arrange-
ment of turrets thus arrived at, which gives you the deck of
THE ROMANCE OF DESIGN 129
the ship. You then build a hull to carry this deck or great
gun platform. It must be very big and very long. Next
you see what room you have got inside this hull for engines
to drive it, and from this and from the length you get the
speed. Last of all you decide on the armour.
All these calculations and considerations act and react
upon one another at every stage, and the manner in which
the Royal Corps of Constructors can juggle with these factors,
and the facility with which the great chiefs and masters of
battleship design like Sir Philip Watts and Sir Eustace Ten-
nyson-D'Eyncourt and their faithful confederate Sir Henry
Oram, the Chief Engineer, were able to speak on these matters
were marvellous beyond belief. In a few hours, or at most
in a few days, one could be told the effect of an alteration in
any one set of conditions upon every other set of conditions.
On this vast process of juggling and higgling we now em-
barked.
From the beginning there appeared a ship carrying ten
15-inch guns, and therefore at least 600 feet long with room
inside her for engines which would drive her 21 knots
and capacity to carry armour which on the armoured belt,
the turrets and the conning tower would reach the thickness
unprecedented in the British Service of 13 inches. For less
armour you could have more speed: for less speed you could
have more armour, and so on within very considerable limits.
But now a new idea began to dawn. Eight 15-inch guns would
fire a simultaneous broadside of approximately 16,000 lb.
Ten of the latest 13* 5-inch would only fire 14,000 lb. There-
fore, we could get for eight 15-inch guns a punch sub-
stantially greater than that of ten i3'5-inch. Nor did the
superiority end there. With the increased size of the shell
came a far greater increase in the capacity of the bursting
charge. It was not quite a geometric progression, because
other considerations intervened; but it was in that order of
ideas. There was no doubt about the punch. On the other
130 THE WORLD CRISIS
hand, look at the speed. Twenty-one knots was all very well
in its way, but suppose we could get a much greater speed.
Suppose we could cram into the hull a horse-power sufficient
to drive these terrific vessels, already possessing guns and
armour superior to that of the heaviest battleship, at speeds
hitherto only obtained by the lightly armoured 12-inch gun
battle-cruisers, should we not have introduced a new element
into naval war ?
And here we leave the region of material. I have built
the process up stage by stage as it was argued out, but of
course all the processes proceeded in simultaneous relation,
and the result was to show a great possibility. Something
like the ship described above could be made if it were wanted.
Was it wanted ? Was it the right thing to make ? Was its
tactical value sufficient to justify the increase in cost and all
the changes in design ? We must turn for the answer to the
tactical sphere.
Here I felt able to see a little more clearly. As cannot be
too often repeated, war is all one; and the same principles
of thought which are true in any form are true mutatis mu-
tandis in every other form. Obviously in creating an Army
or an Air Force or a squadron of battleships you must first of
all have regard to their highest tactical employment, namely,
decisive battle. Let us, therefore, first of all visualise the
battle. Let us try to imagine what its conditions will be;
what we shall have to meet and what would help us most
to win. The first naval idea of our supreme battle at this
time was that it would be fought about something: some-
body would want to be going somewhere and somebody else
would try to stop him. One of the Fleets would be proceed-
ing in a certain direction and the other Fleet would come along
and try to prevent it. However they might approach, the
battle would soon resolve itself into two lines of ships steam-
ing along parallel and bringing all their broadsides to bear
upon each other. Of course if one Fleet is much stronger than
THE ROMANCE OF DESIGN 131
the other, has heavier guns and shoots better, the opposite
line begins to get the worst of it. Ships begin to burn and
blow up and fall out of the line, and every one that falls out
increases the burden of fire upon the remainder. The Fleet
which has more ships in it also has a tail which overlaps the
enemy, and a good many ships in this tail can concentrate
their fire upon the rear ships of the enemy, so that these un-
lucky vessels have not only to fight the ships opposite to them,
but have to bear the fire of a number of others firing obliquely
at them from behind. But smashing up the tail of an enemy's
Fleet is a poor way of preventing him from achieving his ob-
jective, i.e. going where he wants to go. It is not comparable
to smashing up his head. Injuries at the head of the line
tend to throw the whole line into confusion, whereas injuries
at the tail only result in the ships dropping astern without
causing other complications. Therefore the Admiralissimo
will always try to draw a little ahead if he possibly can and
bring his van nearer and nearer to the enemy and gradually,
if he can, force that enemy to turn off, so that he can then
curl round him. This well-known manoeuvre is called ' Cross-
ing the T/ and Admiral Togo had used it in the battle of the
Sea of Japan.
If the speeds of the Fleets are equal, how can this be done ?
The heads of both lines will be abreast and the fire will only
be given and returned ship for ship.
But suppose you have a division of ships in your Fleet which
go much faster than any of your other ships or of your enemy's
ships. These ships will be certainly able to draw ahead and
curl round the head of the enemy's line. More than that,
as they draw ahead they will repeat in a much more effective
fashion the advantage of an overlapping tail, because the
ships at the head of the enemy's line will have to bear the
fire of the overlapping ships as well as the fire of those which
are lying opposite to them, and therefore two or three ships
might be firing on every one of the leading ships of the enemy,
132 THE WORLD CRISIS
thus smashing to pieces the head of the enemy's line and
throwing his whole formation into confusion.
Here then in simple outline is the famous argument for
the Fast Division. A squadron of ships possessing a definite
superiority of speed could be so disposed in the approaching
formation of your own Fleet as to enable you, whichever way
the enemy might deploy, to double the fire after certain inter-
val upon the head of his line, and also to envelop it and cross
it and so force him into a circular movement and bring him
to bay once and for all without hope of escape.
Hitherto in all our battle plans this role had been assigned
to the battle-cruisers. Their speed would certainly enable
them to get there. But we must imagine that they would
also be met by the enemy's battle-cruisers, whereupon, as
they say in the reports of the House of Commons ' debate aris-
ing,' they might easily fight a separate action of their own
without relation to the supreme conflict. Further, the bat-
tle-cruisers, our beautiful 'Cats,' as their squadron was
irreverently called,1 had thin skins compared to the enemy's
strongest battleships, which presumably would head his line.
It is a rough game to pit battle-cruisers against battleships
with only seven or nine inches of armour against twelve or
thirteen, and probably with a weaker gun-power as well.2
Suppose, however, we could make a division of ships fast
1 Lion, Tiger, Queen Mary, Princess Royal.
a Contrary to common opinion and, as many will think, to the
proved lessons of the war, I do not believe in the wisdom of the Battle-
Cruiser type. If it is worth while to spend far more than the price
of your best battleship upon a fast heavily-gunned vessel, it is better
at the same time to give it the heaviest armour as well. You then
have a ship which may indeed cost half as much again as a battleship
but which at any rate can do everything. To put the value of a first-
class battleship into a vessel which cannot stand the pounding of a
heavy action is false policy. It is far better to spend the extra money
and have what you really want. The battle-cruiser in other words
should be superseded by the fast battleship, i.e. fast strongest ship,
in spite of her cost. — W.S.C.
THE ROMANCE OF DESIGN 133
enough to seize the advantageous position and yet as strong
in gun-power and armour as any battleship afloat. Should
we not have scored almost with certainty an inestimable and
a decisive advantage ? The First Sea Lord, Sir Francis
Bridgeman, fresh from the command of the Home Fleet, and
most of his principal officers, certainly thought so. The Fast
Division was the dream of their battle plans. But could we
get such ships? Could they be designed and constructed?
And here we came back again to Sir Philip Watts and Sir
Henry Oram and the Ordnance Board and the Royal Corps
of Naval Constructors.
At this stage the War College were asked to work out on
the tactical board the number of knots superiority in speed
required in a Fast Division in order to ensure this Division
being able to manoeuvre around the German Fleet as it
would be in the years 19 14 and 191 5.
The answer was that if the Fast Division could steam in
company 25 knots or better, they could do all that was neces-
sary. We therefore wanted 4 or 5 knots additional speed.
How were we to get it ? With every knot the amount of
horse-power required is progressively greater. Our new ship
would steam 21 knots, but to steam 25 to 26 she wanted
50,000 horse-power. Fifty thousand horse-power meant more
boilers, and where could they be put ? Why, obviously they
could be put where the fifth turret would go, and having re-
gard to the increased punch of the 15-inch gun we could spare
the fifth turret.
But even this would not suffice. We could not get the
power required to drive these ships at 25 knots except by
the use of oil fuel.
The advantages conferred by liquid fuel were inestimable.
First, speed. In equal ships oil gave a large excess of speed
over coal. It enabled that speed to be attained with far
greater rapidity. It gave forty per cent, greater radius of
action for the same weight of coal. It enabled a fleet to re-
134 THE WORLD CRISIS
fuel at sea with great facility. An oil-burning fleet can, if
need be and in calm weather, keep its station at sea, nourish-
ing itself from tankers without having to send a quarter of
its strength continually into harbour to coal, wasting fuel on
the homeward and outward journey. The ordeal of coaling
ship exhausted the whole ship's company. In wartime it
robbed them of their brief period of rest; it subjected every-
one to extreme discomfort. With oil, a few pipes were con-
nected with the shore or with a tanker and the ship sucked
in its fuel with hardly a man having to lift a finger. Less
than half the number of stokers was needed to tend and
clean the oil furnaces. Oil could be stowed in spare places
in a ship from which it would be impossible to bring coal.
As a coal ship used up her coal, increasingly large numbers
of men had to be taken, if necessary from the guns, to shovel
the coal from remote and inconvenient bunkers to bunkers
nearer to the furnaces or to the furnaces themselves, thus
weakening the fighting efficiency of the ship perhaps at the
most critical moment in the battle. For instance, nearly a
hundred men were continually occupied in the Lion shovel-
ling coal from one steel chamber to another without ever
seeing the light either of day or of the furnace fires. The use
of oil made it possible in every type of vessel to have more
gun-power and more speed for less size or less cost. It alone
made it possible to realise the high speeds in certain types
which were vital to their tactical purpose. All these advan-
tages were obtained simply by burning oil instead of coal un-
der the boilers. Should it at any time become possible to
abolish boilers altogether and explode the oil in the cylinders of
internal combustion engines, every advantage would be multi-
plied tenfold.
On my arrival at the Admiralty we had already built or
building 56 destroyers solely dependent on oil and 74 sub-
marines which could only be driven by oil; and a proportion
of oil was used to spray the coal furnaces of nearly all ships.
THE ROMANCE OF DESIGN 135
We were not, however, dependent upon oil to such an extent
as to make its supply a serious naval problem. To build any
large additional number of oil-burning ships meant basing our
naval supremacy upon oil. But oil was not found in appre-
ciable quantities in our islands. If we required it we must
carry it by sea in peace or war from distant countries. We
had, on the other hand, the finest supply of the best steam coal
in the world, safe in our mines under our own hand.
To change the foundation of the Navy from British coal to
foreign oil was a formidable decision in itself. If it were taken
it must raise a whole series of intricate problems all requiring
heavy initial expense. First there must be accumulated in
Great Britain an enormous oil reserve large enough to enable
us to fight for many months if necessary without bringing in a
single cargo of oil. To contain this reserve enormous installa-
tions of tanks must be erected near the various naval ports.
Would they not be very vulnerable ? Could they be protected ?
Could they be concealed or disguised? The word 'camou-
flage' was not then known. Fleets of tankers had to be built
to convey the oil from the distant oilfields across the oceans
to the British Isles, and others of a different pattern to take
it from our naval harbours to the fleets at sea.
Owing to the systems of finance by which we had bound
ourselves, we were not allowed to borrow even for capital or
'once for all' expenditure. Every penny must be won from
Parliament year by year, and constituted a definite ad-
dition to the inevitably rising and already fiercely chal-
lenged Naval Estimates. And beyond these difficulties
loomed up the more intangible problems of markets and
monopolies. The oil supplies of the world were in the hands
of vast oil trusts under foreign control. To commit the
Navy irrevocably to oil was indeed Ho take arms against
a sea of troubles.' Wave after wave, dark with storm,
crested with foam, surged towards the harbour in which we
still sheltered. Should we drive out into the teeth of the gale,
136 THE WORLD CRISIS
or should we bide contented where we were ? Yet beyond the
breakers was a great hope. If we overcame the difficulties
and surmounted the risks, we should be able to raise the whole
power and efficiency of the Navy to a definitely higher level;
better . ships, better crews, higher economies, more intense
forms of war power — in a word, mastery itself was the prize
of the venture. A year gained over a rival might make the
difference. Forward, then !
The three programmes of 1912, 1913 and 19 14 comprised
the greatest additions in power and cost ever made to the
Royal Navy. With the lamentable exception of the battle-
ships of 19 13 — and these were afterwards corrected — they did
not contain a coal-burning ship. Submarines, destroyers,
light cruisers, fast battleships — all were based irrevocably on
oil. The fateful plunge was taken when it was decided to
create the Fast Division. Then, for the first time, the su-
preme ships of the Navy, on which our life depended, were
fed by oil and could only be fed by oil. The decision to drive
the smaller craft by oil followed naturally upon this. The
camel once swallowed, the gnats went down easily enough.
A decision like this involved our national safety as much as
a battle at sea. It was as anxious and as harassing as any
hazard in war. It was war in a certain sense raging under a
surface of unbroken peace. Compare it with the decision to
attempt to force the Dardanelles with the old surplus vessels
of a fleet which had already proved its supremacy. The oil
decision was vital; the Dardanelles decision was subsidiary.
The first touched our existence; the second our superfluities.
Having succeeded in the first, it did not seem difficult when
the time came to attempt the second. I did not understand
that in war the power of a civilian Minister to carry through
a plan or policy is greatly diminished. He cannot draw his
strength year by year from Parliament. He cannot be sure
of being allowed to finish what he has begun. The loyalties
of peace are replaced by the jealous passions of war. The
THE ROMANCE OF DESIGN 137
Parliamentary safeguards are in abeyance. Explanation and
debate may be impossible or may be denied. I learnt this
later on.
I shall show presently the difficulties into which these de-
cisions to create a fast division of battleships and to rely
upon oil led me into during the years 19 13 and 19 14. Nor
can I deny that colleagues who could not foresee the extra
expense which they involved had grounds of complaint.
Battleships were at that time assumed to cost two and a
quarter millions each. The Queen Elizabeth class of fast
battleships cost over three millions each. The expenditure of
upwards of ten millions was required to create the oil reserve,
with its tanks and its tankers, though a proportion of this
would have been needed in any case. On more than one occa-
sion I feared I should succumb. I had, however, the unfail-
ing support of the Prime Minister. The Chancellor of the
Exchequer whose duty it was to be my most severe critic was
also my most friendly colleague. And so it all went through.
Fortune rewarded the continuous and steadfast facing of
these difficulties by the Board of Admiralty and brought us a
prize from fairyland far beyond our brightest hopes.
An unbroken series of consequences conducted us to the
Anglo-Persian Oil Convention. The first step was to set up
a Royal Commission on Oil Supply. Lord Fisher was in-
vited and induced to preside over this by the following
letter: —
Mr. Churchill to Lord Fisher.
June n, 191 2.
We are too good friends (I hope) and the matters with
which we are concerned are too serious (I'm sure) for any-
thing but plain language.
This liquid fuel problem has got to be solved, and the
natural, inherent, unavoidable difficulties are such that they
require the drive and enthusiasm of a big man. I want you
for this, viz. to crack the nut. No one else can do it so well.
138 THE WORLD CRISIS
Perhaps no one else can do it at all. I will put you in a posi-
tion where you can crack the nut, if indeed it is crackable.
But this means that you will have to give your life and
strength, and I don't know what I have to give in exchange
or in return. You have got to find the oil: to show how it
can be stored cheaply : how it can be purchased regularly and
cheaply in peace; and with absolute certainty in war. Then
by all means develop its application in the best possible way
to existing and prospective ships. But on the other hand,
your Royal Commission will be advisory and not executive.
It will assemble facts and state conclusions. It cannot touch
policy or action. That would not be fair to those on whom I
must now rely. Nor would you wish it. Its report must be
secret from the public, and its work separate from the Ad-
miralty. I cannot have Moore's position1 eclipsed by a kind
of Committee of Public Safety on Designs. The field of
practical policy must be reserved for the immediately re-
sponsible officers. Research however authoritative lies out-
side. All this I know you will concur in.
Then as to personnel. I do not care a d n whom you
choose to assist you, so long as (1) the representative char-
acter of the Committee is maintained, and (2) the old con-
troversies are not needlessly revived. Let us then go into
names specifically.
Further, 'Step by step' is a valuable precept. When
you have solved the riddle, you will find a very hushed at-
tentive audience. But the riddle will not be solved unless
you are willing — for the glory of God — to expend yourself
upon its toils.
I recognise it is little enough I can offer you. But your
gifts, your force, your hopes, belong to the Navy, with or
without return; and as your most sincere admirer, and as the
head of the Naval Service, I claim them now, knowing well
you will not grudge them. You need a plough to draw.
Your propellers are racing in air.
Simultaneously with the setting up of this Commission we
pursued our own Admiralty search for oil. On the advice of
Sir Francis Hopwood and Sir Frederick Black2 I sent Ad-
1 The Third Sea Lord.
2 Director of Admiralty Contracts.
THE ROMANCE OF DESIGN 139
miral Slade with an expert Committee to the Persian Gulf
to examine the oil fields on the spot. These gentlemen were
also the Admiralty representatives on the Royal Commis-
sion. To them the principal credit for the achievement is
due. At the later financial stage the Governor of the Bank
of England, afterwards Lord Cunliffe, and the director of
the Anglo-Persian and Royal Burmah Oil Companies were
most serviceable. All through 191 2 and 19 13 our efforts
were unceasing.
Thus each link forged the next. From the original desire
to enlarge the gun we were led on step by step to the Fast
Division, and in order to get the Fast Division we were forced
to rely for vital units of the Fleet upon oil fuel. This led to
the general adoption of oil fuel and to all the provisions which
were needed to build up a great oil reserve. This led to enor-
mous expense and to tremendous opposition on the Naval
Estimates. Yet it was absolutely impossible to turn back.
We could only fight our way forward, and finally we found
our way to the Anglo-Persian Oil agreement and contract
which for an initial investment of two millions of public
money (subsequently increased to five millions) has not only
secured to the Navy of a very substantial proportion of its
oil supply, but has led to the acquisition by the Government
of a controlling share in oil properties and interests which
are at present valued at scores of millions sterling and also
to very considerable economies, which are still continuing,
in the purchase price of Admiralty oil.
All forecasts in this speculative market are subject to re-
vision. The figures set out below are recent and authorita-
tive.1
*An approximate estimate of the return obtained by His Majesty's
Government on their original investment of £2,200,000, in the Anglo-
Persian Oil Co., Ltd.:
(1) The original Government investment of £2,200,000 in
£1 Ordinary Shares has become one of 5 million
140 THE WORLD CRISIS
On this basis it may be said that the aggregate profits,
realised and potential, of this investment may be estimated
at a sum not merely sufficient to pay for all the programme
of ships, great and small of that year and for the whole pre-
war oil fuel installation; but are such that we may not un-
reasonably expect that one day we shall be entitled also to
claim that the mighty fleets laid down in 1912, 1913 and 19 14,
the greatest ever built by any power in an equal period, were
added to the British Navy without costing a single penny to
the taxpayer.
Such is the story of the creation of a Fast Division of five
famous battleships, the Queen Elizabeth, Warspite, Barham,
Valiant and Malaya, all oil-driven, each capable of steaming
a minimum of 25 knots, mounting eight 15-inch guns and
protected by 13 inches of armour. It is permissible to look
ahead and see what happened to these ships in the Battle
of Jutland. Let us take the accounts of the enemy.
Says Tirpitz (vol. II, p. 284): 'In the further course of the
fight/ i.e. after the destruction of the Indefatigable and
shares, and the appreciation in value of these at cur-
rent prices represent approximately some . . £16,000,000
(2) The Government has received in dividends, interest,
Income Tax, Excess Profits, Duty and Corporation
Tax, over ....... 6,500,000
(3) The supply contract has enabled the Government De-
partments to save on the purchase price of oil as
compared with current prices, about . . . 7,500,000
(4) It may also be claimed that the prices of oil supplied
by other companies have been brought down by the
competition of the Anglo-Persian Company, though
to what extent must be a matter of opinion: and
further, that the saving on oil prices under the sup-
ply contract may be expected to continue through-
out the currency of the contract. It would not be
unfair to estimate the effect of the last two factors
at an additional ...... 10,000,000
Total ....... £40,000,000
THE ROMANCE OF DESIGN 141
Queen Mary, 'the English were strongly reinforced by five1
of their newest ships of the Queen Elizabeth class, only com-
pleted during the war; these vessels, driven exclusively by
oil-fuel, possessed such a high speed that they were able to
take part in the cruiser engagement — they attached them-
selves to the English cruisers and joined in the battle at long
range.'
The First Gunnery Officer of the Derfflinger is more explicit:
Meanwhile we saw that the enemy were being reinforced.
Behind the battle cruiser line approached four big ships.
We soon identified these as of the Queen Elizabeth class.
There had been much talk in our fleet of these ships. They
were ships of the line with the colossal armament of eight
15-inch guns, 28,000 tons displacement and a speed of twenty-
five knots. Their speed, therefore, was scarcely inferior to
ours (twenty-six knots), but they fired a shell more than
twice as heavy as ours. They engaged at portentous range
. . . (p. 164) .2
As we were altering course to N.N.W. we caught sight of
the head of our Third Squadron, the proud ships of the Konig
class. Everyone now breathed more freely. While we had
been engaged by the English Fifth Battle Squadron with its
15-inch guns in addition to the Battle Cruiser Squadron we
had felt rather uncomfortable, (p. 167).
After the gradual disappearance of the four battle cruisers
we were still faced with the four powerful ships of the Fifth
Battle Squadron, Malaya, Valiant, Barhani, and Warspite.
These ships cannot have developed very high speed in this
phase of the battle, for they soon came within range of our
Third Squadron, and were engaged by the ships at the head
of the line, particularly the flagship, the Konig. In this way
the four English battleships at one time and another came
under the fire of at least nine German ships, five battle cruisers
and from four to five battleships. According to my gunnery
log, we were firing after 7.16 p.m. at the second battleship
from the right, the one immediately astern of the leader. At
these great ranges I fired armour-piercing shell.
Actually four.
2 Kiel and Jutland, by Commander George von Hase.
142 THE WORLD CRISIS
The second phase passed without any important events as
far as we were concerned. In a sense this part of the action,
fought against a numerically inferior but more powerfully
armed enemy, who kept us under fire at ranges at which we
were helpless, was highly depressing, nerve-racking and exas-
perating. Our only means of defence was to leave the line
for a short time when we saw that the enemy had our range.
As this manoeuvre was imperceptible to the enemy, we ex-
tricated ourselves at regular intervals from the hail of fire.
(P- 173)-
We may now turn to the smaller vessels.
There was no difficulty whatever in settling the design of the
destroyers. The Admiralty had vacillated about destroyers
in previous years. In 1908 they built large fast 33-knot
Tribals burning oil, and then, worried by the oil problem and
shocked at the expense, reverted for two years to 27-knot coal-
burning flotillas (Acastas and Acherons). I was too late to
stop the last bevy of these inferior vessels, but I gave direc-
tions to design the new flotilla to realise 35 knots speed with-
out giving up anything in gun-power, torpedoes or seaworthi-
ness. I proposed to the Board that if money ran short we
should take sixteen of these rather than twenty of the others.
Building slow destroyers ! One imght as well breed slow race-
horses.
The cruisers were much more difficult. The duties of a
British cruiser are very varied: now scouting for the Battle
Fleet; now convoying merchantmen; now fighting an action
with another cruiser squadron; now showing the flag in distant
or tropical oceans. In an effort to produce a type which would
combine all these requirements, the purity of design had been
lost and a number of compromise ships, whose types melted
into one another, were afloat or building. They ranged from
the strong, heavily gunned and well armoured vessels like the
Minotaur through lighter but still armoured variants of the
' County ' class cruisers down to unarmoured but large ships
like the Dartmouths (the 'Town' class), and the little vessels
THE ROMANCE OF DESIGN 143
of 3,3So tons like the Blonde. Altogether there were nine
distinct classes. It was time to classify and clarify thought
and simplify nomenclature on this subject. The large
armoured cruisers were already superseded by the battle-
cruiser. They still remained a very powerful force, numbering
no less than thirty-five vessels. We would call them ' Cruis-
ers.' All the rest should be called 'Light Cruisers.' For
the future we would build only battle-cruisers (or fast battle-
ships) and light cruisers. The future evolution of the battle
cruiser was well defined and depended on the numbers and
character of any that might be laid down by Germany. Our
lead in battle cruisers (9 to 4) and the creation of the fast
division of battleships made it possible to delay decision on
this type; but the light cruiser was urgent and even vital.
We required a very large number of small fast vessels to pro-
tect the Battle Fleet from torpedo attack, to screen it and
within certain limits to scout for it. After hearing many
arguments, I proposed to the Board that we should concen-
trate on this type, to exclude all consideration of the require-
ments of the distant seas, and to build vessels for attendance
on the Battle Fleets in home waters and for that duty alone.
Now arose the question of design. Should the new light
cruiser be the smallest of the cruisers or the biggest of the
destroyers ? We had already in existence a few unarmoured
light cruisers carrying 4-inch guns called the Blondes. We
had also an experimental destroyer of enormous size, nearly
2,000 tons and about 36 knots speed, called the Swift. In be-
tween these were eight hybrid vessels called ( Scouts' repre-
senting weakness and confusion of thought: they had neither
speed to run nor guns to fight; they steamed only 24 knots and
mounted only a litter of 12 -pounders; they carried no armour,
but they ate up men and money. Whatever happened we
must avoid a feeble compromise like that. I therefore called
for designs of an improved Swift and an improved Blonde.
The main object of both these types was to rupture a torpedo
144 THE WORLD CRISIS
attack on the Battle Fleet, scout for it, and otherwise protect
it. But destroyers were now being freely armed with 4-inch
guns firing a 32-lb. shell capable of inflicting very serious
injury on an unarmoured vessel. We must therefore have
some protection, if not to keep out the shell at any rate to
keep the bulk of the explosion outside the vessel. We must
also have high speed and guns sufficient to punish even the
biggest destroyers cruelly.
The constructors and engineers toiled and schemed, and in
a few weeks Sir Philip Watts and Sir Henry Oram, par nobile
fratrum, produced two joint alternative designs, the super-
Blonde and the super-Swift. Both these vessels showed far
higher qualities than anything previously achieved for their
size and cost; but both were dependent upon oil only. I re-
mitted these designs to a conference of Cruiser Admirals. I
could feel opinion turning to the super- Blonde. I wrote to
Fisher on the 12 th January, 191 2: —
January 12, 1912.
In sustained rumination about super-Swifts, two types
emerging.
(1) The super-Swift. 37 knots. Six 4-inch — 600 tons of
oil. £250,000. I want her to be superior at every point to
all T.B.D.'s. Speed she has, and stronger armament, and
superior stability. But it is alleged by Briggs1 (Advocatus
Diaboli — a very necessary functionary) that she will be as
flimsy as the destroyers, and a bigger target. So I have tried
to find her a thicker skin — not much, but enough to flash off
a 12-pounder or even a 4-inch shell. I can get from Admiral
Watts 2-inch tensile steel round all vitals with great strength-
ening of the general structure of the vessel for 160 tons, £2,200,
and three-quarters of a knot speed. The speed would come
back as the oil was used up. I think it is a great advance.
What do you feel ?
(2) Do you know the Active? She is a Blonde. The
super- Active, or Frenzy, Mania, and Delirium type, now in
question, will be 3,500 tons, 30 knots, 40,000 h.p., ten 4-inch
^ear-Admiral Briggs was at this time Controller or Third Sea
Lord.
THE ROMANCE OF DESIGN 145
guns and 290 tons of armour distributed in 2-inch plates round
vitals. She is therefore much smaller than the Dartmouths,
£65,000 cheaper (£285,000 as against £350,000), about the
same price or size as the Actives, but 4*7 knots faster (? in
smooth water) and with 2-inch protection as against nothing.
Now if all this bears test, how about chucking the two
Dartmouths and the Blonde in the programme, and substituting
four Frenzies, all of a kind, the gain being one additional ship,
four 30-knot cruiserlets or cruiserkins, and the cost being an
extra £170,000. What is your view?
Fisher wrote on the 16th January: —
c Of course there can be no moment's doubt that you ought
to chuck the two Dartmouths and the Blonde and take four
Frenzies in lieu. I hope you won't hestitate ! '
He did not approve of them, however.
'You are forced/ he said, 'by the general consensus of
opinion to have these useless warships and this therefore is
your wisest choice. I say to you deliberately that aviation
has entirely dispensed with the necessity for this type. What
you do want is the super-Swift — all oil — and don't fiddle about
armour; it really is so very silly ! There is only ONE defence
and that is SPEED ! for all small vessels (except those who go
under water).
1 The super-Swift is mainly wanted for the submarine. The
submarine has no horizon. The Swift tells her where the
enemy is and then flees for her life with 40 knots speed !
'The super-Lion, the super-Swift and the super-Submarine
— all else is wasted money !
1 The luxuries of the present are the necessities of the future.
Our grandfathers never had a bath-room. . . . You have got
to plunge for three years ahead ! And THE ONE thing is to
keep Foreign Admiralties running after you ! It's Hell for
them\
1 The Germans are going to have a motor battleship before
us and a cruiser that will make the circuit of the world without
having to replenish her fuel !
''What an Alabama I
146 THE WORLD CRISIS
"The most damnable person for you to have any dealings
with is a Naval Expert ! Sea fighting is pure common sense.
The first of all its necessities is SPEED, so as to be able to
fight-
When you like
Where you like
and How you like.
Therefore the super-Lion, the super-Swift and the super-
Submarine are the only three types for fighting {speed being
the characte istic of each of these types) . Aviation has
wiped out the intermediate types. No armour for anything
but the super-Lion and there restricted ! Cost £1,995,000;
speed over 30 knots; all oil; 10 "improved" guns; and you'll
make the Germans "squirm" I
And again:
' You had better adopt 2 keels to 1! You have it now. It
will be safe; it will be popular; it will head off the approaching
German naval increase. Above all remember Keble in The
Christian Year.
1 "The dusky hues of glorious War !"
' There is always the risk of a (bad Admiral) before a sec-
ond A. K. Wilson comes along to supersede him ! How that
picture of old 'ard 'eart (as the sailors call him) rises before
me now ! . . . Three big fleets that had never seen each other
came from three different quarters to meet him off Cape St.
Vincent — in sight of Trafalgar. When each was many hun-
dreds of miles away from him he"ordered them by " wireless"
exactly what to do, and that huge phalanx met together at his
prescribed second of time without a signal or a sound and
steamed a solid mass at 14 knots and dropped their anchors
with one splash ! Are we going to look at his like again ?
' So you had better have 2 keels to 1 !
'"The dusky hues of glorious War." What a hymn for
The Christian Year by a Saint like Keble ! '
On the 14th January he wrote: —
'I yesterday had an illuminating letter from Jellicoe.
... He has all the Nelsonic attributes. ... He writes to
THE ROMANCE OF DESIGN 147
me of new designs. His one, one, one cry is SPEED ! Do lay
that to heart! Do remember the receipt for jugged hare in
Mrs. Glasse's Cookery Book! "First catch your hare!" . . .
Also he advocates the "improved" gun and the far bigger ship
and (it) will cost less.
'"IPs your money we want," as those Tariff Reform asses
say ! . . . Take my advice — 2 keels to 1 / '
The Cruiser Admirals however plumped for the Super-
Blonde. Meanwhile, between the hammer and the anvil, Sir
Philip Watts had scraped together another inch of armour,
making 3 inches in all, and Sir Henry Oram guaranteed 30 or
even 31 knots of speed.
Now for the guns. The proverbial three alternatives pre-
sented themselves. We could have ten 4-inch (32-lb. shell)
or five 6-inch (100-lb. shell), or we could compromise on a
blend of the two. The Cruiser Admirals' Committee finally
agreed on a compromise. Six 4-inch guns were to be mounted
on the superstructure forward and two 6-inch on the main
deck aft. It was denied that this arrangement was a com-
promise. It must be judged in relation to what the ship
would have to do. When advancing to attack destroyers she
could fire a large number of 32-lb. shots, each sufficient to
wound them grievously; when retreating from a larger cruiser
she could strike back with her two 6-inch guns. I personally
insisted upon the two 6-inch. The Navy would never recog-
nise these vessels as cruisers if they did not carry metal of
that weight. The ultimate evolution of this type in subse-
quent years was to a uniform armament of five 6-inch.
We must now admit that this was right, but they were big
guns to put in so small a ship, and many doubted whether the
platform would be sufficiently stable. For the value then of
the two Dartmouths and one Blonde which had been previously
proposed, plus something scraped from other incidentals of
the programme, plus a hope that the Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer would not be too severe, we were able to lay down no
148 THE WORLD CRISIS
less than eight of these new vessels. I presented them to
Parliament in the following words: —
'They are described as Light Armoured Cruisers, and they
will in fact be the smallest, cheapest and fastest vessels pro-
tected by vertical armour ever projected for the British Navy.
They are designed for attendance on the Battle Fleet. They
are designed to be its eyes and ears by night and day; to watch
over it in movement and at rest. They will be strong enough
and fast enough to overhaul and cut down any torpedo boat
destroyer afloat, and generally they will be available for the
purposes of observation and reconnaissance.'
Judged by its popularity in peace and war this type may
claim success. In the three programmes of 1912, 1913 and
1914, 8, 8, and 6 of them were built respectively, and after
the war began no fewer than 18 more were built. The first
eight fired their torpedoes from the deck as if they were
destroyers. I put the greatest pressure on the constructors
to give them underwater torpedo tubes, but they could not
manage it in 191 2. In 1913 this had been achieved, and
was continued in all other vessels of this class. Such were
the advantages of speed in Light Cruisers that not one of
these vessels, nor the C Class, nor D Class which were their
successors, although frequently engaged with the enemy, was
ever sunk by gunfire. The first of these vessels from which
the class was named was the Arethusa, and under the broad
pennant of Commodore Tyrwhitt she established on an un-
challengeable foundation the glories claimed of old for that
ship.
Come, all you gallant seamen bold,
Whose hearts are cast in honour's mould;
I will to you a tale unfold
Of the saucy Arethusa.
Such were the characteristics of the new vessels with which
we proceeded to equip the Royal Navy in the programme of
1912.
CHAPTER VII
THE NORTH SEA FRONT
'The greatest impediment to action is not discussion, but the want
of that knowledge which is gained by discussion preparatory to action.'
Pericles.
Our First Line of Defence — The Great Change of Front — Close
Blockade and an Oversea Base — The New War-Plans: Distant
Blockade — Manoeuvre Experiments, 191 2 and 1913 — Prowling
Squadrons — The Perils of Surprise — The Limits of Precaution —
A Bolt from the Blue — Cordons — The Limits of German Morality
— The Invasion Problem and the Expeditionary Force — The In-
vasion Committee — First Lord's Notes — The South and East
Fronts Compared — Raid or Invasion — Impossibility of Close
Blockade— The Patrol Flotillas— The Coastal Watch— A Bolt
from the Grey — Possible German Objectives for Raids — As-
sumptions and Conclusions — Difficulties of Preparation — The
Initial Dangers the Greatest — Letter to a Friend — The Other
Side.
THE traditional war policy of the Admiralty grew up dur-
ing the prolonged wars and antagonisms with France.
It consisted in establishing immediately upon the outbreak
of war a close blockade of the enemy's ports and naval bases
by means of flotillas of strong small craft supported by cruis-
ers with superior battle fleets in reserve. The experience of
200 years had led all naval strategists to agree on this funda-
mental principle, 'Our first line of defence is the enemy's
ports.'
When the torpedo was invented, the French tried to frus-
trate this well-known British policy by building large numbers
of torpedo-boats, and the Admiralty, after some years, re-
torted by building torpedo-boat destroyers. These destroyers
fulfilled two conditions: first, they were large enough to keep
the seas in most weathers and to operate across the Channel
149
150 THE WORLD CRISIS
for sufficient periods; secondly, their guns were heavy enough
to destroy or dominate the French torpedo-boats. Thus, in
spite of the advent of the torpedo, we preserved our power to
maintain stronger flotillas in close proximity to the enemy's
naval bases. Meanwhile, all along the South Coast of Eng-
land a series of fortified torpedo-proof harbours in the neigh-
bourhood of our great naval establishments afforded safe,
close, and convenient stations for our battle fleets and other
supporting vessels when not actually at sea.
When early in the present century our potential enemy for
the first time became not France, but Germany, our naval
strategic front shifted from the South to the East Coast and
from the Channel to the North Sea. But although the enemy,
the front, and the theatre had changed, the sound principle of
British naval strategy still held good. Our first line of defence
was considered to be the enemy's ports. The Admiralty policy
was still a close blockade of those ports by means of stronger
flotillas properly supported by cruisers and ultimately by the
battle fleets.
It was not to be expected that our arrangements on this new
front could rapidly reach the same degree of perfection as the
conflicts of so many generations had evolved in the Channel;
and so far as our naval bases were concerned, we were still in
the process of transition when the great war began. More
serious, however, was the effect of the change on the utility
of our destroyers. Instead of operating at distances of from
20 or 60 miles across the Channel with their supporting ships
close at hand in safe harbours, they were now called upon
to operate in the Heligoland Bight, across 240 miles of sea,
and with no suitable bases for their supporting battle fleet
nearer than the Thames or the Forth. Nevertheless, the Ad-
miralty continued to adhere to their traditional strategic
principle, and their war plans up till 191 1 contemplated the
close blockade of the enemy's ports immediately upon the
declaration of war. Our destroyers were constructed with ever
THE NORTH SEA FRONT 151
increasing sea-keeping qualities and with a great superiority
of gun power. The Germans, on the other hand, adhered to
the French conception of the torpedo boat as a means of at-
tack upon our large ships. While we relied in our destroyer
construction principally on gun power and sea-keeping quali-
ties, they relied upon the torpedo and high speed in fair weather
opportunities. But the much greater distances over which
our destroyers had now to operate across the North Sea im-
mensely reduced their effectiveness. Whereas across the
Channel they could work in two reliefs, they required three
across the North Sea. Therefore only one-third instead of
one-half of our fighting flotillas could be available at any given
moment. Against this third the enemy could at any moment
bring his whole force. In order to carry out our old strategic
policy from our Home bases we should have required flotillas
at least three and probably four times as numerous as those of
Germany. This superiority we had not got and were not likely
to get.
Therefore from shortly before 1905 when the French agree-
ment was signed, down to the Agadir crisis in 191 1, the Ad-
miralty made plans to capture one or other of the German
islands. On this it was intended to establish an oversea base
at which from the beginning of the war our blockade flotillas
could be replenished and could rest, and which as war pro-
gressed would have developed into an advanced citadel of
our sea power. In this way, therefore, the Admiralty would
still have carried out their traditional war policy of beating
the enemy's flotillas and light craft into his ports and main-
taining a constant close blockade.
These considerations were not lost upon the Germans.
They greatly increased the fortifications of Heligoland, and
they proceeded to fortify one after another such of the Frisian
Islands as were in any way suitable for our purposes. At the
same time a new and potent factor appeared upon the scene —
the submarine. The submarine not only rendered the cap-
152 THE WORLD CRISIS
ture and maintenance of an oversea base or bases far more
difficult and, as some authorities have steadfastly held, im-
possible, but it threatened with destruction our cruisers and
battleships without whose constant support our flotillas would
easily have been destroyed by the enemy's cruisers.
This was the situation in October, 191 1, when immediately
after the Agadir crisis I became First Lord and proceeded to
form a new Board of Admiralty. Seeing that we had not for
the time being the numerical force of destroyers able to mas-
ter the destroyers of the potential enemy in his home waters,
nor the power to support our flotillas with heavy ships, and
having regard also to the difficulty and hazard in all the cir-
cumstances of storming and capturing one of his now fortified
islands, we proceeded forthwith to revise altogether the War
Plans and substitute, with the full concurrence of our princi-
pal commanders afloat, the policy of distant blockade set up
in the Admiralty War Orders of 191 2.
The policy of distant blockade was not adopted from
choice, but from necessity. It implied no repudiation on the
part of the Admiralty of their fundamental principle of aggres-
sive naval strategy, but only a temporary abandonment of it
in the face of unsolved practical difficulties; and it was in-
tended that every effort should be made, both before and after
a declaration of war, to overcome those difficulties. It was
rightly foreseen that by closing the exits from the North Sea
into the Atlantic Ocean, German commerce would be almost
completely cut off from the world. It was expected that the
economic and financial pressure resulting from such a blockade
would fatally injure the German power to carry on a war. It
was hoped that this pressure would compel the German fleet
to come out and fight, not in his own defended waters, but at
a great numerical disadvantage in the open sea. It was be-
lieved that we could continue meanwhile to enjoy the full
command of the seas without danger to our sea communica-
tions or to the movement of our armies, and that the British
THE NORTH SEA FRONT 153
Isles could be kept safe from invasion. There was at that
time no reason to suppose that these conditions would not
continue indefinitely with undiminished advantage to our-
selves and increasing pressure upon the enemy. So far as all
surface vessels are concerned, and certainly for the first three
years of the war, these expectations were confirmed by ex-
perience.
Under these orders the Fleet was disposed strategically so as
to block the exits from the North Sea by placing the Grand
Fleet at Scapa Flow and drawing a cordon of destroyers across
the Straits of Dover supported by the older battleships and
protected by certain minefields. These conclusions stood the
test of the war. They were never departed from in any
important respect by any of the Boards of Admiralty which
held office. By this means the British Navy seized and kept
the effective control of all the oceans of the world.
They did not, however, secure the command of the Baltic,
nor the absolute control of the North Sea. We could no
longer hope to prevent the enemy from sallying out of his
harbours whenever he chose. What use would he make of
this liberty, at the outset or during the progress of a war ?
By what means could we restrict him most effectually ?
We sought to probe these questions in the naval manoeuvres
of 1912 and 1913.
In 191 2 the newly-formed Admiralty War Staff prepared,
as an experiment, a plan for an immense cordon of cruisers and
destroyers, supported by the Battle Fleet, from the Coast of
Norway to a point on the East Coast of England. To a mili-
tary eye this system appeared unsound, and indeed outside
the Admiralty it was generally condemned by naval opinion.
I quoted Napoleon's scathing comment in 1808: 'Est-ce qu'on
a adopte le systeme des cordons ? Est-ce qu'on veut empecher
le contrebande de passer au l'ennemi ? Qui est-ce qui peut
conseiller au Roi de faire des cordons ? Apres dix annees de
guerre doit-on revenir a ces betises-la ? ' The cordon system
154 THE WORLD CRISIS
was however tried, and was completely exposed and broken
down. We then fell back upon a system of what I may call
1 prowling squadrons and occasional drives/ that is to say,
we recognised that we could not maintain any continuous
control of the North Sea. The best we could do was to
sweep it in strength at irregular intervals and for the rest
await the action of the enemy. This clearly involved a con-
siderable risk of raiding forces which might amount to ten
or twenty thousand men slipping through and disembarking
on our coast. I therefore called for careful individual study
to be made of all the different points where such forces could
be landed, and what would be the best plans for the Germans
to make in each case. At the manoeuvres of 19 13 Sir John
Jellicoe adopted several of these plans for raiding the British
coast and put them into execution. He achieved so consider-
able a measure of success that I thought it necessary to stop
the manoeuvres on the third day lest we might teach the Ger-
mans as well as ourselves.
But before there could be any question of employing the
war policy on which the Admiralty had decided, there was
a preliminary period to be traversed of the most momentous
and critical character. This period raised another set of
problems before which the inconveniences of raids, or even
an attempt at serious invasion, paled in gravity. Of all the
dangers that menaced the British Empire, none was com-
parable to a surprise of the Fleet. If the Fleet or any vital
part of it were caught unawares or unready and our naval
preponderance destroyed, we had lost the war, and there was
no limit to the evils which might have been inflicted upon
us except the mercy of an all-powerful conqueror. We have
seen in recent years how little completely victorious nations
can be trusted to restrain their passions against a prostrate
foe. Great Britain, deprived of its naval defence, could be
speedily starved into utter submission to the will of the con-
queror. Her Empire would be dismembered; her dominions,
THE NORTH SEA FRONT 155
India and her immense African and island possessions would
be shorn off or transferred to the victors. Ireland would be
erected into a hostile well-armed republic on the flank of
Great Britain; and the British people, reduced to a helpless
condition, would be loaded with overwhelming indemnities
calculated to shatter their social system, if, indeed, they were
not actually reduced, in Sir Edward Grey's mordant phrase,
to the position of 'the conscript appendage of a stronger
Power.' Less severe conditions than have since been meted
out to Germany would certainly have sufficed to destroy the
British Empire at a stroke for ever. The stakes were very
high. If our naval defence were maintained we were safe
and sure beyond the lot of any other European nation; if it
failed, our doom was certain and final.
To what lengths, therefore, would the Germans go to com-
pass the destruction of the British Fleet ? Taking the demonic
view of their character which it was necessary to assume for
the purposes of considering a war problem, what forms of
attack ought we to reckon with ? Of course, if Germany had
no will to war, all these speculations were mere nightmares.
But if she had the will and intention of making war, it was evi-
dent that there would be no difficulty in finding a pretext
arising out of a dispute with France or Russia, to create a situ-
ation in which war was inevitable, and create it at the most
opportune moment for herself. The wars of Frederick and
of Bismarck had shown with what extraordinary rapidity and
suddenness the Prussian nation was accustomed to fall upon
its enemy. The Continent was a powder magazine from end
to end. One single hellish spark and the vast explosion might
ensue. We had seen what had happened to France in 1870.
We had seen what neglect to take precautions had brought
upon the Russian fleet off Port Arthur in 1904. We know
now what happened to Belgium in 19 14, and, not less remark-
able, the demand Germany decided to make upon France on
August 1, 1914, that if she wished to remain neutral while
156 THE WORLD CRISIS
Germany attacked Russia, she must as a guarantee hand over
to German garrisons her fortresses of Verdun and Toul.
Obviously, therefore, the danger of a "bolt from the Blue"
was by no means fantastic. Still, might one not reasonably
expect certain warnings? There would probably be some
kind of dispute in progress between the great Powers enjoin-
ing particular vigilance upon the Admiralty. We might hope
to get information of military and naval movements. It was
almost certain that there would be financial perturbations in
the Exchanges of the world indicating a rise of temperature.
Could we therefore rely upon a week's notice, or three days*
notice, or at least twenty-four hours' notice before any blow
actually fell ?
In Europe, where great nations faced each other with enor-
mous armies, there was an automatic safeguard against sur-
prise. Decisive events could not occur till the armies were
mobilised, and that took at least a fortnight. The supreme
defence of France, for instance, could not therefore be over-
come without a great battle in which the main strength of
the French nation could be brought to bear. But no such
assurance was enjoyed by the British Fleet. No naval mobili-
sation was necessary on either side to enable all the modern
ships to attack one another. They had only to raise steam
and bring the ammunition to the guns, But beyond this
grim fact grew the torpedo menace. So far as gunfire alone
was concerned, our principal danger was for our Fleet to
be caught divided and to have one vital part destroyed
without inflicting proportionate damage on the enemy. This
danger was greatly reduced by wireless, which enabled the
divided portions to be instantly directed to a common ren-
dezvous and to avoid action till concentration was effected.
Besides, gunfire was a game that two could play at. One
could not contemplate that the main strength of the fleets
would ever be allowed to come within range of each other
without taking proper precautions. But the torpedo was es-
THE NORTH SEA FRONT 157
sentially a weapon of surprise, or even treachery; and all that
was true of the torpedo in a surface vessel applied with tenfold
force to the torpedo of a submarine.
Obviously there were limits beyond which it was impossible
to safeguard oneself. It was not simply a case of a few weeks
of special precautions. The British Navy had to live its ordi-
nary life in time of peace. It had to have its cruises and its
exercises, its periods of leave and refit. Our harbours were
open to the commerce of the world. Absolute security against
the worst conceivable treachery was physically impossible.
On the other hand, even treachery, which required the co-
operation of very large numbers of people in different stations
and the setting in motion of an immense and complicated
apparatus, is not easy to bring about. It was ruled by the
Committee of Imperial Defence, after grave debate, that the
Admiralty must not assume that if it made the difference be-
tween victory and defeat, Germany would stop short of an
attack on the Fleet in full peace without warning or pretext.
We had to do our best to live up to this standard, and in the
main I believe we succeeded. Certainly the position and con-
dition of the British Fleet was every day considered in relation
to that of Germany. I was accustomed to check our disposi-
tions by asking the Staff from time to time, unexpectedly,
' What happens if war with Germany begins to-day ? ' I never
found them without an answer which showed that we had the
power to effect our main concentration before any portion of
the Fleet could be brought to battle. Our Fleet did not go for
its cruises to the coast of Spain until we knew that the German
High Seas Fleet was having its winter refits. When we held
Grand Manoeuvres we were very careful to arrange the coaling
and leave which followed in such a way as to secure us the
power of meeting any blow which could possibly reach us in a
given time. I know of no moment in the period of which I
am writing up to the declaration of war in which it was physi-
cally possible for the British Fleet to have been surprised or
158 THE WORLD CRISIS
caught dispersed and divided by any serious German force of
surface vessels. An attempt in full peace to make a submarine
attack upon a British squadron in harbour or exercising, or
to lay mines in an area in which they might be expected to
exercise, could not wholly be provided against; but in all
human probability its success would only have been partial.
Further, I do not believe that such treachery was ever contem-
plated by the German Admiralty, Government or Emperor.
While trying as far as possible to guard against even the worst
possibilities, my own conviction was that there would be a
cause of quarrel accompanied by a crisis and a fall in markets,
and followed very rapidly by a declaration of war, or by acts
of war intended to be simultaneous with the declaration, but
possibly occurring slightly before. What actually did happen
was not unlike what I thought would happen.
Early in 191 2, the Prime Minister set up again, under his
own chairmanship, the Invasion Committee of the Committee
of Imperial Defence. This was virtually the Committee which
had assembled during the Agadir crisis in the previous August,
and henceforth down to the outbreak of the war it continued
to meet not infrequently. I asked that Mr. Balfour, who had
retired from the leadership of the Unionist party, should be
added to the Committee. This was effected.
The main question before us was the possibility of the in-
vasion of Great Britain by Germany; but incidentally many
other aspects of a war with Germany were patiently and
searchingly examined. The position which I stated on behalf
of the Admiralty was briefly as follows: —
Once the Fleet was concentrated in its war station, no large
army could be landed in the British Isles. 'Large Army'
was defined for this purpose as anything over 70,000 men.
More than that we guaranteed to intercept or break up while
landing. Less than that could be dealt with by the British
Regular Army, provided it had not left the country. But the
War Office proposed to send the whole Expeditionary Force of
THE NORTH SEA FRONT 159
six Divisions out of the country immediately upon the declara-
tion of war, and to have it all in France by the thirteenth or
fourteenth day. The Admiralty were unable to guarantee —
though we thought it very unlikely — that smaller bodies of per-
haps twenty or thirty thousand Germans might not slip across
the North Sea. These would have to be met at once by well-
trained troops. The Territorial Force would not be capable
in the very early days of their embodiment of coping with the
invaders. Some regular troops ought, therefore, to be left in
the country till we saw how matters went at sea, and could
measure our real position with more certainty. It would be
a disastrous mistake to begin sending six Divisions, and then
because of a successful raid have to interrupt the whole proc-
ess and disentangle two or more Divisions from the troops in
transit to make head against the raiders. We therefore
argued that four Divisions only should be sent in the first
instance, and that two should be left behind till we knew how
we stood at sea. The presence of these two Divisions at
home, together with the Territorial Force, would make it not
worth while for the Germans to invade except with an army
large enough to be certainly caught in transit by the Fleet.
Only an army of a certain size at home could give the Navy
a sufficiently big target on salt water. 'You could not,' as
Sir Arthur Wilson pithily observed, 'expect the Navy to play
international football without a goalkeeper.' The War Office,
on the other hand, continued to demand the immediate dis-
patch of the whole six Divisions.
This controversy was never finally settled till the war began.
It certainly afforded the means of exploring every imaginable
aspect of the conditions which would arise in the first few weeks
of war. Further than that no man could see. When the
actual test came, both the War Office and the Admiralty aban-
doned their respective contentions simultaneously. Lord
Kitchener decided to send only four Divisions immediately to
France, while I on behalf of the Admiralty announced at the
160 THE WORLD CRISIS
great War Council on the 5th August that as we were fully
mobilised and had every ship at its war station, we would take
the responsibility of guarding the island in the absence of the
whole six Divisions. We thus completely changed places.
The Admiralty were better than their word when it came to the
point, and the War Office more cautious than their intentions.
Surveying it all in retrospect, I believe Lord Kitchener's de-
cision was right. But it was taken freely and not under duress
from the Admiralty.
While the discussions of the Invasion Committee were at
their height during the spring and summer of 19 13, 1 prepared
a series of papers in support of the Admiralty view, but also
designed to explore and illuminate the situations that might
arise. They show the hopes and fears we felt before the
event, what we thought the enemy might do against us, and
the dangers we hoped to avoid ourselves. They show the
kind of mental picture I was able to summon up in imagina-
tion of these tremendous episodes which were so soon to rush
upon us. My intention also was to stimulate thought in the
Admiralty War Staff, and to expose weak points in our
arrangements. For this purpose I entered into an active dis-
cussion and correspondence with several of the ablest Ad-
mirals (notably Admiral Beatty, Admiral Lewis Bayly, and
Sir Reginald Custance), seeking to have the whole matter
argued out to the utmost limit possible. I caused war games
to be played at the War College in which, aided by one or
the other of my naval advisers, I took one side, usually the
German, and forced certain situations. I also forecasted the
political data necessary to a study of military and naval
action on the outbreak of war.
Various papers which I prepared in 19 13 were the result of
this process of study and discussion. The first, entitled
'Notes by the First Lord of the Admiralty,' deals with the
problem of raid and invasion in general terms, and shows the
conditions which would prevail in a war with Germany. The
THE NORTH SEA FRONT 161
second propounds the issues to be faced by the War Staff.
The third records my written discussion of the problem with
the First Sea Lord, while the sittings of the Invasion Com-
mittee were proceeding. The fourth and fifth were entitled
'The Time-Table of a Nightmare' and 'A Bolt from the
Grey/ imaginative exercises couched in a half serious vein,
but designed to disturb complacency by suggesting weak
points in our arrangements and perilous possibilities. Space
forbids the inclusion of these last. The first three have been
subjected to a certain compression.
NOTES BY THE FIRST LORD OF THE
ADMIRALTY
It is much harder for the British Navy to stop raids or an
invasion from Germany to-day than it was fifteen years ago
from France. The tension between England and France had
in the course of successive generations led to the development
of a sea front opposite to France of great military strength.
The line Berehaven, Queenstown, Pembroke, Falmouth,
Plymouth, Portland, Portsmouth, Newhaven, Dover, Sheer-
ness, and Chatham, covers with suitable defences every point
of strategic significance, comprises three great naval bases and
dockyards, and two torpedo-proof war harbours (Portland
and Dover). In close proximity to this line are our three
principal military establishments, the Curragh, Salisbury and
Aldershot.
From the British military harbours and bases on this line
close observation of all French Channel ports where transports
could be assembled can be maintained by a superior British
naval force. Cherbourg and Havre can be controlled from
Portland, and Calais and Boulogne from Dover. Flotillas and
light craft employed on this service of observation would have
their own home base close at hand, and a high proportion could
be constantly maintained on duty. The proximity of the
battle fleets in the numerous well-protected harbours, where
every necessity is supplied, ensures the effective support of
the flotillas against any serious attempt to drive them off.
Very different is the situation on the sea front against
162 THE WORLD CRISIS
Germany. With the exception of Chatham, no naval base or
military harbour exists. Chatham itself has no graving docks
for the later Dreadnoughts, and the depth of the Medway
imposes serious limitations of tides and seasons upon great
vessels using the dockyard. Harwich affords anchorage only
to torpedo-craft [and light cruisers], and is lightly defended.
The Humber and the Tyne are unsuitable for large battle
fleets, and are but lightly defended. Rosyth will not be ready
even as a war repairing-base till 191 6 at the earliest. Defences
are being erected at Cromarty, and a temporary floating base
is in process of creation at that point.1 Only improvised emer-
gency arrangements are contemplated for Scapa Flow, and the
Shetlands are quite unprotected. The only war bases available
for the fleet along the whole of this front are Rosyth, Cromarty,
and Scapa — the more remote being preferred, although the
least defended. The landing places along the coast are numer-
ous, extensive, and evenly distributed; the strategic objec-
tives open to an enemy are numerous and important. The
Shetlands are a strategic position of the highest consequence,
totally undefended and ungarrisoned. The same is true of
the Orkneys. Edinburgh and Glasgow, Newcastle, Hull, and
Harwich are all points of primary importance. No large mili-
tary garrisons comparable to those on the southern front exist.
But the comparison of the new conditions with the old be-
comes most unfavourable when we extend our view from the
British to the German coast. It is difficult to find any sea
front of greater natural defensive strength than the German
North Sea coast. Intricate navigation, shifting and extensive
sandbanks and currents, strong tides, frequent mists and
JNo one can form any idea of the difficulties the Admiralty en-
countered in securing adequate defences for Eastern harbours. Coast
Defence was in the province of the War Office and paid for on their
estimates. They needed every penny for their Field Army and Ex-
peditionary Force, and naturally marshalled all their experts against
expenditure on fortifications in Great Britain. In consequence expert
opinion was always divided. The discussions evaporated in tech-
nicalities, and the lay members of the Committee were rarely con-
vinced of the unwelcome need of spending money, j To such a point
was the dispute carried, that Prince Louis and I undertook in desper-
ation to fortify Cromarty ourselves, arm it with naval guns and man
it with marines. And this was the only new work completed when
the war broke out.
THE NORTH SEA FRONT 163
storms, make the Heligoland Bight a very difficult theatre for
oversea operations. The deep re-entrant widening into a
broad debouch, flanked at each side by lines of islands and sus-
tained in the centre by Heligoland, confers the greatest possi-
ble natural advantages upon the defence. To these have been
added, and are being added, everything that military art can
devise. Heligoland is an almost impregnable fortress and an
advanced torpedo and airship station. Borkum and Sylt
are both heavily defended by batteries, mine-fields, and strong
garrisons, and both can be commanded by fire from the main-
land. Into this great defended area, with its wide debouch
facing towards us, access is given from the Ems, the Elbe, the
Weser, the Jade and from the Kiel Canal communicating
with the Baltic, and open for Dreadnoughts at the present
year. Within this area are all the naval establishments of Ger-
many. A fleet or transports assembled at either end of the Kiel
Canal have the widely separated alternatives of emerging either
from the Heligoland Bight or from the Baltic for offensive pur-
poses. There would be no difficulty on the declaration of war in
assembling unperceived at Hamburg, Kiel, Wilhelm shaven, and
other ports, the shipping necessary to transport at least 20,000
men; enough to transport 10,000 men is always in those ports.
Large garrisons exist in the neighbourhood, amply sufficient to
supply whatever military force was required. The Germans
possess to-day large ships of the liner class suitable for trans-
port in a way which the French never did. The rigour with
which agents suspected of sending information have been pur-
sued during the last five or six years has made it difficult to
arrange for the transmission of intelligence. Consular officers
are marked men; and it is to be expected that their communi-
cations by the usual postal and telegraphic channels will be
delayed if hostilities are imminent. Although the sources from
which information may be obtained have been increased in
numbers during recent years, and are still being increased as
opportunity offers, yet the Admiralty are not prepared to make
any confident assertion that a force of upwards of 20,000 men
could not be collected in time of peace, and embarked without
their knowledge. As a matter of fact, very considerable
embarkations of a test character have been carried out without
our having any knowledge until some days after the event.
The continuous development of the mine and the torpedo
1 64 THE WORLD CRISIS
makes it impossible to establish a close watch with heavy ships
on the exits from the Heligoland Bight. To do so for a long
period of time would mean a steady and serious wastage of
valuable units from the above causes, and, if prolonged, would
effectually alter the balance of naval power. On the other
hand, torpedo craft, which cannot keep at sea like great ves-
sels, and must every three or four days return to port for rest
and replenishment, have no base nearer than Harwich, 240
miles away. The operation of controlling the debouches from
the Heligoland Bight by means of flotillas would require twice
the number of oversea torpedo craft that we now possess.
The watch would have to be maintained in three reliefs: one
on duty, one in transit, and one at rest, and therefore only a
third of the existing vessels would be available at any given
time. Such a force could be overwhelmed by a sudden attack
of two or three times their numbers by a well-chosen blow,
opportunities for which would frequently recur. Unless,
therefore, we were to take by storm some fortified German
island which could be held as a base, or were permitted to use
Dutch or Danish territory, the closing of the debouches of the
Heligoland Bight by a close flotilla cordon is, in the opinion
of the Admiralty, impracticable at present.
The development of submarines of ocean-going capacity
may be expected to modify this situation in our favour.
The problem of controlling the alternative debouches from
the Baltic by watching over the Skaw or the Belts presents
many of the features that have been found so unfavourable in
regard to the Heligoland Bight. Nothing effective could be
done, or still less maintained, with our present forces without
using the territory of Norway or Denmark, or both. It
must be borne in mind that the enemy have the option of
striking with their whole force on either line.
On the assumption that a close blockade, either of the Heli-
goland Bight or of the exits from the Baltic, is not possible,
the Admiralty cannot guarantee that individual vessels will
not frequently slip through the cruiser squadrons patrolling
the wide area of the North Sea. The North Sea comprises an
area of more than 125,000 square miles. The number of
cruisers available is less than 30, of which a large proportion
THE NORTH SEA FRONT 165
will always be recoaling. The aid that can be given at a dis-
tance from the British shore by torpedo craft would be partial
and fleeting. The weather is frequently thick; on a third of
the days in the year the visibility is not more than 4 miles; on
a quarter of the days in the year it is not more than 2 miles.
There are about five days fog per month during the year.
April averages ten days fog. At night it is frequently impossi-
ble to see a ship without lights at more than a few hundred
yards distance, and often not at that. It is no exaggeration
to say that the main risk which a single fast ship would run,
steaming at night without lights, would be that of collision,
which chance may be very well accepted. It will be easy to
demonstrate this by experiments at the forthcoming manoeu-
vres. If, therefore, close and certain observation becomes
impossible, there is a very good chance of an indefinite succes-
sion of individual transports reaching the British coasts with-
out being intercepted by the controlling cruiser squadrons.
Let us now consider what arrangements exist or are possible
along the line of the British coasts to detect and attack such
vessels.
Four flotilla cruisers, seventy-four destroyers and torpedo-
boats, and eighteen submarines are placed under the command
of the Admiral of Patrols for the defence of the East Coast from
the Shetlands to Dover; less than 100 vessels and more than
600 miles of sea front. It is quite impossible with such a small
force to maintain a regular patrol, or still less a line of observa-
tion. These flotillas are not intended for observation, but to
attack. To employ them on the former service, for which
their numbers are wholly insufficient, would speedily exhaust
them: at least half would have to be resting and refuelling.
It is not possible with the forces available for the patrol flo-
tillas to prevent enemy vessels from reaching the British
coast. Our dispositions are intended to make it certain that
they will be attacked in force with the least possible delay.
A curious distinction attaches to the work of naval coast
defence. Usually the line of observation lies in advance of the
line of resistance. In coast defence the line of observation is
in rear of the line of resistance. So far as the patrol flotillas
are concerned, the British coasts are themselves the only true
and certain line of observation. The approach of an enemy
may be undetected by the cruising squadrons or by the patrol-
1 66 THE WORLD CRISIS
ling flotillas. But it ought to be certain that his first contact
with the coast at any point is reported to the Admiral of Pa-
trols, and that that officer will have his available forces massed
at convenient points from which an attack can be at once de-
livered. The Admiral of Patrols must treat his problems
selectively and recognise that absolute certainty is out of
reach, that his flotillas are for fighting purposes, and that their
role of scouting is secondary. It is of very little use reporting
the approach of an enemy when one has not the forces with
which to strike him. The patrol flotillas are therefore kept in
hand at the best strategic points, neither scattered nor ex-
hausted, and a system of land observation by outposts, cyclists,
aircraft and signal stations, all connected by telephone, ought
to be perfected, from which accurate information can be trans-
mitted to the points where the patrol flotillas are massed.
Dalesvoe (Shetlands), Fort Ross, Firth of Forth, North
Shields, Grimsby, and Yarmouth are the bases of the patrol
flotillas, and a force of fourteen or fifteen vessels would, on
the average, be available for each. It is upon this disposition
that the Admiralty rely to interrupt the disembarkation of
any considerable force. It is of vital importance that the
watching of the coast-line from the shore should be taken up
from the earliest moment and in advance of general mobilisa-
tion. The effectiveness of the work of the patrol flotillas and
consequently the restriction of possible landings depend upon
early information being received of any disembarkation.
The size of any raiding party that could be landed will, of
course, be accurately proportionate to the delay. It would no
doubt be impossible or undesirable to put the whole system
of coast watches into operation in the precautionary period.
No doubt the arrangements made after war had actually begun
would be much more thorough, and larger numbers of cyclists
and watchers would be available. But a system of watching
likely landing-places ought to be devised which could be
brought silently into operation as soon as the precautionary
period is declared or, if necessary, immediately before, just in
the same way as the watch over the magazines and other vital
points can unostentatiously be improved.
It may well be, therefore, that the coast watch should be set
up in two stages: the first secret, and the second open. For
the first the police and selected cyclists from the Territorial
THE NORTH SEA FRONT 167
Force would appear to be the only resources. It ought to be
possible to organise a pretty effective watch with these, and to
make arrangements which could be actually rehearsed in
time of peace in connection with the work of the patrol flotillas.
It is not so much armed force which is required as vigilant
watching by persons who know what to look for and where to
report their information. Aerial squadrons along the coast-
line or airships would appear to be of the greatest value. The
new naval aeroplane stations which are being constructed will
be of service for this purpose. After war has been declared, or
general mobilisation ordered, the full arrangements devised by
the War Office could come into force in their entirety, but it is
imperative that the precautionary period in advance of mobili-
sation should be provided for.
March 29, 1913.
NOTES BY THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY
{Address to the Admiralty War Staff)
The problem of oversea attack requires to be examined under
three heads: —
(1.) Absolute surprise to-morrow (19th April): everything
going on as usual — Bolt from the Blue.
Objectives of raiders — to prevent the Expeditionary Force
being sent to help France, and incidentally, if possible, to
damage naval arsenals and dockyards.
(2.) The whole expeditionary army has gone to India or
some other distant theatre of war. The war has been going on
some time: the Territorials have been embodied, but great
numbers have been allowed to proceed on leave. The Second
Fleet has been completed to full strength by the closing of the
schools. The Immediate Reserve has been called out; and
the whole of the First and Second Fleets are in those harbours
which enable them to reach their actual war stations as quickly
as possible. The patrol flotillas are mobilised in their war sta-
tions. The forts are manned, and the coastal look-out is
active. But this has been going on for several months while
complete peace continues in Europe. The tension has begun
to be somewhat relaxed, and we have settled down to our ordi-
nary way of life, while at the same time taking special precau-
tions and having our forces so disposed that they are easily
168 THE WORLD CRISIS
and readily available on the slightest sign of danger. This
may be called " Bolt from the Grey." The only adequate ob-
jective of the enemy in this case would be invasion in such
force as to overcome the comparatively feeble military estab-
lishment on foot in the United Kingdom.
(3.) War with Germany has begun. All the fleets are fully
mobilised and in active operation against the enemy according
to the war plans of the Admiralty. The objectives open to
the enemy would be minor raids to destroy naval arsenals and
dockyards: the seizure of bases for flotilla action (this last may
occur also in 1 and 2), and threats or attempts to invade in
force to distract or divide the British fleet simultaneously
with bringing about a great fleet action.
All these three situations with their variants deserve pa-
tient examination.
2. The first condition governing the dimensions of over-
sea attack from Germany is the number of troops available —
(i.) Instantly;
(ii.) In twenty-four hours; and
(iii.) At any time after a general mobilisation is complete.
5. A second great limiting condition is the shipping available
in German ports. For all phases after the war has become
open, whether under 1, 2, or 3, ample shipping is available of
every class required, and the matter need not be further con-
sidered. But in case 1, the invading force is limited by the
amount of suitable shipping available instantly at the right
ports, and secondly, by what is available after 24 hours: in
case 2 by the amount of shipping available instantly. After
that, when war has actually begun, there is no difficulty in find-
ing the ships or the men; the only difficulty is to get them
across.
6. The third condition is the time taken to embark, trans-
port, and land the various forces at different points concur-
rently and alternatively. This requires separate calculations
in every case. These are complicated by the hours of daylight
and darkness, the tides, the weather, and other uncertain
features. Each case must be worked out separately, and
risked on its merits.
7. The last consideration is the distance of the practicable
1
THE NORTH SEA FRONT 169
objective from the landing-point. Here again each case must
be considered individually: —
Harwich is invaluable because it threatens London, and is
unquestionably the best place for so doing. In no other way
could you react so instantaneously upon British public opin-
ion. On the other hand, once the invaders were turned out,
the actual damage done would be small.
Immingham is a purely local injury not worth touching
before war breaks out, and afterwards belonging to the
* driblets' phase.
Blyth or the Tyne are striking places for Newcastle, in-
volving considerable moral effect and immense permanent
damage, not of a vital character.
The Tay (Dundee) is valuable as affording a good landing-
place and ample supplies for a large army (if it could get there),
within effective striking distance of Glasgow and the Clyde.
Cromarty, as long as it is undefended by land and if unde-
fended by ships, would be a good place of disembarkation for
a large force, but they would be isolated in barren country
with great natural difficulties between them and any real
vulnerable point. Cromarty and the Invergordon oil tanks
might, however, be the object of a minor raid in the ' driblets '
phase, if undefended.
Balta Sound, in the Shetlands, and those islands generally
would be of the greatest value as a flotilla base to the Germans.
Until they were expelled from them, which would be costly
both in ships and men, all attempts to blockade the North
Sea would be rendered futile.
On the West Coast there are numerous undefended landing-
places in sheltered waters suitable for the disembarkation of
a.large force (if it could get there). Oban, 60 miles away from
the Clyde, deserves special attention. The mouth of the Clyde
itself, which is lightly defended by land and has only three
submarines at Lamlash, is suitable both for the landing of a
large force and also for a raid on an arsenal. The same may
be said of Barrow.
This would seem to exhaust the principal serviceable land-
ing-places which should be considered, but there may be
others.
a* r? q W. S. C.
April 18, 1913.
170 THE WORLD CRISIS
NOTES BY THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY
{Addressed to the First Sea Lord.)
(marginal notes by first sea lord.)
A.
as
Should like to limit this to two
or three ports at most.
36 answers this,
assumption is risky.
(b) The latter should, I think, be
assumed.
Yes.
Yes.
Yes.
The following assumptions appear to me
at present advised, to be justified: —
1. That not more than 20,000 men could be
collected and embarked in German North
Sea Ports without our knowing it before the
expedition actually sailed; but that up to
that number might actually put to sea before
we were warned,
otherwise the 2. That no military expedition of upwards
of 10,000 men could reach the British coast
before the general alarm was given.
3. That the intention of the German Gov-
ernment to attack us would either (a) be
discovered or (b) , more probably, formally de-
clared while the expedition was in transit.
4. That, having regard to the time taken in
transit, three to six hours' warning would have
been given throughout the country, along the
coasts, and at all ports, and preparations ad-
vanced accordingly.
5. That any expedition arriving at a port
must expect to encounter resistance from
whatever forces or defences are on the spot
after three hours' alarm notice; but that no
one place can be considered more certain than
another, and that only the ordinary prepara-
tions prescribed under our existing mobilisa-
tion arrangements have been made at each
particular place.
6. That any German expedition seeking to
seize a port defended or otherwise must be
provided with an escort sufficient to overcome
the local defences and to beat off the British
THE NORTH SEA FRONT 171
torpedo craft or cruisers known to be in the
vicinity.
7. That the moment Chosen Will be One Assuming that some kind of diplo-
i ,1 t> ... 1 t, ,,1 -r-i! . . .1 . » matic discussion had preceded the
when the British Battle Fleet is on the south- Declaration of war it is to be hoped
west or west coasts of Great Britain or Ireland. Stoftut Ji^tfel?11"
8. That the return of the Battle Fleet to Our own flotillas should be able
the North Sea will be obstructed by mines t0 clear the road-
and submarines, and at night by flotilla
attacks.
9. That pending the return of the Battle JSSTftHfer&Sfift
Fleet the German Navy will have the com- there win be 2nd Fleet ships from
- f - __ , _ J . . . . Nore, also Nore Flotilla, besides
mand of the North Sea, and that so long as it patrol vessels to deal with.
holds the command of the North Sea it can
continue, though at considerable risk, to pass
individual vessels, in addition to the original
20,000 men, into the defended harbour which
has been seized. The maximum time which
in the most unfavourable circumstances would
elapse before the return of the British Fleet
to the North Sea and consequent resumption
of British naval superiority is therefore a vital _ . „ . .
, , , i , \ , . . The time-table given in your "Bolt
matter, and should be worked out m as many from the Blue" is quite sufficient,
. «i 1 1 xt_ j. re aQd cannot be varied to any appre-
vanants as possible by the staff. dabie extent.
10. That the British Fleet when it has re-
turned to the North Sea, whether north-
about or through the Straits of Dover, may
have to fight a general battle at once with the
whole strength of the enemy: and that during ,Tttis almuost h°P5les.s to forecast
. ,... J ,, ° what may happen during this cnti-
tne preliminaries, the progress, and the after- cai time No escorts could then
math of this battle attempts may be made
either to reinforce the original landing or to
make further landings at other points on the
British coasts.
11. That Sabotage, i.e. aCtS Of treachery Resident Germans may certainly
before a declaration of war, are improbable, but TLre^redwlVaTumber ISfofc
that they may occur simultaneously with the cersoverhere map-making.
first military hostilities, and that in any case
they are not included in the present phase of
the inquiry which deals essentially with mili-
tary operations. W S P
April 26, 1913.
be spared.
Yes.
172 THE WORLD CRISIS
B.
certainly. It is useless labour to work out in detail a
series of conventional operations. It is only
necessary to work out real operations, i.e.
the sort of operations an enemy might be
expected to attempt. The numbers of these
are limited: there are only four types.
a Except local co-operation {see 2 First, sabotage, by which is meant acts
of treachery perpetrated by persons or vessels
in disguise before any declaration of war.
Instances of these acts are given by Captain
Hankey in his paper. They are an important
study, but they do not touch the problems we
are now examining, and they are therefore
excluded for the present.
3. Secondly, a military raid on Blyth for
the purpose of destroying Elswick.
We have hitherto assumed 10,000 men for
Blyth-Newcastle; either more or less may be
required. The force must be numerous
enough to make its way in the face of sporadic
opposition by unmobilised territorials and by
the population, from Blyth to Elswick; to
seize and destroy effectively the Elswick
Works and the ships in the Tyne. It seems
improbable that less than 10,000 men would
be sufficient.
4. Thirdly, a raid of not less than 20,000
men on Harwich, with the object of stopping
the regular army from going to France.
*****
The Harwich operation is essentially —
(a.) The secret concentration and embarka-
tion of 20,000 men.
(b.) The destruction of the floating and
land defences of Harwich by the
escorting hostile squadron.
(c.) The disembarkation of 20,000 men
with a proportion of artillery before
the British Fleet can arrive in suffi-
cient force to give battle.
Yea.
THE NORTH SEA FRONT
173
5. Fourthly, a landing in the Firth of Tay.
This is not worth doing unless the force
landed is at least 35,000 men. It is assumed
that war has begun before the enemy actually
completed their embarkation; that the British
Fleet has been forced to concentrate to the
southward * in order to fight a general battle
with the German Fleet; that in consequence
the northern waters of the North Sea are
denuded of ships; and that the passage of fif-
teen or twenty independent transports to a
fixed rendezvous, as suggested, will not be
obstructed by any naval force which could
not be overcome by the German warship
escort. f In this case the forts are fully
manned and the whole coast is alarmed and
vigilant. The enemy's transports must be
escorted and protected by cruisers or old
battleships; the opposition of the forts must
be beaten down, and any resistance by local
territorials on land must be overcome and
quelled. The objective of the invaders is
Glasgow and the Clyde. The whole six di-
visions of the expeditionary force have left
England for a distant war.§
The question to be resolved is whether
these are all the operations which need be con-
sidered at the present time. Are they prac-
ticable ? * And if so, to what extent ? f How
could they be achieved ? { What are the cir-
cumstances most favourable to their suc-
cess ? § What are the measures which should
be taken in each case ? ||
The times and conditions which I have
prescribed are illustrative of the problem;
and before any attempt is made to work out
these cases in detail the conditions should be
formulated exactly.
April 24, 1 913.
•The transports are not likely
to sail before some certainty as to
whereabouts of our Fleet has been
obtained. Every delay adds to the
number of cruisers, &c, which
would be in the way.
fl doubt if much in the way of
escort could be spared. The enemy
must be prepared to meet our entire
superior force in North Sea.
w. s. c.
On the whole this seems a very
risky undertaking, but by no means
impossible, and on the assumption
§ above, quite worth trying.
* First three certainly,
t With limitations.
t As described.
§ Knowledge that we intend to
send army to France, the strongest
inducement, amounting almost to
military necessity.
|| Navy —
Provide sea defences for
Blyth.
Strengthen existing ones (not-
ably Harwich) on East
Coast.
Man them on the principle
of a ship in commission
with nucleus crew.
Provide local submarine de-
fence flotillas at the prin-
cipal East Coast ports.
Army —
Adhere rigidly to the Com-
mittee of Imperial Defence
recommendations (1908), as
accepted by His Majesty's
Government, [i.e. retain
two divisions at home.]
174 THE WORLD CRISIS
These papers are sufficient to show that we did not ignore
the dangers that lay before us or neglect the attempt to
penetrate their mysteries. It is easy to underrate the diffi-
culty of such work in days of peace.
In time of war there is great uncertainty as to what the
enemy will do and what will happen next. But still, once you
are at war the task is definite and all-dominating. Whatever
may be your surmises about the enemy or the future, your
own action is circumscribed within practical limits. There are
only a certain number of alternatives open. Also, you live
in a world of reality where theories are constantly being cor-
rected and curbed by experiment. Resultant facts accumulate
and govern to a very large extent the next decision.
But suppose the whole process of war is transported out of
the region of reality into that of imagination. Suppose you
have to assume to begin with that there will be a war at all;
secondly, that your country will be in it when it comes;
thirdly, that you will go in as a united nation and that the
nation will be united and convinced in time, and that the neces-
sary measures will be taken before it is too late, — then the proc-
esses of thought become speculative indeed. Every set of as-
sumptions which it is necessary to make, draws new veils of
varying density in front of the dark curtain of the future.
The life of the thoughtful soldier or sailor in time of peace
is made up of these experiences — intense effort, amid every
conceivable distraction, to pick out across and among a swarm
of confusing hypotheses what actually will happen on a given
day and what actually must be done to meet it before that day
is ended. Meanwhile all around people, greatly superior in
authority and often in intelligence, regard him as a plotting
knave, or at the best an overgrown child playing with toys,
and dangerous toys at that.
Therefore the most we could do in the days before the war
was to attempt to measure and forecast what would happen to
England on the outbreak and in the first few weeks of a war
THE NORTH SEA FRONT 175
with Germany. To look farther was beyond the power of man.
To try to do so was to complicate the task beyond mental
endurance. The paths of thought bifurcated too rapidly.
Would there be a great sea battle or not? What would
happen then ? Who would win the great land battle ? No
one could tell. Obviously the first thing was to be ready;
not to be taken unawares: to be concentrated; not to be caught
divided : to have the strongest Fleet possible in the best station
under the best conditions in good time, and then if the battle
came one could await its result with a steady heart. Every-
thing, therefore, to guard against surprise; everything, there-
fore, to guard against division; everything, therefore, to in-
crease the strength of the forces available for the supreme sea
battle.
But suppose the enemy did not fight a battle at sea. And
suppose the battle on land was indeterminate in its results.
And suppose the war went on not for weeks or months, but
for years. Well, then it would be far easier to judge those
matters at the time, and far easier then, when everybody was
alarmed and awake and active, to secure the taking of the
necessary steps; and there would be time to take them. No
stage would be so difficult or so dangerous as the first stage.
The problems of the second year of war must be dealt with
by the experience of the first year of war. The problems of
the third year of war must be met by results observed and un-
derstood in the second, and so on.
I repulse, therefore, on behalf of the Boards of Admiralty
over which I presided down to the end of May, 191 5, all
reproaches directed to what occurred in 19 17 and 1918. I can-
not be stultified by any lessons arising out of those years. It
is vain to tell me that if the Germans had built in the three
years before the war, the submarines they built in the three
years after it had begun, Britain would have been undone; or
that if England had had in August, 19 14, the army which we
possessed a year later, there would have been no war. Every
176 THE WORLD CRISIS
set of circumstances involved every other set of circumstances.
Would Germany in profound peace have been allowed by Great
Britain to build an enormous fleet of submarines which could
have no other object than the starvation and ruin of this
island through the sinking of unarmed merchant ships ?
Would Germany have waited to attack France while England
raised a powerful conscript army to go to her aid ?
Every event must be judged in fair relation to the circum-
stances of the time ? and only in such relation.
In examining the questions with which this chapter has been
concerned, I was accustomed to dwell upon the dangers and
the darker side of things. I did this to some extent intention-
ally, in order to create anxiety which would lead to timely
precautions. Every danger set forth we tried to meet. Many
we met. More never matured, either because they were pre-
vented by proper measures, or because the Germans were less
enterprising than I thought it prudent to assume. I will
end on a more robust note.
The following letter was written by me on November 1,
1913, to a friend — a high naval authority — who had delivered
a pessimistic lecture at the War College.
Do you not think you are looking at the problem from a
weak and one-sided point of view which sees only the dangers
which menace us and is blind to all the far greater dangers
which surround the weaker fleet ?
Taking your hypothesis that the German Fleet come out to
fight with every unit they can bring into line, why should it
be supposed that we should not be able to defeat them? A
study of the comparative fleet strength in the line of battle
will be found reassuring.
Why are our Second Fleet ships, which do not require a
single reservist, to be considered less ready than German ships
dependent on mobilised men ?
Why should it be supposed that a British Fleet is bound to
fight the German Fleet at the exact time and place the German
Fleet desires ?
THE NORTH SEA FRONT 177
Why should we not, if we wish, refuse battle until any de-
tached division has joined up ?
Why should we be forced to follow the enemy on to his
selected ground (presumably, from your paper, off our coasts)
when a movement across his communications would not only
place us in healthy waters but cut him from his only hope of
retreat and fuel ?
Why should the British Battle Fleets have to fly the North
Sea when the Germans apparently can move about in perfect
safety ?
All this drift of mind is pusillanimous. Put yourself for a
few moments in the position of the Admiral Commanding the
weaker fleet. If he goes out to fight 'with every unit/ he
knows he must expect to be attacked by a force at least three
to two superior in numbers, superior in addition in strength,
and superior by far ship for ship and squadron for squadron,
in quality.
He knows he will have to move with his weaker force into
waters which (to him) will appear ' infested ' by 70 or 80 Brit-
ish submarines and over 200 sea-going torpedo craft. He
knows that he must sooner or later, and sooner much rather
than later, return to German ports to coal; and that if he is
cut off either by the British Fleet or by the British submarines,
or preferably by both, he runs the gravest risk of being not
merely defeated but destroyed. If he tries to reduce his in-
feriority in the line of battle by attempting diversions in the
shape of landings, he knows he will have to send transports
crowded with men through waters commanded by an unfought
superior enemy and swarming with torpedo craft, any one of
which will send 5,000 or 6,000 men to the bottom.
. If he succeeds by great good fortune, probably at a heavy
sacrifice, in landing 15,000 or 20,000 men, he knows that is
perfectly useless unless it can be reinforced by three or four
times as many.
He knows that if his raid is not successfully supported within
a very few days those already on shore will have been killed
or captured, and he will have to begin all over again.
Lastly, he knows what people at manoeuvres so often forget,
viz., that cannons kill men and smash ships and that battles
produce decisions against which there is no appeal.
He knows that it will pay his enemy to lose ship for ship
178 THE WORLD CRISIS
with him in every class, and that when this melancholy proc-
ess has run its full course that enemy would still have on the
water a fleet in being not less numerous than that with which
Germany had begun the war.
If, knowing all this, the 'naturally offensive character of
the German ' leads him to come out and stake everything on
a pitched battle, surely that ought to be a cause to us of pro-
found satisfaction.
The second hypothesis — the war of harassments — is more
indeterminate, and both sides may look about for some means
of waiting on each other without undue risk, till decisive
periods supervene. For after all a ship can only fight another
ship when she meets her.
CHAPTER VIII
IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE
The Oil Reserves and Supply — The Anglo-Persian Agreement — The
1 914 Estimates — The Rise of Naval Expenditure — The Canadian
Ships — The Conflict over the Estimates — The Admiralty Case —
A New Year's Declaration — Final Stage of the Estimates — The
European Calm and the Anglo-German Detente — Renewed Ef-
forts for an Anglo-German Naval Agreement — British Party
Strife and Irish Feuds — Aggravation of the Irish Struggle — Fac-
tion— The Curragh Episode — Parliamentary Fury — Appeals to
Reason — The Buckingham Palace Conference — Visits of the
British Squadrons to Kiel and Kronstadt — The Crime of Sara-
jevo— The Sunlit World — Origin of the Test Mobilisation — The
Great Review.
TAURING the whole of 19 13 I was subjected to an ever-
■*— * growing difficulty about the oil supply. We were now
fully committed to oil as the sole, motive power for a large
proportion of the Fleet, including all the newest and most vital
units. There was great anxiety on the Board of Admiralty
and in the War Staff about our oil-fuel reserves. The Second
Sea Lord, Sir John Jellicoe, vehemently pressed for very
large increases in the scales contemplated. The Chief of the
War Staff was concerned not only about the amount of the re-
serves but about the alleged danger of using so explosive a
fuel in ships of war. Lastly, Lord Fisher's Royal Commis-
sion, actuated by Admiralty disquietude, showed themselves
inclined to press for a reserve equal to four years' expected
war consumption. The war consumption itself had been esti-
mated on the most liberal scale by the Naval Staff. The
expense of creating the oil reserve was however enormous.
Not only had the oil to be bought in a monopoly-ridden mar-
ket, but large installations of oil tanks had to be erected and
179
180 THE WORLD CRISIS
land purchased for the purpose. Although this oil-fuel re-
serve when created was clearly, whether for peace or war, as
much an asset of the State as the gold reserve in the Bank of
England, we were not allowed to treat it as capital expendi-
ture: all must be found out of the current Estimates. At the
same time, the Treasury and my colleagues in the Cabinet were
becoming increasingly indignant at the naval expense, which
it might be contended was largely due to my precipitancy in
embarking on oil-burning battleships and also in wantonly
increasing the size of the guns and the speed and armour of
these vessels. On the one hand, therefore, I was subjected to
this evergrowing naval pressure, and on the other to a solid
wall of resistance to expense. In the midst of all lay the exist-
ence of our naval power.
I had thus to fight all the year on two fronts: on one to re-
pulse the excessive and, as I thought, extravagant demands
of the Royal Commission and of my naval advisers, and on the
other to wrest the necessary supplies from the Treasury and
the Cabinet. I had to be very careful that arguments intended
for one front did not become known to my antagonists on the
other. I wrote to Lord Fisher that to prescribe a four years
standard of reserves would be the death-blow to the oil policy
of which he was the champion. I was forced to enter into
arguments of extreme technical detail with the Second Sea
Lord and the War Staff both as to the probable consumption
per month of oil in the opening phases of a naval war, and
secondly upon the number of months' supply that should be
in the country in each individual month. I had extreme diffi-
culties with the Board of Admiralty in regard to the reductions
which I thought necessary in both scales, and I feared for some
time that I should lose the services of the Second Sea Lord.
This, however, was happily averted and we finally agreed upon
reduced scales which were in the end accepted by all concerned.
These conclusions stood the test of war.
The reduced scales estimated a total consumption in the
IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE 181
first ten months of war of 1,000,000 tons. The actual con-
sumption was 8oo,ooo. At the end of the ten months we held
1,000,000 tons in reserve, or another twelve months' supply
at the current rate of expenditure, apart from further pur-
chases which proceeded ceaselessly on the greatest scale.
During this year (19 13) also I carried through the House
of Commons the Bill authorising the Anglo-Persian Oil Con-
vention. This encountered a confusing variety of opposi-
tions— economists deprecating naval expenditure; members
for mining constituencies who were especially sensible of the
danger of departing from the sound basis of British coal; oil
magnates who objected to a national inroad upon their
monopolies; Conservatives who disapproved of State trading;
partisan opponents who denounced the project as an unwar-
rantable gamble with public money and did not hesitate to im-
pute actual corruption. There was always a danger of these
divergent forces combining on some particular stage or point.
However, we gradually threaded our way through these diffi-
culties and by the Autumn the Convention was the law of the
land. We now at any rate had an oil supply of our own.
All our financial commitments, fomented by rising prices
and the ever-increasing complexity and refinement of naval
appliances, came remorselessly to a head at the end of 19 13
when the Estimates for the new year had to be presented
first to the Treasury and then to the Cabinet. Knowing that
the conflict would be most severe, I warned all Admiralty
departments to be well ahead with their financial work and
to prepare justification for the unprecedented demands we
were obliged to make. We set forth our case in a volume of
some eighty pages in which we analysed minutely each vote
and marshalled our reasons. The main burden of this task
fell upon the Financial Secretary, Dr. Macnamara, whose long
experience of Admiralty business was invaluable.
We failed to reach any agreement with the Treasury in the
preliminary discussions, and the whole issue was remitted to
182 THE WORLD CRISIS
the Cabinet at the end of November. There followed nearly
five months of extreme dispute and tension, during which
Naval Estimates formed the main and often the sole topic of
conversation at no less than fourteen full and prolonged meet-
ings of the Cabinet. At the outset I found myself almost in a
minority of one. I was not in a position to give way on any
of the essentials, especially in regard to the Battleship pro-
gramme, without departing from the calculated and declared
standards of strength on which the whole of our policy to-
wards Germany depended. The Cabinet had decided in 19 12
to maintain equality in the Mediterranean with the Austrian
Fleet, four Dreadnoughts of which were steadily building.
Moreover, the issue was complicated by the promised three
Canadian Dreadnoughts. The Canadian Government had
stipulated that these should be additional to the 60 per cent,
standard. We had formally declared that they were indis-
pensable, and on this assurance Sir Robert Borden was com-
mitted to a fierce party fight in Canada. As it was now clear,
owing to the action of the Canadian Senate, that these ' addi-
tional' 'indispensable' ships would not be laid down in the
ensuing year, I was forced to demand the earlier laying down
of three at least of the battleships of the 19 14-15 programme.
This was a very hard matter for the Cabinet to sanction. By
the middle of December it seemed to me certain that I should
have to resign. The very foundations of naval policy were
challenged, and the controversy was maintained by Ministerial
critics specially acquainted with Admiralty business, versed
in every detail of the problem and entitled to be exactly in-
formed on every point. The Prime Minister, however, while
appearing to remain impartial, so handled matters that no ac-
tual breach occurred. On several occasions when it seemed
that disagreement was total and final, he prevented a decision
adverse to the Admiralty by terminating the discussion; and
in the middle of December, when this process could go on no
longer, he adjourned the whole matter till the middle of Janu-
ary.
IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE 183
I wrote to him on December 18: —
' Your letter is very kind, and I appreciate fully all the diffi-
culties of the situation. But there is no chance whatever of
my being able to go on, if the quota of capital ships for 1914-^
15 is reduced below four. Even the Daily News does not ex-
pect that. I base myself on (1) my public declarations in
Parliament; (2) the 60 per cent, standard (see Minute of the
Sea Lords); (3) the Cabinet decision on the Mediterranean;
and (4) my obligations towards Mr. Borden. You must in this
last aspect consider broad effects.
1 If on a general revirement of Naval Policy the Cabinet decide
to reduce the quota, it would be indispensable that a new
exponent should be chosen. I have no doubts at all about
my duty.
1 My loyalty to you, my conviction of your superior judgment
and superior record on naval matters, prompt me to go all
possible lengths to prevent disagreement in the Cabinet. But
no reduction or postponement beyond the year of the four
ships is possible to me.
' I gathered that the final decision was to stand over till we
reassemble in January. But there is no hope of any altera-
tion in my view on this cardinal point, or of the view of my
naval advisers.'
To the First Sea Lord I wrote on December 26: —
1 I could not in any circumstances remain responsible if the
declared programme of four ships were cut down. But my
responsibility is greater than anyone else's, and I hold my naval
colleagues perfectly free to review the situation without re-
gard to the action which I should take in the circumstances
which may now be apprehended.'
Prince Louis, however, assured me that he and the other
Sea Lords would not remain in their appointments in the
situation described. My two political colleagues, Dr. Mac-
namara and Mr. Lambert, the Civil Lord, were both stalwart
Radicals, but there was no doubt that they also would have
declined responsibility. They had both been at the Ad-
1 84 THE WORLD CRISIS
miralty for six or seven years, and their devotion to the inter-
ests of the Navy and of the National Defence was unques-
tionable. We thus all stood together.
During the interval of' the Christmas holidays, which I
spent in the south of France, I restated the Admiralty case
in the light of all the discussions which had taken place. The
closing passages of this Document may be reproduced.
The General Situation
No survey of British naval expenditure and no controversy
arising out of it can be confined to our naval strength. It must
also have regard to our military weakness compared to all
the other European States that are building Navies. Even
the modest establishments which Parliament has regarded as
necessary have not been and are not being maintained. In
1 9 13, when the five Great Powers of Europe have added over
50 millions to their military expenditure, when every Power
in the world is increasing the numbers and efficiency of its
soldiers, our regular army has dropped by 6,200 men. The
Special Reserve is 20,000 short, and the Territorials are 65,000
short. Only the belief that the naval strength of the country
is being effectively maintained prevents a widespread, and in
important respects a well justified, alarm. If at any time we
lose the confidence which the country has given to our naval
administration in the last 5 years, the public attention cannot
fail to be turned into channels which, apart from raising awk-
ward questions, will lead directly to largely increased expendi-
ture.
Our naval standards and the programmes which give effect
to them must also be examined in relation not only to Germany
but to the rest of the world. We must begin by recognising
how different the part played by our Navy is from that of the
Navies of every other country. Alone among the great mod-
ern States we can neither defend the soil upon which we live
nor subsist upon its produce. Our whole regular army is
liable to be ordered abroad for the defence of India. The
food of our people, the raw material of their industries, the
commerce which constitutes our wealth, has to be protected
as it traverses thousands of miles of sea and ocean from every
IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE 185
quarter of the globe. Our necessary insistence upon the right
of capture of private property at sea exposes British merchant
ships to the danger of attack not only by enemy's warships
but by converted armed-merchantmen. The burden of re-
sponsibility laid upon the British Navy is heavy, and its weight
increases year by year.
All the world is building ships of the greatest power, train-
ing officers and men, creating arsenals, and laying broad and
deep the foundations of future permanent naval development
and expansion. In every country powerful interests and huge
industries are growing up which will render any check or cessa-
tion in the growth of Navies increasingly difficult as time
passes. Besides the Great Powers, there are many small
States who are buying or building great ships of war and whose
vessels may by purchase, by some diplomatic combination, or
by duress, be brought into the line against us. None of these
Powers need, like us, Navies to defend their actual safety or
independence. They build them so as to play a part in the
world's affairs. It is sport to them. It is death to us.
These possibilities were described by Lord Crewe in the
House of Lords last year. It is not suggested that the whole
world will turn upon us, or that our preparations should con-
template such a monstrous contingency. By a sober and
modest conduct, by a skilful diplomacy we can in part disarm
and in part divide the elements of potential danger. But two
things must be remembered. First, that our diplomacy de-
pends in a great part for its effectiveness upon our naval posi-
tion, and that our naval strength is the one great balancing
force which we can contribute to our own safety and to the
peace of the world. Secondly, we are not a young people with
a scanty inheritance. We have engrossed to ourselves, in
times when other powerful nations were paralysed by barbar-
ism or internal war, an immense share of the wealth and traffic
of the world. We have got all we want in territory, and our
claim to be left in the unmolested enjoyment of vast and
splendid possessions, often seems less reasonable to others
than to us.
Further, we do not always play the humble role of passive
unassertiveness. We have intervened regularly — as it was
our duty to do, and as we could not help doing — in the affairs
of Europe and of the world. We are now deeply involved in
1 86 THE WORLD CRISIS
the European situation. We have responsibilities in many
quarters. It is only two years ago that the Chancellor of the
Exchequer went to the Mansion House and delivered a speech
which to save Europe from war, brought us to the very verge
of it. I have myself heard the Foreign Secretary say to my
predecessor that he had received so stiff a communication from
the German Ambassador, that the Fleet must be placed in a
condition of readiness to be attacked at any moment. The
impression which those events produced in my mind is inef-
faceable. I saw that even a Liberal Government, whose first
and most profound resolve must always be to preserve peace,
might be compelled to face the gravest and most hateful possi-
bilities. All Governments in England will not be Liberal
Governments; all Foreign Secretaries will not have the suc-
cess of Sir Edward Grey. We have passed through a year of
continuous anxiety and, although I believe the foundations of
peace among the Great Powers have been strengthened, the
causes which might lead to a general war have not been re-
moved and often remind us of their presence. There has not
been the slightest abatement of naval and military preparation.
On the contrary, we are witnessing this year increases of expen-
diture by the Continental Powers beyond all previous experi-
ence. The world is arming as it has never armed before.
Every suggestion of arrest or limitation has been brushed aside.
From time to time awkward things happen, and situations
occur which make it necessary that the naval force at our im-
mediate disposal, now in this quarter now in that, should be
rapidly counted up. On such occasions the responsibilities
which rest on the Admiralty come home with brutal reality to
the Minister at its head, and unless our naval strength is
solidly, amply and unswervingly maintained, with due and
fair regard to the opinions of the professional advisers of the
Government, I could not feel that I was doing my duty if I
did not warn the country of its danger.
The memorandum and the interval for reflection produced
a certain change in the situation, and on my return to England
in the middle of January, I was informed by several of my most
important colleagues that they considered the Admiralty case
on main essentials had been made good. The conflict, how-
ever, renewed itself with the utmost vigour. We continued to
IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE 187
pump out documents and arguments from the Admiralty in a
ceaseless stream, dealing with each new point as it was chal-
lenged. I telegraphed to Sir Robert Borden acquainting him
with the crisis that was developing about the three ships to be
accelerated in lieu of the Canadian Dreadnoughts, informing
him of my intention to resign if unsuccessful, and invoking
his aid by a full exposition of the Canadian point of view.
This he most readily gave, setting forth in a masterly tele-
gram the embarrassed position in which his Government would
stand in their naval effort if no additional measure were taken
by us to cover their interim default.
Meanwhile, echoes of the controversy had found their way
into the newspapers. As early as January 3, the Chancellor
of the Exchequer, in an interview with the Daily Chronicle, had
deplored the folly of expenditure upon armaments, had
pointedly referred to the resignation of Lord Randolph
Churchill on the subject of economy, and had expressed the
opinion that the state and prospects of the world were never
more peaceful. The Liberal and Radical press were loud in
their economy chorus, and a very strong movement against
the Admiralty developed among our most influential sup-
porters in the House of Commons. However, Parliament
soon reassembled. The Irish question began to dominate
attention. Eager partisans of the Home Rule cause were by
no means anxious to see the Government weakened by the
resignation of the entire Board of Admiralty. We were al-
ready so hard pressed in the party struggle that the defection
even of a single Minister might have produced a serious effect.
No one expected me to pass away in sweet silence. The pros-
pect of a formidable naval agitation added to the Irish tension
was recognised as uninviting. In order to strengthen myself
with my party, I mingled actively in the Irish controversy;
and in this precarious situation the whole of February and
part of March passed without any ground given or taken on
either side.
188 THE WORLD CRISIS
At last, th oiks to the unwearying patience of the Prime
Minister, and to his solid, silent support, the Naval Estimates
were accepted practically as they stood. In all these months
of bickering we had only lost three small cruisers and twelve
torpedo-boats for harbour defence. Estimates were presented
to Parliament ior 5 y^ millions. We had not secured this
victory withe* t being compelled to give certain general assur-
ances with regard to the future. I agreed, under proper re-
serves, to promise a substantial reduction on the Estimates
of the following year. When the time came, I was not pressed
to redeem this undertaking.
The spring and summer of 19 14 were marked in Europe
by an exceptional tranquillity. Ever since Agadir the policy
of Germany towards Great Britain had not only been cor-
rect but considerate. All through the tangle of the Balkan
Conferences British and German diplomacy laboured in har-
mony. The long distrust which had grown up in the Foreign
Office, though not removed, was sensibly modified. Some at
least of those who were accustomed to utter warnings began
to feel the need of revising their judgment. The personalities
who expressed the foreign policy of Germany seemed for the
first time to be men to whom we could talk and with whom
common action was possible. The peaceful solution of the
Balkan difficulties afforded justification for the feeling of
confidence. For months we had negotiated upon the most
delicate questions on the brink of local rupture, and no rup-
ture had come. There had been a score of opportunities had
any Power wished to make war. Germany seemed, with us, to
be set on peace. Although abroad the increase of armaments
was proceeding with constant acceleration, although the
fifty million capital tax had been levied in Germany, and that
alarm bell was ringing for those that had ears to hear, a dis-
tinct feeling of optimism passed over the mind of the British
IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE 189
Government and the House of Commons. There seemed
also to be a prospect that the personal goodwill and mutual
respect which had grown up between the principal people on
both sides might play a useful part in the future: and some
there were who looked forward to a wider combination in
which Great Britain and Germany, without prejudice to their
respective friendships or alliances, might together bring the
two opposing European systems into harmony and give to
all the anxious nations solid assurances of safety and fair
play.
Naval rivalry had at the moment ceased to be a cause of
friction. We were proceeding inflexibly for the third year
in succession with our series of programmes according to scale
and declaration. Germany had made no further increases
since the beginning of 191 2. It was certain that we could
not be overtaken as far as capital ships were concerned. I
thought that the moment was opportune to renew by another
method the conversations about a naval agreement if not a
naval holiday which had been interrupted in 191 2. I there-
fore suggested to the Foreign Secretary that I should meet
Admiral von Tirpitz if a convenient opportunity presented
itself, and I set out in the following minute some of the points
which I thought might be discussed and which, though small,
if agreed upon would make for easement and stability.
Prime Minister. Ma? 2°' W*
Sir Edward Grey.
In Madrid at Easter, Sir Ernest Cassel told me that he had
received from Herr Ballin a statement to this effect: 'How I
wish that I could get Churchill here during the Kiel Week.
Tirpitz will never allow the Chancellor to settle any naval
questions, but I know he would like to have a talk with his
English colleague on naval matters, and I am sure that if the
subject of limiting naval armaments were ever approached in
a businesslike way, some agreement would be reached/ On
the same day I received a telegram from the Admiralty, say-
igo THE WORLD CRISIS
ing that the Foreign Office particularly wished a British squad-
ron to visit German ports simultaneously with other naval
visits. Personally I should like to meet Tirpitz, and I think
a non-committal, friendly conversation, if it arose naturally
and freely, might do good, and could not possibly do any
harm. Indeed, after all I have said about a Naval Holiday,
it would be difficult for me to repulse any genuine desire on
his part for such a conversation. The points I wish to discuss
are these: —
i st. My own Naval Holiday proposals and to show him, as
I can easily do, the good faith and sound reasons on which they
are based. I do not expect any agreement on these, but I
would like to strip the subject of the misrepresentation and
misunderstanding with which it has been surrounded, and put
it on a clear basis in case circumstances should ever render
it admissible.
2nd. I wish to take up with him the suggestion which he
made in his last speech on Naval Estimates of a limitation
in the size of capital ships. Even if numbers could not be
touched, a limitation in the size would be a great saving, and
is on every ground to be desired. This subject could only
be satisfactorily explored by direct personal discussion in the
first instance.
3rd. I wish to encourage him to send German ships to
foreign stations by showing him how much we wish to do the
same, and how readily we shall conform to any dispositions
which have the effect of reducing the unwholesome concentra-
tion of fleets in Home Waters. Quite apart from the diplo-
matic aspect, it is bad for the discipline and organisation of
both navies, and the Germans fully recognise this.
4th. I wish to discuss the abandonment of secrecy in regard
to the numbers and general characteristics (apart from special
inventions) of the ships, built and building, in British and
German dockyards. This policy of secrecy was instituted by
the British Admiralty a few years ago with the worst results
for us, for we have been much less successful in keeping our
secrets than the Germans. I should propose to him in prin-
ciple that we gave the Naval Attaches equal and reciprocal
facilities to visit the dockyards and see what was going on
just as they used to do in the past. If this could be agreed
upon it would go a long way to stopping the espionage on
IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE 191
both sides which is a continued cause of suspicion and ill-
feeling.
I hope, in view of the very strong feeling there is about
naval expenditure and the great difficulties I have to face,
my wish to put these points to Admiral von Tirpitz if a good
opportunity arises, and if it is clear that he would not resent
it, may not be dismissed. On the other hand, I do not wish
to go to Germany for the purpose of initiating such a dis-
cussion. I would rather go for some other reason satisfactory
in itself, and let the discussion of these serious questions come
about only if it is clearly appropriate. . . .
For the present I suggest that nothing should be done
until the Emperor's invitation arrives; and, secondly, until
we hear what Tirpitz's real wish is. W S C
Sir Edward Grey was apprehensive that more harm than
good might result from such a discussion, and I do not my-
self pronounce upon the point; but I am anxious to place
the letter on record as a proof of my desire while maintain-
ing our naval position to do all that could be done to mitigate
asperity between the British and German Empires.
The strange calm of the European situation contrasted
with the rising fury of party conflict at home. The quarrel
between Liberals and Conservatives had taken on much of
that tense bitterness and hatred belonging to Irish affairs.
As it became certain that the Home Rule Bill would pass
into law under the machinery of the Parliament Act, the
Protestant counties of Ulster openly developed their prepara-
tions for armed resistance. In this they were supported and
encouraged by the whole Conservative party. The Irish
Nationalist leaders — Mr. Redmond, Mr. Dillon, Mr. Devlin
and others — watched the increasing gravity of the situation
in Ulster with apprehension. But there were elements be-
hind them whose fierceness and whose violence were inde-
scribable; and every step or gesture of moderation on the
iQ2 THE WORLD CRISIS
part of the Irish Parliamentary Party excited passionate an-
ger. Between these difficulties Mr. Asquith's Government
sought to thread their way.
From the earliest discussions on the Home Rule Bill in
1909 the Chancellor of the Exchequer and I had always ad-
vocated the exclusion of Ulster on a basis of county option
or some similar process. We had been met by the baffling
argument that such a concession might well be made as the
final means of securing a settlement, but would be fruit-
less till then. The time had now arrived when the Home
Rule issue had reached its supreme climax, and the Cabinet
was generally agreed that we could not go farther without
providing effectually for the exclusion of Ulster. In March,
therefore, the Irish leaders were informed that the Govern-
ment had so resolved. They resisted vehemently. They
had it in their power at any time to turn out the Government,
and they would have been powerfully reinforced from within
the Liberal Party itself. There is no doubt that the Irish
leaders feared, and even expected, that any weakening of the
Bill would lead to its and their repudiation by the Irish people.
Confronted, however, with the undoubted fact that the Gov-
ernment would not shrink from being defeated and broken up
on the point, they yielded. Amendments were framed which
secured to any Ulster county the right to vote itself out of
the Home Rule Bill until after two successive General Elec-
tions had taken place in the United Kingdom. There could
be no greater practical safeguard than this. It preserved
the principle of Irish unity, but it made certain that unity
could never be achieved except by the free consent of the
Protestant North after seeing a Dublin Parliament actually
on trial for a period of at least five years.
These proposals were no sooner announced to Parliament
than they were rejected with contumely by the Conservative
opposition. We, however, embodied them in the text of the
Bill and compelled the Irish Party to vote for their inclusion.
IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE 193
We now felt that we could go forward with a clear conscience
and enforce the law against all who challenged it. My own
personal view had always been that I would never coerce
Ulster to make her come under a Dublin Parliament, but I
would do all that was necessary to prevent her stopping the
rest of Ireland having the Parliament they desired. I be-
lieve this was sound and right, and in support of it I was cer-
tainly prepared to maintain the authority of Crown and Par-
liament under the Constitution by whatever means were
necessary. I spoke in this sense at Bradford on March
14th.
It is greatly to be hoped that British political leaders will
never again allow themselves to be goaded and spurred and
driven by each other or by their followers into the excesses
of partisanship which on both sides disgraced the year 19 14,
and which were themselves only the culmination of that long
succession of biddings and counter-biddings for mastery to
which a previous chapter has alluded. No one who has not
been involved in such contentions can understand the intensity
of the pressures to which public men are subjected, or the way
in which every motive in their nature, good, bad and indif-
ferent, is marshalled in the direction of further effort to secure
victory. The vehemence with which great masses of men
yield themselves to partisanship and follow the struggle as if
it were a prize fight, their ardent enthusiasm, their glistening
eyes, their swift anger, their distrust and contempt if they
think they are to be baulked of their prey; the sense of wrongs
mutually interchanged, the extortion and enforcement of
pledges, the infectious loyalties, the praise that waits on vio-
lence, the chilling disdain, the honest disappointment, the
cries of l treachery ' with which every proposal of compromise
is hailed; the desire to keep good faith with those who follow,
the sense of right being on one's side, the harsh unreasonable
actions of opponents — all these acting and reacting recipro-
cally upon one another tend towards the perilous climax.
194 THE WORLD CRISIS
To fall behind is to be a laggard or a weakling, not sincere,
not courageous; to get in front of the crowd, if only to com-
mand them and to deflect them, prompts often very violent
action. And at a certain stage it is hardly possible to keep
the contention within the limits of words or laws. Force,
that final arbiter, that last soberer, may break upon the scene.
The preparations of the Ulster men continued. They de-
clared their intention of setting up a provisional Government.
They continued to develop and train their forces. They im-
ported arms unlawfully and even by violence. It need
scarcely be said that the same kind of symptoms began
to manifest themselves among the Nationalists. Volunteers
were enrolled by thousands, and efforts were made to procure
arms.
As all this peril grew, the small military posts in the North
of Ireland, particularly those containing stores of arms, be-
came a source of preoccupation to the War Office. So also
did the position of the troops in Belfast. The Orangemen
would never have harmed the Royal forces. It was more than
probable that the troops would fraternise with them. But the
Government saw themselves confronted with a complete over-
turn of their authority throughout North-East Ulster. In
these circumstances, military and naval precautions were in-
dispensable. On 14th March it was determined to protect
the military stores at Carrickfergus and certain other places
by small reinforcements, and as it was expected that the Great
Northern Railway of Ireland would refuse to carry the troops,
preparations were made to send them by sea. It was also
decided to move a battle squadron and a flotilla from Arosa
Bay, where they were cruising, to Lamlash whence they could
rapidly reach Belfast. It was thought that the popularity and
influence of the Royal Navy might produce a peaceable solu-
tion, even if the Army had failed. Beyond this nothing was
authorised, but the Military Commanders, seeing themselves
confronted with what might well be the opening movements
IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE 195
in a civil war, began to study plans of a much more serious
character on what was the inherently improbable assumption
that the British troops would be forcibly resisted and fired
upon by the Orange army.
These military measures, limited though they were, and
the possible consequences that might follow them, produced
the greatest distress among the officers of the Army, and when
on 20th March the Commander-in-Chief in Ireland and other
Generals made sensational appeals to gatherings of officers
at the Curragh to discharge their constitutional duty in all
circumstances, they encountered very general refusals.
These shocking events caused an explosion of unparalleled
fury in Parliament and shook the State to its foundations.
The Conservatives accused the Government of having plotted
the massacre of the loyalists of Ulster, in which design they
had been frustrated only by the patriotism of the Army. The
Liberals replied that the Opposition were seeking to subvert
the Constitution by openly committing themselves to prepara-
tions for rebellion, and had seduced not the Army but its of-
ficers from their allegiance by propaganda. We cannot read
the debates that continued at intervals through April, May
and June, without wondering that our Parliamentary in-
stitutions were strong enough to survive the passions by which
they were convulsed. Was it astonishing that German agents
reported and German statesmen believed that England was
paralysed by faction and drifting into civil war, and need not
be taken into account as a factor in the European situation ?
How could they discern or measure the deep unspoken under-
standings which lay far beneath the froth and foam and fury
of the storm ?
In all these scenes I played a prominent and a vehement
part, but I never doubted for a moment the strength of the
foundation on which we rested. I felt sure in my own mind
that, now that the sting was out of the Home Rule Bill, noth-
ing in the nature of civil war would arise. On the contrary
1 96 THE WORLD CRISIS
I hoped for a settlement with the Conservative Party not
only upon the Home Rule Bill with Ulster excluded, but also
on other topics which ever since 1909 had been common
ground between some of those who were disputing so angrily.
I felt, however, that the Irish crisis must move forward to
its climax, and that a reasonable settlement could only be
reached in the recoil.
On the 28th April I closed a partisan reply to a violent
attack with the following direct appeal to Sir Edward Car-
son:—
1 1 adhere to my Bradford speech . . . but I will venture to
ask the House once more at this moment in our differences
and quarrels to consider whither it is we may find ourselves
going. . . . Apart from the dangers which this controversy
and this Debate clearly show exist at home, look at the conse-
quences abroad.
'Anxiety is caused in every friendly country by the belief
that for the time being Great Britain cannot act. The high
mission of this country is thought to be in abeyance, and the
balance of Europe appears in many quarters for the time being
to be deranged. Of course, foreign countries never really
understand us in these islands. They do not know what we
know, that at a touch of external difficulties or menace all
these fierce internal controversies would disappear for the time
being, and we should be brought into line and into tune.
But why is it that men are so constituted that they can only
lay aside their own domestic quarrels under the impulse of
what I will call a higher principle of hatred ? . . .
'Why cannot the right hon. and learned Gentleman (Sir
Edward Carson) say boldly, "Give me the Amendments to
this Home Rule Bill which I ask for, to safeguard the dignity
and the interests of Protestant Ulster, and I in return will use
all my influence and goodwill to make Ireland an integral unit
in a federal system " ? '
These words gave the debate an entirely new turn. The
Prime Minister said the next day, 'The First Lord's pro-
posal was made on his own account, but I am heartily in
IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE 197
sympathy with it.' Mr. Balfour declared that it had 'the
promise and the potency of a settlement which would avoid
this final and irreparable catastrophe of civil war.' Later,
Sir Edward Carson, after laying stress on the gravity of the
crisis and the weakening it entailed on the position of Great
Britain abroad, declared that he would not quarrel with the
matter or the manner of my proposal, and that 'he was not
very far from the First Lord/ If Home Rule passed, his
most earnest hope would be that it might be such a success
that Ulster might come under it, and that mutual confi-
dence and good will might arise in Ireland, rendering Ulster
a stronger unit in the federal scheme. These potent indica-
tions were not comprehended on the Continent.
During the whole of May and June the party warfare pro-
ceeded in its most strident form, but underneath the surface
negotiations for a settlement between the two great parties
were steadily persisted in. These eventuated on the 20th
July in a summons by the King to the leaders of the Con-
servative, Liberal and Irish parties to meet in conference at
Buckingham Palace. When this conference was in its most
critical stage I wrote the following letter to Sir Edward Grey :
the wording is curious in view of the fact that I had then no
idea of what the next forty-eight hours was to produce. On
this I am content to rest so far as the Irish question before
the war is concerned.
Mr. Churchill to Sir Edward Grey
July 22, 1914.
. . . Failing an Irish agreement there ought to be a British
decision. Carson and Redmond, whatever their wishes, may
be unable to agree about Tyrone; they may think it worth
a war; and from their point of view it may be worth a war.
But that is hardly the position of the forty millions who dwell
in Great Britain; and their interests must, when all is said and
done, be our chief and final care. In foreign affairs you would
proceed by two stages. First you would labour to stop Austria
1 98 THE WORLD CRISIS
and Russia going to war; second, if that failed, you would try
to prevent England, France, Germany and Italy being drawn
in. Exactly what you would do in Europe, is right in this
domestic danger, with the difference that in Europe the second
step would only hope to limit and localise the conflict, whereas
at home the second step — if practicable and adopted — would
prevent the local conflict.
The conference therefore should labour to reduce the differ-
ence to the smallest definite limits possible. At that point,
if no agreement had been reached, the Speaker should be
asked to propose a partition ; and we should offer the Unionist
leaders to accept it if they will. . . .
I want peace by splitting the outstanding differences, if
possible with Irish acquiescence, but if necessary over the
heads of both Irish parties.
At the end of June the simultaneous British naval visits
to Kronstadt and Kiel took place. For the first time for sev-
eral years some of the finest ships of the British and German
Navies lay at their moorings at Kiel side by side surrounded
by liners, yachts and pleasure craft of every kind. Undue
curiosity in technical matters was banned by mutual agree-
ment. There were races, there were banquets, there were
speeches. There was sunshine, there was the Emperor. Of-
ficers and men fraternised and entertained each other afloat
and ashore. Together they strolled arm in arm through the
hospitable town, or dined with all good will in mess and ward-
room. Together they stood bareheaded at the funeral of a
German officer killed in flying an English seaplane.
In the midst of these festivities, on the 28th June, arrived
the news of the murder of the Archduke Charles at Sarajevo.
The Emperor was out sailing when he received it. He came
on shore in noticeable agitation, and that same evening,
cancelling his other arrangements, quitted Kiel.
Like many others, I often summon up in my memory the
impression of those July days. The world on the verge of
IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE 199
its catastrophe was very brilliant. Nations and Empires
crowned with princes and potentates rose majestically on
every side, lapped in the accumulated treasures of the long
peace. All were fitted and fastened — it seemed securely —
into an immense cantilever. The two mighty European sys-
tems faced each other glittering and clanking in their panoply,
but with a tranquil gaze. A polite, discreet, pacific, and on
the whole sincere diplomacy spread its web of connections
over both. A sentence in a dispatch, an observation by an
ambassador, a cryptic phrase in a Parliament seemed sufficient
to adjust from day to day the balance of the prodigious struc-
ture. Words counted, and even whispers. A nod could be
made to tell. Were we after all to achieve world security and
universal peace by a marvellous system of combinations in
equipoise and of armaments in equation, of checks and coun-
ter-checks on violent action ever more complex and more
delicate ? Would Europe thus marshalled, thus grouped, thus
related, unite into one universal and glorious organism capa-
ble of receiving and enjoying in undreamed of abundance
the bounty which nature and science stood hand in hand to
give? The old world in its sunset was fair to see.
But there was a strange temper in the air. Unsatisfied
by material prosperity the nations turned restlessly towards ''
strife internal or external. National passions, unduly ex- '
alted in the decline of religion, burned beneath the surface
of nearly every land with fierce if shrouded fires. Almost one
might think the world wished to suffer. Certainly men were
everywhere eager to dare. On all sides the military prepara-
tions, precautions and counter precautions had reached their
height. France had her Three Years' military service; Rus-
sia her growing strategic Railways. The Ancient Empire of
the Hapsburgs, newly smitten by the bombs of Sarajevo, was
a prey to intolerable racial stresses and profound processes
of decay. Italy faced Turkey; Turkey confronted Greece;*
Greece, Serbia and Roumania stood against Bulgaria. Britain
200 THE WORLD CRISIS
was rent by faction and seemed almost negligible. America
was three thousand miles away. Germany, her fifty million
capital tax expended on munitions, her army increases com-
pleted, the Kiel Canal open for Dreadnought battleships that
very month, looked fixedly upon the scene and her gaze be-
came suddenly a glare.
In the autumn of 19 13, when I was revolving the next year's
Admiralty policy in the light of the coming Estimates, I had
sent the following minute to the First Sea Lord: —
October 22, 1913.
First Sea Lord.
Second Sea Lord.
Secretary.
We have now had manoeuvres in the North Sea on the
largest scale for two years running, and we have obtained a
great deal of valuable data which requires to be studied. It
does not therefore seem necessary to supplement the ordinary
tactical exercises of the year 1914-15 by Grand Manoeuvres.
A saving of nearly £200,000 could apparently be effected in
coal and oil consumption, and a certain measure of relief would
be accorded to the Estimates in an exceptionally heavy year.
In these circumstances I am drawn to the conclusion that
it would be better to have no Grand Manoeuvres in 19 14-15,
but to substitute instead a mobilisation of the Third Fleet.
The whole of the Royal Fleet Reserve, and the whole of the
Reserve officers could be mobilised and trained together for
a week or ten days. The Third Fleet ships would be given
the exact complements they would have in war, and the whole
mobilisation system would be subjected to a real test. The
balance Fleet Reservists could be carefully tested as to quality,
and trained either afloat or ashore. I should anticipate that
this would not cost more than £100,000, in which case there
would still be a saving on the fuel of the manoeuvres. While
the Third Fleet ships were mobilised the First Fleet ships
would rest, and thus plenty of officers would be available for
the training of the reservists on shore, and possibly, if need be,
for their peace training afloat. This last would, of course,
IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN BALANCE 201
reveal what shortage exists. A very large staff would be em-
ployed at all the mobilising centres to report upon the whole
workings of the mobilisation. The schools and training estab-
lishments would be closed temporarily according to the mobili-
sation orders, and the whole process of putting the Navy on a
war footing, so far as the Third Fleet was concerned, would
be carried out. I should not propose to complete the Second
Fleet, as we know all about that.
At another time in the year I should desire to see mobilised
the whole of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, and put
them afloat on First Fleet ships for a week as additional to
complements.
Please put forward definite proposals, with estimates, for
carrying out the above policy, and at the same time let me
have your opinion upon it.
Prince Louis agreed. The necessary measures were1 taken
and the project was mentioned to Parliament on the 18th
March, 19 14. In pursuance of these orders and without con-
nection of any kind with the European situation, the Test
Mobilisation began on the 15th July. Although there was no
legal authority to compel the reservists to come up, the re-
sponse was general, upwards of 20,000 men presenting them-
selves at the naval depots. The whole of our mobilisation
arrangements were thus subjected for the first time in naval
history to a practical test and thorough overhaul. Officers
specially detached from the Admiralty watched the process of
mobilisation at every port in order that every defect, shortage
or hitch in the system might be reported and remedied. Prince
Louis and I personally inspected the process at Chatham. All
the reservists drew their kits and proceeded to their assigned
ships. All the Third Fleet ships coaled and raised steam and
sailed for the general concentration at Spithead. Here on
the 17 th and 18 th of July was held the grand review of the
Navy. It constituted incomparably the greatest assemblage
of naval power ever witnessed in the history of the world.
The King himself was present and inspected ships of every
202 THE WORLD CRISIS
class. On the morning of the 19th the whole Fleet put to sea
for exercises of various kinds. It took more than six hours
for this armada, every ship decked with flags and crowded
with bluejackets and marines, to pass, with bands playing
and at 15 knots, before the Royal Yacht, while overhead
the naval seaplanes and aeroplanes circled continuously. Yet
it is probable that the uppermost thought in the minds both
of the Sovereign and those of his Ministers there present was
not the imposing spectacle of British majesty and might de-
filing before their eyes, not the oppressive and even sultry at-
mosphere of continental politics, but the haggard, squalid,
tragic Irish quarrel which threatened to divide the British
nation into two hostile camps.
One after another the ships melted out of sight beyond the
Nab. They were going on a longer voyage than any of us
could know.
CHAPTER IX
THE CRISIS
July 24— July 30
Prepare, prepare the iron helm of war,
Bring forth the lots, cast in the spacious orb;
The Angel of Fate turns them with mighty hands,
And casts them out upon the darkened earth !
Prepare, prepare! [Blake.]
Cabinet of Friday, July 24 — Fermanagh and Tyrone — The Austrian
Ultimatum to Serbia — Seventeen Points to remember — The Naval
Position — The Mission of Herr Ballin — Sunday, July 26 — The
Fleet held together — The Admiralty Communique — The Cabinet
and the Crisis — The Policy of Sir Edward Grey: Cardinal Points
— Belgium and France — Was there an Alternative? — Justice to
France — Naval Preparations of July 27 and 28 — The Precaution-
ary Period — The Turkish Battleships — What the German Ad-
miralty knew — German Agents — The Decisive Step — Passage of
the Straits of Dover by the Fleet, July 30 — The Fleet in its War
Station — The King's Ships at Sea.
THE Cabinet on Friday afternoon sat long revolving the
Irish problem. The Buckingham Palace Conference
had broken down. The disagreements and antagonisms
seemed as fierce and as hopeless as ever, yet the margin in dis-
pute, upon which such fateful issues hung, was inconceivably
petty. The discussion turned principally upon the boundaries
of Fermanagh and Tyrone. To this pass had the Irish fac-
tions in their insensate warfare been able to drive their re-
spective British champions. Upon the disposition of these
clusters of humble parishes turned at that moment the polit-
ical future of Great Britain. The North would not agree to
this, and the South would not agree to that. Both the leaders
wished to settle; both had dragged their followers forward
to the utmost point they dared. Neither seemed able to
203
204 THE WORLD CRISIS
give an inch. Meanwhile, the settlement of Ireland must
carry with it an immediate and decisive abatement of party
strife in Britain, and those schemes of unity and co-operation
which had so intensely appealed to the leading men on both
sides, ever since Mr. Lloyd George had mooted them in
1 910, must necessarily have come forward into the light of
day. Failure to settle on the other hand meant something
very like civil war and the plunge into depths of which no
one could make any measure. And so, turning this way and
that in search of an exit from the deadlock, the Cabinet toiled
around the muddy byways of Fermanagh and Tyrone. One
had hoped that the events of April at the Curragh and in
Belfast would have shocked British public opinion, and
formed a unity sufficient to impose a settlement on the Irish
factions. Apparently they had been insufficient. Apparently
the conflict would be carried one stage further by both sides
with incalculable consequences before there would be a re-
coil. Since the days of the Blues and the Greens in the By-
zantine Empire, partisanship had rarely been carried to more
absurd extremes. An all-sufficient shock was, however, at
hand.
The discussion had reached its inconclusive end, and the
Cabinet was about to separate, when the quiet grave tones
of Sir Edward Grey's voice were heard reading a document
which had just been brought to him from the Foreign Office.
It was the Austrian note to Serbia. He had been reading
or speaking for several minutes before I could disengage my
mind from the tedious and bewildering debate which had
just closed. We were all very tired, but gradually as the
phrases and sentences followed one another impressions of
a wholly different character began to form in my mind. This
note was clearly an ultimatum; but it was an ultimatum such
as had never been penned in modern times. As the reading
proceeded it seemed absolutely impossible that any State in
the world could accept it, or that any acceptance, however
THE CRISIS 205
abject, would satisfy the aggressor. The parishes of Fer-
managh and Tyrone faded back into the mists and squalls of
Ireland, and a strange light began immediately, but by per-
ceptible gradations, to fall and grow upon the map of Europe.
I always take the greatest interest in reading accounts of
how the war came upon different people; where they were,
and what they were doing, when the first impression broke on
their mind, and they first began to feel this overwhelming
event laying its fingers on their lives. I never tire of the
smallest detail, and I believe that so long as they are true
and unstudied they will have a definite value and an endur-
ing interest for posterity; so I shall briefly record exactly what
happened to me.
I went back to the Admiralty at about 6 o'clock. I said
to my friends who have helped me so many years in my work1
that there was real danger and that it might be war.
I took stock of the position, and wrote out to focus them
in my mind a series of points which would have to be attended
to if matters did not mend. My friends kept these as a check
during the days that followed and ticked them off one by one
as they were settled.
1. First and Second Fleets. Leave and disposition.
2. Third Fleet. Replenish coal and stores.
3. Mediterranean movements.
4. China dispositions.^
5. Shadowing cruisers abroad.
6. Ammunition for self -defensive merchantmen.
7. Patrol Flotillas. Disposition.
Leave.
Complete.
35 ex-Coastals.
8. Immediate Reserve.
9. Old Battleships for Humber. Flotilla for Humber.
10. Ships at emergency dates.
Ships-building for Foreign Powers.
1 Mr. Marsh and Mr. (now Sir James) Masterton Smith.
206 THE WORLD CRISIS
ii. Coastal Watch.
12. Anti-aircraft guns at Oil Depots.
13. Aircraft to Sheerness. Airships and Seaplanes.
14. K. Espionage.
15. Magazines and other vulnerable points.
16. Irish ships.
17. Submarine dispositions.
I discussed the situation at length the next morning (Satur-
day) with the First Sea Lord. For the moment, however,
there was nothing to do. At no time in all these last three
years were we more completely ready.
The test mobilisation had been completed, and with the
exception of the Immediate Reserve, all the reservists were
already paid off and journeying to their homes. But the
whole of the 1st and 2nd Fleets were complete in every way
for battle and were concentrated at Portland, where they
were to remain till Monday morning at 7 o'clock, when
the 1st Fleet would disperse by squadrons for various exer-
cises and when the ships of the 2nd Fleet would proceed to
their Home Ports to discharge their balance crews. Up till
Monday morning therefore, a word instantaneously trans-
mitted from the wireless masts of the Admiralty to the Iron
Duke would suffice to keep our main force together. If the
word were not spoken before that hour, they would begin to
separate. During the first twenty-four hours after their sepa-
ration they could be reconcentrated in an equal period; but
if no word were spoken for forty-eight hours (i.e. by Wednes-
day morning), then the ships of the 2nd Fleet would have
begun dismissing their balance crews to the shore at Ports-
mouth, Plymouth and Chatham, and the various gunnery
and torpedo schools would have recommenced their instruc-
tion. If another forty-eight hours had gone before the word
was spoken, i.e. by Friday morning, a certain number of
vessels would have gone into dock for refit, repairs or laying
up. Thus on this Saturday morning we had the Fleet in hand
for at least four days.
fi/^do
*
£ £.*.*. ««..fT;~ y^-r S-^/ J>.
0 .5 -«*. • <^« m. ■ 4^ii ■ -^
/o-
J/i
<^2^ £u^<jL<*U~Cj frf
^<^< s/A^Cj
a
"■■ :■■■;, .
" "' '"♦
THE CRISIS 207
The night before (Friday), at dinner, I had met Herr Ballin.
He had just arrived from Germany. We sat next to each other,
and I asked him what he thought about the situation. With
the first few words he spoke, it became clear that he had not
come here on any mission of pleasure. He said the situation
was grave. 'I remember/ he said, 'old Bismarck telling me
1 the year before he died that one day the great European War
would come out of some damned foolish thing in the Balkans/
These words, he said, might come true. It all depended
on the Tsar. What would he do if Austria chastised Serbia ?
A few years before there would have been no danger, as the
Tsar was too frightened for his throne, but now again he was
feeling himself more secure upon his throne, and the Russian
people besides would feel very hardly anything done against
Serbia. Then he said, 'If Russia marches against Austria,
we must march; and if we march, France must march, and
what would England do?' I was not in a position to say
more than that it would be a great mistake to assume that
England would necessarily do nothing, and I added that she
would judge events as they arose. He replied, speaking with
very great earnestness, 'Suppose we had to go to war with
Russia and France, and suppose we defeated France and yet
took nothing from her in Europe, not an inch of her territory,
only some colonies to indemnify us. Would that make a
difference to England's attitude ? Suppose we gave a guaran-
tee beforehand/ I stuck to my formula that England would
judge events as they arose, and that it would be a mistake to
assume that we should stand out of it whatever happened.
I reported this conversation to Sir Edward Grey in due
course, and early in the following week I repeated it to the
Cabinet. On the Wednesday following the exact proposal
mooted to me by Herr Ballin, about Germany not taking any
territorial conquests in France but seeking indemnities only
in the colonies, was officially telegraphed to us from Berlin
and immediately rejected. I have no doubt that Herr Ballin
2o8 THE WORLD CRISIS
was directly charged by the Emperor with the mission to find
out what England would do.
Herr Ballin has left on record his impression of his visit
to England at this juncture. 'Even a moderately skilled Ger-
man diplomatist/ he wrote, l could easily have come to an
understanding with England and France, who could have
made peace certain and prevented Russia from beginning
war/ The editor of his memoirs adds: 'The people in Lon-
don were certainly seriously concerned at the Austrian Note,
but the extent to which the Cabinet desired the maintenance
of peace may be seen (as an example) from the remark which
Churchill, almost with tears in his eyes, made to Ballin as they
parted: "My dear friend, don't let us go to war." '
I had planned to spend the Sunday with my family at
Cromer, and I decided not to alter my plans. I arranged to
have a special operator placed in the telegraph office so as to
ensure a continuous night and day service. On Saturday
afternoon the news came in that Serbia had accepted the
ultimatum. I went to bed with a feeling things might
blow over. We had had, as this account has shown, so many
scares before. Time after time the clouds had loomed up
vague, menacing, constantly changing; time after time they
had dispersed. We were still a long way, as it seemed, from
any danger of war. Serbia had accepted the ultimatum,
could Austria demand more ? And if war came, could it not
be confined to the East of Europe? Could not France and
Germany, for instance, stand aside and leave Russia and
Austria to settle their quarrel? And then, one step further
removed, was our own case. Clearly there would be a chance
of a conference, there would be time for Sir Edward Grey to
get to work with conciliatory processes such as had proved so
effective in the Balkan difficulties the year before. Anyhow,
whatever happened, the British Navy had never been in a
better condition or in greater strength. Probably the call
would not come, but if it did, it could not come in a better
THE CRISIS 209
hour. Reassured by these reflections I slept peacefully, and
no summons disturbed the silence of the night.
At 9 o'clock the next morning I called up the First Sea
Lord by telephone. He told me that there was a rumour
that Austria was not satisfied with the Serbian acceptance
of the ultimatum, but otherwise there were no new develop-
ments. I asked him to call me up again at twelve. I went
down to the beach and played with the children. We dammed
the little rivulets which trickled down to the sea as the tide
went out. It was a very beautiful day. The North Sea shone
and sparkled to a far horizon. What was there beyond that
line where sea and sky melted into one another ? All along
the East Coast, from Cromarty to Dover, in their various
sally-ports, lay our patrol flotillas of destroyers and submarines.
In the Channel behind the torpedo proof moles of Portland
Harbour waited all the great ships of the British Navy. Away
to the north-east, across the sea that stretched before me, the
German High Sea Fleet, squadron by squadron, was cruising
off the Norwegian coast.
At 12 o'clock I spoke to the First Sea Lord again. He told
me various items of news that had come in from different
capitals, none however of decisive importance, but all tend-
ing to a rise of temperature. I asked him whether all the
reservists had already been dismissed. He told me they had.
I decided to return to London. I told him I would be with
him at nine, and that meanwhile he should do whatever was
necessary.
Prince Louis awaited me at the Admiralty. The situation
was evidently degenerating. Special editions of the Sunday
papers showed intense excitement in nearly every European
capital. The First Sea Lord told me that in accordance
with our conversation he had told the Fleet not to dis-
perse. I took occasion to refer to this four months later in
my letter accepting his resignation. I was very glad publicly
to testify at that moment of great grief and pain for him that
210 THE WORLD CRISIS
his loyal hand had sent the first order which began our vast
naval mobilisation.
I then went round to Sir Edward Grey, who had rented
my house at 33, Eccleston Square. No one was with him
except Sir William Tyrrell of the Foreign Office. I told him
that we were holding the Fleet together. I learned from him
that he viewed the situation very gravely. He said there
was a great deal yet to be done before a really dangerous crisis
was reached, but that he did not at all like the way in which
this business had begun. I asked whether it would be help-
ful or the reverse if we stated in public that we were keeping
the Fleet together. Both he and Tyrrell were most insistent
that we should proclaim it at the earliest possible moment:
it might have the effect of sobering the Central Powers and
steadying Europe. I went back to the Admiralty, sent for
the First Sea Lord, and drafted the necessary communique.
The next morning the following notice appeared in all the
papers: —
BRITISH NAVAL MEASURES
ORDERS TO FIRST AND SECOND FLEETS
NO MANOEUVRE LEAVE
We received the following statement from the Secretary
of the Admiralty at an early hour this morning : —
Orders have been given to the First Fleet, which is con-
centrated at Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave for
the present. All vessels of the Second Fleet are remaining at
their home ports in proximity to their balance crews.
On Monday began the first of the Cabinets on the European
situation, which thereafter continued daily or twice a day.
It is to be hoped that sooner or later a detailed account of the
movement of opinion in the Cabinet during this period will
be compiled and given to the world. There is certainly no
reason for anyone to be ashamed of honest and sincere coun-
sel given either to preserve peace or to enter upon a just and
THE CRISIS 211
necessary war. Meanwhile it is only possible, without breach
of constitutional propriety, to deal in the most general terms
with what took place.
The Cabinet was overwhelmingly pacific. At least three-
quarters of its members were determined not to be drawn
into a European quarrel, unless Great Britain were herself
attacked, which was not likely. Those who were in this mood
were inclined to believe first of all tjiat Austria and Serbia
would not come to blows; secondly, that if they did, Russia
would not intervene; thirdly, if Russia intervened, that Ger-
many would not strike; fourthly, they hoped that if Germany
struck at Russia, it ought to be possible for France and Ger-
many mutually to neutralise each other without righting.
They did not believe that if Germany attacked France, she
would attack her through Belgium or that if she did the Bel-
gians would forcibly resist; and it must be remembered, that
during the whole course of this week Belgium not only never
asked for assistance from the guaranteeing Powers but point-
edly indicated that she wished to be left alone. So here were
six or seven positions, all of which could be wrangled over and
about none of which any final proof could be offered except
the proof of events. It was not until Monday, August 3, that
the direct appeal from the King of the Belgians for French and
Brirish aid raised an issue which united the overwhelming
majority of Ministers and enabled Sir Edward Grey to make
his speech on that afternoon to the House of Commons.
My own part in these events was a very simple one. It
was first of all to make sure that the diplomatic situation
did not get-ahead of the naval situation, and that the Grand
Fleet should be in its War Station before Germany could know
whether or not we should be in the war, and therefore if possible
before we had decided ourselves. Secondly, it was to point out
that if Germany attacked France, she would do so through
Belgium, that all her preparations had been made to this end,
and that she neither could nor would adopt any different
212 THE WORLD CRISIS
strategy or go round any other way. To these two tasks I
steadfastly adhered.
Every day there were long Cabinets from eleven onwards.
Streams of telegrams poured in from every capital in Europe.
Sir Edward Grey was plunged in his immense double struggle
(a) to prevent war and (b) not to desert France should it come.
I watched with admiration his activities at the Foreign Office
and cool skill in council. Both these tasks acted and re-
acted on one another from hour to hour. He had to try to
make the Germans realise that we were to be reckoned with,
without making the French or Russians feel they had us in
their pockets. He had to carry the Cabinet with him in all
he did. During the many years we acted together in the
Cabinet, and the earlier years in which I read his Foreign
Office telegrams, I thought I had learnt to understand his
methods of discussion and controversy, and perhaps without
offence I might describe them.
After what must have been profound reflection and study,
the Foreign Secretary was accustomed to select one or two
points in any important controversy which he defended with
all his resources and tenacity. They were his fortified vil-
lages. All around in the open field the battle ebbed and
flowed, but if at nightfall these points were still in his pos-
session, his battle was won. All other arguments had ex-
pended themselves, and these key positions alone survived.
The points which he selected over and over again proved to
be inexpugnable. They were particularly adapted to de-
fence. They commended themselves to sensible and fair-
minded men. The sentiments of the patriotic Whig, the
English gentleman, the public school boy all came into the
line for their defence, and if they were held, the whole front
was held, including much debatable ground.
As soon as the crisis had begun he had fastened upon the
plan of a European conference, and to this end every con-
ceivable endeavour was made by him. To get the great
THE CRISIS 213
Powers together round a table, in any capital that was agree-
able with Britain there to struggle for peace, and if necessary
to threaten war against those who broke it, was his plan. Had
such a conference taken place, there could have been no war.
Mere acceptance of the principle of a conference by the Cen-
tral Powers would have instantly relieved the tension. A
will to peace at Berlin and Vienna would have found no dif-
ficulties in escaping from the terrible net which was drawing
in upon us all hour by hour. But underneath the diplomatic
communications and manoeuvres, the baffling proposals and
counter-proposals, the agitated interventions of Tsar and
Kaiser, flowed a deep tide of calculated military purpose.
As the ill-fated nations approached the verge, the sinister ma-
chines of war began to develop their own momentum and
even to take control themselves.
The Foreign Secretary's second cardinal point was the Eng-
lish Channel. Whatever happened, if war came, we could not
allow the German Fleet to come down the Channel to attack
the French ports. Such a situation would be insupportable
for Great Britain. Every one who counted was agreed on
that from a very early stage in our discussions. But in ad-
dition we were, in a sense, morally committed to France to
that extent. No bargain had been entered into. All ar-
rangements that had been concerted were, as has been ex-
plained, specifically preluded with a declaration that neither
party was committed to anything further than consultation
together if danger threatened. But still the fact remained
that the whole French Fleet was in the Mediterranean. Only
a few cruisers and flotillas remained to guard the Northern
and Atlantic Coasts of France; and simultaneously with that
redisposition of forces, though not contingent upon it or de-
pendent upon it, we had concentrated all our battleships at
home, and only cruisers and battle-cruisers maintained British
interests in the Mediterranean. The French had taken their
decision on their own responsibility without prompting from
214 THE WORLD CRISIS
us, and we had profited by their action to strengthen our mar-
gin in the Line of Battle at home. Whatever disclaimers we
had made about not being committed, could we, when it came
to the point, honourably stand by and see the naked French
coasts ravaged and bombarded by German Dreadnoughts un-
der the eyes and within gunshot of our Main Fleet ?
It seemed to me, however, very early in the discussion that
the Germans would concede this point to keep us out of the
war, at any rate till the first battles on land had been fought
without us; and sure enough they did. Believing as I did
and do that we could not, for our own safety and indepen-
dence, allow France to be crushed as the result of aggressive
action by Germany, I always from the very earliest moment
concentrated upon our obligations to Belgium, through which
I was convinced the Germans must inevitably march to in-
vade France. Belgium did not bulk very largely in my senti-
ments at this stage. I thought it very unlikely that she
would resist. I thought, and Lord Kitchener, who lunched
with me on the Tuesday (28th), agreed, that Belgium would
make some formal protest and submit. A few shots might
be fired outside Liege or Namur, and then this unfortunate
State would bow its head before overwhelming might. Per-
haps, even, there was a secret agreement allowing free pas-
sage to the Germans through Belgium. How otherwise would
all these preparations of Germany, the great camps along the
Belgian Frontier, the miles and miles of sidings, the intricate
network of railways have been developed? Was it possible
that German thoroughness could be astray on so important a
factor as the attitude of Belgium?
Those wonderful events which took place in Belgium on
Sunday and Monday and in the week that followed could
not be foreseen by us. I saw in Belgium a country with
whom we had had many differences over the Congo and other
subjects. I had not discerned in the Belgium of the late
King Leopold the heroic nation of King Albert. But what-
THE CRISIS 215
ever happened to Belgium, there was France whose very life
was at stake, whose armies in my judgment were definitely
weaker than those by whom they would be assailed, whose
ruin would leave us face to face alone with triumphant Ger-
many: France, then schooled by adversity to peace and cau-
tion, thoroughly democratic, already stripped of two fair
provinces, about to receive the final smashing blow from
overwhelming brutal force. Only Britain could redress the
balance, could defend the fair play of the world. Whatever
else failed, we must be there, and we must be there in time.
A week later every British heart burned for little Belgium.
From every cottage labouring men, untrained to war but
with the blood of an unconquered people in their veins, were
hurrying to the recruiting stations with intent to rescue
Belgium. But at this time it was not Belgium one thought
of, but France. Still, Belgium and the Treaties were indis-
putably an obligation of honour binding upon the British
State such as British Governments have always accepted;
and it was on that ground that I personally, with others, took
my stand.
I will now examine the alternative question of whether
more decided action by Sir Edward Grey at an early stage
would have prevented the war. We must first ask, At what
early stage ? Suppose after Agadir or on the announcement of
the new German Navy Law in 191 2 the Foreign Secretary had,
m cold blood, proposed a formal alliance with France and Rus-
sia, and in execution of military conventions consequential
upon the alliance had begun to raise by compulsion an army
adequate to our responsibilities and to the part we were play-
ing in the world's affairs; and suppose we had taken this ac-
tion as a united nation ; who shall say whether that would have
prevented or precipitated the war? But what chance was
there of such action being unitedly taken ? The Cabinet of the
day would never have agreed to it. I doubt if four Ministers
would have agreed to it. But if the Cabinet had been united
216 THE WORLD CRISIS
upon it, the House of Commons would not have accepted their
guidance. Therefore the Foreign Minister would have had to
resign. The policy which he had advocated would have stood
condemned and perhaps violently repudiated; and with that
repudiation would have come an absolute veto upon all those
informal preparations and non-committal discussions on
which the defensive power of the Triple Entente was erected.
Therefore, by taking such a course in 191 2 Sir Edward Grey
would only have paralysed Britain, isolated France and in-
creased the preponderant and growing power of Germany.
Suppose again that now after the Austrian ultimatum to
Serbia, the Foreign Secretary had proposed to the Cabinet
that if matters were so handled that Germany attacked France
or violated Belgian territory, Great Britain would declare
war upon her. Would the Cabinet have assented to such a
communication? I cannot believe it. If Sir Edward Grey
could have said on Monday that if Germany attacked France
or Belgium, England would declare war upon her, might
there not still have been time to ward off the catastrophe?
The question is certainly arguable. But the knowledge which
we now have of events in Berlin tends to show that even then
the German Government were too deeply committed by their
previous action. They had before their eyes the deliberate
British announcement that the Fleet was being held together.
That at least was a serious if silent warning. Under its im-
pression the German Emperor, as soon as he returned to
Berlin, made on this same Monday and succeeding days
strong efforts to bring Austria to reason and so to prevent
war. But he could never overtake events or withstand the
contagion of ideas. However this may be, I am certain that
if Sir Edward Grey had sent the kind of ultimatum suggested,
the Cabinet would have broken up, and it is also my belief
that up till Wednesday or Thursday at least, the House of
Commons would have repudiated his action. Nothing less
than the deeds of Germany would have converted the British
THE CRISIS 217
nation to war. To act in advance of those deeds would have
led to an exposure of division worse than the guarded atti-
tude which we maintained, which brought our country into
the war united. After Wednesday or Thursday it was too
late. By the time we could speak decisive words of warning,
the hour of words had certainly passed for ever.
It is true to say that our Entente with France and the
military and naval conversations that had taken place since
1906, had led us into a position where we had the obligations
of an alliance without its advantages. An open alliance, if it
could have been peacefully brought about at an earlier date,
would have exercised a deterring effect upon the German
mind, or at the least would have altered their military cal-
culations. Whereas now we were morally bound to come to
the aid of France and it was our interest to do so, and yet the
fact that we should come in appeared so uncertain that it
did not weigh as it should have done with the Germans.
Moreover, as things were, if France had been in an aggressive
mood, we should not have had the unquestioned right of an
ally to influence her action in a pacific sense: and if as the re-
sult of her aggressive mood war had broken out and we had
stood aside, we should have been accused of deserting her,
and in any case would have been ourselves grievously en-
dangered by her defeat.
However, in the event there was no need to moderate the
French attitude. Justice to France requires the explicit
statement that the conduct of her Government at this awful
juncture was faultless. She assented instantly to every pro-
posal that could make for peace. She abstained from every
form of provocative action. She even compromised her own
safety, holding back her covering troops at a considerable
distance behind her frontier, and delaying her mobilisation in
the face of continually gathering German forces till the latest
moment. Not until she was confronted with the direct de-
mand of Germany to break her Treaty and abandon Russia,
218 THE WORLD CRISIS
did France take up the challenge; and even had she acceded
to the German demand, she would only, as we now know,
have been faced with a further ultimatum to surrender to
German military occupation as a guarantee for her neutral-
ity the fortresses of Toul and Verdun. There never was any
chance of France being allowed to escape the ordeal. Even
cowardice and dishonour would not have saved her. The
Germans had resolved that if war came from any cause, they
would take and break France forthwith as its first operation.
The German military chiefs burned to give the signal, and
were sure of the result. She would have begged for mercy in
vain.
She did not beg.
The more I reflect upon this situation, the more convinced
I am that we took the only practical course that was open to
us or to any British Cabinet; and that the objections which
may be urged against it were less than those which would
have attended any other sequence of action.
After hearing the discussions at Monday's Cabinet and
studying the telegrams, I sent that night to all our Com-
manders-in-Chief the following very secret warning: —
July 27, 1914.
This is not the Warning Telegram, but European political
situation makes war between Triple Entente and Triple Al-
liance Powers by no means impossible. Be prepared to
shadow possible hostile men of war and consider dispositions
of H.M. ships under your command from this point of view.
Measure is purely precautionary. No unnecessary person is
to be informed. The utmost secrecy is to be observed.
On Tuesday morning I sent the following minute to the First
Sea Lord, to which he replied marginally the same day: —
THE CRISIS
219
July 28, 1914.
1. It would appear that the minesweepers ww go North with Fleet.
should be quietly collected at some suitable
point for attendance on the Battle Fleet,
should it move.
2. Let me have a short statement on the Done-
coal position and what measures you propose.
3. I presume Firedrake and Lurcher will Yes.
now join their proper flotilla.
4. All the Vessels engaged On the COast Of Have been ordered away.
Ireland should be considered as available on
mobilisation, and on receipt of the warning
telegram should move to their war stations
without the slightest delay.
5. It would certainly be desirable that wni be done as soon as f.o. concur
Triumph should be quietly mobilised and
that she should be ready to close the China
flagship with available destroyers. The posi-
tion of the German heavy cruisers in China
waters makes it clear that this can be done.
Please examine and report what disadvan-
tages this mobilisation would entail. We can
then discuss whether it is worth while taking
them in the present circumstances. The
China Squadron must be capable of concen-
trating as soon as the warning telegram is
sent and before a main action is necessary.
Without the Triumph the margin of superior-
ity is small and any reinforcement from other
stations would be slow.
6. You should consider whether the posi-
tion of the Goeben1 at Pola does not justify
the detachment of the New Zealand to join
the Mediterranean flag.
7. Yesterday, after consultation with the
Prime Minister, I arranged personally with
the Chief of the Imperial General Staff for
the better guarding of magazines and oil tanks
Should concentrate at Hong Kong
at once.
Decided "No" at Conference.
Settled personally
I.G.S.
with O. of
1 1 have inconsistently adopted the familiar spelling of this ship's
name instead of Goben.
Done.
220 THE WORLD CRISIS
against evilly-disposed persons and attacks
by aircraft. These measures have now been
taken. See attached letter from the Chief of
the Imperial General Staff and my reply.
You should direct the Director of Operations
Division to obtain full detailed information
from the War Office of what has been done,
and in the event of any place being overlooked,
to make the necessary representations.
8. Director of the Air Division should be
asked to report the exact positions of the air-
craft which were concentrated yesterday in
the neighbourhood of the Thames Estuary,
and further to state what is being done to
reach a complete understanding between the
l. b. aircraft and the military authorities in charge
of the aerial gun defences at various points.
This is of the utmost importance if accidents
are to be avoided. „7 c ^
W. b. C
The official ' warning telegram' was despatched from
the Admiralty on Wednesday, the 29th. On this same day
I obtained from the Cabinet the authority to put into
force the ' Precautionary Period' regulations. The work
of Ottley and of Hankey and generally of the Committee
of Imperial Defence, was now put to the proof. It was
found in every respect thorough and comprehensive, and
all over the country emergency measures began to astonish
the public. Naval harbours were cleared, bridges were
guarded, steamers were boarded and examined, watchers lined
the coasts.
First Sea Lord.
Fourth Sea Lord.
Director of Air Department. T ,
r July 29, 1 9 14.
In the present stage of aeronautics, the primary duty of
British aircraft is to fight enemy aircraft, and thus afford pro-
tection against aerial attack. This should be made clear to
THE CRISIS 221
air officers, Commander-in-Chief, Nore, and Admiral of Pa-
trols, in order that machines may not be needlessly used up
in ordinary scouting duties. After the primary requirement
is well provided for, whatever aid is possible for coastal watch
and extended defence scouting should be organised. But the
naval aircraft are to regard the defence against attack from
the air as their first and main responsibility. They must
be carefully husbanded. W S P
Director Intelligence Division. y > 9 4-
Please mark off on my 'Table of Battleship Strength' all
British and German Dreadnought battleships available for
war (a) in the next month, and (b) at the end of three months.
You should include the two Turkish ships in your calculation.
Let me also have a similar table about battle-cruisers.
w. s. c.
Our war arrangements comprised an elaborate scheme for
dealing with vessels under construction. In 191 2 measures
had been taken to keep it perpetually up to date. The prin-
ciple was that for the first three months of a war all efforts
should be concentrated on finishing ships that could be ready
in the first six months, other vessels whose dates of completion
were more remote being somewhat retarded. This ensured
the greatest possible superiority in the early months,'and would
give us time to see what kind of a war it was and how it went,
before dealing with more distant contingencies. The plan of
course covered all ships building in Great Britain for foreign
Powers. Of these there were two battleships building for
Turkey, three flotilla leaders for Chili, four destroyers for
Greece, and three monitors for Brazil. There were also other
important ships, including a Chilian and a Brazilian battle-
ship and a Dutch cruiser, which would not be ready till much
later. The Turkish battleships were vital to us. With a
margin of only seven Dreadnoughts we could not afford to do
without these two fine ships. Still less could we afford to see
222 THE WORLD CRISIS
them fall into bad hands and possibly be used against us. Had
we delivered them to Turkey, they would, as the event turned
out, have formed with the Goeben a hostile force which would
have required a force of not less than five British Dreadnought
battleships or battle-cruisers to watch them. Thus the British
numbers would have been reduced by three instead of being
increased by two. One of the Turkish battleships (the
Reshadieh) which Armstrongs were building on the Tyne when
the crisis began, was actually complete. The Turkish crew,
over 500 strong, had already arrived to take her over and were
lying in their steamer in the river. There seemed to be a great
danger of their coming on board, brushing aside Messrs.
Armstrongs' workmen and hoisting the Turkish flag, in which
case a very difficult diplomatic situation would have been
created. I determined to run no risks, and on the 31st July
I sent written instructions that adequate military guards
were to be placed on board this vessel and that in no circum-
stances was she to be boarded by the Turks. It has some-
times been made a ground for reproach against me that the
requisition of these ships was one of the causes which brought
Turkey into the war three months later. We now know that
negotiations were taking place from the 24th July onwards
between the Germans and the leaders of the Committee of
Union and Progress for an alliance between Germany and
Turkey, and that such Alliance was actually signed on
August 2.
It is interesting to read in the German Official History
what they knew about our preparations at this time.
'At 6.20 p.m. on July 28 the following telegram was re-
ceived in Berlin from the German Naval Attache: —
" Admiralty are not publishing ships' movements. 2nd
Fleet remains fully manned. Schools closed in naval bases;
preliminary measures taken for recall from leave. Accord-
ing to unconfirmed news 1st Fleet still at Portland, one sub-
THE CRISIS 223
marine flotilla left Portsmouth. It is to be assumed that Ad-
miralty is preparing for mobilisation on the quiet."
"He telegraphed later on the same day as follows: —
"As already reported by telegram, the British Fleet is pre-
paring for all eventualities. In broad outline the present dis-
tribution is as follows: 1st Fleet is assembled at Portland.
The battleship Bellerophon which was proceeding to Gibraltar
for refit has been recalled. The ships of the 2nd Fleet are at
their bases: they are fully manned. The schools on shore
have not reopened. Ships of the 2nd and 3rd Fleets have
coaled, completed with ammunition and supplies, and are at
their bases. In consequence of the training of reservists, just
completed, latter can be manned more quickly than usual
and with more or less practised personnel, the Times says,
within 48 hours. The destroyer and patrol flotillas and the
submarines are either at or en route for their stations. No
leave is being granted, officers and men already on leave have
been recalled.
"In the naval bases and dockyards great activity reigns;
in addition special measures of precaution have been adopted,
all dockyards, magazines, oil tanks, etc., being put under
guard. Repairs of ships in dockyard hands are being speeded
up. A great deal of night work is being done.
"The Press reports that the Mediterranean squadron had
left Alexandria; it is said that it will remain at Malta.
"All ships and squadrons have orders to remain ready for
sea.
"Outwardly complete calm is preserved, in order not to
cause anxiety by alarming reports about the Fleet.
"Movements of ships, which are generally published daily
by the Admiralty, have been withheld since yesterday. . . .
"The above preparations have been made on the Admi-
ralty's independent initiative. The result is the same, who-
ever gave the orders.'"
The German Naval Attache thus showed himself extremely
well informed. As I have already mentioned in an earlier
chapter, the general warrant to open the letters of certain
persons which I had signed three years before as Home
224 THE WORLD CRISIS
Secretary, had brought to light a regular network of minor
agents, mostly British, in German pay in all our naval ports.
Had we arrested them, others of whom we might not have
known, would have taken their place. We therefore thought
it better, having detected them, to leave them at large. In
this way one saw regularly from their communications, which
we carefully forwarded, what they were saying to their pay-
masters in Berlin during these years, and we knew exactly
how to put our hands upon them at the proper moment. Up
to this point we had no objection to the German Government
knowing that exceptional precautions were being taken
throughout the Navy. Indeed, apart from details, it was
desirable that they should know how seriously we viewed the
situation. But the moment had now come to draw down
the curtain. We no longer forwarded the letters and a few
days later, on a word from me to the Home Secretary, all
these petty traitors, who for a few pounds a month were
seeking to sell their country, were laid by the heels. Nor was
it easy for the Germans to organise on the spur of the mo-
ment others in their places.
The most important step remains to be recounted. As
early as Tuesday, July 28, I felt that the Fleet should go to
its War Station. It must go there at once, and secretly; it
must be steaming to the north while every German authority,
naval or military, had the greatest possible interest in avoid-
ing a collision with us. If it went thus early it need not go
by the Irish Channel and northabout. It could go through
the Straits of Dover and through the North Sea, and there-
fore the island would not be uncovered even for a single day.
Moreover, it would arrive sooner and with less expenditure
of fuel.
At about 10 o'clock, therefore, on the Tuesday morning
I proposed this step to the First Sea Lord and the Chief of
the Staff and found them wholeheartedly in favour of it.
We decided that the Fleet should leave Portland at such an
THE CRISIS 225
hour on the morning of the 29th as to pass the Straits of
Dover during the hours of darkness, that it should traverse
these waters at high speed and without lights, and with the
utmost precaution proceed to Scapa Flow. I feared to bring
this matter before the Cabinet, lest it should mistakenly be
considered a provocative action likely to damage the chances
of peace. It would be unusual to bring movements of the
British Fleet in Home Waters from one British port to an-
other before the Cabinet. I only therefore informed the
Prime Minister, who at once gave his approval. Orders were
accordingly sent to Sir George Callaghan, who was told inci-
dentally to send the Fleet up under his second-in-command
and to travel himself by land through London in order that
we might have an opportunity of consultation with him.
Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief Home Fleets.
July 28, 1 9 14. Sent 5 p.m.
To-morrow, Wednesday, the First Fleet is to leave Portland
for Scapa Flow. Destination is to be kept secret except to
flag and commanding officers. As you are required at the
Admiralty, Vice-Admiral 2nd Battle Squadron is to take com-
mand. Course from Portland is to be shaped to southward,
then a middle Channel course to the Straits of Dover. The
Squadrons are to pass through the Straits without lights dur-
ing the night and to pass outside the shoals on their way north.
Agamemnon is to remain at Portland, where the Second Fleet
will assemble.
We may now picture this great Fleet, with its flotillas and
cruisers, steaming slowly out of Portland Harbour, squadron
by squadron, scores of gigantic castles of steel wending their
way across the misty, shining sea, like giants bowed in anxious
thought. We may picture them again as darkness fell, eigh-
teen miles of warships running at high speed and in absolute
blackness through the Narrow Straits, bearing with them
into the broad waters of the North the safeguard of consider-
able affairs.
226 THE WORLD CRISIS
Although there seemed to be no conceivable motive chance
or mischance which could lead a rational German Admiralty
to lay a trap of submarines or mines or have given them the
knowledge and the time to do so, we looked at each other
with much satisfaction when on Thursday morning (the 30th)
at our daily Staff Meeting the Flagship reported herself and
the whole Fleet well out in the centre of the North Sea.1
The German Ambassador lost no time in complaining of
the movement of the Fleet to the Foreign Office. According
to the German Official Naval History, he reported to his
Government on the evening of the 30th that Sir Edward
Grey had answered him in the following words: —
'The movements of the Fleet are free of all offensive
character, and the Fleet will not approach German waters/
'But/ adds the German historian, 'the strategic concen-
tration of the Fleet had actually been accomplished with its
transfer to Scottish ports/ This was true. We were now in
a position, whatever happened, to control events, and it was
not easy to see how this advantage could be taken from us.
A surprise torpedo attack before or simultaneous with the
declaration of war was at any rate one nightmare gone for
ever. We could at least see for ten days ahead. If war
should come no one would know where to look for the British
Fleet. Somewhere in that enormous waste of waters to the
1 Later in the morning I learnt that Lord Fisher was in the office
and I invited him into my room. I told him what we had done and
his delight was wonderful to see.
Foolish statements have been made from time to time that this
sending of the Fleet to the North was done at Lord Fisher's suggestion.
The interview with me which Lord Fisher records in his book is cor-
rectly given by him as having taken place on the 30th. The Fleet had
actually passed the Straits of Dover the night before. I think it
necessary to place on record the fact that my sole naval adviser on
every measure taken prior to the declaration of war was the First Sea
Lord.
THE CRISIS 227
north of our islands, cruising now this way, now that, shrouded
in storms and mists, dwelt this mighty organisation. Yet
from the Admiralty building we could speak to them at any
moment if need arose. The king's ships were at sea.
CHAPTER X
THE MOBILISATION OF THE NAVY
July 3 1 -August 4
* The meteor flag of England
Shall yet terrific burn;
Till danger's troubled night depart,
And the star of peace return.'
Campbell.
Cabinet Tension — The Opposition Leaders — The Naval Reserves —
British Decision to close the Chanel to German Warships — Ger-
many declares War upon Russia — General Mobilisation of the
Navy — Sir John Jellicoe appointed Commander-in-Chief — Ger-
man Invasion of Luxemburg and Belgium — Monday, August 3,
in the House of Commons — British Ultimatum to Germany —
Nation and Empire — Situation in the Mediterranean — Menace
of the Goeben — Admiralty Instructions to Sir Berkeley Milne —
August 4. The Goeben found — Cabinet veto on Hostilities —
Italian Declaration of Neutrality — First Escape of the Goeben —
Awaiting the Signal — ' Commence hostilities against Germany.'
/ I \HERE was complete agreement in the Cabinet upon
-*- every telegram sent by Sir Edward Grey and in his
handling of the crisis. But there was also an invincible re-
fusal on the part of the majority to contemplate British inter-
vention by force of arms should the Foreign Secretary's efforts
fail and a European war begin. Thus, as the terrific week
wore on and the explosion became inevitable, it seemed prob-
able that a rupture of the political organism by which the
country had so long been governed was also rapidly approach-
ing. I lived this week entirely in the official circle, seeing
scarcely anyone but my colleagues of the Cabinet or of the
Admiralty, and moving only to and fro across the Horse
228
THE MOBILISATION OF THE NAVY 229
Guards between Admiralty House and Downing Street. Each
day as the telegrams arrived showing the darkening scene of
Europe, and the Cabinets ended in growing tension, I pulled
over the various levers which successively brought our naval
organisation into full preparedness. It was always necessary
to remember that if Peace was preserved every one of these
measures, alarmist in their character and involving much ex-
pense, would have to be justified to a Liberal House of Com-
mons. That assembly once delivered from the peril, would
certainly proceed upon the assumption that British participa-
tion in a Continental struggle would have been criminal mad-
ness. Yet it was not practicable often to divert the main
discussions of the Cabinet into purely technical channels. It
was therefore necessary for me to take a peculiar and invidi-
ous personal responsibility for many things that had to be
done when their turn came. I had also to contemplate a
break up of the governing instrument. Judged by reports
and letters from members, the attitude of the House of Com-
mons appeared most uncertain.
On Thursday evening I entered into communication with
the Unionist leaders through Mr. F. E. Smith.1 I informed
him of the increasing gravity of the European situation and
of the military preparations which were everywhere in prog-
ress in Europe. I stated that no decision had been reached
by the Cabinet, and that I had received letters from one or
two Unionists of influence protesting vehemently against our
being drawn into a Continental war. I asked him to let me
know where he and his friends stood on the supreme issue.
He replied at once that he himself was unreservedly for stand-
ing by France and Belgium. After consulting with Mr.
Bonar Law, Sir Edward Carson and others who were gath-
ered at Sir Edward Goulding's house at Wargrave, he sent
me the following written assurance, which I showed to Mr.
Asquith the next morning (Saturday).
1 Now Lord Birkenhead.
230 THE WORLD CRISIS
Mr. F. E. Smith to Mr. Churchill.
July 31, 1914.
I have spoken to my friends of whom you know and I have
no doubt that on the facts as we understand them — and
more particularly on the assumption (which we understand
to be certain) that Germany contemplates a violation of Bel-
gian neutrality — the Government can rely upon the support
of the Unionist Party in whatever manner that support can
be most effectively given.
Secretary, Saturday, August 1, 1914.
First Sea Lord.
It seems certain that the order to mobilise will be issued
after Cabinet this morning. Have everything in readiness.
Examination service should be put into force simultane-
ously- w. s. c.
At the Cabinet I demanded the immediate calling out of
the Fleet Reserves and the completion of our naval prepara-
tions. I based this claim on the fact that the German Navy
was mobilising and that we must do the same. The Cabinet,
who were by no means ill-informed on matters of naval organ-
isation, took the view after a sharp discussion that this step
was not necessary to our safety, as mobilisation only affected
the oldest ships in the Fleet, and that our main naval power
was already in full preparedness for war and the Fleet in its
war station. I replied that though this was true, we needed
the Third Fleet ships, particularly the older cruisers, to fulfil
the roles assigned to them in our war plan. However, I did
not succeed in procuring their assent.
On Saturday evening I dined alone at the Admiralty. The
foreign telegrams came in at short intervals in red boxes
which already bore the special label 'Sub-Committee,' denot-
ing the precautionary period. The flow was quite continu-
ous, and the impression produced on my mind after reading
THE MOBILISATION OF THE NAVY 231
for nearly an hour was that there was still a chance of peace.
Austria had accepted the conference, and intimate personal
appeals were passing between the Tsar and the Kaiser. It
seemed to me, from the order in which I read the series of
telegrams, that at the very last moment Sir Edward Grey
might succeed in saving the situation. So far no shot had
been fired between the Great Powers. I wondered whether
armies and fleets could remain mobilised for a space without
fighting and then demobilise.
I had hardly achieved this thought when another Foreign
Office box came in. I opened it and read 'Germany has de-
clared war on Russia/ There was no more to be said. I
walked across the Horse Guards Parade and entered 10
Downing Street, by the garden gate. I found the Prime
Minister upstairs in his drawing-room: with him were Sir
Edward Grey, Lord Haldane and Lord Crewe; there may have
been other Ministers. I said that I intended instantly to
mobilise the Fleet notwithstanding the Cabinet decision, and
that I would take full personal responsibility to the Cabinet
the next morning. The Prime Minister, who felt himself
bound to the Cabinet, said not a single word, but it was clear
from his look that he was quite content. As I walked down
the steps of Downing Street with Sir Edward Grey, he said
to me, 'You should know I have just done a very important
thing. I have told Cambon that we shall not allow the Ger-
man fleet to come into the Channel. ' I went back to the
Admiralty and gave forthwith the order to mobilise. We
had no legal authority for calling up the Naval Reserves, as
no proclamation had been submitted to His Majesty in view
of the Cabinet decision, but we were quite sure that the Fleet
men would unquestioningly obey the summons. This action
was ratified by the Cabinet on Sunday morning, and the
Royal Proclamation was issued some hours later.
Another decision and a painful one was required. Sir
George Callaghan's command of the Home Fleets had been
232 THE WORLD CRISIS
extended by a year, and was now due to end on the ist Octo-
ber. It had been announced that he would then be succeeded
by Sir John Jellicoe. Further, our arrangements prescribed
that Sir John Jellicoe should act as second-in-command in the
event of war. The First Sea Lord and I had a conference
with Sir George Callagban, on his way through London to the
North on the 30th. As the result of this conference we decided
that if war came, it would be necessary to appoint Sir John
Jellicoe immediately to the chief command. We were doubtful
as to Sir George Callaghan's health and physical strength being
equal to the immense strain that would be cast upon him;
and in the crash of Europe it was no time to consider indi-
viduals. Sir John Jellicoe left London for the Fleet with
sealed instructions, directing him on the seals being broken
to take over the command. On the night of August 2, when
we considered war certain, we telegraphed to both Admirals
apprising them of the Admiralty decision. It was naturally a
cruel blow to Sir George Callaghan to have to lay down his
charge at such a moment, and his protests were re-echoed by
practically all the principal Admirals who had served under
him and by Sir John Jellicoe himself. It was also a grave
matter to make a change in the command of the Fleets at
this juncture. However, we did what we thought right, and
that without an hour's delay. Sir John Jellicoe assumed com-
mand on the evening of August 3, and received almost imme-
diately an order from the Admiralty to proceed to sea at
daylight on the 4th.
The Cabinet sat almost continuously throughout the Sun-
day, and up till luncheon-time it looked as if the majority
would resign. The grief and horror of so many able colleagues
were painful to witness. But what could any one do? In
the luncheon interval I saw Mr. Balfour, a veritable rock in
times like these, and learned that the Unionist leaders had
tendered formally in writing to the Prime Minister their un-
qualified assurances of support.
THE MOBILISATION OF THE NAVY 233
I returned to the Admiralty. We telegraphed to our
Commanders-in-Chief : —
To-day, August 2, at 2.20 the following note was handed
to the French and German Ambassadors. [Begins] The Brit-
ish Government would not allow the passage of German ships
through the English Channel or the North Sea in order to
attack the coasts or shipping of France [ends].
Be prepared to meet surprise attacks.
The French Naval Attache, the Comte de Saint-Seine had
been summoned. The following is the precis of our con-
versation:—
August 2, 1914.
The First Lord in the presence of the First Sea Lord and
Chief of the War Staff, informed the French Naval Attache
of the Cabinet's decision and the note on naval matters handed
to M. Cambon at 2.20 p.m., August 2.
In order to prepare for the possibility of an alliance being
concluded between the Governments, but without prejudg-
ing the question, the following preliminary steps are to be
taken: —
The package containing the secret signal books to be dis-
tributed and opened but not used.
Mutual regulations for the entry of allied ships into each
other's ports to be issued now.
The officers in command of the Mediterranean and China
Stations will be given permission to enter into communica-
tion with the French Senior Officers in command on their
stations.
Certain staff questions were discussed, but the First Lord
clearly pointed out that these involved no question of pol-
icy which would have to be decided by Parliament.
The general direction of the naval war to rest with the
British Admiralty.
The direction of the allied fleets in the Mediterranean to
rest with the French, the British Admiral being junior.
In the event of the neutrality of Italy being assured, France
would undertake to deal with Austria assisted only by such
British ships as would be required to cover German ships
234 THE WORLD CRISIS
in that sea, and secure a satisfactory composition of the
allied fleet.
The arrangement come to locally on the China Station
would be carried out under the general direction of the British
Admiral.
British naval bases would be at the disposal of the French.
Should any portion of the German main fleet make its way
South towards the Mediterranean, it would be followed by a
superior British force.
The Attache was asked to communicate the above at once
to his Government by telegraph and obtain full knowledge
and authority for a further discussion on details to-night.
Meanwhile events were influencing opinion hour by hour.
When the Cabinet met on Sunday morning we were in pres-
ence of the violation of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg by
the German troops. In the evening the German ultimatum
to Belgium was delivered. The next day arrived the appeal
of the King of the Belgians that the guaranteeing Powers
should uphold the sanctity of the Treaty regarding the neu-
trality of Belgium. This last was decisive. By Monday the
majority of Mr. Asquith's colleagues regarded war as in-
evitable. Discussion was resumed on Monday morning in a
different atmosphere, though it seemed certain that there
would be numerous resignations.
Before the Cabinet separated on Monday morning, Sir Ed-
ward Grey had procured a predominant assent to the prin-
cipal points and general tone of his statement to Parliament
that afternoon. Formal sanction had been given to the al-
ready completed mobilisation of the Fleet and to the imme-
diate mobilisation of the Army. No decision had been taken
to send an ultimatum to Germany or to declare war upon
Germany, still less to send an army to France. These supreme
decisions were never taken at any Cabinet. They were com-
pelled by the force of events, and rest on the authority of the
Prime Minister. We repaired to the House of Commons to
hear the statement of the Foreign Secretary. I did not know
THE MOBILISATION OF THE NAVY 235
which of our colleagues had resigned or what the composition
of a War Government would be. The aspect of the assem-
bly was awed but resolute. No one could mistake its inten-
tion. Sir Edward Grey made his statement with the utmost
moderation. In order that there should be no ground for
future reproaches, he informed the House that the Germans
were willing to comply with the British demand that no
German warships should be sent into the English Channel.
The sombre march of his argument carried this weighty ad-
mission forward in its stride. When he sat down he was
possessed in an overwhelming measure of the support of the
assembly. Neither he nor I could remain long in the House.
Outside, I asked him 'What happens now?' 'Now,' he said,
'we shall send them an ultimatum to stop the invasion of
Belgium within 24 hours.'
Some of the Ministers still clung to the hope that Germany
would comply with the British ultimatum and would arrest
the onrush of her armies upon Belgium. As well recall the
avalanche, as easily suspend in mid-career the great ship
that has been launched and is sliding down the ways. Ger-
many was already at war with Russia and France. It was
certain that in 24 hours she would be at war with the
British Empire also.
All through the tense discussions of the Cabinet one had
in mind another greater debate which must begin when
these were concluded. Parliament, the nation, the Domin-
ions, would have to be convinced. That the cause was
good, that the argument was overwhelming, that the response
would be worthy, I did not for a moment doubt. But it
seemed J:hat an enormous political task awaited us, and I
saw in the mind's eye not only the crowded House of Com-
mons, but formidable assembly of the people throughout the
land requiring full and swift justification of the flaming action
taken in their name. But such cares were soon dispersed.
When the Council doors had opened and Ministers had come
236 THE WORLD CRISIS
into the outer air, the British nation was surging forward in
its ancient valour, and the Empire had sprung to arms.
'Men met each other with erected look,
The steps were higher that they took,
Friends to congratulate their friends made haste;
And long inveterate foes saluted as they passed.' 1
Meanwhile in the Mediterranean a drama of intense in-
terest and as it ultimately proved of fateful consequence,
was being enacted.
The event which would dominate all others, if war broke
out, was the main shock of battle between the French and
German armies. We knew that the French were counting on
placing in the line a whole army corps of their best troops
from North Africa, and that every man was needed. We
were informed also that they intended to transport these
troops across the Mediterranean as fast as ships could be
loaded, under the general protection of the French Fleet,
but without any individual escort or system of convoys. The
French General Staff calculated that whatever happened
most of the troops would get across. The French Fleet dis-
posed between this stream of transports and the Austrian
Fleet afforded a good guarantee. But there was one ship in
the Mediterranean which far outstripped in speed every vessel
in the French Navy. She was the Goeben. The only heavy
ships in the Mediterranean that could attempt to compete
with the Goeben in speed were the three British battle-cruisers.
It seemed that the Goeben, being free to choose any point on
a front of three or four hundred miles, would easily be able to
avoid the French Battle Squadrons and, brushing aside or
outstripping their cruisers, break in upon the transports and
sink one after another of these vessels crammed with soldiers.
1 Dryden, Threnodia Augustalis.
THE MOBILISATION OF THE NAVY 237
It occurred to me at this time that perhaps 1 that was the task
she had been sent to the Mediterranean to perform. For this
reason as a further precaution I had suggested to the First
Sea Lord as early as July 28 that an additional battle cruiser,
the New Zealand, should be sent to reinforce our squadron.
When it came to the pinch a few days later, Admiral Boue
de Lapeyrere, the French Commander-in-Chief, adopted a
system of convoys; and on August 4 he prudently delayed
the embarkation of the troops until he could organise ade-
quate escorts. But of this change of plan the Admiralty was
not advised.
On July 30 I called for the war orders of the Mediterranean
command and discussed them fully with the First Sea Lord.
These orders, issued in August, 1913, had had to take into
consideration a variety of political contingencies, viz. Great
Britain at war with Germany only, with Germany and Aus-
tria only, or with Germany, Austria and Italy; and Great
Britain and France allied together against each or any of the
three aforesaid opponents. The course to be followed dif-
fered somewhat in each case. Briefly, if Britain found her-
self single-handed against the whole Triple Alliance, we should
temporarily have to abandon the Mediterranean and con-
centrate at Gibraltar. In all other cases the concentration
would be at Malta, and if the French were allies our squad-
rons would join them for a general battle. It now seemed
necessary to give the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediter-
ranean some more specific information and directions.
Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.
July 30, 1914.
It now seems probable should war break out and England
and France engage in it, that Italy will remain neutral and
that Greece can be made an ally. Spain also will be friendly
and possibly an ally. The attitude of Italy is however un-
certain, and it is especially important that your Squadron
should not be seriously engaged with Austrian ships before
238 THE WORLD CRISIS
we know what Italy will do. Your first task should be to
aid the French in the transportation of their African army by
covering and if possible bringing to action individual fast
German ships, particularly Goeben, which may interfere with
that transportation. You will be notified by telegraph when
you may consult with the French Admiral. Except in com-
bination with the French as part of a general battle, do not
at this stage be brought to action against superior forces.
The speed of your Squadrons is sufficient to enable you to
choose your moment. You must husband your force at
the outset and we shall hope later to reinforce the Mediter-
ranean.
These directions on which the First Sea Lord and I were
completely in accord, gave the Commander-in-Chief guidance
in the general conduct of the naval campaign; they warned
him against fighting a premature single-handed battle with
the Austrian Fleet in which our battle cruisers and cruisers
would be confronted with Austrian Dreadnought Battle-
ships; they told him to aid the French in transporting their
African forces, and they told him how to do it, viz., 'by cov-
ering and, if possible, bringing to action individual fast Ger-
man ships, particularly Goeben' So far as the English lan-
guage may serve as a vehicle of thought, the words employed
appear to express the intentions we had formed.
Sir Berkeley Milne accordingly replied on July 31 that he
would keep his forces concentrated in readiness to assist the
French Fleet to protect the transports, and he rightly left
our trade in the Eastern Mediterranean to shift for itself.
In this posture he awaited permission to consult with the
French Admiral. This permission could not be given him
till August 2 at 7.6 p.m., when I telegraphed as follows to
our Commanders-in-Chief all over the world: —
' Situation very critical. Be prepared to meet surprise at-
tacks. You can enter into communication with the French
Senior Officer on your station for combined action in case
THE MOBILISATION OF THE NAVY 239
Great Britain should decide to become ally of France against
Germany. '
Earlier that same day the following, initialled both by the
First Sea Lord and myself, was also sent to Sir Berkeley Milne
from the Admiralty: —
'Goeben must be shadowed by two battle-cruisers. Ap-
proaches to Adriatic must be watched by cruisers and de-
stroyers. Remain near Malta yourself. It is believed that
Italy will remain neutral, but you cannot yet count absolutely
on this/
At 12.50 a.m. on August 3, I emphasised the importance
of the Goeben compared with all other objectives by a further
telegram, which I' drafted myself, to Sir Berkeley Milne: —
'Watch on mouth of Adriatic should be maintained, but
Goeben is your objective. Follow her and shadow her wherever
she goes and be ready to act on declaration of war, which
appears probable and imminent.'
Early on the morning of August 4 we were delighted by the
following news from the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean,
to the Admiralty : —
'Indomitable, Indefatigable shadowing Goeben and Breslau
37*44 North 7*56 East/
We replied: —
'Very good. Hold her. War imminent.''
(This to go now.)
'Goeben is to be prevented by force from interfering with
French transports.'
(This to await early confirmation.)
I then sent the following minute to the Prime Minister
and Sir Edward Grey: —
240 THE WORLD CRISIS
Memorandum
(Most Urgent.)
Prime Minister.
Sir Edward Grey.
German battle-cruiser Goeben and fast light cruiser Breslau
have been found west of Sicily and are being shadowed by
British battle-cruisers Indomitable and Indefatigable. It
would be a great misfortune to lose these vessels as is possible
in the dark hours. She is evidently going to interfere with the
French transports which are crossing to-day.
The following telegram has already been sent : —
' Good. Hold her. War imminent.'
We wish to add this: —
* If Goeben attacks French transports you should at once en-
gage her.'
An immediate decision is required.
Sir Edward Grey agreed to this and so did the Prime Minis-
ter, but the latter asked that it should be mentioned to the
Cabinet, which was meeting almost immediately, for their
confirmation. On this I sent, before going to the Cabinet,
the following: —
'If Goeben attacks French transports you should at once
engage her. You should give her fair warning of this before-
hand.'
The Cabinet, however, adhered formally to the view that
no act of war should be committed by us before the expiration
of the ultimatum. The moral integrity of the British Empire
must not be compromised at this solemn moment for the sake
of sinking a single ship.
The Goeben of course did not attack the French transports.
In fact, though this we did not know at the time, she was
steaming away from the French transport routes when sighted
by the Indomitable and Indefatigable. Even if, however, she
had attacked transports, the decision of the British Cabinet
would have prevented our battle-cruisers from interfering.
THE MOBILISATION OF THE NAVY 241
This decision obviously carried with it the still more impera-
tive veto against opening fire on the Goeben, if she did not
attack French transports, during the hours when we had her
in our power. I cannot impeach the decision. It is right
that the world should know of it. But little did we imagine
how much this spirit of honourable restraint was to cost us
and all the world.
In consequence of the Cabinet decision, the First Sea Lord
sent by my directions the following telegram from the Ad-
miralty : —
Admiralty to all ships, August 4, 2.5 p.m.
The British ultimatum to Germany will expire at midnight
Greenwich Mean Time, August 4. No act of war should be
committed before that hour, at which time the telegram to
commence hostilities against Germany will be dispatched from
the Admiralty.
Special addition to Mediterranean, Indomitable, Indefati-
gable.
This cancels the authorisation to Indomitable and Inde-
fatigable to engage Goeben if she attacks French transports.
At about the same time I received the following minute
from the First Sea Lord: —
First Lord. August 4.
In view of the Italian declaration of neutrality, propose to
telegraph to Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, acquaint-
ing him and enjoining him to respect this rigidly and not to
allow a ship to come within six miles of the Italian coast.
B.
Considering how disastrous it would be if any petty inci-
dent occurred which could cause trouble at this fateful
moment with Italy and approving of the First Sea Lord's
precaution, I replied in writing: —
August 4.
So proceed. Foreign Office should intimate this to Italian
Government. W. S. C.
242 THE WORLD CRISIS
Thereupon at 12.55 P-m- the following telegram was sent
by the Admiralty to the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediter-
ranean:—
Italian Government have declared neutrality. You are to
respect this neutrality rigidly and should not allow any of His
Majesty's ships to come within six miles of Italian coast.
This certainly as it turned out was destined to complicate
the task of catching the Goeben; but not, as it will appear,
in a decisive manner.
During the afternoon I sent the following minute to the
Chief of the Staff and the First Sea Lord.
August 4, 1914.
I presume you have fully informed French Admiralty of our
intentions and that the closest co-operation has been estab-
lished at all points with the French Fleet. If not, this should
be done immediately. W. S. C.
On this the Chief of the Staff sent the following telegram
to all stations: 'You can enter into the closest co-operation
with the French officers on your station.'
Throughout this long summer afternoon three great ships,
hunted and hunters, were cleaving the clear waters of the
Mediterranean in tense and oppressive calm. At any mo-
ment the Goeben could have been smitten at under 10,000
yards range by sixteen 12-inch guns firing nearly treble her
own weight of metal. At the Admiralty we suffered the tor-
tures of Tantalus.
At about 5 o'clock Prince Louis observed that there was
still time to sink the Goeben before dark. In the face of
the Cabinet decision I was unable to utter a word. Noth-
ing less than the vital safety of Great Britain could have
justified so complete an overriding of the authority of the
Cabinet. We hoped to sink her the next day. Where could
she go? Pola seemed her only refuge throughout the Medi-
THE MOBILISATION OF THE NAVY 243
terranean. According to international law nothing but in-
ternment awaited her elsewhere. The Turks had kept their
secret well. As the shadows of night fell over the Mediter-
ranean the Goeben increased her speed to twenty-four knots,
which was the utmost that our two battle-cruisers could
steam. She increased her speed still further. We have since
learned that she was capable for a very short time of an
exceptional speed, rising even to twenty-six or twenty-seven
knots. Aided by this, she shook off her unwelcome com-
panions and vanished gradually in the gathering gloom.
We shall return to this story in due course.
At 5.50 p.m. we sent the following message: —
Admiralty to all ships.
General message. The war telegram will be issued at mid-
night authorising you to commence hostilities against Ger-
many, but in view of our ultimatum they may decide to open
fire at any moment. You must be ready for this.
Now, after all the stress and convulsion of the preceding
ten days, there came to us at the Admiralty a strange inter-
lude of calm. All the decisions had been taken. The ulti-
matum to Germany had gone: it must certainly be rejected.
War would be declared at midnight. As far as we had been
able to foresee the event, all our preparations were made.
Mobilisation was complete. Every ship was in its station:
every man at his post. All over the world, every British
captain and admiral was on guard. It only remained to
give the signal. What would happen then? It seemed that
the next move lay with the enemy. What would he do?
Had he some deadly surprise in store? Some awful design,
long planned and perfected, ready to explode upon us at any
moment NOW ? Would our ships in foreign waters have been
244 THE WORLD CRISIS
able to mark down their German antagonists ? If so, morning
would witness half a dozen cruiser actions in the outer seas.
Telegrams flowed in from the different naval stations round
our coasts reporting the movements of vessels and rumours
of sighting of enemies. Telegrams still flowed in from the
Chancelleries of Europe as the last futile appeals of reason
were overtaken by the cannonade. In the War Room of the
Admiralty, where I sat waiting, one could hear the clock tick.
From Parliament Street came the murmurs of the crowd;
but they sounded distant and the world seemed very still.
The tumult of the struggle for life was over: it was succeeded
by the silence of ruin and death. We were to awake in Pan-
demonium.
I had the odd sense that it was like waiting for an election
result. The turmoil of the contest seemed finished: the votes
were being counted, and in a few hours the announcement
would be made. One could only wait; but for what a result !
Although the special duties of my office made it imperative
that I, of all others, should be vigilant and forward in all that
related to preparation for war, I claim, as these pages show,
that in my subordinate station I had in these years before
the war done nothing wittingly or willingly to impair the
chances of a peaceable solution, and had tried my best as
opportunity offered to make good relations possible between
England and Germany. I thank God I could feel also in
that hour that our country was guiltless of all intended pur-
pose of war. Even if we had made some mistakes in the
handling of this awful crisis, though I do not know them, from
the bottom of our hearts we could say that we had not willed
it. Germany it seemed had rushed with head down and
settled resolve to her own undoing. And if this were what
she had meant all along, if this was the danger which had
really menaced us hour by hour during the last five years,
and would have hung over us hour by hour until the crash
eventually came, was it not better that it should happen
1HE MOBILISATION OF THE NAVY 245
now: now that she had put herself so hopelessly in the wrong,
now that we were ready beyond the reach of surprise, now
that France and Russia and Great Britain were all in the line
together ?
The First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Staff came in with
French Admirals who had hurried over to concert in detail
arrangements for the co-operation of the two Fleets in the
Channel and in the Mediterranean. They were fine figures
in uniform, and very grave. One felt in actual contact with
these French officers how truly the crisis was life or death
for France. They spoke of basing the French Fleet on Malta
— that same Malta for which we had fought Napoleon for so
many years, which was indeed the very pretext of the renewal
of the war in 1803. i Malta ou la guerre!1 Little did the Na-
poleon of St. Helena dream that in her most desperate need
France would have at her disposal the great Mediterranean
base which his strategic instinct had deemed vital. I said to
the Admirals, 'Use Malta as if it were Toulon/
The minutes passed slowly.
Once more now in the march of centuries Old England was
to stand forth in battle against the mightiest thrones and
dominations. Once more in defence of the liberties of Eu-
rope and the common right must she enter upon a voyage of
great toil and hazard across waters uncharted, towards coasts
unknown, guided only by the stars. Once more 'the far-off
line of storm-beaten ships' was to stand between the Conti-
nental Tyrant and the dominion of the world.
It was 11 o'clock at night — 12 by German time — when
the ultimatum expired. The windows of the Admiralty were
thrown wide open in the warm night air. Under the roof
from which Nelson had received his orders were gathered a
small group of Admirals and Captains and a cluster of clerks,
pencil in hand, waiting. Along the Mall from the direction
of the Palace the sound of an immense concourse singing
'God save the King' floated in. On this deep wave there
246 THE WORLD CRISIS
broke the chimes of Big Ben; and, as the first stroke of the
hour boomed out, a rustle of movement swept across the room.
The war telegram, which meant ' Commence hostilities against
Germany/ was flashed to the ships and establishments under
the White Ensign all over the world.
I walked across the Horse Guards' Parade to the Cabinet
room and reported to the Prime Minister and the Ministers
who were assembled there that the deed was done.
CHAPTER XI
WAR: THE PASSAGE OF THE ARMY
August 4- August 22 1 9 14
'The Time to visualise what will fall under the harrow of war is
before the harrow is set in motion. Afterwards comes in Inevitable-
ness with iron lips, and Fatalism with unscrutinising gaze, and Us
with filmed eyes, and Instinct with her cry, "Do not look too closely,
seeing one must keep one's senses !" '
Mary Johnston, ' Cease Firing/ Chapter XXIX.
British Strategy — The Great War Council, August 5 — Four Divisions
or Six — Changes in the Cabinet — Lord Kitchener: Secretary of
State for War — Organisation of the British Armies — Lord Kit-
chener's Task — The Royal Naval Division — Departure of the
German and Austrian Ambassadors — The Board of Admiralty in
War — Responsibilities of the First Lord — Procedure — The Ger-
man Method — Relative Naval Strength — The Prospects of Bat-
tle— British Command of the Sea — Paralysis of the German Mer-
cantile Marine — Frustration of the German Attack on Trade —
The Goeben at Messina on August 5 — Knowledge and Dispositions
of Sir Berkeley Milne — Orders to the Indomitable — The Southern
Exit — No Contact with the French — The Goeben and Breslau
leave Messina — Rear-Admiral Troubridge's Successive Decisions
— Second Escape of the Goeben — Explanations — A Sinister Fatal-
ity— Final Abandonment of the Pursuit — Transportation of the
British Army to France — Instructions to Sir John Jellicoe — Cov-
ering Movements of the Fleet — Safe Passage of the Army — The
Deadly Hush.
/TAHE entry of Great Britain into war with the most power-
■*■ ful military Empire which has ever existed was strategi-
cally impressive. Her large Fleets vanished into the mists
at one end of the island. Her small Army hurried out of the
country at the other. By this double gesture she might seem
to uninstructed eyes to divest herself of all her means of
defence, and to expose her coasts nakedly to the hostile thrust.
247
248 THE WORLD CRISIS
Yet these two movements, dictated by the truest strategy,
secured at once our own safety and the salvation of our Allies.
The Grand Fleet gained the station whence the control of the
seas could be irresistibly asserted. The Regular Army reached
in the nick of time the vital post on the flank of the French
line. Had all our action been upon this level, we should
to-day be living in an easier world.
The differences which had prevailed about entering the war
were aggravated by a strong cross-current of opinion, by no
means operative only in the Cabinet, that if we participated
it should be by naval action alone. Men of great power and
influence, who throughout the struggle laboured tirelessly and
rendered undoubted services, were found at this time reso-
lutely opposed to the landing of a single soldier on the Con-
tinent. And, if everything had not been prepared, if the
plan had not been perfected, if it had not been the only plan,
and if all military opinion had not been industriously mar-
shalled round it — who shall say what fatal hesitancy might
not have intervened?
On the afternoon of August 5 the Prime Minister convened
an extraordinary Council of War at Downing Street. I do
not remember any gathering like it. It consisted of the Min-
isters most prominently associated with the policy of our
entering the war, the chiefs of the Navy and the Army, all the
high military commanders, and in addition Lord Kitchener
and Lord Roberts. Decision was required upon the ques-
tion, How should we wage the war that had just begun?
Those who spoke for the War Office knew their own minds
and were united. The whole British Army should be sent at
once to France, according to what may justly be called the
Haldane Plan. Everything in that Minister's eight years'
tenure of the War Office had led up to this and had been sac-
rificed for this. To place an army of four or six divisions of
WAR: THE PASSAGE OF THE ARMY 249
infantry thoroughly equipped with their necessary cavalry on
the left of the French line within twelve or fourteen days of
the order to mobilise, and to guard the home island mean-
while by the fourteen Territorial Divisions he had organised,
was the scheme upon which, aided by Field-Marshals Nichol-
son and French, he had concentrated all his efforts and his
stinted resources. It was a simple plan, but it was a practi-
cal plan. It had been persistently pursued and laboriously
and minutely studied. It represented approximately the max-
imum war effort that the voluntary system would yield ap-
plied in the most effective and daring manner to the decisive
spot; and mobilisation schemes, railway graphics, time-tables,
the organisation of bases, depots, supply arrangements, etc.,
filling many volumes, regulated and ensured a thorough and
concerted execution. A commander whose whole life led up
to this moment had been chosen. All that remained to be
done was to take the decision and give the signal.
At this point I reported on behalf of the Admiralty that
our mobilisation being in every respect complete and all our
ships in their war stations, we would waive the claim we had
hitherto made in all the discussions of the Committee of Im-
perial Defence that two Regular Divisions should be retained
in Great Britain as a safeguard against invasion, and that so
far as the Admiralty was concerned, not four but the whole
. six divisions could go at once; that we would provide for their
transportation and for the security of the island in their ab-
sence. This considerable undertaking was made good by the
Royal Navy.
Discussion then turned upon the place to which they should
be dispatched. Lord Roberts inquired whether it was not
possible to base the British Army on Antwerp so as to strike,
in conjunction with the Belgian armies, at the flank and rear
of the invading German hosts. We were not able from an
Admiralty point of view to guarantee the sea communications
of so large a force on the enemy side of the Straits of Dover,
250 THE WORLD CRISIS
but only inside the Anglo-French flotilla cordon which had
already taken up its station. Moreover, no plans had been
worked out by the War Office for such a contingency. They
had concentrated all their thought upon integral co-operation
with the French left wherever it might be. It was that or
nothing.
Another discussion took place upon how far forward the
British Expeditionary Force should be concentrated. Some
high authorities, dwelling on the fact that the mobilisation of
the British army had begun three days later than the French,
were for concentrating it around Amiens for intervention
after the first shock of battle had been taken. But in the
end Sir John French and the forward school had their way
and it was felt that we must help France in the way the
French Staff thought would be most effective.
When I next went to the Cabinet after the declaration of
war, I found myself with new companions. During the previ-
ous seven years Lord Morley had always sat on the left of the
Prime Minister, and I had always sat next to Lord Morley.
Many a wise and witty admonition had I received pencilled in
scholarly phrase from my veteran neighbour, and many a
charming courtesy such as he excelled in had graced the toil-
some path of business. He had said to me on the Sunday of
Resolve, 'If it has to be, I am not the man to do it. I should
only hamper those like you who have to bear the burden.'
Now he was gone. In his place sat Lord Kitchener. On my
left also there was a fresh figure — the new Minister of Agricul-
ture, Lord Lucas. I had known him since South African
War days, when he lost his leg: and to know him was to de-
light in him. His open, gay, responsive nature, his witty,
ironical, but never unchivalrous tongue, his pleasing presence,
his compulsive smile, made him much courted by his friends,
of whom he had many and of whom I was one. Young for
WAR: THE PASSAGE OF THE ARMY 251
the Cabinet, heir to splendid possessions, happy in all that
surrounded him, he seemed to have captivated Fortune with
the rest.
Both these two men were marked for death at the hands of
the enemy, the young Minister grappling with his adversary
in the high air, the old Field Marshal choking in the icy sea.
I wonder what the twenty politicians round the table would
have felt if they had been told that the prosaic British Cabinet
was itself to be decimated in the war they had just declared.
I think they would have felt a sense of pride and of relief
in sharing to some extent the perils to which they were
to send their countrymen, their friends, their sons.
At the Council of War on August 5 Lord Kitchener had
not yet become Secretary of State for War, but I knew
that his appointment was impending. The Prime Minister,
then also Secretary of State for War, could not possibly be
burdened with the continuous flow of inter-departmental work
proceeding between the War Office and the Admiralty and
requiring to be transacted between Ministers. He therefore
invited Lord Kitchener to undertake ministerial charge of
the War Office, and the Field-Marshal, who had certainly not
sought this post in any way, had no choice but to accept.
My relations with Lord Kitchener had been limited. Our
first meeting had been on the field of Omdurman, when as a
lieutenant in the 21st Lancers I had been sent back to report
verbally to the Commander-in-Chief the position of the ad-
vancing Dervish Army. He had disapproved of me severely
in my youth, had endeavoured to prevent me from coming
to the Soudan Campaign, and was indignant that I had suc-
ceeded in getting there. It was a case of dislike before first
sight. On my side, I had dealt with his character and cam-
paigns in two bulky volumes conceived throughout in a faith-
ful spirit of critical impartiality. It was twelve years before
252 THE WORLD CRISIS
I saw him again, when we were formally introduced to each
other and had a brief talk at the Army Manoeuvres in 1910.
I got to know him a little at the Malta Conference in 191 2,
and thenceforward we used to talk over Imperial Defence
topics when from time to time we met. On these occasions
I had found him much more affable than I had been led to
expect from my early impressions or from all I had heard
about him. In the week before the war we had lunched and
dined together two or three times, and we had discussed all the
possibilities so far as we could foresee them. I was glad when
he was appointed Secretary of State for War, and in those
early days we worked together on close and cordial terms.
He consulted me constantly on the political aspects of his
work, and increasingly gave me his confidence in military
matters. Admiralty and War Office business were so inter-
laced that during the whole of the first ten months we were
in almost daily personal consultation. I cannot forget that
when I left the Admiralty in May, 191 5, the first and, with
one exception, the only one of my colleagues who paid me a
visit of ceremony was the over-burdened Titan whose dis-
approbation had been one of the disconcerting experiences
of my youth.
As is well known, the British armies on mobilisation con-
sisted of a highly organised expeditionary force of six Regular
Divisions of Infantry and a Cavalry Division. In addition
there were two Regular Infantry Divisions, the 7th and 8th,
which had to be collected from their garrisons all over the
Empire or formed out of troops surplus to the Expeditionary
Force at home; and it was decided also to employ two divisions,
half British and half native, from India. Behind these trained
forces, unquestionably of a very high order, stood fourteen
Territorial Divisions and thirteen Mounted Brigades to whom
the defence of Britain must be confided. These were little
WAR: THE PASSAGE OF THE ARMY 253
trained, lightly equipped with artillery, but composed of far-
sighted and intelligent men who had not waited for the hour
of danger to make their country's cause their own. In six
months or, as some thought, in a shorter period, such troops
could be made to play their part.
Lord Kitchener now came forward to the Cabinet, on almost
the first occasion after he joined us, and in soldierly sentences
proclaimed a series of inspiring and prophetic truths. Every
one expected that the war would be short; but wars took unex-
pected courses, and we must now prepare for a long struggle.
Such a conflict could not be ended on the sea or by sea power
alone. It could be ended only by great battles on the Conti-
nent. In these the British Empire must bear its part on a
scale proportionate to its magnitude and power. We must be
prepared to put armies of millions in the field and maintain
them for several years. In no other way could we discharge
our duty to our allies or to the world.
These words were received by the Cabinet in silent assent;
and it is my belief that had Lord Kitchener proceeded to de-
mand universal national service to be applied as it might be
required, his request would have been acceded to. He, how-
ever, proposed to content himself with calling for volunteers,
and in the first instance to form six new regular divisions. It
would have been far better to have formed the new volunteers
upon the cadres of the Territorial Army, each of which could
have been duplicated or quadruplicated in successive stages.
But the new Secretary of State had little knowledge of and no
faith in the British territorial system. The name itself was to
him a stumbling-block. In the war of 1870 he had been
present at a battle on the Loire, probably Le Mans, in which
the key of the position, confided to French territorial troops,
had been cast away, entailing the defeat of the whole army.
He dwelt on this incident to me on several occasions, and I
know it had created fixed impressions in his mind. Vain to
explain how entirely different were the characters of the troops
254 THE WORLD CRISIS
forming the French and British territorial forces — the former
aged conscripts in their last periods of service; the latter keen
and ardent youths of strong military predilections. They
were territorials, and that was the end of it.
This at the very outset aggravated the difficulties of his
already gigantic task. He set himself to create the cadres
first of six, then of twelve, and ultimately of twenty-four
1 Kitchener Army' divisions, at the same time that the recruits
were pouring in upon him by the hundred thousand. That
this vast feat of improvisation was accomplished must certainly
rank among the wonders of the time.
The arguments against compulsory service, cogent as they
no doubt were, were soon reinforced by the double event of
overwhelming numbers of volunteers and of a total lack of arms
and equipment. Apart from the exiguous stores held by the
Regular Army, there was literally nothing. The small scale of
our military forces had led to equally small factories for war
material. There were no rifles, there were no guns; and the
modest supplies of shells and ammunition began immediately
to flash away with what seemed appalling rapidity. Many
months must elapse, even if the best measures were taken,
before new sources of supply even on a moderate scale could
be opened up. One was now to learn for the first time that it
took longer to make a rifle than a gun; and rifles were the
cruellest need of all. We had nothing but staves to put in the
hands of the eager men who thronged the recruiting stations.
I ransacked the Fleet and the Admiralty stores and scraped
together another 30,000 rifles, which literally meant another
30,000 men in the field. Afloat only the Marines would have
their rifles; Jack must, in the last resort trust to his cutlass
as of old.
At the moment when Lord Kitchener began the formation
of his first six new army divisions and before the great rush of
recruits had begun, I offered him the Royal Naval Division,
which he gladly accepted. Before the war we had foreseen
WAR: THE PASSAGE OF THE ARMY 255
the fact that the Navy would on mobilisation have many
thousands of men in their depots for whom there would be no
room in any ship of war that we could send to sea. I had
therefore proposed to the Committee of Imperial Defence in
1913 the formation of three brigades, one composed of Marines
and the other two of men of the Royal Naval Volunteer Re-
serve and of the Royal Fleet Reserve. These brigades it was
intended to use to assist in home defence in the early stages of
a war. The cadres were therefore easily formed from the
available resources. The Marine Brigade was already virtu-
ally in existence, and it was clear that all three would be ready
for action long before any of the new troops that were being
raised. The Naval Volunteers, who longed to serve afloat,
accepted the new task with many heartburnings but with
boundless loyalty. Alas, for most of them it proved a fateful
decision. Few there were of that gallant company that sur-
vived unscathed. As for their deeds, they will not be for-
gotten in the history even of these crowded times.1
It fell to my lot to prescribe the arrangements for the de-
parture of the German Ambassador and, eight days later, of
his Austrian Colleague. Accordingly on the morning of
August 5 I sent my Naval Secretary Admiral Hood in uniform
to the German Embassy desiring to know in what manner
we might facilitate Prince Lichnowsky's wishes and conve-
nience. While the German mob were insulting and even pelt-
ing the departing French and British Ambassadors, we set
ourselves to work with meticulous care to secure the obser-
vance of every propriety and courtesy towards those for whom
we were responsible. Prince Lichnowsky has given his own
record of his ceremonious treatment, which appeared to make
a marked impression upon his mind.
1The minute constituting the Division is printed in Appendix A.
256 THE WORLD CRISIS
To Count Mensdorf, the Austrian Ambassador, I wrote as
follows: —
August 13, 1914.
'My Naval Secretary Admiral Hood, who brings this let-
ter, is instructed to put himself at your disposal in arranging
for the comfort and convenience of your journey by sea. If
there is any way in which I can be of service to you at this
time, you will not I hope fail to command me.
Although the terrible march of events has swept aside the
ancient friendship between our countries, the respect and re-
gard which spring from so many years of personal association
cannot pass from the hearts of your English friends.'
The Austrian Ambassador asked that a ship might be pro-
vided to take him direct to Trieste, and that consideration
might be shown to a number of unhappy Austrian non-com-
batants long resident in London who now had to fly the
country. I therefore arranged that upwards of 200 persons
should embark in the Ambassador's ship. I felt sure that in
taking these measures I was acting in accord with what Brit-
ish dignity required.
The position of the Admiralty in relation to the Fleet, and
of the First Lord in relation to his naval colleagues under
conditions of war requires explanation. The control of the
main armies was divided between the War Office and General
Headquarters, but in the Admiralty these functions were in-
evitably combined to a far larger extent. The Naval Com-
mander-in-Chief, living with his actual fighting Fleet and al-
ways ready at a few hours' notice to lead it personally into
full battle, stood much nearer to the event than his military
counterpart. The staff which he could accommodate upon
his flagship, the volume of business which he could transact,
were necessarily limited by physical conditions. Everything
must be ready to move at the shortest notice into extreme
WAR: THE PASSAGE OF THE ARMY 257
danger, and Staff, office, organisation, Commander-in-Chief,
might vanish out of existence in an instant. The first duty
of the Commander-in-Chief was to keep his mind and body
fit for the supreme task of personally commanding the mighty
array of ships when in contact with the enemy. The vigilant
guarding of the Fleet from danger, its training for battle, its
organisation, its efficiency and the direct personal conduct of
individual operations were all concentrated in one man. But
this was enough. It was the duty of the Admiralty so far as
possible to shield him from all further responsibilities or
anxieties, to lap him round with securities and assistance
and to bear all other parts of the great load of war them-
selves.
The Admiralty itself was also in direct contact with the
event. It not only exercised administrative control over the
Navy and over the whole of the preparations for strengthening
and developing the Fleet; it not only determined the strategic
distribution of our naval power in every theatre; but from
its wireless masts or by cable it issued information often of a
vital character to ships in many instances actually in contact
with the enemy. It was the only place from which the supreme
view of the naval scene could be obtained. It was the intelli-
gence centre where all information was received, where alone
it could be digested, and whence it was transmitted wherever
required. It moved the fleets, squadrons and flotillas out of
harbour when information pointed to enemy's activities being
probable. It specified the minimum forces which should be
employed in any operation, while leaving the Commander-in-
Chief free to add to them at his discretion. Apart from actual
battle or the tactical conduct of particular operations, in
which the Admiralty never interfered, it decided every im-
portant question arising out of the conduct of the naval war.
Robed in the august authority of centuries of naval tradition
and armed with the fullest knowledge available, the Board
of Admiralty wielded unchallenged power.
258 THE WORLD CRISIS
As these conditions arose naturally and inevitably and will
certainly be reproduced in one form or another should there
be a future war, it is of high importance to pierce beneath the
corporate responsibility of this organism and lay bare how the
machine actually worked. In practice it resolved itself, and
could only resolve itself, into the intimate comradeship and
co-operation of the First Lord and the First Sea Lord, with
the Chief of the Staff, not at this time a member of the Board,
standing at their side. By the Letters Patent and Orders in
Council constituting his office, the First Lord is responsible \
to Crown and Parliament for all the business of the Admi-
ralty. In virtue of this he delegates to an eminent sailor the
responsibility for its technical and professional conduct. But
he cannot thus relieve himself either in theory or in fact. He
is held strictly accountable for all that takes place; for every
disaster he must bear the blame. The credit of victories
rightly goes to the commanders who gain them; the burden
of defeat or miscarriage must be shouldered by the Admi-
ralty, and the censures of the nation fall primarily upon its
Head.
How then is a civilian Minister appointed for political or
parliamentary reasons and devoid of authoritative expert
knowledge, to acquit himself of his duty ? Clearly it depends
upon the character, temperament and capacity both of the
First Lord and the First Sea Lord. They must settle it be-
tween themselves, and if they cannot agree wholeheartedly on
the momentous problems with which they are confronted in
swift succession, another combination must be chosen by the
Sovereign on the advice of the Prime Minister. I interpreted
my duty in the following way: — I accepted full responsibility
for bringing about successful results, and in that spirit I exer-
cised a close general supervision over everything that was done
or proposed. Further, I claimed and exercised an unlimited
power of suggestion and initiative over the whole field, subject
only to the approval and agreement of the First Sea Lord on
WAR: THE PASSAGE OF THE ARMY 259
all operative orders. Right or wrong, that is what I did, and
it is on that basis that I wish to be judged.
In practice the difficulties were less than would be imagined.
Indeed, over long periods of unending crisis and tension the
machine worked very smoothly. The Second, Third and
Fourth Sea Lords dropped back upon the outbreak of war into
the positions the ' Supply Boards' had occupied in the great
naval wars of the past. They were the providers of men, of
ships and of stores. They took no part, or only a very occa-
sional part, in strategic decisions. It was the responsibility
of the First Sea Lord to keep the Second Sea Lord fully in-
formed of what was in progress in order that the latter could
replace him temporarily at a moment's notice. In practice,
however, both Prince Louis and Lord Fisher worked more
closely with the Chief of the Staff, and these two presented
themselves to me always in full accord.
The constitutional authority of the Board of Admiralty was
exercised at that time in accordance with long custom by two
Members of the Board, sitting together with the Secretary of
the Admiralty. Thus the Admiralty War Group at the begin-
ning of the struggle consisted of the First Lord, the First Sea
Lord, the Chief of the Staff and the Secretary. To these were
added, when the First Sea Lord wished and on particular occa-
sions, the Second Sea Lord and certain special advisers, of
whom more anon. We met every day and sometimes twice a
day, reviewed the whole position and arrived at a united deci-
sion on every matter of consequence. The execution was con-
fided to the Chief of the Staff. The Secretary registered, re-
corded, and, apart from the orders given by the War Staff, took
the consequential action. Besides our regular meetings the
First Sea Lord and I consulted together constantly at all hours.
Within the limits of our agreed policy either he or I gave in
writing authority for telegrams and decisions which the Chief
of the Staff might from hour to hour require. Moreover, it
happened in a large number of cases that seeing what ought
260 THE WORLD CRISIS
to be done and confident of the agreement of the First Sea
Lord, I myself drafted the telegrams and decisions in accor-
dance with our policy, and the Chief of the Staff took them
personally to the First Sea Lord for his concurrence before
dispatch. In addition to these urgent executive matters, the
regular flow of Admiralty papers passed upwards from the
First Sea Lord or other Lords to me for decision by minute;
and I further, by minutes and memoranda, initiated discussion
and action over the whole area of naval business.
The advantages and disadvantages of these methods must
be judged by their general results; but it is instructive to com-
pare them with those which we now know prevailed at the
German Admiralty. On the outbreak of war, the Naval
Secretary of State von Tirpitz, himself an admiral, found him-
self cut off entirely from the strategical and quasi-tactical
control of the fleets, to such an extent that he declares 'he
did not know the naval war plans.' He was confined to purely
administrative business, and thus charged, he was carried off
as an adjunct to the Emperor's suite at Great Headquarters.
The Naval Staff, headed in the first instance by von Pohl,
alone had the ear of the Emperor and received from the lips
of the All-Highest indications of his Imperial pleasure. The
position of Admiral von Tirpitz was therefore most unhappy.
The Naval Staff warded him off the Emperor as much as possi-
ble, and persuaded the Emperor to repulse his efforts to break
in. The Emperor, oppressed with the whole burden of the
State, gave to the Staff from time to time directions and uttered
passing expressions which thereafter operated with irresistible
authority. It is to this state of affairs that Admiral von
Tirpitz ascribes the paralysis which gripped the German Fleet
through the first critical months of the naval war. This it
was, according to him, that lost the opportunity of fighting
the supreme battle under the least unfavourable conditions,
enabled the control of the seas to pass into our hands prac-
tically without a struggle, and secured the uninterrupted
WAR: THE PASSAGE OF THE ARMY 261
transport of our armies to the Continent. If our solution
of the difficult problem of naval war direction was imper-
fect, so also was that of our enemy.
A study of the tables and diagrams set out in the Appen-
dix1 shows that our known margin of superiority in Home
Waters was smaller then than at any subsequent moment
in the war. The Grand Fleet as concentrated in its North-
ern war station on August 1, 1914, comprised 24 vessels
classified as ' Dreadnoughts' or better. In addition the battle
cruiser Invincible was at Queenstown watching the Atlantic,
the two Lord Nelsons were with the Channel Fleet, and three
battle cruisers were in the Mediterranean. The Germans
actually mobilised 16 ships similarly classed.2 We could
not be absolutely certain, though we thought it unlikely,
that they might not have ready two, or even three, more;
and these of the greatest power. Happily, every British
ship was ready and in perfect order. None was under repair.
Our strength for an immediate fleet action was 24 to a certain
16 and a possible 19. These figures do not, as the tables in
the Appendix reveal, do justice to the full material strength
of the British Fleets as a whole, still less to the gun-power
of the British Line of Battle, which after the Dreadnoughts
comprised eight King Edwards markedly superior to the next
eight Germans. But apart from all that may be said on this,
and of the confidence which it inspired, the fact remains that
from five to eight Dreadnoughts was all the certain numerical
superiority we had. There was not much margin here for
mischance, nor for the percentage of mechanical defects
which in so large a Fleet has to be expected, and no margin
whatever for a disaster occasioned by surprise had we been
unready. To a superficial observer who from the cliffs of
Dover or Portland had looked down upon a Battle Squadron
Appendix B. 2 Admiral Scheer, p. 13.
262 THE WORLD CRISIS
of six or seven ships, lying in distant miniature below, the
foundation upon which the British world floated would have
presented itself in a painfully definite form. If the intelli-
gence and courage of British seamen were not all that we be-
lieved them to be; if the workmanship which had built these
great vessels were not honest and thorough; if our seaman-
ship or our gunnery had turned out to be inferior; if some
ghastly novelty or blunder supervened, the battle might be
very even.
It is easy to understand how tense were the British naval
expectations. If the German Navy was ever to fight a bat-
tle, now at the beginning was its best chance. The German
Admiralty knew, of course, what ships we had available, and
that we were mobilised, concentrated and at sea. Even if
they assumed the extraordinary fact that every one of our
Dreadnoughts was ready and that not one of them had de-
veloped a defect, they could fight to German eyes a battle
1 6 against a maximum 27 — heavy odds from their point of
view, still heavier when the survey was extended to the whole
of the Fleets, but yet odds far less heavy than they would
have to face after six months, after twelve months or at any
later period. For look at the reinforcements which were
approaching these two opposing Fleets. They must assume
that, in addition to completing our own vessels, we should
requisition every battleship building for a foreign Power in
our yards, and on this basis seven great ships must join the
Grand Fleet within three months, and twelve great ships
within six months, against which only three in three months
and five in six months could be reckoned on their side, leaving
the balance in three months at 34 to 19 and in six months at
39 to 21; and this took, no account of three battle-cruisers in
the Mediterranean and one (Australia) in the Pacific which
obviously we could bring home if necessary.
Here then, was the least unfavourable moment for Germany;
here was the best chance they would ever see. Was it not also
WAR: THE PASSAGE OF THE ARMY 263
the strategic moment? Might they not assume that the
transportation of the British Army to France would be a
grave preoccupation for the Admiralty? Was it not clear
that a victory, even a partial victory, would be more fruitful
at this juncture than at any other? Forty- two fast German
merchant cruisers needed only a breathing space to get loose
and to arm upon the seas, requiring afterwards to be hunted
down one by one. Might not above all the interruption and
delay in the transportation of the Army be of real effect in
the supreme trial of strength on land? The German Staff
believed in a short war. They were staking everything upon
a supreme trial of strength on land. Why should not the
German Fleet be hurled in too and play its part for what it
was worth in the supreme decision? To what other use
could it ever be put?
We therefore looked for open battle on the sea. We ex-
pected it and we courted it. The news that the two Navies
were approaching each other to take a decision in blue water
would have been received in the Fleet with unaffected satisfac-
tion, and at the Admiralty with composure. We could not send
our Grand Fleet into the minefields and submarine-infested
areas of the Heligoland Bight. But had battle been offered
by the enemy under any conditions which did not put us at a
serious disadvantage, it would have been at once accepted.
In fact, however, the sober confidence of the Admiralty
was based upon calculations of relative naval strength, the
soundness of which was not disputed by the German Naval
Staff. Even von Tirpitz, the advocate of action, writes (p.
356): ' Against an immediate fight was the fact that the whole
English Fleet was ready for battle when the war broke out
owing to the test mobilisation, whereas only our active squad-
rons were ready/ ' Great Britain,' says the Official German
Naval History, '. . . had secured extensive military advan-
tages by her test mobilisation and her subsequent measures,
regardless of the uneasiness necessarily provoked thereby . . .
264 THE WORLD CRISIS
which advantage Germany could not counter or overtake.'
The German Staff felt that even if this was the best chance
for a trial of strength, it was still a chance so hazardous
and even so forlorn that it was not worth taking; and their
Battle Fleet remained hoarded up in harbour for an ignomini-
ous day, imposing upon the British, no doubt, a continued and
serious expenditure of our resources for naval purposes, gain-
ing for Germany substantial advantages of a secondary char-
acter, but not exercising any decisive influence upon the whole
course of the war.
So we waited; and nothing happened. No great event
immediately occurred. No battle was fought. The Grand
Fleet remained at sea: the German Fleet did not quit the shelter
of its harbours. There were no cruiser actions. A German
minelayer sowing a minefield off Harwich was chased and sunk
by a flotilla of destroyers led by the Amphion; and the Am-
phion returning, was blown up on the German minefield. Other-
wise silence unbroken by cannon brooded over the broad and
narrow waters. But during that silence and from its first
moment the sea-power of Great Britain ruled unchallenged
throughout the world. Every German cruiser in foreign waters
vanished into the immense spaces of the sea; every German
merchant ship, from the earliest moment when the entry of
Britain into the war became apparent, fled for neutral har-
bours. Seven out of eight, potential commerce destroyers,
were bottled up without ever a shot being fired. German sea-
borne trade outside the Baltic ceased to exist from the night
of August 4. On the other hand, after a few days of hesita-
tion the swarming mercantile marine of Britain, enocuraged
by a Government insurance of no more than six per cent., be-
gan to put to sea; and even before the main armies had met
in battle on the Continent, the whole vast ocean traffic of the
British Empire was proceeding with the utmost activity. By
the end of August the rate of insurance had already fallen to
six per cent, and the Admiralty was able to announce that of
WAR: THE PASSAGE OF THE ARMY 265
the forty- two German liners from whom attacks on trade
were to be apprehended, eleven were tied up unarmed in
harbours of the United States watched outside territorial
limits by British cruisers, six had taken refuge in other neutral
harbours, where they were either dismantled or observed,
fourteen were in German ports gripped by the blockade, six
were held as prizes in British hands, and only five remained
unaccounted for and unlocated. The fate of these five will
be recounted later.
All fell out in these respects, therefore, in broad accordance
with the views set forth in my memorandum on commerce
protection of August 23, 19 13, revised in April, 1914, which
is printed in full in the Appendix for the benefit of the thor-
ough.1 None of those gloomy prophecies which had formed
the staple of so many debates and articles, that our merchant
ships would be hunted from the seas by German raiders, that
scores of additional British cruisers would be required for
commerce protection, that British merchant ships once safe
in harbour would not venture to sea, materialised; and they
might be relegated to the limbo of exploded alarms. The
three great naval dangers which had bulked most largely in
our mkids in the years before the war — first, the danger of
surprise of the Fleet; second, the Mine danger; third, the pa-
ralysis of our seaborne trade — rolled away behind us like giant
waves which a ship has finally surmounted.
More than a hundred years had passed since the British
Navy had been called upon to face an emergency of the first
magnitude. If a hundred years hence, in similar circum-
stances, it is found equally ready, we shall have no more
reason to complain of our descendants than they have reason
to complain of us.
* * * * *
It is time to return to the Mediterranean.
Admiral Souchon, the German Commander, having outdis-
1 Appendix C. I hope it may be read. — W. S. C.
266 THE WORLD CRISIS
tanced our shadowing cruisers in the darkness of the night,
pursued his course to Messina, where he arrived with the
Goeben and Breslau on the morning of August 5. He had
already received, as we now know, a telegram sent from Nauen
at 1.35 a.m. on the preceding day by the German Admiralty.
This message gave him all-important information. It stated
that an alliance had been concluded between Germany and
Turkey, and directed him to proceed to Constantinople im-
mediately. Of this treaty we knew nothing. All our reports
were of an entirely different tenor; nor was it till long after-
wards that we learnt the true attitude of Turkey at this hour.
On arrival at Messina the Goeben and Breslau began to
coal from German colliers. This occupied the whole of the
day, the whole of the night and the greater part of the next
day, the 6th. Exactly thirty-six hours elapsed before the
Goeben moyed. Meanwhile the light cruiser Gloucester,
watching off the Southern exit of the Straits of Messina, re-
ported at 3.35 p.m. on August 5 to Sir Berkeley Milne that
the strength of the wireless signals she was taking in indicated
that the Goeben must be at Messina.
The British Commander-in-Chief had left the Malta Chan-
nel in his flagship the Inflexible after midnight of August 4,
and at about 11 a.m. on August 5 he had assembled all his
three battle cruisers and two light cruisers off Pantellaria isl-
and, midway between Sicily and the African coast.2 Accord-
ing to his own published account3 he had learned on the 4th
that the German mail steamer General was remaining at
Messina at the disposition of the Goeben. He therefore be-
lieved throughout the whole of the 5th that 'the Goeben,
Breslau and General were all at Messina. ' His belief was
correct.
One of his battle cruisers, the Indomitable, had to coal.
He sent her to Biserta. This was an important decision.
2 See map to face p. 274.
3 The Flight of the Goeben, Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne.
WAR: THE PASSAGE OF THE ARMY 267
Considering that he believed that the Goeben was at Messina,
and that he intended himself to watch to the Northward with
two battle cruisers, some authorities have held that it would
have been a sensible precaution to let this third ship coal at
Malta, where facilities were certain and instant, and whence
she could so easily move to close the Southern exit from Mes-
sina, or join Rear-Admiral Troubridge in the mouth of the
Adriatic, as that officer had been led to expect.1 By sending
the Indomitable to coal at Malta, he could have placed two
battle cruisers watching the Northern exit and one at the
Southern. But the Commander-in-Chief decided to keep all
three battle cruisers together in his own hand and to patrol
off the Western end of Sicily between Sardinia and Biserta.
The Southern exit was therefore left completely open to the
Goeben: and a severe action was reserved for Rear- Admiral
Troubridge if, as seemed likely, she ran up the Adriatic.
At 5 p.m. on the 5th Sir Berkeley Milne received the signal
sent by the Gloucester at 3.35 p.m. reporting the presence of
the Goeben at Messina. Here was certain confirmation of his
belief. He was at this moment about 100 miles West of Sicily.
He continued however to cruise with his two ships between
Sicily and Sardinia, and as late as the evening of August 6,
his orders to the Indomitable were still to join him thereabouts.
He did this because he considered that placing all three battle
cruisers in this position was his surest way of carrying out the
instructions of the Admiralty telegram of July 30 about aid-
ing the French in the transport of their African army. That
it was one method of carrying out these orders cannot be
disputed, and the Admiral has set out in his book the reasons
which led him to adopt it. The superior speed of the Goeben
made it necessary, he states, if he were to intercept her, that
he should stand a long way off and have timely notice of her
approach. To place his whole force in this way between her
and the French transports was, he argues, the best chance of
1 See Official Naval History, pp. 60, 61/
268 THE WORLD CRISIS
catching the Goeben if she tried to attack them. He reported
his intended dispositions late on the 4th to the Admiralty,
whose only comment upon them was, ' Watch over the Adri-
atic should be maintained for the double purpose of prevent-
ing the Austrians from coming out or the Germans from en-
tering.' The exceedingly prompt manner in which the Goeben
had been found, although in the open sea, on the 4th had
given the Admiralty the feeling that the Admiral on the spot
had a grip of the situation and needed no further directions.
Sir Berkeley Milne had not, however, succeeded in com-
municating with the French Admiral, although he had made
repeated attempts by wireless and had sent the Dublin to
Biserta with a letter. He did not know where the French
Fleet or the French transports were. He did not tell the Ad-
miralty this. The Admiralty for their part, after the general
telegram of August 4 enjoining immediate consultation with
the French, assumed that the two Commanders-in-Chief in
the Mediterranean were acting in concert. They did not
therefore ask the French for any information, nor was any
volunteered by the French Admiralty. Any inquiry addressed
to Paris would have elicited the fact that the French had
changed their plans and that no transports were yet at sea.
All parties were on this point to some extent in fault.
Meanwhile the British Ambassador in Rome was endeav-
ouring to tell the Admiralty as soon as the pressure on the
wires allowed that the Goeben was at Messina. The news
did not reach London till 6 p.m. on August 5. The Admi-
ralty passed it without comment, though with some delay, to
Sir Berkeley Milne, who already knew from other sources.
It is a fair criticism on the Admiralty that they did not im-
mediately they knew the Goeben was at Messina authorise
the British ships to follow her into the Straits. The point
was not put to me either by the First Sea Lord or the Chief
of the Staff, and as I had not myself been concerned in initi-
ating or drafting the telegram about rigidly respecting Italian
WAR: THE PASSAGE OF THE ARMY 269
neutrality, it was not specially in my mind. Had it been put
to me I should at once have consented. This was no petty
incident and the prize was well worth the risk of vexing the
Italians. In fact, permission to chase through the Straits was
given by the Admiralty unasked to Sir Berkeley Milne, as
soon as it was realised that the Goeben was escaping unblocked
to the Southward. It was then too late.
In pursuance of the orders he had received from Germany,
Admiral Souchon with the Goeben and Breslau, having at
length completed coaling and made his will, steamed out of
Messina harbour at 5 p.m. on August 6, cleared for action and
with his bands playing. He no doubt expected to encounter
at least one and possibly two of the British battle cruisers as
soon as he was outside territorial waters. In view of the fact
that, as he was aware, his position must have been accurately
known to the British Commander-in-Chief for many hours,
this assumption was not unreasonable. Unhappily, as has
been described, every one of the three British battle cruisers
was otherwise engaged. Thus when the German Admiral
rounded the Southern point of Italy and turned Eastward,
the only three antagonists whose combination of power and
speed he had to dread were already far astern.
Still there was the British armoured cruiser squadron watch-
ing the Adriatic. This squadron consisted of four good ships,
viz. Defence, Warrior, Duke of Edinburgh and Black Prince.
It was commanded by Rear-Admiral Troubridge, who had
also under his orders eight destroyers, and was being joined
by the light cruiser Dublin and two more destroyers from
Malta. It is necessary to restate the facts of this officer's
action.
On the assumption — which was dominant — that the Goeben
would make for Pola, Admiral Troubridge was well placed for
meeting her. It was not until he heard from the Gloucester
that she had turned South and was persistently steering on a
South-Easterly course that any new decision was required
270 THE WORLD CRISIS
from him. He received no orders to quit his station from Sir
Berkeley Milne. He was in constant hope of receiving a
battle cruiser. But Admiral Troubridge decided to act on
his own responsibility. Eight minutes after midnight of
August 6 (i.e. 0.08, August 7) he gave orders to his four
cruisers and his eight destroyers to steam Southward at full
speed for the purpose of intercepting the Goeben. He also
signalled to the Dublin (Captain John Kelly) at that moment
coming from Malta to join him with the two extra destroyers,
to head her off. He reported his decision to the Commander-
in-Chief. Thus at midnight August 6-7 sixteen British ves-
sels were converging upon the Goeben and Breslau and were
in positions from which they could hardly fail to intercept
the enemy shortly after daylight. At 3.50 a.m., however, after
further reflection and having received no orders or reply from
Sir Berkeley Milne, Admiral Troubridge became convinced
that he could not hope to engage the Goeben under the ad-
vantageous conditions of the half light of dawn, and that in
an action fought in broad waters in full daylight, his four
ships would be sunk one after another by the Goeben, who all
the time would keep outside the range — 16,000 yards — of the
British 9.2-inch guns. This is thought by some naval officers
to be an extreme view. The limited ammunition of the
Goeben would have had to have been wonderfully employed
to have sunk all four British armoured cruisers seriatim at
this long range.1 Moreover, if the Goeben and Breslau had
become involved in an action, it is hard to believe that none
of the sixteen British cruisers and destroyers which were
available could have closed in upon them and attacked them
with gun or torpedo. All the destroyers were capable of reach-
ing the enemy and could have found their opportunity to at-
1 At the Falklands the two British battle cruisers used up nearly
three-quarters of their ammunition to sink only two weaker antago-
nists, using 12-inch guns against 8'8-inch. The Goeben single-handed
would have had to have sunk four, using 11 -inch guns against 9' 2-inch.
WAR: THE PASSAGE OF THE ARMY 271
tack. It would have been indeed a prodigious feat on the
part of the Germans to dispose of so many antagonists at once.
However, the Admiral came to the conclusion that the Goeben
was 'a superior force ' which by his instructions, passed to
him by the Commander-in-Chief, he was not to engage. And
in this conclusion he has been sustained by a British naval
court-martial.
He thereupon desisted from his attempt to intercept the
Goeben, turned his ships and destroyers and entered the har-
bour of Zante about 10 a.m. preparatory to resuming his
watch in the Adriatic. The Dublin and her two destroyers
having asked and been refused permission to make a day-
light attack, had attempted to intercept the Goeben before
dawn, but did not succeed in finding her in the darkness.
By 6 o'clock therefore on the morning of August 7 the
Goeben, already the fastest capital unit in the Mediterranean,
was steaming on an unobstructed course for the Dardanelles,
carrying with her for the peoples of the East and Middle East
more slaughter, more misery and more ruin than has ever
before been borne within the compass of a ship.
Thus of all the British vessels which were or could have
been brought within effective distance, none did anything
useful excepting only the two light cruisers Dublin and
Gloucester, commanded, as it happened, by two brothers.
The Dublin (Captain John Kelly) as we have seen did all in
her power to place herself athwart the enemy's course and to
fight him by night or day; and the Gloucester (Captain W. A.
Howard Kelly) hung on to the heels of the Goeben till late in
the afternoon, in extreme danger and with the utmost tenac-
ity, and only relinquished the chase under the direct orders
of the Commander-in-Chief.
Various explanations have been offered for the failure to
bring the Goeben to action after the declaration of war, and
every telegram sent by the Admiralty was searched to find
phrases which could justify or palliate what had occurred.
272 THE WORLD CRISIS
For instance, it was pleaded that the sentence in the Admi-
ralty telegram to the Commander-in-Chief of July 30, 'Do
not at this stage be brought to action against superior forces
except in combination with the French as part of a general
battle/ justified Admiral Troubridge in refraining from at-
tacking the Goeben with his four armoured cruisers. On this
it may be observed that this sentence is clearly shown by the
context to refer to the Austrian Fleet against whose battle-
ships it was not desirable that our three battle cruisers should
be engaged without battleship support. Secondly it was con-
tained in a telegram giving the Commander-in-Chief general
directions for the strategic conduct of the naval campaign in
the Mediterranean. It was not intended by the Admiralty
to govern tactical action. The words, however, acquired a
more particular significance when they were repeated — as
they were — by the Commander-in-Chief to his subordinate
Admiral Troubridge. But even so it ought not to have been
treated as a veto upon British ships ever engaging superior
forces however needful the occasion. This was an unreason-
able reading of the Admiralty instructions. On such a read-
ing both the Gloucester and the Dublin were guilty of dis-
obedience. On such a reading, pedantically construed, no
individual British ship in the Mediterranean would have been
allowed to fight a vessel stronger by a single gun. Nobody
ever honestly supposed that such doctrines were being laid
down by the Admiralty. Moreover, the self-same telegram
specifically emphasised the importance of bringing the Goeben
to action and singled out that vessel particularly among all
the hostile forces in the Mediterranean. No such conception
of his duty was taken by either of the Captains Kelly. Nor
was it the view of Sir Berkeley Milne himself; for he disap-
proved strongly of Admiral Troubridge's abandonment of the
chase.
Again it has been urged that the sentence, 'Your first task
should be to aid the French in the transportation of their
WAR: THE PASSAGE OF THE ARMY 273
African army/ imposed upon Sir Berkeley Milne the duty of
placing all three of his battle cruisers west of Sicily. Thus
wrested from their context and from the whole series of Ad-
miralty telegrams, these directions have been made to serve
as an explanation. Against them must be read the full text.
On July 30, 'Your first task should be to aid the French in the
transportation of their African army by covering and if possi-
ble bringing to action individual fast German ships, particu-
larly "Goeben." ' * And again, on August 2, 'Goeben must be
shadowed by two battle cruisers.' And again on August 3,
'Goeben is your objective. Follow her and shadow her wher-
ever she goes, and be ready to act on declaration of war, which
appears probable and imminent.' And again on August 4,
'Good. Hold her. War imminent.'
Certainly if the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean
had in reliance upon these dominant and reiterated instruc-
tions managed to put one battle cruiser each side of the
Straits of Messina, instead of all on one side, and if in conse-
quence he had brought the Goeben to action, as would have
been inevitable, and if he had thus protected the French
transports in the most effectual manner by fighting the
Goeben, no one could have found fault with him on the score
that he had exceeded his orders.
The reader is now in a position to form his own judgment
on this affair. I have indicated plainly the point on which
the Admiralty was in fault, namely, in not spontaneously
lifting the prohibition to enter Italian waters the moment we
learned the Goeben was at Messina. The conduct of Rear-
Admiral Troubridge was subsequently investigated by a
Court of Inquiry composed of the three Commanders-in-Chief
of Portsmouth, Devonport and Chatham. As the result of
their report, he was tried by court-martial at Portland in
September and honourably acquitted of all blame. His
career in the Navy was, however, at an end, the general feel-
1The italics are mine. — W. S. C.
274 THE WORLD CRISIS
ing of the Service not accepting the view that the four ar-
moured cruisers and other vessels at his disposal ought not
to have fought the Goeben. In view of his acquittal he was
appointed to take charge of the naval guns which we sent
with a mission to Serbia. In this capacity his work was dis-
tinguished and successful. He gained the confidence and re-
spect of the Serbians and their Government, and he proved on
numerous occasions that whatever might be thought of his
reasons for not attacking the Goeben, want of personal courage
was not among them.
After studying the reports of Sir Berkeley Milne and other
officers concerned, the First Sea Lord recorded the opinion
that Admiral Milne had taken the best measures with the
force at his disposal, that his dispositions were the proper
ones, and that they were successful inasmuch as they pre-
vented the Germans from carrying out their primary role
of interrupting French troops crossing from Africa. On this
I find that my sole comment was (August 27): 'The explana-
tion is satisfactory; the result unsatisfactory/ Thereafter on
August 30, 1914, the Admiralty issued a statement that:
'The conduct and dispositions of Sir Berkeley Milne in re-
gard to the German vessels Goeben and Breslau have been the
subject of the careful examination of the Board of Admiralty
with the result that their Lordships have approved the mea-
sures taken by him in all respects.'
In all this story of the escape of the Goeben one seems to
see the influence of that sinister fatality which at a later stage
and on a far larger scale was to dog the enterprise against
the Dardanelles. The terrible 'Ifs' accumulate. If my first
thoughts on July 27 of sending the New Zealand to the Medi-
terranean had materialised; if we could have opened fire on
the Goeben during the afternoon of August 4; if we had been
less solicitous for Italian neutrality; if Sir Berkeley Milne had
sent the Indomitable to coal at Malta instead of Biserta; if
the Admiralty had sent him direct instructions when on the
WAR: THE PASSAGE OF THE ARMY 275
night of the 5th they learned where the Goeben was; if Rear-
Admiral Troubridge in the small hours of August 7 had not
changed his mind; if the Dublin and her two destroyers had
intercepted the enemy during the night of the 6th~7th — the
story of the Goeben would have ended here. There was, how-
ever, as it turned out, one more chance of annulling the doom
of which she was the bearer. That chance, remote though it
was, the Fates were vigilant to destroy.
At 1 a.m. on August 8 Sir Berkeley Milne, having collected
and coaled his three battle cruisers at Malta, set out at a
moderate speed on an Easterly course in pursuit of the Goeben.
At this juncture the Fates moved a blameless and punctili-
ous Admiralty clerk to declare war upon Austria. The code
telegram ordering hostilities to be commenced against Austria
was inadvertently released without any authority whatever.
The mistake was repaired a few hours later; but the first
message reached Sir Berkeley Milne at 2 p.m. on August 8
when he was half-way between Sicily and Greece. His orig-
inal war orders, had prescribed that in the event of a war with
Austria he should in the first instance concentrate his fleet
near Malta, and faithful to these instructions he turned his
ships about and desisted from the pursuit of the Goeben.
Twenty-four hours were thus lost before orders could reach
him to resume it. But the Goeben herself had come to a stand-
still. Admiral Souchon was cruising irresolutely about the
Greek islands endeavouring to make sure that he would be
admitted by the Turks to the Dardanelles. He dallied thirty-
six hours at Denusa and was forced to use his tell-tale wireless
on several occasions. It was not till the evening of the 10th
that he entered the Dardanelles and the Curse descended ir-
revocably upon Turkey and the East.
From the 9th to the 22nd of August the Army was crossing
the Channel. This was a period of great anxiety to us. All
276 THE WORLD CRISIS
the most fateful possibilities were open. We were bound to
expect a military descent upon our coasts with the intention of
arresting or recalling our Army, or a naval raid into the Chan-
nel to cut down the transports, or a concentrated submarine
attack upon these vessels crowded with our troops. The
great naval battle might begin at any moment, either inde-
pendently or in connection with any of these operations. It
was a period of extreme psychological tension.
In continued anxiety lest some capital mistake should be
made through a different sense of proportion prevailing in the
Fleet and at the Admiralty, I drew up the following apprecia-
tion which with the concurrence of the First Sea Lord was sent
officially to Sir John Jellicoe.
Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets. August 8,
1914. Sent 10.15 p.m.
1. To-morrow, Sunday, the Expeditionary Force begins to
cross the Channel. During that week the Germans have the
strongest incentives to action. They know that the Expedi-
tionary Force is leaving, and that the mobilisation and training
of the Territorial Army is incomplete. They may well argue
that a raid or raids now upon the East Coast would interrupt,
confuse and probably delay the departure of the Army, and
further that it might draw the Grand Fleet rapidly South to
interfere with the landing.
2. Alternatively, or simultaneously, they may attempt to
rush the Straits and interrupt the passage of the Army. It
seems in the last degree improbable that if they did so they
would use their modern Battle Fleet. Their principle has
been, according to all we know about them, to aim at a general
battle with the British Fleet when by attrition and accident
our margin of superiority has been reduced. They may be
assumed to know our general dispositions in the South, and
the strong and numerous Submarine flotillas of which we and
the French dispose. They must apprehend that the Straits
are mined. Since the distance across the Channel can be
covered in 6 to 8 hours, 3 hours' notice of their approach would
enable every transport to reach safety. To force the Straits
and enter the Channel with their best ships means the certain
WAR: THE PASSAGE OF THE ARMY 277
loss of units which it is vital to them to preserve if they are
ever to fight a general battle. And this sacrifice, with all its
hazards, would lead them only into an Anglo-French lake,
lined with fortified harbours and infested with torpedo craft,
at the end of which lies the Atlantic Ocean, and the Grand
Fleet — wherever it is — certainly between them and home. If
this plan were followed by the Germans, we should mine the
Straits of Dover heavily behind them, and leave you to engage
them at your convenience.
3. A far more probable German plan would be (A) to send a
fast division to rush the Straits and attack the transports,
while at the same time (B) making raids on the East Coast to
create a diversion. Our dispositions in the Channel and its
approaches provide fully for (A). With regard to (B), it is
not considered that more than 10,000 men can be spared from
Germany at present for raids. Such raid or raids would incon-
venience the military arrangements, but the Army is ready to
meet the raiders if they land. Their Lordships would wish to
emphasise that it is not part of the Grand Fleet7 s duty to prevent
such raids, but to deal with the enemy's Battle Fleet. The
enemy's older ships will possibly be used to cover either one
or more raids. Their main Battle Fleet may be in rear to sup-
port them. They may expect you to come direct to prevent
the raid, and therefore may lay one or more lines of mines
across your expected course, or use their Submarines for the
same purpose. Whereas if you approach from an Easterly or
North-Easterly direction, i.e. behind them, you would cut the
German Battle Fleet from its base, the landed raiders from all
reinforcements, and you would approach by a path along which
the chance of meeting mines would be sensibly reduced. In
our view therefore you should ignore the raid or raids, and
work by a circuitous route so as to get between the enemy's
fleet, or covering force, and home. It would seem undesirable
to come South of latitude 570 until news of a raid has been
actually received; and even then the possibility of the German
Battle Fleet being still in the Heligoland Bight, i.e. behind
you, cannot be excluded.
This appreciation of the situation is not intended to hamper
your discretion to act according to circumstances.
The naval dispositions by which the passage of the Army
was covered have been fully described in the Official History of
278 THE WORLD CRISIS
the War and in other Service works. The northern approaches
to the Straits of Dover were patrolled by cruiser squadrons
and by flotillas from Harwich and the Thames. The Straits
of Dover were minutely watched by the British and French
Destroyer flotillas of the Dover cordon and by the Submarine
flotillas of Commodore Keyes. Behind these there was con-
stituted on August 7 the Channel Fleet, comprising nineteen
battleships of the 5th, 7th and 8th Battle Squadrons, now all
fully mobilised. This fleet, having assembled under the com-
mand of Admiral Burney at Portland, cruised in readiness for
battle at the western end of the Channel at such distances from
the Dover cordon as its commander might judge convenient.
The western entrance to the Channel was guarded by other
cruiser squadrons.
During the first few days of the transportation no great
numbers of troops were crossing the Channel, but from the
12th to the 17th the bulk of the Army was in transit, and the
strategic tension reached its climax. Until this period was
reached the Grand Fleet was kept in its northern station and
was even permitted to cruise northwards of the Orkneys, but
on August 12 Admiral Jellicoe was directed to re-enter the
North Sea and to cruise southward into a position of effec-
tive proximity.
Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets.
August 12, 1914.
We cannot wholly exclude the chance of an attempt at a
landing during this week on a large scale supported by High
Sea Fleet. In addition to the possibilities explained in Ad-
miralty appreciation of situation sent you 8th, extraor-
dinary silence and inertia of enemy may be prelude to serious
enterprises. Our view remains as expressed in appreciation,
and even if larger landing forces were employed the general
principles of action would remain unaltered except that the
urgency of interrupting the landing would of course be greater.
You ought however to be nearer the theatre of decisive action,
WAR: THE PASSAGE OF THE ARMY 279
as we originally contemplated, and now that you have shaken
off the submarine menace, or as soon as you can do so, it would
appear necessary to bring the Fleet to the Eastward of the
Orkneys passing either N. or S. of the Shetlands keeping well
out of sight of land and stopping traffic if necessary. Cruiser
sweeps to the South and South-east should be made as con-
venient. Acknowledge this immediately on receipt.
During the three days of heaviest transportation, August 15,
16 and 17, the Heligoland Bight was closely blockaded by sub-'
marines and destroyers, supported between the Horn Reef and
the Dogger Bank by the whole of the Grand Fleet. Thus bat-
tle in open water was offered to the German Navy during the
three days when their inducements to fight were at their maxi-
mum. But except for an occasional submarine, no sign be-
trayed the existence of the enemy's naval power.
All went well. Not a ship was sunk, not a man was
drowned: all arrangements worked with the utmost smooth-
ness and punctuality. The Army concentration was com-
pleted three days in advance of Sir John French's original
undertaking to General Lanrezac;1 and with such secrecy
was the whole of this vast operation enshrouded, that on the
evening of August 21, only a few hours before the British
cavalry patrols were in contact with the Germans, General
von Kluck, commanding the First German Army in Belgium,
received from the Supreme Command no better information
than the following: —
'A landing of British troops at Boulogne and their advance
from about Lille must be reckoned with. It is believed that
no landing of British troops on a big scale has yet taken
place.' 2
Three days later the whole British Army was fighting the
battle of Mons.
1 General Lanrezac — ' Le plan de Campagne Frangais,' p. iio.
2 General von Kluck — ' The March on Paris,' p. 38.
280 THE WORLD CRISIS
The silence at sea was accompanied by a suspense on land.
Except for the over-running and trampling down of Liege,
and a French raid into Alsace, only the covering troops of the
great armies were in contact. There was a long, stifling
pause before the breaking of the storm. All over Europe
millions of men, pouring along the roads and railroads, flow-
ing across the Rhine bridges, draining from the farthest
provinces of the wide Russian Empire, streaming northwards
from Southern France and Northern Africa, were forming in
the immense masses of manoeuvre or the lines of battle.
There was plenty to fill the newspapers; but to those who un-
derstood what was coming, the fortnight with which this
chapter is concerned seemed oppressed by a deathly hush.
CHAPTER XII
THE BATTLE IN FRANCE
August 20-September 6, 19 14
'For while the dagger gleam'd on high
ReePd soul and sense, reel'd brain and eye.'
Scott, 'The Lady of the Lake,' Canto V-XVL
Germany's Choice: Prudence or Audacity — Her Dangerous Com-
promise— The French Offensive School — One View of French
Strategy — Plan XVII — Its Complete Failure — The Despatch of
the Sixth Division — The Morrow of Mons — Fears for the Chan-
nel Ports — The Lloyd George of Agadir — The British Base
Shifted to St. Nazaire — Some expedients — The Retreat — A Press
Communique — The Eve of the Marne — The Russian Pressure —
Lord Kitchener's Journey to Paris — Correspondence with Sir
John French — A Day on the Aisne — The Sea Flank Project —
Lord Kitchener's Wise Restraint.
PRUDENCE and audacity may be alternated but not
A mixed. Having gone to war it is vain to shrink from
facing the hazards inseparable from it. At the outset of the
war Germany had a choice between a prudent and an auda-
cious strategy. She could either have fallen, as she did, upon
France with her main strength and held off Russia mean-
while, or have fallen upon Russia with ample forces and stood
on the defensive against France. If she had taken the sec-
ond course she would have said to France and to Europe:
"This is an Eastern quarrel. Let us endeavour to limit the
area of the conflict. We are going to rescue our ally Austria
from Russia. We have no dispute with France. We have
no intention of invading French territory. Unless you attack
us, we shall not touch you: if you attack us, we shall have
to defend ourselves. As for Belgium, it is sacred to us." The
281
282 THE WORLD CRISIS
German Government would then have appealed to England
to help to localise the struggle, and a well-meaning effort
would most probably have been made with that object.
France would therefore have had to choose between deserting
her ally and invading Germany in cold blood, alone. Neither
Belgium nor England would have entered the war. By the
winter the Russian armies would have been torn to pieces in
the East, and France brought to a standstill before barbed
wire and entrenchments on German soil in the West. France
would therefore have appeared the aggressor, who had made
a treaty with Russia in order to get back her lost provinces,
and then in pursuance of this treaty had flagrantly invaded
Germany and had been arrested by the defenders of the
Fatherland. On the other hand, the moment Russia was
beaten, overwhelming German forces could be brought to
bear on France. And if in this second stage the Germans
had chosen to violate the neutrality of Belgium, Britain, if
she had intervened at all, would have intervened divided and
too late. All these tremendous political-strategic considera-
tions were present in the minds of British Ministers, and Mr.
Lloyd George in particular would never believe, until the
mass invasion of Belgium was an actual fact, that the Ger-
mans would be so unwise as to ignore them. Ludendorff,
however, tells us that the German General Staff rejected such
a plan for one decisive reason, namely, that it involved a long
war. This answer seems insufficient.
Germany had long and deliberately committed herself to
the alternative plan of the invasion of France through Bel-
gium with the intention of destroying the French armies in a
few weeks. This was a decision of extreme hazard and
audacity; flying in the face of world opinion, openly assuming
the role of the aggressor, committing a hideous wrong against
Belgium, incurring probably Belgian resistance and possibly,
as they must apprehend, British intervention. But having
embarked on such an audacious adventure, the Germans failed
THE BATTLE IN FRANCE 283
to concentrate wholly upon it. In order to secure victory in
a few weeks in France before England could develop her
strength, they must be prepared to endure serious injuries in
the East. The German force opposing Russia was therefore
rightly cut down to the absolute minimum. But to carry
their plan through in its integrity more territory should have
been yielded to the Russian invaders, and in no circumstances
should any reinforcements have been transferred from the
West to the Eastern front until the decision in the West had
been reached.
* * * * *
I had throughout the greatest misgivings of an impulsive
offensive by the French based, not on calm calculations of
numbers, distances and times, but upon 'the psychology of
the French nation/ 'the best traditions of the French Army/
'the natural elan of the poiluJ I knew, of course, that the
offensive school held the dominance in France. One could
see its reflection in the language of our military men, though
these were strongly anchored to modern realities by unpleas-
ant recollections of the Boer War. Without knowing with
any certainty or exactness the French plan, I dreaded, when-
ever I reflected on the problem, an impetuous onset followed
by a shattering shock.
As between the two nations, France and Germany, it would
be natural for the stronger to be left to take the offensive and
invade the weaker. Four or five marches from the frontier
the task of the invader becomes very difficult and may be
made more difficult still. The defenders have superior com-
munications from flank to flank and from front to rear; they
fall back on carefully-chosen, well-prepared positions and on
ample magazines of munitions and supplies. The invader
finds himself in a hostile country, surrounded by spies, with
bridges and roads, especially lateral roads, broken and disor-
ganised, and important junctions defended by fortresses still
in the hands of the enemy. He is thus forced to deliver the
284 THE WORLD CRISIS
first great battle on ground selected and prepared by his op-
ponent. It is surely at this moment, and after this first shock
has been sustained under the best conditions, that the oppor-
tunity for the offensive energy of the weaker Power presents
itself.
If the Germans invaded France it seemed to me in those
days that the French would be wise to act as follows: —
They should entrench themselves conveniently along or
near their frontier, constructing a vast system of field forti-
fications, open and concealed, sham and real, according to
every device known at that time; and in these positions they
should await the first shock of the Germans. I believed that
the Germans did not appreciate the tremendous power of
modern weapons, particularly the rifle. I based this on what
I had seen of their methods in their manoeuvres of 1906 and
1909 and on what I had learned about rifle fire in the South
African War. The Germans were the challengers; they were
the stronger, but not, in my opinion, strong enough for the
continuous storming and reduction of well-fortified positions
held by French regular armies or by British troops. I did
not, of course, contemplate that the French would dig one
uniform line along the whole length of their frontier. They
would naturally treat the problem selectively, here resisting
with their utmost strength, there allowing the enemy to pene-
trate and bulge into unpromising country or into some well-
considered tactical area only to be brought up by lines fifteen
to twenty miles in rear. They would not hesitate to sell the
Germans piece by piece a certain amount of ground for dis-
proportionate losses. The universal tactical object to be pur-
sued in this first phase should be to force the Germans to
expose themselves in the open to the rifle and artillery fire of
well-trained Frenchmen.
It would be reasonable to hope that a process of this kind,
continued for three or four days along the whole front, would
have resulted in far heavier losses to the Germans than to the
THE BATTLE IN FRANCE 285
French, and that a larger proportion of the German than of
the French armies would have been deployed and extended.
One hoped in this way to see the French take toll of the man-
hood of the German nation at the outset of the war, as the
British Army did on a small scale at Mons and Le Cateau.
This would in no way have excluded tactical action by means
of counter-attacks wherever opportunities presented them-
selves. Meanwhile at least two-fifths of the French armies
should have been held back in a great mass of manoeuvre,
north-east of Paris. With this mass of manoeuvre I hoped
the British Army would have been associated. This general
disposition should not have been compromised by any effort
to proceed to the relief of Belgium, except with cavalry and
small detachments to encourage the Belgians and to gain
time. I was, of course, firmly persuaded, in common with
the British General Staff, that the main German encircling
movement would take place through Belgium and would com-
prise considerable forces west of the Belgian Meuse. I hoped
that if this movement eventuated and prolonged itself in
great strength, the French would find an opportunity of using
the greater part of their armies of manoeuvre against it after
the Germans had been well punished along the whole front.
At any rate, that is the sort of way in which I thought then,
before the event, and think still, the French Command might
best have safeguarded the vital interests of France.
Very different, however, were the ideas of General Joffre.
The famous 'Plan XVII' consisted in a general offensive in
an easterly and north-easterly direction by four French
armies, with the last remaining army in reserve behind their
centre. It was based upon an ardent faith that the French
right would penetrate deeply into Alsace and Lorraine and an
obstinate disbelief that the French left would be turned by a
German movement west of the Meuse through Belgium.
Both these calculations were to be completely falsified by the
first events of the war. From the very earliest days it was
286 THE WORLD CRISIS
clear that the views which the British General Staff had con-
sistently held, since 191 1, of a great German turning move-
ment through Belgium, probably on both sides of the Belgian
Meuse, were correct. Why should the Germans with their
eyes open throw first Belgium and then the British Empire
into the scales against them unless for an operation of supreme
magnitude? Besides, there were the evidences of their long
preparations — camps, railways and railway sidings — which
the British Staff under Sir John French and Sir Henry Wilson
had so minutely studied. Lastly, reported with much accu-
racy from day to day, there came the enormous troop move-
ments on the German right, towards and into Belgium on
both sides of the Meuse. Before the end of the first week in
August General Lanrezac, the Commander of the left French
Army (the Fifth), was raising loud cries of warning and alarm
about the menace to his left, and indeed his rear, if he carried
out the role assigned to him and attacked as ordered in a
north-easterly direction. By the end of the second week the
presence of the accumulating masses of the German right
could no longer be denied by the French High Command,
and certain measures, tardy and inadequate, were taken to
cope with it. Nevertheless, after the raid of a corps and a
cavalry division into Alsace on the 13th August, General
Joffre began his offensive into Lorraine with the two armies
of the French right, the centre armies conforming a few days
later; and up till the evening of the 18th General Lanrezac
and the left French army were still under orders to advance
north-east. Three days later this same army was defending
itself in full battle from an attack from the north and north-
west. It had been compelled to make a complete left wheel.
The main shock began on the 20th, when the two armies of
the French right battered themselves in vain against the
strongly-prepared German defences. By the 21st the French
centre armies were definitely stopped, and by noon on the
23rd General Lanrezac and the French army of the left were
THE BATTLE IN FRANCE 287
outflanked and beaten. Meanwhile our small army, thrust
hurriedly forward towards Mons to shield the French left,
found itself in presence of not less than four army corps with
numerous cavalry constituting the swinging fist and sabre of
the German encircling advance. By the evening of the 23rd
'Plan XVII J had failed in every single element. The French
armies of the right were thrown back into France and were
entirely occupied in defending themselves. Their armies of
the centre and the left were in full retreat towards Paris and
the south, and the British Army, isolated and beset by over-
whelming numbers, was in the direst peril of complete de-
struction. So mueh for 'Plan XVII. '
The utmost secrecy had naturally been maintained by the
French about their general plan. The existence of their nation
was at stake. Neither the British Cabinet nor what was left
of the War Office were in a position to understand what was
passing. I do not know how far Lord Kitchener was specially
informed. I think it very improbable that he shared the
secrets of the French Headquarters to the extent of being
able to measure what was happening on the front as a whole.
If he shared them, he did not show it by any remark which
escaped him. He knew, of course, all there was to be known
about the situation of our own army, and a good deal about
the forces contiguous to it.
As the shock drew near, Prince Louis and I felt it our duty
at the Admiralty to free Lord Kitchener's hands in every
respect and to bear to the full our burden of responsibility.
I therefore wrote to him on the 22nd August as follows:
The Admiralty are confident of their ability to secure this
country against invasion or any serious raid. If you wish
to send the 6th Division abroad at once, we should not raise
any objection from the naval standpoint. The situation,
now that both the Navy and the Territorials are mobilised
288 THE WORLD CRISIS
and organised, is entirely different from those which have
been discussed in the Invasion Committee, of the C.I.D.1;
and if you want to send the last Regular Division, the First
Sea Lord and I are quite ready to agree, and so far as possi-
ble to accept responsibility.
He replied:
'It is very doubtful if the division now crossing2 will get
up in time to take part in the battle now impending on the
Sambre. As soon as I can I will let you know about the 6th
Division going over. If I send it we have practically nothing
left.'
Late on the evening of August 23 I had a talk with Lord
Kitchener. We knew the main battle had been joined and
that our men had been righting all day; but he had received
no news. He was darkly hopeful. The map was produced.
The dense massing of German divisions west of the Belgian
Meuse and curling round the left flank of the Anglo-French
line was visible as a broad effect. So was the pivot of Namur,
in front of which this whole vast turning movement seemed
precariously to be hinged. He had in his mind a great French
counterstroke — a thrust at the shoulder, as it were, of the
long, straining, encircling arm which should lop it off or cripple
it fatally. He said of the Germans, 'They are running a grave
risk. No one can set limits to what a well-disciplined army
can do; but if the French were able to cut in here/ he made
a vigorous arrow N.W. from Namur, 'the Germans might
easily have a Sedan of their own on a larger scale/ I had a
pleasing vision of the first phase of Austerlitz, with the Aus-
trians stretching and spreading their left far out to the vil-
lages of Tellnitz and Sokolnitz, while Napoleon remained
crouched for his spring at the Pratzen plateau. But had
France a Napoleon? One had marched through Charleroi
1 Committee of Imperial Defence.
2 The Fourth Division (the Fifth to go).
THE BATTLE IN FRANCE 289
ninety-nine years before. Was there another? And were
the Germans like the Austrians and Russians of Austerlitz?
However, we went anxiously but hopefully to our slumbers.
At 7 o'clock the next morning I was sitting up in bed in
Admiralty House working at my boxes, when the door of my
bedroom opened and Lord Kitchener appeared. These were
the days before he took to uniform, and my recollection is
that he had a bowler hat on his head, which he took off with
a hand which also held a slip of paper. He paused in the door-
way and I knew in a flash and before ever he spoke that the
event had gone wrong. Though his manner was quite calm,
his face was different. I had the subconscious feeling that it
was distorted and discoloured as if it had been punched with
a fist. His eyes rolled more than ever. His voice, too, was
hoarse. He looked gigantic. 'Bad news/ he said heavily
and laid the slip of paper on my bed. I read the telegram.
It was from Sir John French.
'My troops have been engaged all day with the enemy on
a line roughly east and west through Mons. The attack was
renewed after dark, but we held our ground tenaciously. I
have just received a message from G.O.C. 5th French Army
that his troops have been driven back, that Namur has
fallen, and that he is taking up a line from Maubeuge to Ro-
croi. I have therefore ordered a retirement to the line Valen-
ciennes-Longueville-Maubeuge, which is being carried out
now. It will prove a difficult operation, if the enemy remains
in contact. I remember your precise instructions as to method
and direction of retirement if necessity arises.
' I think that immediate attention should be directed to the
defence of Havre.'
I did not mind it much till I got to Namur. Namur fallen !
Namur taken in a single day — although a French brigade
had joined the Belgians in its defence. We were evidently
in the presence of new facts and of a new standard of values.
If strong fortresses were to melt like wisps of vapour in a
290 THE WORLD CRISIS
morning sun, many judgments would have to be revised.
The foundations of thought were quaking. As for the
strategic position, it was clear that the encircling arm was
not going to be hacked off at the shoulder, but would close
in a crushing grip. Where would it stop ? What of the naked
Channel ports? Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne! 'Fortify
Havre/ said Sir John French. One day's general battle and
the sanguine advance and hoped-for counterstroke had been
converted into ' Fortify Havre.' 'It will be difficult to with-
draw the troops if the enemy remains in contact' — a disquiet-
ing observation. I forget much of what passed between us.
But the apparition of Kitchener Agonistes in my doorway will
dwell with me as long as I live. It was like seeing old John
Bull on the rack !
When I met the Admirals later, at ten, they were deeply
perturbed about these Channel ports. They had never taken
the War Office view of the superiority of the French Army.
They saw in this first decisive shock the confirmation of their
misgivings. Some one suggested we should at any rate make
sure of the Cotentin peninsula, as an ample place of arms,
girt on three sides by the sea, from which the British armies
of the future might proceed to the rescue of France. Fortify
Havre indeed! Already we looked to Cherbourg and St.
Nazaire.
British Admiralty to French Admiralty.
August 24th, 1 9 14.
* Admiralty think it most important to naval interests to
defend Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne as long as possible.
We release Admiral Rouyer's armoured cruiser squadron to
co-operate in the land defences of these three places. We
will reinforce him if necessary with a battle squadron. French
flotilla bases and naval stores at Calais and Boulogne can be
transferred to Dover, and all preparations for that should be
immediately worked out. . . . We wish also to receive with-
out delay French views about land defences of Dunkirk,
THE BATTLE IN FRANCE 291
Boulogne, Calais and Havre and what military prospects are
of holding on to all of them. We will, of course, assist in any
way in our power.
Lastly we are considering shifting all military stores of
British Expeditionary Force now at Boulogne to Cherbourg.
We wish to know French views on the necessity for this as
the result of the present battle becomes more clear. . . .
First Lord to Commander-in-Chief Grand Fleet.
August 24th, 1914.
* Personal. News from France is disappointing and seri-
ous results of battle cannot yet be measured, as it still con-
tinues over enormous front.
I have had the telegrams about it repeated to you.
We have not entered the business without resolve to see
it through and you may be assured that our action will be
proportioned to the gravity of the need.
I have absolute confidence in final result.
No special action is required from you at present, but you
should address your mind to a naval situation which may
arise where Germans control Calais and French coasts and
what ought to be the position of Grand Fleet in that event.
I had not seen the Chancellor of the Exchequer, except at
Cabinets, since the fateful Sunday before the war. I had
been buried in the Admiralty and he in the Treasury. I sus-
tained vague general impressions of a tremendous financial
crisis — panic, bankruptcies, suspension of the Bank Act,
moratoriums, paper money — like a distant tumult. I real-
ised that he, aided by the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Reading,
was riding the storm and regaining effective control of events.
But I did not attempt to follow and appreciate the remark-
able sequence of decisions by which an unprecedented, un-
imaginable situation was met. Now, however, with this
fateful news, I felt intensely the need of contact with him,
and I wanted to know how it would strike him and how he
would face it. So I walked across the Horse Guards Parade
and made my way to the tunnel entrance of the Treasury
292 THE WORLD CRISIS
Board Room. It must have been about 10 o'clock in the
morning and, as I opened the door, I saw the room was
crowded. One of that endless series of conferences with all
the great business and financial authorities of Britain, by
means of which the corner was turned, was in progress. He
saw me at once : I beckoned with my ringer and he came out.
We went into a little room scarcely bigger than a cupboard
which adjoined, and I told him what had happened. I was
relieved and overjoyed at his response. He was once again
the Lloyd George of Agadir. Not since the morning of the
Mansion House speech, three years before, had I seen him
so strong and resolute for our country or so sure of its might.
First Lord to Commander-in-Chief Grand Fleet
August 25th, 1914.
* British retirement on French frontier successfully and
skilfully effected. Army now in strong position, well sup-
ported. Our casualties reported not severe considering con-
tinued engagement with two German corps and two cavalry
divisions. Enemy was well punished and lost heavily.
Main battle has still to be fought. General impression better
this morning. Hope all is well with you.
Then came the days of retreat. We saw that the French
armies of the right were holding their own, but all the centre
and left was marching southwards towards Paris as fast as
possible, while our own five divisions1 were for several days
plainly in the very jaws of destruction. At the Admiralty
we received requests to shift the base of the whole army from
Havre to St. Nazaire; and with this complicated business we
had to cope. The process of retreat continued day after day.
A seemingly irresistible compulsion was pressing and forcing
backwards the brave armies of France. Why should it stop?
Would they ever be able to turn? If France could not save
herself, nothing could save her.
1 The Fourth Division (fifth in order of embarkation) arrived on
the field at the beginning of the battle of Le Cateau.
THE BATTLE IN FRANCE 293
Casting about for help in this bitter time, I ventured to
make the suggestions which follow. But it was not found
possible, in view of all the difficulties, to give effect to them.
Mr. Churchill to Lord Kitchener.
August 2&th, 1914.
Here is an idea which deserves examination. The Siberian
troops would, if used against Germany and Austria, have to
come south at an awkward moment and derange the com-
munications (so I am told). On the other hand, it would
probably be easy to send them to Archangel, and it is (roughly)
only six days from Archangel to Ostend.
If a couple of Russian Corps d'Armee were transported
round this route, it would be possible to strike at the German
communications in a very effective manner.
It is an interesting idea, though I dare say it would not
greatly commend itself to the Russians. Don't trouble to
answer.
Prime Minister.
Sir Edward Grey.
Lord Kitchener.
September 5, 19 14.
I hear from many sources of the keen and widespread desire
of individual Americans to take part in the war on our side.
It has been stated that 50,000 or 60,000 Americans have vol-
unteered, including a number of Virginians. I also hear that
Wealthy Americans are anxious to subscribe to the equipment
of a force. There is no doubt that a large number of American
citizens of quality and character are anxious to fight on our
side. The value and advantage of such aid cannot be over-
rated from any point of view. I am ignorant of the law on
these subjects: but Foreign Legions have played their part in
many wars. It ought to be possible to organise in Canada
an American volunteer force amounting to at least a Division,
which could go into action as such. Nothing will bring Ameri-
can sympathy along with us so much as American blood shed
in the field. What is wanted now is that there should be an
announcement made that we will accept the services of Ameri-
cans who come to Canada or England and volunteer; that they
294 THE WORLD CRISIS
will be formed into units in which they can serve together
with their friends and comrades; that they will be able to
choose their own regimental officers; and that the British
Government will bear the whole expense of equipment and
transportation; and that they shall share in every way the
perils and fortunes of our troops.
I believe there is a source of fighting manhood here of the
highest possible quality, whose very employment would pro-
duce beneficial reactions in every direction. The problem is
how to set up the rallying flag in Canada, and so indicate
where those who wish to help us can go to join.
w. s. c.
Personally I was hopeful that the wave of invasion would
spend its fury, and as I had indicated in my memorandum of
three years before, I believed that if the French forces had
not been squandered by precipitate action on the frontiers,
an opportunity of striking the decisive blow would occur
about the fortieth day. In order to encourage my colleagues
I reprinted this memorandum and circulated it to the whole
Cabinet on September 2, pointing out that I had never
counted upon a victorious issue at the frontiers, had always
expected that the French armies would be driven into retreat
by the twentieth day, but that, in spite of this, there were
good hopes of success. But I had no means of measuring the
forces by which this result would be achieved, except by the
most general processes.
Meanwhile the impression of an overwhelming disaster
was conveyed to England through a hundred channels. News-
paper correspondents made their way in the confusion to the
very fringe of the German advance. Stragglers by the thou-
sand and even detachments from the British Army, appeared
in a desperate condition far to its rear and on its flanks. In
spite of the censorship, the reports in the papers were alarm-
ing, while rumour far exceeded anything that was printed.
Acute distress was manifested. In these circumstances, at
the request of Lord Kitchener and the Prime Minister, I
THE BATTLE IN FRANCE 295
drafted on Sunday, September 4, the following communique,
which was universally accepted as coming from the Army,
and I hope and believe gave comfort without concealing the
truth.
It is now possible to make another general survey, in con-
tinuation of that issued on August 30, of the operations of
the British Army during the last week.
No new main trial of strength has taken place. There have
indeed been battles in various parts of the immense front
which in other wars would have been considered operations
of the first magnitude, but in this war they are merely the in-
cidents of the strategic withdrawal and contraction of the
allied forces necessitated by the initial shock on the frontiers
and in Belgium, and by the enormous strength which the Ger-
mans have thrown into the western theatre while suffering
heavily through weakness in the eastern.
The British Expeditionary Army has conformed to the gen-
eral movement of the French forces and acted in harmony
with the strategic conceptions of the French General Staff.
Since the battle at Cambrai [Le Cateau] on August 26, where
the British troops successfully guarded the left flank of the
whole line of French Armies from a deadly turning attack
supported by enormous force, the 7 th French Army1 has come
into operation on our left, and this, in conjunction with the
5 th Army on our right, has greatly taken the strain and pres-
sure off our men. The 5th French Army in particular on
August 29 advanced from the line of the Oise River to meet
and counter the German forward movement, and a consider-
able battle developed to the south of Guise. In this the 5th
French Army gained a marked and solid success, driving back
with heavy loss and in disorder three German Army Corps —
the 10th, the Guard, and a reserve corps. It is believed that
the Commander of the 10th German Corps was among those
killed. In spite of this success, however, and all the benefits
which flowed from it, the general retirement to the south con-
tinued, and the German Armies, seeking persistently after
the British troops, remained in practically continuous con-
tact with our rearguards. On August 30 and 31 the British
1 Actually called the 6th Army.
296 THE WORLD CRISIS
covering and delaying troops were frequently engaged, and
on September i a very vigorous effort was made by the Ger-
mans, which brought about a sharp action in the neighbour-
hood of Compiegne. This action was fought principally by
the ist British Cavalry Brigade and the 4th Guards Brigade
and was entirely satisfactory to the British. The German
attack, which was most strongly pressed, was not brought to
a standstill until much slaughter had been inflicted upon
them and until ten German guns had been captured. The
brunt of this creditable affair fell upon the Guards Brigade,
who lost in killed and wounded about 300 men.1
After this engagement our troops were no longer molested.
Wednesday, September 2, was the first quiet day they had
had since the battle of Mons, on August 23. During the
whole of this period marching and fighting had been continu-
ous, and in the whole period the British casualties had
amounted, according to the latest estimates, to about 15,000
officers and men. The fighting having been in open order
upon a wide front, with repeated retirements, has led to a
large number of officers and men, and even small parties,
missing their way and getting separated, and it is known that
a very considerable number of those now included in the total
will rejoin the colours safely. These losses, though heavy in
so small a force, have in no wise affected the spirit of the
troops. They do not amount to a third of the losses inflicted
by the British force upon the enemy, and the sacrifice re-
quired of the Army has not been out of proportion to its mili-
tary achievements. In all, drafts amounting to 19,000 men
have reached our Army or are approaching them on the line
of communications, and advantage is being taken of the five
quiet days that have passed since the action of September 1
to £11 up' the gaps and refit and consolidate the units.
The British Army is now south of the Marne and is in line
with the French forces on the right and left. The latest in-
formation about the enemy is that they are neglecting Paris and
are marching in a south-easterly direction towards the Marne
and towards the left and centre of the French line} The ist
1 In fact, however, it was the ist Middlesex (19th Infantry Brigade
attached to 4th Division), who captured the guns at Nery, the Guards
being miles away at Villers Cotterets.
2 The italics are new.
THE BATTLE IN FRANCE 297
German Army is reported to be between La Ferte sous Jou-
arre and Essises Viffort. The 2nd German Army, after taking
Rheims,1 has advanced to Chateau-Thierry and to the east
of that place. The 4th German Army is reported to be march-
ing south on the west of the Argonne between Suippes and
Ville sur Tourbe. All these points were reached by the Ger-
mans on September 3. The 7th German Army has been re-
pulsed by a French Corps near D'Ein ville. It would there-
fore appear that the enveloping movement upon the Anglo-French
left flank has been abandoned by the Germans, either because it
is no longer practicable to continue such a great extension or
because the alternative of a direct attack upon the Allied line is
preferred. Whether this change of plan by the Germans is
voluntary or whether it has been enforced upon them by the
strategic situation and the great strength of the Allied Armies
in their front, will be revealed by the course of events.
There is no doubt whatever that our men have established
a personal ascendancy over the Germans and that they are
conscious of the fact that with anything like even numbers
the result would not be doubtful.
At this time I knew, of course, that another supreme battle
was impending. My principal fear was that the French would
turn too soon and make their new effort before the German
thrust had reached its full extension. I was glad therefore
to learn on September 3 that the French Government were
quitting Paris, as it showed a resolve to treat the capital just
as if it were an ordinary tactical feature to be fought round
or through as might be convenient in a purely military sense.
It also showed a determination to continue the war whatever
might happen to Paris. We were now at the thirty-fifth day
of mobilisation. The Germans must be strung out in their
pursuit and far ahead of supplies, munitions and drafts. The
great mass of Paris with its circle of forts must either, like a
breakwater, divide the oncoming German waves, or by com-
pelling them to pass wholly to the east of it serve as a secure
flank for the French.
1 The Third German Army took Rheims and were bombarded in the
town by the Second Army.
298 THE WORLD CRISIS
And at this culminating moment the Russian pressure
began to produce substantial effects. Honour must ever be
done to the Tsar and Russian nation for the noble ardour
and loyalty with which they hurled themselves into the war.
A purely Russian treatment of their military problem would
have led the Russian armies into immediate withdrawals
from their frontiers until the whole of their vast mobilisation
was completed. Instead of this, they added to a forward
mobilisation an impetuous advance not only against Austria
but into Germany. The flower of the Russian army was soon
to be cut down in enormous and fearful battles in East Prus-
sia. But the results of their invasion were gathered at the
decisive point. The nerve of the German Headquarters failed.
On August 25 two army corps and a cavalry division of the
German right were withdrawn from France. On August 31
Lord Kitchener was able to telegraph to Sir John French:
'Thirty- two trains of German troops were yesterday reported
moving from the western field to meet the Russians.' l
Awful was the responsibility of General Joffre and the
French High Command for the decision which must now be
taken. To turn too late was to risk the demoralisation of
the armies. To turn too soon was to court another and this
time a final defeat. And how compute the balance of all the
agonies and pressures simultaneously operating and recipro-
cally interacting which should determine the dread issue?
Whatever the mistakes of the opening phase, however wrong
the tactical and strategic conceptions which had induced
them, immortal glory crowns the brows of those who gave
the fateful signal, and lights the bayonets of the heroic armies
that obeyed it.
On September 6, being the thirty-seventh day of mobilisa-
tion, all the French armies between Verdun and Paris, to-
gether with the British Army and the French forces in Paris
1 Official History Appendix 22, p. 473.
THE BATTLE IN FRANCE 299
and to the north of Paris, turned upon their pursuers and
sprang at their throats. The Battle of the Marne had begun.
I may now be permitted to descend to a small scale of
events, and to refer to an incident which has caused both
stir and controversy.
By the 27 th August the Cabinet had formed the opinion
that great friction had arisen between Sir John French and
General Lanrezac and also between the British and French
Head-quarters. Actually the difference was with General
Lanrezac, who Sir John French considered had not given
him due notice of his intention to retire after the battle on
the 22nd and 23rd. We were concerned with the apparent
intention of the British Army to retire and refit behind the
French left. Their losses so far reported to us did not exceed
10,000 men. We could not measure the exhaustion of the
troops nor the extent of the disorganisation inseparable from
continued fighting and retreating. We accordingly decided
to send Lord Kitchener at once to see the British and French
Commanders-in-Chief and make sure that nothing that Brit-
ain could do should be left undone.1 If Lord Kitchener had
gone in plain clothes no difficulty would have risen, but his
appearance in Paris in the uniform of a Field-Marshal senior
to the Commander-in-Chief at that dark and critical moment,
wounded and disconcerted Sir John French deeply and not
unnaturally. I laboured my utmost to put this right and to
make it clear that the Cabinet and not Lord Kitchener were
responsible.
Admiralty,
September 4, 19 14.
Mr. Churchill to Sir John French.
I have wanted so much to write to you and yet not to
bother you with reading letters. Still, I suppose there are
1 The correspondence on this subject is printed in the Official His-
tory of the War, Appendix 22, p. 471.
300 THE WORLD CRISIS
moments when you can find the leisure to read a few lines
from a friend. The Cabinet was bewildered by your telegram
proposing to retire from the line, coming on the top of a cas-
ualty list of 6,000, and your reports as to the good spirit of
the troops. We feared that you and Joffre might have quar-
relled, or that something had happened to the Army of which
we had not been informed. In these circumstances tele-
graphing was useless, and a personal consultation was indis-
pensable if further misunderstandings were to be avoided.
I am sure it would be wise to have some good officer on
your staff like, say, Major Swinton, who could without
troubling you unduly give us a clear and complete impres-
sion of what is taking place day by day. Our only wish is to
sustain and support you. We are at a point where losses
will only rouse still further the spirit of the nation, provided
they are incurred, as yours have been, in brilliant and success-
ful action. But we ought to be kept in a position to form a
true and connected impression of the course of events.
For my own part, I am only anxious that you shall be sus-
tained and reinforced in every way, and I look forward con-
fidently to seeing you ere long at the head of a quarter of a
million men, and in the spring of half a million.
I enclose you a paper which I wrote three years ago, which
seems to have been borne out by the course of events, and
which I hope will continue to be confirmed.
In case any further difficulties arise, and you think I can
be of any use, you have only to send for me, and subject to
the naval situation I could reach you very quickly by motor-
car or aeroplane.
It is hard sitting here day after day with so many friends
engaged. The resolution of the nation is splendid. It is a
different country to the one you left
God guard you and prosper our arms.
France,
September 6, 19 14.
Sir John French to Mr. Churchill.
Thank you very much for your kind and encouraging
letter. It was a keen pleasure to hear from you and to read
your words.
I have had a terribly anxious time and the troops have
suffered severely, but they are simply glorious !
THE BATTLE IN FRANCE 301
I think you have heard me say that I would be ready to
take on any enemy in Europe half as strong again. I say
that more than ever now I I can't find words to say all I
think of them.
There has been some extraordinary misunderstanding at
home as to my relations with General Joffre, the French
C-in-C. We have been on the very best terms all through,
and he has spoken most kindly of the help he has received
from us. I can't understand what brought Kitchener to
Paris. I am writing to you as one of my greatest friends and
I know you'll let me write freely and privately. His visit
was really most unfortunate. He took me away from the
front to visit him in Paris on a very critical day when I should
have been directing the operation most carefully, and I tell
you between ourselves strictly that when I returned to my
Head-quarters I found a very critical situation existing (8
p.m. !) and authoritative orders and directions badly needed.
It was the day when the Guards and a Cavalry Brigade were
so heavily engaged.
I do beg of you, my dear Friend, to add one more to all the
many great kindnesses you have done me and stop this inter-
ference with field operations.
In reply I sent further explanations which, aided as they
were by victory, proved acceptable.
Sir John French to Mr. Churchill.
General Head-quarters,
British Forces,
September 10, 19 14.
Thank you, my dear Friend, with all my heart for your
truly kind reply to my letter, and also for your previous letter
of the 4th. I fear I was a little unreasonable about K. and
his visit, but we have been through a hard time and perhaps
my temper isn't made any better by it ! However, as usual,
you have poured balm into my wounds — although they may
have been only imaginary — and I am deeply grateful.
Since I wrote to you last the whole atmosphere has changed
and for 5 solid days we have been pursuing instead of pur-
sued, and the Germans have had simply hell. This very day
302 THE WORLD CRISIS
we have captured several hundred, cut off a whole lot of trans-
port and got 10 or 12 guns — and the ground is strewn with
dead and wounded Germans. Something like this happened
yesterday and the day before. But this is nothing to what
they have lost in front of the 5 th and 6th French armies,
which have been much more strongly opposed. They are
indeed fairly on the run and we are following hard.
What a wonderful forecast you made in 191 1. I don't
remember the paper, but it has turned out almost as you
said. I have shown it to a few of my Staff.
I was afraid of Joffre's strategy at first and thought he
ought to have taken the offensive much sooner, but he was
quite right
$ $ * $ sje
I felt it vitally important to my whole structure of
thought on this war problem to see for myself with my own
eyes what was passing at the front and what were the con-
ditions of this new war, and to have personal contact with
Sir John French. Reflection and imagination can only build
truly when they are checked point by point by direct impres-
sions of reality. I believed myself sufficiently instructed to
derive an immense refreshment of judgment from personal
investigation without incurring the opposite danger of a dis-
torted view through particular experiences. But it was not
until the armies came to a standstill along the line of the Aisne,
that I felt justified in asking Lord Kitchener to allow me to
accept the repeated invitations of Sir John French. He gladly
gave his permission and I started the next morning. On the
1 6th September the Duke of Westminster drove me from
Calais to the British Head-quarters at La Fere-en-Tardenois.
We made a fairly wide detour as we had no exact information
as to where the flanks of the moving armies actually lay, and
it was not until nightfall that we fell in with the left flank of
the British line. Sir John had all his arrangements ready
made for me, and the next day between daylight and dark
I was able to traverse the entire British artillery front from
the edge of the Craonne Plateau on the right to the outskirts
THE BATTLE IN FRANCE 303
of Soissons on the left. I met everybody I wanted to meet
and saw everything that could be seen without unnecessary
danger. I lunched with "The Greys" then commanded by
that fine soldier Colonel Bulkeley- Johnson. I had a long
talk with Sir Henry Rawlinson on a haystack from which
we could observe the fire of the French artillery near Soissons.
I saw for the first time what then seemed the prodigy of a
British aeroplane threading its way among the smoke puffs
of searching shells. I saw the big black German shells, "the
coal boxes" and "Jack Johnsons" as they were then called,
bursting in Paissy village or among our patient, impassive
batteries on the ridge. I climbed to a wooded height beneath
which the death-haunted bridge across the Aisne was visible.
When darkness fell I saw the horizon lighted with the quick
flashing of the cannonade. Such scenes were afterwards to
become commonplace: but their first aspect was thrilling.
I dined with the young officers of the Head-quarters Staff
and met there, for the last time alas, my brilliant, gallant
friend Hugh Dawnay. Early next morning I opened with
Sir John French the principal business I had to discuss,
namely, the advantages of disengaging the British Army
from its position on the Aisne and its transportation to its
natural station on the sea flank in contact with the Navy.
I found the Field Marshal in the most complete accord, and
I undertook to lay his views before Lord Kitchener and the
Prime Minister, who I knew would welcome such a develop-
ment. I started home immediately and reached London the
next morning.
Contact with the Army was always a great encouragement
to every one who visited France. In the field, in spite of the
newly-dug graves and hurrying ambulances, there was not
the same sense of tragedy as hung around our windows in
Whitehall. But I could not share the universal optimism of
the Staff. It was firmly believed and loudly declared on every
side that if all available reinforcements in officers and men
304 THE WORLD CRISIS
were sent to the Army without delay, the war would be
finished by Christmas. Fierce were the reproaches that the
War Office were withholding vitally needed officers, instruc-
tors and material for the purpose of training vast armies that
would never be ready in time. I combated these views to
the best of my ability, being fully convinced of Lord Kitch-
ener's commanding foresight and wisdom in resisting the
temptation to meet the famine of the moment by devouring
the seed-corn of the future. I repeated the memorable words
he had used to the Cabinet that 'The British Empire must
participate in the land war on the greatest scale and that in
no other way could victory be won.' Taking a complete sur-
vey, I consider now that this prudent withholding from the
Army in the field in the face of every appeal and demand the
key-men who alone could make the new armies, was the great-
est of the services which Lord Kitchener rendered to the na-
tion at this time, and it was a service which no one of lesser
authority than he could have performed.
CHAPTER XIII
ON THE OCEANS
Expeditions against the German Colonies — The Imperial Reinforce-
ments— The Admiralty at Full Strain — General situation in the
Outer Seas — The Price of Concentration at Home — The Konigs-
berg and the Emden in the Indian Ocean — The Convoy System —
General situation in the Pacific — British dispositions — Japan
Declares War on Germany — Overwhelming Forces of the Allies —
Difficulty of their Task — Fox and Geese — Problem of Admiral
von Spee — Limitations on his Action — Plight of Cruisers without
Bases — Tell-tale Coal — The Admiralty Problem — The Capture
of Samoa — The great Australasian Convoy — The Capture of New
Guinea — Depredations of the Emden — Concentration against the
Emden — Public Dissatisfaction on Admiralty Statement — Sail-
ing of the Australasian Convoy to Colombo — The Canadians
cross the Atlantic — First Imperial Concentration Complete.
ON an August morning, behold the curious sight of a Brit-
ish Cabinet of respectable Liberal politicians sitting
down deliberately and with malice aforethought to plan the
seizure of the German colonies in every part of the world!
A month before, with what horror and disgust would most
of those present have averted their minds from such ideas !
But our sea communications depended largely upon the
prompt denial of these bases or refuges to the German cruisers;
and further, with Belgium already largely overrun by the
German armies, every one felt that we must lose no time in
taking hostages for her eventual liberation. Accordingly, with
maps and pencils, the whole world was surveyed, six separate
expeditions were approved in principle and remitted to the
Staffs for study and execution. An enterprising Captain had
already on the outbreak of war invaded the German colony
of Togoland. We now proposed, in conjunction with the
French, to attack the Cameroons — a much more serious under-
30s
306 THE WORLD CRISIS
taking. General Botha had already declared his intention of
invading German South- West Africa. The New Zealand and
Australian Governments wished at once to seize Samoa and
the German possessions in the Pacific. An Anglo-Indian ex-
pedition was authorised for the attack of German East Africa.
The Staff work in preparation for the military side of this
last expedition was by no means perfect, and resulted in a seri-
ous rebuff. The transportation of the expeditionary forces
simultaneously in all these different directions while the seas
were still scoured by the German cruisers threw another set
of responsibilities upon the Admiralty.
From the middle of September onwards we began to be
at our fullest strain. The great map of the world which cov-
ered one whole wall of the War Room now presented a re-
markable appearance. As many as twenty separate enter-
prises and undertakings dependent entirely upon sea power
were proceeding simultaneously in .different parts of the globe.1
Apart from the expeditions set forth above, the enormous
business of convoying from all parts of the Empire the troops
needed for France, and of replacing them in some cases with
Territorials from home, lay heavy upon us. It was soon to
be augmented.
It had been easy to set on foot the organisation of the three
Naval Brigades and other Divisional troops for the Royal
Naval Division; but at a very early stage I found the creation
of the artillery beyond any resources of which I could dispose.
We could, and did, order a hundred field guns in the United
States, but the training, mounting and equipping of the artil-
lerymen could not and ought not to be undertaken apart from
the main preparation of the Army. My military staff officer,
Major Ollivant, at this stage had a very good idea which pro-
voked immediately far-reaching consequences. He advised
me to ask Lord Kitchener for a dozen British batteries from
India to form the artillery of the Royal Naval Division, letting
1 See map to face p. 328.
ON THE OCEANS 307
India have Territorial batteries in exchange. I put this to
Lord Kitchener the same afternoon. He seemed tremendously
struck by the idea. What would the Cabinet say ? he asked.
If the Government of India refused, could the Cabinet over-
rule them? Would they? Would I support him in the mat-
ter? And so on. I had to leave that night for the North to
visit the Fleet, which was lying in Loch Ewe, on the west
coast of Scotland. Forty-eight hours later, when I returned,
I visited Lord Kitchener and asked him how matters were
progressing. He beamed with delight. 'Not only/ he said,
'am I going to take twelve batteries, but thirty-one; and not
only am I going to take batteries, I am going to take battal-
ions. I am going to take thirty-nine battalions: I am going
to send them Territorial divisions instead — three Territorial
divisions. You must get the transports ready at once.' After
we had gloated over this prospect of succouring our struggling
front, I observed that I could now count on the twelve bat-
teries for the Royal Naval Division. 'Not one/ he said.
'I am going to take them all myself; and he rubbed his
hands together with every sign of glee. So the Naval Divi-
sion was left again in the cold and had to go forward as in-
fantry only.
This new development involved a heavy addition to our
convoy work, and the situation in the Indian and Pacific
Oceans must now be examined by the reader.
When war began the Germans had the following cruisers
on foreign stations: Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Etnden, Nurn-
berg, Leipzig (China); Konigsberg (East Africa and Indian
Ocean); Dresden, Karlsruhe (West Indies). All these ships
were fast and modern, and every one of them did us serious
injury before they were destroyed. There were also several
gunboats: Geier, Planet, Komet, Nusa and Eber, none of
which could be ignored. In addition, we expected that the
Germans would try to send to sea upwards of forty fast
armed merchantmen to prey on commerce. Our arrangements
308 THE WORLD CRISIS
were, however, as has been narrated, successful in prevent-
ing all but five from leaving harbour. Of these five the larg-
est, the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, was sunk by the Highflyer
(Captain Buller) on August 26: the Cap Trafalgar was sunk
on September 14 by the British armed merchant cruiser Car-
mania (Captain Noel Grant) after a brilliant action between
these two naked ships; and the three others took refuge and
were interned in neutral harbours some months later. Our
dispositions for preventing a cruiser and commerce-raider
attack upon our trade were from the outset very largely suc-
cessful, and in the few months with which this volume deals,
every one of the enemy ships was reduced to complete inac-
tivity, sunk or pinned in port.
Nevertheless, it is a fair criticism that we ought to have
had more fast cruisers in foreign waters, and in particular
that we ought to have matched every one of the German
cruisers with a faster ship as it was our intention to do.1 The
Karlsruhe in the West Indies gave a chance to our hunting
vessels at the outbreak of war, and the Konigsberg in the In-
dian Ocean was sighted a few days earlier. But our ships
were not fast enough to bring the former to action or keep in
close contact with the latter till war was declared. As will
be seen, nearly every one of these German cruisers took its
prey before being caught, not only of merchant ships but of
ships of war. The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sank the Mon-
mouth and Good Hope, the Konigsberg surprised and destroyed
the Pegasus, and the Emden sank the Russian cruiser Zem-
chug and the French destroyer Mousquet. Certainly they did
their duty well.
The keynote of all the Admiralty dispositions at the out-
break of war was to be as strong as possible in home waters
in order to fight a decisive battle with the whole German
Navy. To this end the foreign stations were cut down to
the absolute minimum necessary to face the individual ships
1 See Appendix.
ON THE OCEANS 309
abroad in each theatre. The fleet was weak in fast light
cruisers and the whole of my administration had been oc-
cupied in building as many of them as possible. None, of the
Arethusas had, however yet reached the Fleet. We there-
fore grudged every light cruiser removed from home waters,
feeling that the Fleet would be tactically incomplete without
its sea cavalry. The principle of first things first, and of
concentrating in a decisive theatre against the enemy's main
power, had governed everything, and had led to delay in
meeting an important and well-recognised subsidiary require-
ment. The inconvenience in other parts of the globe had to
be faced. It was serious.
Nowhere did this inconvenience show itself more than in
the Indian Ocean. After being sighted and making off on
the 31st of July, the Konigsberg became a serious preoccu-
pation on all movements of troops and trade. Another fast
German cruiser, the Etnden, which on the outbreak of war
was on the China station, also appeared in the middle of Sep-
tember in Indian waters, and being handled with enterprise
and audacity began to inflict numerous and serious losses
upon our mercantile marine. These events produced conse-
quences.
By the end of August we had already collected the bulk
of the 7th Division from all the fortresses and garrisons of
the Empire. During September the two British Indian divi-
sions with additional cavalry (in all nearly 50,000 men) were
already crossing the Indian Ocean. On top of this came the
plans for exchanging practically all the British infantry and
artillery in India for Territorial batteries and battalions, and
the formation of the 27th, 28th and 29th Divisions of regu-
lar troops. The New Zealand contingent must be escorted
to Australia and there, with 25,000 Australians, await con-
voys to Europe. Meanwhile the leading troops of the Cana-
dian Army, about 25,000 strong, had to be brought across
the Atlantic. All this was of course additional to the main
310 THE WORLD CRISIS
situation in the North Sea and to the continued flow of drafts,
reinforcements and supplies across the Channel. Meanwhile
the enemy's Fleet remained intact, waiting, as we might think,
its moment to strike ; and his cruisers continued to prey upon
the seas. To strengthen our cruiser forces we had already
armed and commissioned twenty-four liners as auxiliary cruis-
ers, and had armed defensively fifty-four merchantmen. An-
other forty suitable vessels were in preparation. In order to
lighten the strain in the Indian Ocean and to liberate our
light cruisers for their proper work of hunting down the
enemy, I proposed the employment of our old battleships
(Canopus class) as escorts to convoys.
Besides employing these old battleships on convoy, we had
also at the end of August sent three others abroad as rally-
ing points for our cruisers in case a German heavy cruiser
should break out: thus the Glory was sent to Halifax, the
Albion to Gibraltar and the Canopus to the Cape de Verde
station. Naval history afforded numerous good examples of
the use of a protective battleship to give security and defen-
sive superiority to a cruiser force — to serve, in fact, as a float-
ing fortress round which the faster vessels could manoeuvre,
and on which they could fall back. These battleships also
gave protection to the colliers and supply ships at the vari-
ous oceanic bases, without which all our cruiser system would
have broken down. The reader will see the system further
applied as the war advances.
At the beginning of September I decided that the whole
convoy system in the Indian Ocean must be put on a regular
basis.
Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Chief of Staff.
Sir Henry Jackson. ' Oi.ii.
' J September 5, 19 14.
There is no use in our sending escorts which are weaker than
the enemy's ship from which attack is to be apprehended.
Armed merchant cruisers can in no case be counted on except as
ON THE OCEANS 311
an additional reinforcement. Single troopships may be es-
corted by one war vessel, if that vessel is stronger than the
Konigsberg. No convoys of transports are to go across the
Indian Ocean or Red Sea unless escorted by at least two war
vessels, one of which must be stronger than the Konigsberg.
In large convoys of over six vessels a third, and in very large
convoys a fourth, warship should be added. Military needs
must give way to the limitations of escort. Six ships, includ-
ing the Fox, are available; and it ought to be possible to or-
ganise fortnightly if not 12-day convoys from Bombay.
Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, should be directed to
submit, by telegraph, a scheme for such convoys. All trans-
ports which may want convoy must be held over till the next
is ready. W. S. C.
Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Chief of Staff. 0 _ ,
September 15, 19 14.
In order to accelerate the despatch of the third Division
from India to France, and the seven battalions to German
East Africa, it is proposed that the transports now conveying
the Territorial Division to Egypt shall go on to Bombay. It
has also been decided to exchange thirty-one batteries of
[British] Indian regular artillery for service in Europe with an
equal number of Territorial batteries which are to embark
shortly from home. The ships carrying the Territorial bat-
teries will also go on to Bombay and be available as additional
transport.
Please concert these measures with the War Office. It is
most important that these double convoys each way should
hit off our fortnightly escorts which are the governing con-
sideration.
Pray let me have a scheme showing how all this movement
can be fitted in with the greatest speed and smoothness.
w. s. c.
Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Chief of Staff.
Sir Henry Jackson. September 18, 1914.
In addition to the 2 Divisions now coming from India and
the expedition for German East Africa, we must expect the
following: —
3i2 THE WORLD CRISIS
(a) A third Indian Division.
(b) 31 batteries of field artillery from India, to be ex-
changed for an equal amount of Territorial artillery
from home.
(c) 39 battalions of British infantry from India, to be ex-
changed for an equal number of Territorial battalions
from home.
(d) As many more Indian troops as India in these circum-
stances finds it convenient to despatch.
(e) Reinforcements to make good wastage of Indian troops
in the field.
These later movements are not all finally settled and ap-
proved, but it is certain that from now till Christmas we shall
require to maintain regular fortnightly convoys. We cannot
delay till then the work of hunting down Kbnigsberg and Emden
by our own fast cruisers, nor can we keep these vessels em-
ployed indefinitely on duties for which they are unsuited. It
is necessary that 3 old battleships, including Ocean from Gi-
braltar, should proceed at once to the East Indies Station to
relieve, as they arrive, first Dartmouth and Chatham, and next
Black Prince. Minerva should go on to India with the trans-
ports she is now escorting to Egypt, and the East Indies con-
voy force should be as follows: —
Suez : 2 Majesties 1 and Minerva.
Bombay: i Majestic, Swiftsure, and Fox.
These escorts should sail every fortnight to exchange trans-
ports at the rendezvous 500 miles east of Aden. Modern ships
would be released for other duties as these came on the spot.
(2) In the Mediterranean the French should be asked to
supply 4 old battleships and 2 old armoured cruisers for con-
voy duty between Marseilles and Port Said, and asked to
arrange fortnightly sailings via Malta to fit in with the Indian
convoy service. We will escort all transports from England
to Malta at times which will enable the French convoys to
take them up en route.
(3) The force at the Dardanelles must be raised to a strength
sufficient to fight the Turco- German fleet. As soon, therefore,
as the French escort becomes available, Indomitable should
1 The old battleships in question were actually "Canopuses" — the
class above "Majesties."
ON THE OCEANS 313
join Indefatigable. Defence should also be ordered there from
Malta. Weymouth should come home. The four destroyers
from the Canal should rejoin their flotilla at the Dardanelles.
(4) In view of the above, I agree that Fox should remain
with the Indian convoy and that Dartmouth should take the
three transports to Mombassa, afterwards hunting Konigsberg.
(5) The whole of this should be co-ordinated and worked
out into a regular time-table of sailings, to which the military
must adhere, sending more or less transports, according to their
convenience. It must be clearly understood that no inter-
mediate sailings are possible. W S P
The position in the Pacific was also complicated.
When I went to the Admiralty at the end of 191 1, arrange-
ments were made to form the China squadron of the Defence,
the Minotaur, and an armoured cruiser of the County class.
These two first-named ships were in themselves a very satis-
factory disposition against the powerful German armoured
cruisers, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. They were approxi-
mately equal to the Germans in modernity, size and speed,
but of heavier metal, firing a broadside of 2,520 pounds as
against 1,725 pounds of their rivals.
But as time passed and the pressure upon us grew more
severe, we had in 191 3 to bring one of these ships (Defence)
back to the Mediterranean. In order to fill the gap with
the least possible inroad upon our home strength, Prince
Louis being First Sea Lord, we devised a frugal scheme by
which the Triumph — one of the two battleships which had
been built for and bought from Chili to prevent their falling
into Russian hands at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese
War — was made to serve as a depot ship manned on mobilisa-
tion from the crews of the river gunboats on the Yangtse and
the West River. Her sister (the Swiftsure) shortly after-
wards became the flagship in the East Indies. These two
ships had the good speed for battleships of their date of 20*1
knots. They carried four 10-inch and no less than fourteen
314 THE WORLD CRISIS
7 '5-inch guns. They were not heavily armoured, and accord-
ing to our ideas they were a compromise between the battle-
ship and the armoured cruiser. Differing in conception at
many points from the standard types of the Royal Navy,
these vessels did not fit homogeneously into any of our battle
squadrons, and were conveniently employed on special duties.
Without the Triumph Admiral Jerram's squadron {Minotaur
and Hampshire with the light cruiser Yarmouth) would on the
outbreak of war have had little or no margin, though the
Minotaur was the strongest of all our armoured cruisers.
But once the Triumph was mobilised, our superiority, except
in speed, was overwhelming, and we could afford to see how
greater matters went at home before deciding whether to
reinforce the China station or not.
In the first hours of the crisis, my thoughts had turned to
the China station. As early as the 28th July I proposed to
the First Sea Lord the discreet mobilisation of the Triumph
and the concentration of the China squadron upon her; and
this was accordingly effected in good time. Five thousand
miles to the southward was the Australian squadron, con-
sisting of the battle-cruiser Australia, and the two excellent
modern light cruisers Sydney and Melbourne. The Australia
by herself could, of course, defeat the Scharnhorst and Gneise-
nau, though by running different ways one of the pair could
have escaped destruction. Our last look round the oceans
before the fateful signal, left us therefore in no immediate
anxiety about the Pacific.
On the outbreak of war the French armoured cruisers
Montcalm and Dupleix and the Russian light cruisers Askold
and Zemchug, in the Far East, were placed under British com-
mand, thus sensibly increasing our predominance. A few
days later an event of the greatest importance occurred. The
attitude of Japan towards Germany suddenly became one of
fierce menace. No clause in the Anglo- Japanese Treaty en-
titled us to invoke the assistance of Japan. But it became
ON THE OCEANS 315
evident before the war had lasted a week that the Japanese
nation had not forgotten the circumstances and influences
under which they had been forced, at the end of the Chinese
War, to quit Port Arthur. They now showed themselves
resolved to extirpate all German authority and interests in
the Far East. On the 15th, Japan addressed an ultimatum
to Germany demanding within seven days the unconditional
surrender of the German naval base Tsing Tau [Kiaochau],
couching this demand in the very phrases in which nineteen
years before they had been summoned to leave Port Arthur
at the instance of Germany. In reply the German Emperor
commanded his servants to resist to the end; and here, as
almost in every other place where Germans found themselves
isolated in the face of overwhelming force, he was obeyed with
constancy.
The advent of Japan into the war enabled us to use our
China squadron to better advantage in other theatres. The
Newcastle was ordered across the Pacific, where our two old
sloops (the Algerine and Shearwater) were in jeopardy from
the German light cruiser Leipzig. The Triumph was sent to
participate with a small British contingent in the Japanese
attack upon the fortress of Tsing Tau. General arrange-
ments were made by the British and Japanese Admiralties
whereby responsibility for the whole of the Northern Pacific,
except the Canadian Coast, was assumed by Japan.
The table following sets forth the rival forces in the western
Pacific at the outbreak of war. Even without the ships em-
ployed by Japan or the great Japanese reserves which lay
behind them, the superior strength of the Allies was over-
whelming. But the game the two sides had to play was by
no means as unequal as it looked. It was indeed the old game
of Fox and Geese. The two powerful German cruisers Scharn~
horst and Gneisenau, with their two light cruisers, formed a
modern squadron fast and formidable in character. Our
battle-cruiser Australia could catch them and could fight
316
THE WORLD CRISIS
I5
rt
^ N
•s
d
i
>--i
C3
8
1 ^>
*
1 Q
5^ N
U
V
3
w
H
w
a
CO
Ph
t— i
s
CO
1
M
w
pq
o
H
b
O
o
H
H
U3
P
O
i
d -^
a, a
I— >^
d
3
a
H
U
O
£
o
CO
52
*3
0)
Crt
u
a
Id
i
J
d
o
-4->
"^
a
-*-»
+j
ed
cj
u
pq
PQ
<
ft, ft< &s
M
<»
.9 g
PQ ^
-4i
s
8
III
§
S a ^
.^ ^> 8
?% 8 • >s>
to fc} °h
~
8
C5
o
»58
e
8
SO
v
1 *9
1 <^>
CO
1 ^5
.9
u
to
■s
§
8
S? "^
3 3 3
to »5 "J
£ ^ b S 8
t§ ^ t| tq o
2 S
° o
CD ju
5 £
* £
3 rt
5 fc
fe3
J
2
u
2 S
a «
en
© 3
I o
■3 a
d en
O
i
ON THE OCEANS 317
them single-handed. The Minotaur and the Hampshire could
just catch them and, as we held, could fight them with good
prospects of success; but it would be a hard fought action.
If the Triumph were added to Minotaur and Hampshire, there
was no risk at all in the fight but almost insuperable difficulty
in bringing the enemy to action. Among the light cruisers,
the Yarmouth, Melbourne, Sydney and the Japanese Chikuma
could both catch and kill Emden or Nilrnberg. Of our older
light cruisers Fox and Encounter could have fought Emden or
Nilrnberg with a chance of killing or at least of crippling them
before being killed: but neither was fast enough to catch them.
Our remaining cruisers could only be used in combination
with stronger vessels. With our forces aided by two French
and two Russian ships and by the Japanese to the extent
which will be described, the Admiralty had to protect all the
expeditions, convoys and trade in the Pacific. To wit —
The New Zealand convoy to Australia.
The Australian and New Zealand convoy from Australia
to Europe.
The convoy of the British Far Eastern garrisons to Eu-
rope.
The convoy of Indian troops to relieve our Far Eastern
garrisons.
The expedition to Samoa.
The expedition to New Guinea.
All these were in addition to the general trade, which con-
tinued uninterruptedly.
Admiral von Spee, the German Commander in the Pacific,
had therefore no lack of objectives. He had only to hide
and to strike. The vastness of the Pacific and its multi-
318 THE WORLD CRISIS
tude of islands offered him their shelter, and, once he had
vanished, who should say where he would reappear? On
the other hand, there were considerable checks on his action
and a limit, certain though indefinite, to the life of his squad-
ron. With the blockade of Tsing Tau he was cut from his
only base on that side of the world. He had no means of
docking his ships or executing any serious repairs, whether
necessitated by battle or steaming. The wear and tear on
modern ships is considerable, and difficulties multiply with
every month out of dock. To steam at full speed or at high
speed for any length of time on any quest was to use up his
life rapidly. He was a cut flower in a vase; fair to see, yet
bound to die, and to die very soon if the water was not con-
stantly renewed. Moreover, the process of getting coal was
one of extraordinary difficulty and peril. The extensive or-
ganisation of the Admiralty kept the closest watch in every
port on every ton of coal and every likely collier. The pur-
chase of coal and the movement of a collier were tell-tale traces
which might well lay the pursuers on his track. His own
safety and his power to embarrass us alike depended upon
the uncertainty of his movements. But this uncertainty
might be betrayed at any moment by the movement of col-
liers or by the interception of wireless messages. Yet how
could colliers be brought to the necessary rendezvous with-
out wireless messages? There existed in the Pacific only
five German wireless stations, Yap, Apia, Nauru, Rabaul,
Angaur, all of which were destroyed by us within two months
of the outbreak of war. After that there remained only the
wireless on board the German ships, with which it was very
dangerous to breathe a word into the ether. Such was the
situation of Admiral von Spee.
The problem of the Admiralty was also delicate and com-
plex. All our enterprises lay simultaneously under the shadow
of a serious potential danger. You could make scare schemes
which showed that von Spee might turn up with his whole
ON THE OCEANS 319
squadron almost anywhere. On the other hand, we could
not possibly be strong enough every day everywhere to meet
him. We had, therefore, either to balance probabilities and
run risks, or reduce our movements and affairs to very narrow
limits. Absolute security meant something very like abso-
lute paralysis; yet fierce would have been the outcry attendant
either upon stagnation or disaster. We decided deliberately
to carry on our affairs and to take the risk. After all, the
oceans were as wide for us as for von Spee. The map of
the world in the Admiralty War Room measured 20 feet
by 30. Being a seaman's map, its centre was filled by the
greatest mass of water on the globe: the enormous areas of
the Pacific filled upwards of 300 square feet. On this map
the head of an ordinary veil-pin represented the full view to
be obtained from the masts of a ship on a clear day. There
was certainly plenty of room for ships to miss one another.
As has been stated, the British China squadron mobilised
and concentrated at Hong-Kong, and the Australian Navy
at Sydney. Admiral von Spee was at Ponape in the Caro-
line Islands when Great Britain declared war upon Germany.
From Hong-Kong and Sydney to Ponape the distances were
each about 2,750 miles. Although Japan had not yet entered
the war, the German Admiral did not attempt to return to
Kiaochau, as this might have involved immediate battle with
the British China Squadron. He proceeded only as far as
the Ladrone Islands (German), where the Emden from Kiao-
chau, escorting his supply ships, met him on August 12. He
sent the Emden into the Indian Ocean to prey on commerce
and turned himself eastward towards the Marshall Islands.
On August 22 he detached the Number g to Honolulu to ob-
tain information and send messages, to cut the cable between
Canada and New Zealand, and to rejoin him at Christmas
Island on September 8. Here he was in the very centre of
the Pacific.
The Admiralty knew nothing of these movements beyond
320 THE WORLD CRISIS
a report that he was coaling at the Caroline Islands on
August 9. Thereafter he vanished completely from our view.
We could know nothing for certain. The theory of the Ad-
miralty Staff, however, endorsed by Admiral Sir Henry Jack-
son, who was making a special and profound study of this the-
atre, was that he would go to the Marshall Islands and there-
after would most probably work across to the west coast of
South America, or double the Horn on his way back to Europe.
This theory, and the intricate reasoning by which it was sup-
ported, proved to be correct. In the main, though we could
by no means trust ourselves to it and always expected un-
pleasant surprises, it was our dominant hypothesis. It is on
this basis that the operations in the Pacific should be studied.
As early as August 2 the New Zealand Government — ever
in the van of the Empire — had convinced themselves that
war was inevitable, and had already made proposals for rais-
ing forces and striking at the enemy. The Operations Divi-
sion of the War Staff proposed in consequence the capture of
Samoa and the destruction of the wireless station there; and
this was recommended to me by the First Sea Lord and the
Chief of the Staff as a feasible operation. By August 8 New
Zealand telegraphed that if a naval escort could be furnished
the expedition to attack Samoa could start on August 11.
The staff concurred in this, holding that the Gneisenau and
Scharnhorst were adequately covered by the Australian squad-
ron. I assented the same day. It was arranged that the ex-
pedition should meet the battle-cruiser Australia and the
French cruiser Montcalm at or on the way to Noumea.
Another expedition from Australia to attack German New
Guinea had also been organised by the Government of the
Commonwealth. The uncertainty about the Scharnhorst and
Gneisenau invested all movements in those waters with a
certain hazardous delicacy. It was thought, however, that
the light cruisers Melbourne1 and Sydney could convoy the
1 Encounter went instead of Melbourne.
ON THE OCEANS 321
Commonwealth New Guinea expedition northward, keeping
inside the Barrier Reef, and that before they came out into
open waters the New Guinea convoy could be joined by Aus-
tralia and Montcalm, who would by then have completed the
escort of the New Zealand expedition to Samoa. We thought
it above all things important that these expeditions, once
they had landed and taken possession of the German colonies,
should be self-sufficing, and that no weak warships should
be left in the harbours to support them. Any such vessels,
apart from the difficulty of sparing them, would be an easy
prey for the two large German cruisers.
Samoa was occupied on the 30th August. The wireless
station at Nauru was destroyed on the 10th September. The
Australian contingent was picked up by the battle-cruiser
Australia on September 9 and arrived at Rabaul safely two
days later.
We had now to provide for the Australian convoy to Eu-
rope which was due to leave Sydney on September 27 for
Port Adelaide, where they would be joined by the New Zea-
land contingent and its own escort as well as by the 'Aus-
tralian Fleet' (Australia, Sydney and Melbourne) as soon as
they were free from the New Guinea expedition. Our orig-
inal proposal for the escort of the Australian Army was, there-
fore, Australia, Sydney and Melbourne, with the small cruisers
from New Zealand. To cover the Commonwealth during the
absence of all her Fleet, it was arranged that the Minotaur,
together with the Japanese Ibuki and Chikuma, should come
south to New Britain Islands.
In the middle of September the New Zealand contingent
was due to sail for Adelaide. The Australia and her consorts
were still delayed in New Guinea, where some delay was caused
by the German resistance. Great anxiety was felt in New Zea-
land at the prospect of throwing their contingent across to
Australia with no better escort than the two P class cruisers.
They pointed out the dangers from the Scharnhorst and Gnei-
322 THE WORLD CRISIS
senau, which on September 14 had been reported off Samoa.
The Admiralty view was that it was most improbable the
Schamhorst and Gneisenau could know of the contemplated
New Zealand expedition, still less of the date of its sailing;
that in order to deliver an attack in New Zealand waters they
would have to steam far from their coaling bases north of
the Equator, and would indeed have to be accompanied by
their colliers, greatly reducing their speed and hampering
their movements. In these circumstances the Admiralty
foresaw but little danger to the New Zealand convoy in the
first part of their voyage, were unable to provide further pro-
tection for this stage, and expressed the opinion that the risk
should be accepted. To this decision the New Zealand Gov-
ernment bowed on September 21, and it was settled that the
New Zealand convoy should sail on the 25th. Meanwhile,
however, renewed exploits by the Emden in the Bay of Ben-
gal created a natural feeling of alarm in the mind of the New
Zealand and Australian public; and without prejudice to our
original view, we decided to make arrangements to remove
these apprehensions.
On the 24th news arrived that the New Guinea expedition
had successfully overcome all opposition, and we then deter-
mined on the following change of plans, viz. Minotaur and
Ibuki to go to Wellington and escort the New Zealanders to
Adelaide, while Australia and Montcalm, after convoying the
auxiliaries and weak warships back from New Guinea to
within the shelter of the Barrier Reef, should hunt for the
Schamhorst and Gneisenau in the Marshall Islands, whither
it seemed probable they were proceeding. This decision al-
tered the composition of the escort of the Australian convoy,
and their protection across the Pacific and Indian Oceans
was to an important extent confided to a vessel which flew
the war flag of Japan. This historic fact should be an addi-
tional bond of goodwill among the friendly and allied nations
who dwell in the Pacific.
ON THE OCEANS 323
Meanwhile the depredations of the Emden in the Bay of
Bengal continued. On the 22nd she appeared off Madras,
bombarded the Burma Company's oil tanks, and threw a
few shells into the town before she was driven off by the bat-
teries. This episode, following on the disturbance of the Cal-
cutta-Colombo trade route and the numerous and almost
daily sinkings of merchant ships in the Bay of Bengal, created
widespread alarm, and on October 1 I sent the following min-
ute to the First Sea Lord, proposing, inter alia, a concen-
tration on a large scale in Indian waters against the Emden.
This concentration would comprise Hampshire, Yarmouth,
Sydney, Melbourne, Chikuma (Japan), Zemchug and Askold
(Russian), Psyche, Pyramus and Philomel — a total of ten —
and was capable of being fully effective in about a month.
Secretary. October 1, 1914.
Chief of Staff.
First Sea Lord.
Three transports, empty but fitted for carrying cavalry,
are delayed in Calcutta through fear of Emden. This involves
delaying transport of artillery and part of a cavalry division
from Bombay. The Cabinet took a serious view, and pressed
for special convoy. Have you any ship ? I should be very
sorry to interrupt the offensive operations against Emden for
the sake of convoying three empty transports. I was inclined
to recommend that the three should put to sea at night with
lights out and steer wide of the track. It is 100 to 1 that they
would get round safely, and a 1,000 to 1 that two out of the
three would get round safely. Let me have your proposals at
once. It is clear that the transports have got to go.1
3|C 3|C #f* 5p 5JC
Now that Scharnhorst and Gneisenau have been located in
the Society Islands there is no need for Melbourne and Sydney
to remain in Australasian waters. Sydney should immediately
be ordered to join Hampshire, Yarmouth and Chikuma in the
Emden hunt, and Melbourne should come there with the Aus-
tralasian convoy. As soon as Zemchug and Askold have fin-
1 They went without escort and without mishap.
324 THE WORLD CRISIS
ished with their convoy, they should return and join Hamp-
shire. This will give seven ships searching for Emden and
avoid the necessity of moving one of the three Light Cruisers
now hunting Konigsberg. Numbers are everything, and the
extirpation of these pests is a most important object.
What is the use of Psyche, Pyramus and Philomel in New
Zealand waters after the convoy has started ? There is noth-
ing but the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau to be considered, and
they are sufficiently dealt with by —
(i) Australia.
Montcalm.
(2) First Japanese Squadron.
(3) Second Japanese Squadron.
On the other hand, these three vessels, together with Pioneer,
would be good for searching for Emden in company with the
faster and more powerful ships. I propose, therefore, that
they should accompany the Australian and New Zealand con-
voys home to Indian waters, and should then join up with the
seven Cruisers which will then be under Hampshire in hunting
Emden, making a total of ten vessels available a month from
now. The necessary arrangements to enable them, in spite of
their limited fuel capacity, to get to Colombo can easily be
made. In the event of Emden being captured before this con-
centration is complete, all these vessels should be sent to assist
in the hunt for Konigsberg, or, conversely, if Konigsberg is
caught, the three Light Cruisers should turn over to the
Emden. It is no use stirring about the oceans with two or three
ships. When we have got Cruiser sweeps of 8 or 10 vessels
ten or fifteen miles apart there will be some good prospect
of utilising information as to the whereabouts of the Emden
in such a way as to bring her to action. Such large and de-
cisive measures are much the cheapest and most satisfactory
in the end. W S C
And again on October 15.
Sydney should escort Australians and thereafter hunt
Emden.
This shot as will presently be seen went home.
ON THE OCEANS 325
The press and the public were not in a position to under-
stand all that the Admiralty were doing nor to appreciate
the general results achieved. All they saw at this time was
that a few German cruisers were apparently doing whatever
they chose upon the oceans and sinking British merchantmen
day after day. A great deal of discontent began to make
itself heard and felt. I therefore prepared a note for pub-
lication in the hopes of placating our critics.
October 24, 1914.
The Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following state-
ment in regard to the capture and destruction of British mer-
chant ships by German warships: —
Eight or nine German cruisers are believed to be at large
in the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Indian Oceans. Search-
ing for these vessels and working in concert under the vari-
ous Commanders-in-Chief are upwards of 70 British (includ-
ing Australian), Japanese, French, and Russian cruisers, not
including auxiliary cruisers. Among these are a number of
the fastest British cruisers. The vast expanses of sea and
ocean and the many thousand islands of the archipelagos of-
fer an almost infinite choice of movement to the enemy's
ships. In spite of every effort to cut off their coal supply,
it has hitherto been maintained by one means or another in
the face of increasing difficulties.
The discovery and destruction of these few enemy cruisers
is therefore largely a matter of time, patience, and good luck.
The public should have confidence that the Commanders-in-
Chief and the experienced captains serving under them are
doing all that is possible and taking the best steps to bring
the enemy to action. They have so far been also occupied
in very serious and important convoy duty, but this work
has somewhat lessened and the number of searching cruisers
is continually augmented.
Meanwhile, merchant ships must observe Admiralty in-
structions, which it is obviously impossible to specify, and
use all the precautions which have been suggested. On routes
where these instructions have been followed, they have so
326 THE WORLD CRISIS
far proved very effective. On the other hand, where they
have been disregarded captures have been made. The same
vastness of sea which has so far enabled the German cruisers
to avoid capture will protect the trade.
The only alternative to the methods now adopted would
be the marshalling of merchantmen in regular convoys at
stated intervals. So far it has not been thought necessary
to hamper trade by enforcing such a system. The percent-
age of loss is much less than was reckoned on before the war.
Out of 4,000 British ships engaged in foreign trade only 39
have been sunk by the enemy, or just under 1 per cent, in all.
The rate of insurance for cargoes, which on the outbreak
of war was fixed at 5 guineas per cent., has now been reduced
to 2 guineas per cent, without injury to the solvency of the
fund. For hulls, as apart from cargoes, the insurance has
also been considerably reduced. Between 8,000 and 9,000
foreign voyages have been undertaken to and from United
Kingdom ports, less than five per thousand of which have
been interfered with, and of these losses a large number have
been caused by merchant vessels taking everything for granted
and proceeding without precautions as if there were no war.
On the other hand, the German oversea trade has prac-
tically ceased to exist. Nearly all their fast ships which could
have been used as auxiliary cruisers were promptly penned
into neutral harbours or have taken refuge in their own.
Among the comparatively few German ships which have put
to sea, 133 have been captured, or nearly four times the num-
ber of those lost by the very large British mercantile marine.
In these circumstances, there is no occasion for anxiety
and no excuse for complaint. On the contrary, the more
fully the facts concerning our oversea trade and its protection
by the Royal Navy can be disclosed, and the more attentively
they are studied, the greater will be the confidence and satis-
faction with which the situation can be viewed.
The various changes of plan necessary to meet the natural
anxieties of the New Zealand Government entailed a delay
of three weeks in the sailing of the Australian convoy. This,
Lord Kitchener declared, made no difference, as they could
continue their indispensable training equally well in Australia.
ON THE OCEANS 327
By October 25, when the convoy was about to sail, the
rebellion in South Africa introduced another disturbing ele-
ment. It was decided by the Cabinet on that date to make
arrangements for the Australian and New Zealand Army
Corps to come via the Cape instead of via the Suez Canal,
so as to be available in South Africa if need be. Alternative
arrangements of a complicated nature were therefore pre-
pared. On the 30th, however, in view of later advices from
South Africa, it was arranged for the whole convoy to pro-
ceed together to Colombo and for the decision about the last
part of the route to be delayed until then. The convoy started
on November 1 under the escort of the Minotaur, Ibuki, Mel-
bourne and Sydney.
Before they reached Colombo the Sydney found her quarry
and the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps was more
needed in Egypt than at the Cape. But this will appear in
its proper place.
It remained to carry the Canadian Army across the At-
lantic. Upwards of 25,000 volunteers of a very high in-
dividual quality, partially trained in Valcartier camp, were
embarked in the St. Lawrence in a convoy of thirty-one ships,
to which were added two ships carrying the Newfoundland
contingent and a British battalion from Bermuda. Rear-
Admiral Wemyss with a squadron of light cruisers was en-
trusted with the actual duties of escort, but the essential
protection of the convoy was secured by far more distant
and powerful agencies. All the Cruiser Squadrons of the
Grand Fleet were spread in two lines between the coasts of
Norway and Scotland to guard against a sortie by the Ger-
man fast vessels, and the Grand Fleet itself remained at sea
in their support to the northward. The North American
Squadron under Rear-Admiral Hornby covered the German
merchant cruisers which were lurking in New York Harbour.
328 THE WORLD CRISIS
Two old battleships, the Glory and the Majestic, were ordered
to meet the convoy at a rendezvous well off the beaten track,
and Admiral Hornby himself in the Lancaster accompanied
them the first portion of the route. Lastly, the Princess Royal
was detached from the Grand Fleet to meet the convoy in
mid- Atlantic and thus guard against any German battle-
cruiser which might conceivably have slipped through the
wide areas patrolled by Sir John Jellicoe. The movements
of the Princess Royal were kept secret from everybody, and
even the Canadian Government, in spite of their natural
anxiety, were denied this reassurance.
The convoy sailed on October 3 and ten days later safely
approached the mouth of the English Channel. The inten-
tion had been to disembark the Canadian troops at Ports-
mouth, where all arrangements had been made for them.
But on the very day they were due to arrive a German sub-
marine was reported off Cherbourg and another was sighted
off the Isle of Wight by the Portsmouth Defence Flotilla.
On this we insisted, whatever the military inconvenience,
on turning the whole convoy into Plymouth. During Oc-
tober 14 this armada bearing the first flower of the martial
spirit of Canada was safely berthed in Plymouth Sound.
With this event, all the initial movements in the Imperial
concentration had been completed. They had comprised the
transportation of the equivalent of 5 divisions from India
to Europe and their replacement by 3 divisions of Ter-
ritorials from England; the collection of the 7th and 8th divi-
sions from all the garrisons and fortresses of the British Em-
pire with consequential replacements from home and from
India; the transportation of approximately two divisions
from Canada to England; and lastly — though this was not
finished till December — that of approximately two divisions
from Australia and New Zealand to Egypt. The effect of
this concentration was to add a reinforcement of 5 British
regular divisions (7th, 8th, 27th, 28th and 29th) and 2
GENERAL SITUATION
OVERSEAS EARLY IN
OCTOBER 1914.
The chart includes battle-
ships, battlecruiscrs.cruisers,
light cruisers, sloops and
armed merchant cruisers.
Armoured vessels are
shown in capitals, but other-
wise no attempt has been
made to discriminate be-
tween classes.
Allied vesselshave been in-
cluded where their presence
affects the situation. They
are distinguished by having
the initial letter of their
nationality placed after their
names.
F. French.
J. Japanese.
R. Russian.
ON THE OCEANS 329
Anglo-Indian divisions to the regular forces immediately
available to support the 6 regular divisions with which we
had begun the war, raising our Army in France by the
end of November to approximately 13 divisions of highly
trained long-service troops. In addition the 4 Canadian
and Australian divisions were completing their training in
England and Egypt, and were held to be in a more advanced
state of preparation than the 10 divisions of Territorials
which remained in England or the 24 divisions of the New
Armies which Lord Kitchener was raising. The whole busi-
ness of transportation by sea while all the enemy's cruisers
were still at large had been conducted without accident of
any kind or without the loss of a single ship or a single life.
CHAPTER XIV
IN THE NARROW SEAS
'This battle fares like to the morning's war,
When dying clouds contend with growing light,
What time the shepherd, blowing of his nails,
Can neither call it, perfect day nor night.
Now sways it this way, like a mighty sea,
Forced by the tide to combat with the wind;
Now sways it that way, like the selfsame sea,
Forced to retire by fury of the wind:
Some time the flood prevails, and then the wind;
Now one the better, then another best;
Both tugging to be victors, breast to breast,
Yet neither conquerors nor conquered:
So is the equal poise of the fell war.'
Henry VI. Part III.
Action of August 28 in the Heligoland Bight — Fate of the German
Light Cruisers — Paralysis of German Naval Enterprise — The
Ostend Demonstration — The Royal Naval Air Service — The Air
Situation at the Outbreak of War — The Admiralty take Charge
at Home — The Zeppelin Menace and the 'Hornets' — Offence the
true Defence — Beginning of the Dunkirk Guerrilla — Samson's
Aeroplanes — The Armoured Cars — First dawn of the Tank idea
— General Joffre's request — The Omnibus Brigade — An Em-
barrassing Responsibility — The Sinking of the Aboukir, Hogue
and Cressy.
I NOW have to chronicle a brilliant episode which came
at a most timely moment and throughout which we en-
joyed the best of good luck. My insistent desire to develop
a minor offensive against the Germans in the Heligoland Bight
led to conferences with Commodore Tyrwhitt, who com-
manded the light cruisers and destroyers of 'The Harwich
Striking Force,' and Commodore Keyes, the head of the Sub-
marine Service also stationed at Harwich. On August 23
330
IN THE NARROW SEAS 331
Commodore Keyes called personally upon me at the Ad-
miralty with a proposal for 'a well-organised drive commenc-
ing before dawn from inshore close to the enemy's coast/
On the 24th I presided at a meeting in my room between him
and Commodore Tyrwhitt and the First Sea Lord and the
Chief of the Staff.
The plan which the two Commodores then outlined was
at once simple and daring. Since the first hours of the war
our submarines had prowled about in the Heligoland Bight.
They had now accumulated during a period of three weeks
accurate information about the dispositions of the enemy.
They knew that he was in the habit of keeping a flotilla of
destroyers attended by a couple of small cruisers, cruising and
patrolling each night to the North of Heligoland, and that
these were accustomed to be relieved shortly after daylight
by a second flotilla which worked on a much less extended
beat. They proposed to take two flotillas of our best de-
stroyers and two light cruisers from Harwich by night and
reach just before dawn a point inside the Northern Coast of
the Heligoland Bight not far from the island of Sylt. From
this point they would make a left-handed scoop inshore, falling
upon and chasing back the outcoming flotilla if they met it,
and then would all turn together in a long line abreast West-
ward towards home to meet and if possible destroy the in-
coming German flotilla. Six British submarines in two divi-
sions would take part in the operation so as to attack the
German heavy ships should they come out, and two battle-
cruisers (the Invincible and New Zealand) then stationed at
the Humber would act as support.
Such was in short the plan proposed by these officers and
approved by the First Sea Lord. Action was fixed for the
28th. As soon as Sir John Jellicoe was informed of these in-
tentions, he offered to send in further support three battle-
cruisers and six light cruisers. He did more. He sent Sir
David Beatty. The result was a success which far exceeded
332 THE WORLD CRISIS
the hopes of the Admiralty, and produced results of a far-
reaching character upon the whole of the naval war.
At dawn on the 28th, Admiral Tyrwhitt's flotillas, led by
the Arethusa and Fearless, reached their point of attack and,
in the words of Admiral Scheer, ' broke into the Heligoland
Bight.' The enemy was taken by surprise. The weather
near the land was increasingly misty. The Heligoland bat-
teries came into action, but without effect. The German
battleships and battle-cruisers could not cross the bar of the
outer Jade owing to the tide till 1 p.m. Only the German
light cruisers on patrol or close at hand in the Elbe or the
Ems could come to the aid of their flotillas. A confused, dis-
persed and prolonged series of combats ensued between the
flotillas and light cruisers and continued until after four o'clock
in the afternoon. During all this time the British light forces
were rampaging about the enemy's most intimate and
jealously guarded waters.
Very little, however, turned out as had been planned.
Owing to a mischance, arising primarily from a fault in Ad-
miralty staff work, the message apprising Commodores Keyes
and Tyrwhitt of the presence of Admiral Beatty with his
additional battle cruisers and light cruisers, did not reach
them in time; nor was Admiral Beatty aware of the areas in
which the British submarines were working. Several awk-
ward embarrassments followed from this and might easily
have led to disastrous mistakes. However, fortune was
steady, and the initial surprise together with the resolute
offensive carried us safely through. The German light cruisers
precipitately proceeding to the assistance of their flotillas and
animated by the hopes of cutting off our own, ran into the
British battle-cruisers. Admiral Beatty, in spite not only of
the risk of mines and submarines, but also — for all he could
know — of meeting superior forces, had with extraordinary
audacity led his squadron far into the Bight. Two enemy
cruisers (the Ariadne and the Koln) were smashed to pieces
IN THE NARROW SEAS 333
by the enormous shells of the Lion and the Princess Royal:
a third (the Mainz) was sunk by the light cruisers and de-
stroyers. Three others (the Frauenlob, Strassburg and the
Stettin) limped home with many casualties. One German
destroyer was sunk. The rest in the confusion and light mist
escaped, though several were injured.
The good news trickled into the Admiralty during the day,
but for some time we were very anxious about the Arethusa.
A feed-pipe had been smashed by a shell and her steaming
power was reduced to seven or eight knots. However, she
returned unmolested to the Thames.
Not a single British ship was sunk or, indeed, seriously
injured; and our casualties did not exceed thirty-five killed
and about forty wounded, in spite of the fact that, in the
words of the German Lieutenant Tholens, 'The English ships
made the greatest efforts to pick up the survivors.'1 Two
hundred and twenty-four Germans, many desperately
wounded, were rescued in circumstances of much danger by
Commodore Keyes on the destroyer Lurcher, and brought to
England. Considerably more than a thousand Germans, in-
cluding the Flotilla Admiral and the Destroyer Commodore,
perished. A son of Admiral von Tirpitz was among the
prisoners. Much more important, however, than these ma-
terial gains was the effect produced upon the morale of the
enemy. The Germans knew nothing of our defective Staff
work and of the risks we had run. All they saw was that
the British did not hesitate to hazard their greatest vessels
as well as their light craft in the most daring offensive action
and had escaped apparently unscathed. They felt as we
should have felt had German destroyers broken into the
Solent and their battle-cruisers penetrated as far as the Nab.
The results of this action were far-reaching. Henceforward
the weight of British naval prestige lay heavy across all Ger-
man sea enterprise. Upon the Emperor the impression pro-
1 Admiral Scheer, p. 52.
334 THE WORLD CRISIS
duced was decisive. Thus Scheer (p. 57): 'The restrictions
imposed on the Battle Fleet were adhered to/ And still more
explicit, von Tirpitz (p. 357): ' . . . August 28th, a day-
fateful, both in its after effects and incidental results, for the
work of our navy. . . . The Emperor did not want losses
of this sort. . . . Orders were issued by the Emperor . . .
after an audience to Pohl, to which I as usual was not sum-
moned, to restrict the initiative of the Commander-in-Chief
of the North Sea Fleet: the loss of ships was to be avoided,
fleet sallies and any greater undertakings must be approved
by His Majesty in advance,' etc. On von Tirpitz protesting
against 'this muzzling policy' . . . 'there sprang up from
that day forth an estrangement between the Emperor and
myself, which steadily increased.'
The German Navy was indeed 'muzzled.' Except for fur-
tive movements by individual submarines and minelayers not
a dog stirred from August till November. Meanwhile our
strength, both offensive afloat and defensive in our harbours,
was steadily and rapidly increasing.
The news of this naval action reached the French and British
armies in the dark hour before the dawn of victory and was
everywhere published to the retreating troops.1
As the German armies pressed forward towards Paris they
turned the back of their right shoulder increasingly towards
the sea. The Belgian Army making a sortie from Antwerp
struck towards the German lines of communication and
endeavoured to hamper and delay the great advance. In
order to help the Belgians and to take some pressure off our
own hard-pressed Army, the Admiralty, in consultation with
Lord Kitchener, attempted to make a diversion. A brigade of
Marines was disembarked, covered by warships (Aug. 26), at
Ostend in the hopes that it would attract the attention of the
1 See also Appendix.
IN THE NARROW SEAS 335
enemy and give him the impression that larger forces would
follow from the sea.
Telegram to Belgian Government.
25. 8. 14.
'In order to delay southward German advance and to create
diversion favourable to the forward movement of the Belgian
Army, Admiralty wish to send a brigade of Marines, 3,000
strong, to Ostend at daylight, 26th, covered by battleships and
cruisers accompanied by an aeroplane squadron. This brigade
will push out reconnaissances to Bruges, Thourout, and Dix-
mude, and will remain at Ostend to cover the disembarkation
of a larger force should circumstances render that desirable.
Do you agree ? If so, please send the necessary instructions
to your local authorities. Publicity is useful in this case. The
impression to be produced is that a considerable British army
is landing/
Orders to General Aston.
25. 8. 14.
ci. At daylight to-morrow, if circumstances allow, you will
disembark such portions of your brigade as have arrived at
Ostend and occupy the town. You will push out reconnais-
sances of cyclists to Bruges, Thourout, and Dixmude. You
will establish yourself at Ostend, forming an entrenched
picket line around the town in such a way as to enable you to
cover the debarkation of a Division of the Army. A squadron
of aeroplanes will reach you before noon, having previously
made an aerial reconnaissance of the country within 30 miles
of Ostend. The aeroplanes will be placed under your orders.
'2. The object of this movement is to create a diversion,
favourable to the Belgians, who are advancing from Antwerp
and to threaten the western flank of the German southward
advance. It should therefore be ostentatious. You should
not advance inland from Ostend without further orders, but
some enterprise may be permitted to the patrols. Informa-
tion about the enemy will be supplied you personally at the
Admiralty.
'The object in view would be fully attained if a considerable
force of the enemy were attracted to the coast. You will be
re-embarked as soon as this is accomplished. '
336 THE WORLD CRISIS
To give further publicity I announced in the House of
Commons that a British force had begun landing at Ostend.
The Marines remained on shore for the best part of a week
and were then withdrawn. The old battleships and cruisers
which covered them were no doubt in more danger from sub-
marines than we thought at the time, but no mishap occurred;
nor was there any loss ashore or afloat. There was no means
at the time of knowing whether this petty operation exercised
any appreciable influence on German movements. We now
know that it was certainly a factor. The Head of the Opera-
tions Branch of the German General Staff in his narrative
shows that the news of this landing reached Main Head-
quarters on August 30. He says: —
'One day countless British troops were said to have landed
at Ostend and to be marching on Antwerp; on another that
there were about to be great sorties from Antwerp. Even
landings of Russian troops, 80,000 men, at Ostend were men-
tioned. At Ostend a great entrenched camp for the English
was in preparation.'
General Dupont, the French Director of Military Intelli-
gence, goes much further and ranks the Belgian sortie as a
culminating element in the German decision to make a gen-
eral retreat, taken on September io.1
An unbroken chain of events drew the Admiralty again to
the Belgian Coast; and to explain this a digression is necessary.
Before the war the British air force was divided into the
Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service, the former
of which were to be concerned with aeroplanes and the latter
with hydro-aeroplanes, or seaplanes as I christened them for
short. The War Office claimed on behalf of the Royal Flying
Corps complete and sole responsibility for the aerial defence of
Great Britain. But owing to the difficulties of getting money,
they were unable to make any provision for this responsibility,
dupont, 'Haut Commandment Allemand en 1914,' p. 92.
IN THE NARROW SEAS 337
every aeroplane they had being earmarked for the Expedi-
tionary Force. Seeing this and finding myself able to procure
funds by various shifts and devices, I began in 191 2 and 1913,
to form under the Royal Naval Air Service flights of aero-
planes as well as of seaplanes for the aerial protection of our
naval harbours, oil tanks and vulnerable points, and also for
a general strengthening of our exiguous and inadequate avia-
tion. In consequence I had in my own hand on the eve of
the war fifty efficient naval machines, or about one-third of
the number in possession of the Army. The War Office viewed
this development with disfavour, and claimed that they alone
should be charged with the responsibility for home defence.
When asked how they proposed to discharge this duty, they
admitted sorrowfully that they had not got the machines and
could not get the money. They adhered however to the prin-
ciple.
When the war began the situation foreseen arose. The
whole of the military aeroplanes went to France at once with
the Expeditionary Force, and not a single squadron or even
an effective machine remained to guard British vulnerable
points from German aerial attack. The Admiralty was, how-
ever, found provided with a respectable force of its own which
immediately took over the protection of our dockyards and
patrolled our shores in connection with the coast watch.
As the Germans overran Belgium and all the Channel ports
were exposed, the danger of air attacks upon Great Britain
became most serious and real. Zeppelins had already cruised
over Antwerp, and it was known that London was in range
of the Zeppelin sheds at Diisseldorf and Cologne. To meet
this danger there was nothing except the naval aeroplanes
the Admiralty had been able to scrape and smuggle together.
On September 3 Lord Kitchener asked me in Cabinet whether
I would accept, on behalf of the Admiralty, the responsibility
for the aerial defence of Great Britain, as the War Office had
no means of discharging it. I thereupon undertook to do
338 THE WORLD CRISIS
what was possible with the wholly inadequate resources which
were available. There were neither anti-aircraft guns nor
searchlights, and though a few improvisations had been made,
nearly a year must elapse before the efficient supplies necessary
could be forthcoming. Meanwhile at any moment half a
dozen Zeppelins might arrive to bomb London or, what was
more serious, Chatham, Woolwich or Portsmouth.
I rated the Zeppelin much lower as a weapon of war than
almost any one else. I believed that this enormous bladder of
combustible and explosive gas would prove to be easily destruc-
tible. I was sure the fighting aeroplane, rising lightly laden
from its own base, armed with incendiary bullets, would harry,
rout and burn these gaseous monsters. I had proclaimed this
opinion to the House of Commons in 1913, using the often-
quoted simile of the hornets.
I therefore did everything in my power in the years betore
the war to restrict expenditure upon airships and to concen-
trate our narrow and stinted resources upon aeroplanes. I
confined the naval construction of airships to purely experi-
mental limits, and in April, 191 5, when the slow progress and
inferior quality of our only rigid experimental airship were
manifest, I gave orders that it should be scrapped, the plant
broken up and the labour and material devoted to increasing
the output of aeroplanes. Had I had my way, no airships
would have been built by Great Britain during the war (except
the little ' Blimps ' for teasing submarines). After I left the
Admiralty this policy was reversed, and forty millions of
money were squandered by successive Boards in building
British Zeppelins, not one of which on any occasion ever ren-
dered any effective fighting service. Meanwhile the alter-
native policy of equipping the Fleet with aerial observation
by flying aeroplanes off warships or off properly constructed
carriers lagged pitifully with the result that at the Battle of
Jutland we had no British airships and only one aeroplane in
the air.
IN THE NARROW SEAS 339
The hornet theory, at one time so fiercely derided, was, of
course, ultimately vindicated by the war. Zeppelins were
clawed down in flames from the sky over both land and sea
by aeroplanes until they did not dare to come any more. The
aeroplane was the means by which the Zeppelin menace was
destroyed, and it was virtually the only means, apart from
weather and their own weakness, by which Zeppelins were
ever destroyed.
However, although my thought was perfectly sound in
principle and the policy following from it was unquestionably
right, we were not in a position at the beginning of the war to
produce effective results. Aeroplane engines were not power-
ful enough to reach the great heights needed for the attack of
Zeppelins in the short time available. Night flying had only
just been born; the location of aircraft by sound was unknown;
the network of telephones and observation points was non-
existent. And here was the danger, certainly real and not
easy to measure, literally on top of us.
It was easy to order the necessary guns, searchlights, etc.,
and set on foot the organisation which should produce and
employ them. But it was no use sitting down and waiting
for a year while these preparations were completing. Only
offensive action could help us. I decided immediately to
strike, by bombing from aeroplanes, at the Zeppelin sheds
wherever these gigantic structures could be found in Germany
and secondly, to prevent the erection of any new Zeppelin
sheds in the conquered parts of Belgium or France. Here
again the policy was right. Our resources were, however, fee-
ble and slender. Compared to the terrific developments at
the end of the war, they were pitiful. Still, they were all we
had, and all that our knowledge of aviation at that time could
bestow. Deficiencies in material had to be made good by
daring. All honour to the naval airmen, the pioneers of the
aerial offensive, who planned and executed in these early
months the desperate flights over hostile territory in an ele-
34Q THE WORLD CRISIS
ment then scarcely known, which resulted in the raids on
Diisseldorf and Cologne on the Rhine, Friedricbshaven on
Lake Constance, and Cuxhaven in the Heligoland Bight.
Altogether in the first twelve months of the war six Zeppelins
were destroyed in the air or in their sheds by the offensive
action of a handful of British naval airmen; and few were
destroyed by any other agency except accident.
In order to strike at the Zeppelin sheds in Germany and to
prevent the erection of new ones in Belgium, it was necessary
to start from as near the enemy's line as possible. Extracts
from my own minutes, principally to Captain Sueter, the
enterprising and energetic Director of the Air Division, give
as good an account as any other.
Director of Air Division. ^ ' 9*4-
Chief of Staff.
The largest possible force of naval aeroplanes should be
stationed in Calais or Dunkirk. Reports have been received,
and it is also extremely probable, that the Germans will at-
tempt to attack London and other places by Zeppelin airships,
of which it is said a considerable number exist. The close
proximity of the French coast to England renders such an
attack thoroughly feasible. The proper defence is a thorough
and continual search of the country for 70 to 100 miles inland
with a view to marking down any temporary airship bases, or
airships replenishing before starting to attack. Should such
airships be located they should be immediately attacked.
Commander Samson, with Major Gerrard as second in com-
mand, will be entrusted with this duty; and the Director of
Air Division will take all steps to supply them with the neces-
sary pilots, aeroplanes and equipment.
Secretary. September 3, 19 14.
Director of Air Division.
Third Sea Lord.
Aerial searchlights must immediately be got ready for use
in conjunction with the aerial guns. Propose me without de-
lay the quickest means of meeting this need, with estimates of
IN THE NARROW SEAS 341
time and money. At least thirty or forty aerial searchlights
are required. 'Vernon'1 should co-operate. Drastic and
energetic action is required.
2. Let me have a return on one sheet of paper showing all
anti-aircraft guns, regular or improvised, available afloat and
ashore, at the present time; and what deliveries may be ex-
pected in the next two months. Let me have also any sug-
gestions for increasing their number. No one can doubt that
aerial attack upon England must be a feature of the near
future.
Secretary. September 5, 19 14.
First Sea Lord.
Third Sea Lord.
Chief of Staff.
Director of Naval Ordnance.
Director of Air Division.
There can be no question of defending London by artillery
against aerial attack. It is quite impossible to cover so vast
an area; and if London, why not every other city ? Defence
against aircraft by guns is limited absolutely to points of mili-
tary value. . . .
Far more important than London are the vulnerable points
in the Medway and at Dover and Portsmouth. Oil-tanks,
power-houses, lock-gates, magazines, airship sheds, all require
to have their aerial guns increased in number. Portsmouth
in particular requires attention now that enemy's territory
has come so near.
Aerial searchlights must be provided in connection with
every group of guns. . . .
But, after all, the great defence against aerial menace
is to attack the enemy's aircraft as near as possible to their
point of departure. Director of Air Division has already re-
ceived directions on this. The principle is as follows: —
(a) A strong oversea force of aeroplanes to deny the French
and Belgian coasts to the enemy's aircraft, and to attack all
Zeppelins and air bases or temporary air bases which it may
be sought to establish, and which are in reach.
(b) We must be in constant telegraphic and telephonic
1 The Naval torpedo school centre.
342 THE WORLD CRISIS
communication with the oversea aeroplane squadrons. We
must maintain an intercepting force of aeroplanes and airships
at some convenient point within range of a line drawn from
Dover to London, and local defence flights at Eastchurch and
Calshot.
(c) A squadron of aeroplanes will be established at Hen-
don, also in telephonic communication with the other stations,
for the purpose of attacking enemy aircraft which may attempt
to molest London. Landing grounds must be prepared in all
the parks; railings must be removed, and the area marked out
by a large white circle by day and by a good system of lighting
at night. It is indispensable that airmen of the Hendon flight
should be able to fly by night, and their machines must be
fitted with the necessary lights and instruments.
Agreeably with the above, instructions must be prepared for
the guidance of the Police, Fire Brigade, and civil population
under aerial bombardment. This will have to be sustained
with composure. Arrangements must be concerted with the
Home Office and the Office of Works for the extinction of lights
upon a well-conceived plan, for the clearance and illumination
in the parks, in order that the defending aeroplanes can have
freedom of action, etc.
The whole of the points dealt with in this minute are to be
elaborated and put into precise detail this afternoon by a
Committee composed as follows: —
Third Sea Lord (in the Chair).
Director of Air Division.
Director of Naval Ordnance.
And a representative of the War Office from either the
Master General of the Ordnance or Home Defence Depart-
ment.
I expect to receive not later than to-morrow a definite pro-
gramme for action within the lines of this minute.
The whole matter is of the highest urgency.
Secretary. September 5, 19 14.
First Sea Lord.
Director of Air Division.
In order to discharge adequately the responsibilities which
we have assumed for the aerial defence of England, it is neces-
sary that we should maintain an aerial control over the area
IN THE NARROW SEAS 343
approximately 100 miles radius from Dunkirk. To do this,
we must support the aeroplanes which are stationed on the
French coast with sufficient armed motor cars and personnel
to enable advanced subsidiary aeroplane bases to be estab-
lished 30, 40 and 50 miles inland.
According to all accounts received, the Germans, in so far
as they have penetrated this region, have done it simply by
bluff. Small parties of Uhlans, taking advantage of the
terror inspired by their atrocities in Belgium, have made
their way freely about the country, and have imposed them-
selves upon the population. We require, in the first instance,
200 or 300 men with 50 or 60 motor cars, who can support and
defend our advanced aerial bases. I should propose to draw
these by suitable volunteers from the Marine Brigade. They
should be placed under the orders of Commander Samson,
and should operate from Dunkirk. It will be necessary first
to obtain permission from the French authorities. This, after
consultation with Lord Kitchener, I am taking steps to do.
We ought to be able to make it quite impossible for parties of
15 or 20 Uhlans to make their way with safety through this
area. During the next week the Germans will presume on
their immunity, and will be found in occupation of numbers
of places where they cannot possibly maintain any effective
force. The advantage of an aeroplane reconnaissance is that
the approach of any serious body of troops can be discovered
while it is still at least two days' march away. There ought,
therefore, to be no difficulty in chopping these small parties
of the enemy without our force getting into any trouble.
Propose me plans for immediate action on these lines in
detail.
Secretary. 0ctober 2' ^
Director of Naval Ordnance.
Director of the Air Division.
The experiments with regard to projectiles for use against
aircraft must be worked out on the most generous scale, eight
or ten different lines being pursued simultaneously, the neces-
sary funds being provided. It is perfectly useless in time of
war to go through successively the whole series of experi-
ments appropriate to peace-time administration. Let me
344 THE WORLD CRISIS
have a report on the projectiles available. We must have
means of attacking Zeppelins, not only with shells from guns,
but with incendiary bullets or grenades from aeroplanes.
The needs and activities of the naval aeroplanes in the
neighbourhood of Dunkirk led directly to the development
of the armoured car, and the armoured car led directly to
the birth of the tank, which was in essence only an armoured
car capable of crossing trenches. Almost immediately after
the German inroad into Belgium, I received accounts of the
remarkable work done by a Belgian motor-car, hastily
equipped with armour and a machine gun, in shooting down
and driving back the numerous Uhlans with which the enemy
were seeking to overrun the country. Commander Samson
was prompt to realise and seize the advantage of armoured
cars for the purpose of protecting his aeroplane operations
and also on their own account. In view of the reports re-
ceived from him and other sources, I gave, during the latter
part of August and September, successive orders for the forma-
tion of armoured-car squadrons under the Admiralty; and as
all this arose out of the aeroplane squadron stationed at Dun-
kirk, the formation of the armoured-car squadrons was en-
trusted to Commodore Sueter. In this task this officer dis-
played great energy, and in a very short time no less than
seven or eight squadrons were called into being, based on
the purchase of all the Rolls-Royce cars that were available
and rapidly improvised armour protection.
The first few cars had scarcely begun to show their advan-
tages in Commander Samson's guerrilla from Dunkirk when
the difficulty which ultimately led to the creation of the tank
manifested itself. The German cavalry sought to protect
themselves against the attack of the armoured cars by dig-
ging trenches across the road.
To meet this, I gave the following directions: —
IN THE NARROW SEAS 345
Colonel Ollivant. September 23, 1914.
Director of Air Division.
Royal Naval Division Administration.
It is most important that the motor transport and armed
motor-cars should be provided to a certain extent with cars
carrying the means of bridging small cuts in the road, and an
arrangement of planks capable of bridging a ten- or twelve-
feet span quickly and easily should be carried with every ten
or twelve machines. A proportion of tools should also be
supplied.
Let me have proposals at once.1
Other conditions, however, swept down upon us very
quickly, and by the middle of October, after the events to
be narrated in the next chapters, the trench lines on both sides
reached the sea and became continuous over the whole front.
Thus at the moment when the new armoured-car force was
coming into effective existence at much expense and on a
considerable scale, it was confronted with an obstacle and a
military situation which rendered its employment practically
impossible. The conclusion was forced naturally and ob-
viously upon me, and no doubt upon others, that if the ar-
moured car on which so much money and labour had been
spent could not move round the enemy's trenches and operate
against an open flank of his army, some method should be
devised which would enable it to traverse and pass over the
trenches themselves. This subject will, however, be dealt
with in its proper place.
The air was the first cause that took us to Dunkirk. The
armoured car was the child of the air; and the tank its grand-
child.
But besides all this the undefended condition of the Chan-
nel ports against any serious effort by the enemy inspired
the Admiralty with lively alarm. The danger of the Germans
1 The first design of the Tank made at my request by Admiral Bacon
in September, 19 14, carried a bridge in front which it dropped on ar-
riving at a trench, passed over, and automatically raised behind it.
346 THE WORLD CRISIS
taking Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne stared us in the face for
many anxious weeks. On September 3 I minuted to the First
Sea Lord : —
'With the Germans along the French coast, modified dispo-
sitions will become necessary. The danger from aerial attack
must not be underrated. The possibility of the Germans tak-
ing very heavy guns to Calais after taking the town, and
getting submarines down from the Elbe to operate from
Calais as a base, should also be considered. We could of
course stop any surface craft, but submarines might slip
through secretly and be a great nuisance when once established.
On the 10th September I went to Dunkirk myself and was
to some extent reassured. I made the following note at the
time for the information of those concerned: —
1 September 11, 1914.
'The First Lord visited Dunkirk and Calais on the 10th in-
stant, and conferred with the Governors of both places.
' Dunkirk is being defended on a considerable scale, and has
already developed substantial strength. Lines of defence are
constructed on a radius of 4 to 6 miles approximately from the
enceinte of the town, which are armed by over 400 pieces of
artillery and held by 18,000 men. These works, which are
strongly executed, can be further protected by large inunda-
tions both of fresh and salt water. The fresh water inunda-
tions are now accumulating; the salt can be turned on at any
time in two days. The place should certainly require a siege
in form to reduce it, and it is getting stronger every week. The
First Lord promised the assistance of warships if required
to cover the flanks. The anchorage at Dunkirk gives suf-
ficient water for the Majestic class, and is certainly close to
the shore. The high sandhills would require the fire to be in-
direct, but otherwise there would be no difficulty. There is
nothing to cause disquietude in the measures taken for the
defence of Dunkirk. It seems probable that they are sufficient
to make it not worth while for the enemy to undertake the re-
duction of the fortress.
t Calais is simply an enceinte rather larger in extent than
IN THE NARROW SEAS 347
that of Dunkirk, and protected by a few well-executed outlying
fieldworks. All that can be said about Calais is that it could
not be taken by a coup de main. It is garrisoned by 7,000
troops, but it could certainly not be counted on to hold out
for more than a few days against a determined attack.'
In the third week of September Marshal Joffre telegraphed
to Lord Kitchener asking whether a Brigade of Marines could
not be sent to Dunkirk to reinforce the garrison and to con-
fuse the enemy with the idea of British as well as French forces
being in this area. Lord Kitchener asked me whether the
Admiralty would help in this matter. I agreed to send the
brigade if he would also send some Yeomanry Cavalry for its
local protection. He sent a regiment. I was thus led, though
by no means unwillingly, into accepting a series of minor
responsibilities of a very direct and personal kind, which made
inroads both upon my time and thought and might well —
though I claim they did not — have obscured my general view.
I formed a small administration to handle the business, in
which Colonel Ollivant 1 was the moving spirit. On his sug-
gestion we took fifty motor omnibuses from the London streets
so as to make our Marines as mobile as possible, and very
soon we had British detachments ostentatiously displaying
themselves in Ypres, Lille, Tournai and Douai. Many risks
were run by those engaged in these petty operations, first
under General Aston and subsequently when his health had
failed, under General Paris. No mishap occurred either to
the Marines or to the Yeomanry. They played their part in
the general scheme without loss or misadventure. It was,
however, with sincere relief that a month later, on the ar-
rival of the leading troops of Sir John French's Army in the
1 An officer of the General Staff who had been attached, at my re-
quest in 1 91 3, to the Admiralty War Staff in order to promote an ef-
fective liaison between the two staffs. This very gifted officer rendered
us invaluable service. He died prematurely after the hardships of the
war, throughout the whole of which he served with distinction in
situations of responsibility and danger.
348 THE WORLD CRISIS
neighbourhood, I transferred these detachments to the Com-
mander-in-Chief, and divested myself of anxieties which
though subsidiary were burdensome.
Looking back with after-knowledge and increasing years,
I seem to have been too ready to undertake tasks which were
hazardous or even forlorn. Taking over responsibility for
the air defence of Great Britain when resources were prac-
tically non-existent and formidable air attacks imminent
was from a personal point of view "some love but little
policy." The same is true of the Dunkirk guerrilla. Still
more is it true of the attempt to prolong the defence of Ant-
werp which will be related in the next chapter. I could with
perfect propriety, indeed with unanswerable reasons, have in
every one of these cases left the burden to others. I believed,
however, that the special knowledge which I possessed, and
the great and flexible authority which I wielded in this time
of improvisation, would enable me to offer less unsatisfactory
solutions of these problems than could be furnished in the
emergency by others in less commanding positions. I could at
that time give directions over a very large and intricate field
of urgent and swiftly changing business which were acted
upon immediately by a great variety of authorities who other-
wise would have had no common connecting centre. So I
acted for the best, with confidence in the loyalty of my col-
leagues, in the goodwill of the public, and, above all, in my
own judgment which I seemed to see confirmed from day to
day by many remarkable events.
This chapter, which began with good luck and success,
must end, however, with misfortune. The original War
Orders had been devised to meet the situation on the out-
break of hostilities. They placed the pieces on the board
in what we believed to be the best array, and left their future
disposition to be modified by experience. Under these orders
the 7th Cruiser Squadron in the Third Fleet, consisting of the
IN THE NARROW SEAS 349
old cruisers of the Bacchante class {Bacchante, Euryalus (flag-
ship), Cressy, Aboukir, Rogue), was based on the Nore 'in
order to ensure the presence of armoured ships in the southern
approaches of the North Sea and eastern entrance to the
Channel, and to support the 1st and 3rd Flotillas operating in
that area from Harwich.' The object of these flotillas was
'to keep the area south of the 54th parallel clear of enemy
torpedo craft and minelayers.' The Cruiser Force was 'to
support them in the execution of these duties and also, with
the flotillas, to keep a close watch over enemy war vessels and
transports in order that their movement may be reported
at the earliest moment.'
This very necessary patrol had accordingly been maintained
day after day without incident of any kind happening, and we
had now been six weeks at war. In war all repetitions are peril-
ous. You can do many things with impunity if you do not
keep on doing them over and over again.
It was no part of my duty to deal with the routine move-
ments of the Fleet and its squadrons, but only to exercise a
general supervision. I kept my eyes and ears open for every
indication that would be useful, and I had many and various
sources of information. On September 17, during my visit
to the Grand Fleet, I heard an expression used by an officer
which instantly arrested my attention. He spoke of 'the
live-bait squadron.' I demanded what was meant, and was
told that the expression referred to these old cruisers patrol-
ling the narrow waters in apparently unbroken peace. I there-
upon reviewed the whole position in this area. I discussed it
with Commodore Tyrwhitt and with Commodore Keyes.
The next morning I addressed the following minute to the
First Sea Lord: —
Secretary. September 18, 1914.
First Sea Lord.
The force available for operations in the narrow seas should
be capable of minor action without the need of bringing down
350 THE WORLD CRISIS
the Grand Fleet. To this end it should have effective support
either by two or three battle cruisers or battleships of the
Second Fleet working from Sheerness. This is the most
efficiently air and destroyer patrolled anchorage we possess.
They can lie behind the boom, and can always be at sea when
we intend a raid. Battle cruisers are much to be pre-
ferred.
The Bacchantes ought not to continue on this beat. The
risk to such ships is not justified by any services they can ren-
der. The narrow seas, being the nearest point to the enemy,
should be kept by a small number of good modern ships.
The Bacchantes should go to the western entrance of the
Channel and set BethelPs battleships — and later Wemyss'
cruisers — free for convoy and other duties.
The first four Arethusas should join the flotillas of the nar-
row seas.
I see no sufficient reason to exchange these flotillas now that
they know their work with the northern ones.
As the "M" boats are delivered they should be formed into
a separate half-flotilla and go north to work with the Grand
Fleet.
The King Alfred should pay off and be thoroughly repaired.
Prince Louis immediately agreed and gave directions to the
Chief of the Staff to make the necessary redistribution of
forces. With this I was content, and I dismissed the matter
from my mind, being sure that the orders given would be
complied with at the earliest moment. Before they could
take effect, disaster occurred.
Pending the introduction of the new system, the Admiralty
War Staff carried on with the old. The equinoctial weather
was, however, so bad that the destroyer flotillas were ordered
back to harbour by the Admiral commanding the Bacchante
squadron. That officer, however, proposed to continue his
patrol in the Dogger area with the cruisers alone. The Ad-
miralty War Staff acquiesced in the principle of these arrange-
ments but on the 19th instructed him to watch instead the
Broad Fourteens: —
IN THE NARROW SEAS 351
'The Dogger Bank patrol need not be continued. Weather
too bad for destroyers to go to sea. Arrange for cruisers to
watch Broad Four teens.'
This routine message did not of course come before me.
It was not sent, however, by the War Staff without proper
consideration. In the short steep seas which are the features
of gales in these narrow waters, a submarine would be at a
serious disadvantage and could only observe with extreme
difficulty and imperfection. The rough weather which drove
in our destroyers was believed to be an important protection
against enemy submarines.
Both Admiral and Admiralty, therefore, were in agreement
to leave the cruisers at sea without their flotilla. If the
weather moderated, it was intended that one of Commodore
Tyrwhitt's flotillas should join them there on the morning
of the 20th. The sea, however, continued so high on the 20th
that the flotilla, led by the Fearless, had to turn back to Har-
wich. Thus all through the 19th, 20th and 21st the three
cruisers, the Aboukir, Cressy and Hogue, were left to main-
tain the watch in the narrow waters without a flotilla screen.
The Admiral in the Euryalus had to return to harbour on the
20th to coal his ship. He left the squadron in command of
the senior captain after enjoining special precautions. There
was no more reason to expect that they would be attacked at
this time than at any other. On the contrary, rumours of
German activity to the northward had brought the whole
Grand Fleet out in a southerly sweep down to the line be-
tween Flamborough Head and the Horn Reef. Nor was there
any connection between the orders to these cruisers and the
movement of the Marine Brigade from Dover to Dunkirk
which took place on the 20th. The cruisers were simply ful-
filling their ordinary task, which from frequent repetition had
already become dangerous and for which they were not in
any case well suited.
352 THE WORLD CRISIS
As soon as the weather began to abate on the 21st, Com-
modore Tyrwhitt started off again for the Broad Fourteens
with eight destroyers, and was already well on his way when
the morning of the 22nd broke. As the sea subsided, the
danger from submarines revived. The three cruisers, how-
ever, instead of going to meet their destroyers, steamed slowly
northward without zigzagging and at under ten knots, as no
doubt they had often done before. Meanwhile a single Ger-
man submarine, becoming more venturesome every day, was
prowling southward down the Dutch coast. At 6.30 a.m.,
shortly after daylight, the Aboukir was struck by a torpedo.
In twenty-five minutes this old vessel capsized. Some of her
boats were smashed by the explosion, and hundreds of men
were swimming in the water or clinging to wreckage. Both
her consorts had hurried with chivalrous simplicity to the
aid of the sinking ship. Both came to a dead standstill within
a few hundred yards of her and lowered all their boats to
rescue the survivors. In this posture they in their turn were
both sunk, first the Hogue and then the Cressy, by the same
submarine. Out of over 2,000 men on board these three ships,
only 800 were saved, and more than 1,400 perished. The
ships themselves were of no great value : they were among the
oldest cruisers of the Third Fleet and contributed in no ap-
preciable way to our vital margins. But like all Third Fleet
ships, they were almost entirely manned with reservists, most
of whom were married men; and they carried also young
cadets from Osborne posted for safety to ships which it was
thought would not be engaged in the great battles. This
cruel loss of life, although small compared to what the Army
was enduring, constituted the first serious forfeit exacted
from the Navy in the war. It greatly stimulated and encour-
aged the enterprise of the German submarines. The com-
mander of the fatal boat (Lieutenant Weddigen) was exult-
ingly proclaimed as a national hero. Certainly the destruction
with his own fingers of fourteen hundred persons was an epi-
IN THE NARROW SEAS 353
sode of a peculiar character in human history. But, as it
happened, he did not live long to enjoy his sombre fame. A
storm of criticism was directed at the Admiralty, and natu-
rally it was focussed on me. 'Here was an instance of the
disaster which followed from the interference of a civilian
Minister in naval operations and the over-riding of the judg-
ment of skilful and experienced Admirals.' The writer1 of a
small but venomous brochure which was industriously circu-
lated in influential circles in London did not hesitate to make
this charge in the most direct form,2 and it was repeated in
countless innuendoes throughout the British Press. I did not,
however, think it possible to make any explanation or reply.
I caused the most searching inquiries to be made in the
Admiralty into the responsibility for this tragic event. The
necessary Court of Inquiry was convened. The Court found
that the responsibility for the position of the cruisers on that
day was attributable to the Admiralty War Staff telegram of
the 19th which has been already quoted. The First Sea Lord
held that this was a reflection upon the Admiralty by a sub-
ordinate Court; but it seemed to me that the criticism was
just and that it should stand. It was, however, by no means
exhaustive. One would expect senior officers in command of
cruiser squadrons to judge for themselves the danger of their
task, and especially of its constant repetition; and while obey-
ing any orders they received, to represent an unsatisfactory
situation plainly to the Admiralty instead of going on day after
day, and week after week, until superior authority intervened
or something lamentable happened. One would expect also
that ordinary precautions would be observed in the tactical
1 Mr. Thomas Gibson Bowles.
2 'The loss on September 22/ wrote Mr. Gibson Bowles, 'of the
Aboukir, the Cressy and the Hogue, with 1,459 officers and men killed,
occurred because, despite the warnings of admirals, commodores and
captains, Mr. Churchill refused, until it was too late, to recall them
from a patrol so carried on as to make them certain to fall victims to
the torpedoes of an active enemy.'
354 THE WORLD CRISIS
conduct of squadrons. Moreover, although the impulse which
prompted the Hogue and Cressy to go to the rescue of their
comrades in the sinking Aboukir was one of generous human-
ity, they could hardly have done anything more unwise or
more likely to add to the loss of life. They should at once
have steamed away in opposite directions, lowering boats at
the first opportunity.
I remitted all these matters to Lord Fisher when two
months later he arrived at the Admiralty; but he laconically
replied that 'most of the officers concerned were on half pay,
that they had better remain there, and that no useful pur-
pose would be served by further action/
CHAPTER XV
ANTWERP
1 If Hopes were dupes, Fears may be liars,
It may be in yon smoke conceal'd,
Your comrades chase e'en now the fliers,
And but for you, possess the field.
For while the tired waves vainly breaking
Seem here no painful inch to gain,
Far back, through creeks and inlets making,
Comes silent flooding in the main.'
Clough.
The Battle of the Marne — The Race for the Sea — Antwerp, the True
Flank — Admiralty Concern about Antwerp — The Neutrality of
the Scheldt — Opening of the Siege of Antwerp, September 28 —
Lord Kitchener's Plans — Belgian Decision to Evacuate Antwerp
— Conference at Lord Kitchener's House, Midnight, October 2 —
British Ministers urge further Resistance — My Mission to Ant-
werp— French Aid Promised — The Situation in Antwerp, October
3 — My Proposals to the Belgian and British Governments —
Progress of the German Attack — Strange Contrasts — Acceptance
of my Proposals by British and Belgian Governments — Chances
of Success — Relief Approaching — Fighting of October 5 — The
Belgian Night Attack Fails — The Front broken in, October 6 —
Arrival of the British Naval Brigades — Arrival of Sir Henry
Rawlinson — Decisions of British and Belgian Council of War,
Night of October 6 — The Personal Aspect — Five Days Gained.
TT is not possible to understand the British attempt to pro-
•*■ long the defence of Antwerp without seeing the episode
in its true setting. The following is a simple way of review-
ing the military operations in the West up to the point which
this account has now reached.
The German armies swept through Belgium intending to
turn and drive back the French left and left centre. At the
3SS
356 THE WORLD CRISIS
same time after a diversion in Alsace the French centre struck
forward on either side of Metz at the German left and left
centre. The French hoped that this counter-stroke would
rupture the German line and paralyse the turning movement
through Belgium. However, after the whole fronts had been
in collision for several days of intense battle, it appeared that
the French counter-stroke had not ruptured the German line,
and that the turning movement through Belgium had suc-
ceeded in driving back the French left. Thus by the twenti-
eth day the French right was thrown on to the defensive and
their three armies of the left and left centre and the British
army were in full retreat southward towards Paris. The Ger-
mans therefore were completely successful in the first main
shock.
But henceforward the French right stood like a rock in
front of Nancy under General de Castelnau, and at the
Trouee des Charmes under General Dubail, and the Germans
sustained a series of bloody checks. Meanwhile the French
left and centre by retreating for five marches extended the
pursuing Germans to the utmost while falling back themselves
on their own reserves and supplies. And by September 6 (the
37th day) the French armies turned and assumed the offensive
on the whole front of 120 miles from Paris to Verdun. In
addition a new French army under General Maunoury had
come into existence to the north of Paris which attacked the
German right, and all the time the resistance of the Nancy
army (de Castelnau) and of the army of General Dubail on
its right continued unbreakable. Thus from September 6 the
whole of the French and German armies and the British Ex-
peditionary Force were locked in general battle on a front of
over 180 miles, with practically every division and all their
reserves on both sides thrown in.
This battle, which lasted for four days, was the greatest of
the war. The Germans aimed not at the capture of Paris or
Verdun or Nancy, but at the final destruction of the French
ANTWERP 357
military power. Had they succeeded in breaking the French
front between Paris and Verdun or in falling upon its rear
from the direction of Nancy, nearly half the French Army,
certainly more than a million men, would have been cut off in
the Verdun angle. The rest, whatever happened in the neigh-
bourhood of Paris, would have had to retreat to the south-
ward and would never again have been numerous enough to
form a complete front. Compared with stakes like these, the
entry into Paris by the German right flank or the capture of
the Channel Ports by a couple of German corps were insignifi-
cant and rightly discarded by the German Headquarters.
Once the French Army was cut in half and finally beaten,
everything would fall into their hands. They therefore di-
rected all their available troops to the battlefield, ignored the
Channel Ports, and compelled von Kluck, commanding their
right army, to skirt Paris and close in to their main battle
front. How near they were to success will long be debated
and never decided. But certainly they were within an ace.
No military reproach lies upon their disregard of other objec-
tives: but only upon any failure to disregard them. It is not
to their neglect to enter Paris or seize Calais that their fatal
defeat was due, but rather to the withdrawal of two German
army corps to repel the Russian invasion of East Prussia.
The soul of the French nation triumphed in this death
struggle, and their armies, defeated on the frontier, turned
after the long marches of retreat, and attacked and fought
with glorious and desperate tenacity. British attention has
naturally been concentrated upon the intense military situa-
tion developed before and around Paris, in which our own
army played a decisive part; and the various pressures which
operated upon von Kluck have now been minutely exposed.
Attacked on his right flank and rear by Maunoury's army
while advancing to the main battlefield, he was compelled to
counter-march first two of his corps and then his two remain-
ing corps in order to make head against the new danger. Thus
358 THE WORLD CRISIS
a gap of 30 miles was opened in the German line between von
Kluck and von Bulow. Into this gap marched the battered
but reanimated British army. The tide had turned. But
the whole of this great situation about Paris was itself only
complementary to the battle as a whole. The gaze of the
military student must range along the whole line of the French
armies, the defeat of any one of which would have been fatal.
Most of all his eye will rest upon the very centre of the Paris-
Verdun line, where Foch though driven back maintained his
resistance. 'My centre cedes. My right recoils. Situation
excellent. I attack/ But all the four French armies between
Paris and Verdun fought with desperate valour, while Dubail
and de Castelnau round the corner maintained their superb
defence. And thus, weakened by its rapid advance, the
whole German line came to a standstill. And as this condi-
tion was reached, the penetration by the British and by the
Fifth French army on the British right, of the gap in the Ger-
man line between von Bulow and von Kluck determined both
these commanders in succession to retreat, and thus imposed
a retrograde movement upon the whole of the invading hosts.
'The most formidable avalanche of fire and steel ever let
loose upon a nation' had spent its force.
From the moment when the German hopes of destroying
the French armies by a general battle and thus of ending the
war at a single stroke had definitely failed, all the secondary
and incidental objectives which hitherto they had rightly
discarded became of immense consequence. As passion de-
clined, material things resumed their values. The struggle
of armies and nations having failed to reach a decision, places
recovered their significance, and geography rather than psy-
chology began to rule the lines of war. Paris now unattain-
able, the Channel Ports — Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne —
still naked, and lastly Antwerp, all reappeared in the field of
values like submerged rocks when the tidal wave recedes.
The second phase of the war now opened. The French,
ANTWERP 359
having heaved the Germans back from the Marne to the
Aisne, and finding themselves unable to drive them further
by frontal attacks, continually reached out their left hand
in the hopes of outflanking their opponents. The race for
the sea began. The French began to pass their troops from
right to left. Castelnau's army, marching behind the front
from Nancy, crashed into battle in Picardy, striving to turn
the German right, and was itself outreached on its left.
Foch's army, corps after corps, hurried by road and rail to
prolong the fighting front in Artois; but round the left of this
again lapped the numerous German cavalry divisions of von
der Marwitz — swoop and counter-swoop. On both sides every
man and every gun were hurled as they arrived into the con-
flict, and the unceasing cannonade drew ever northwards
and westwards — ever towards the sea.
Where would the grappling armies strike blue water? At
what point on the coast ? Which would turn the other's flank ?
Would it be north or south of Dunkirk ? Or of Gravelines or
Calais or Boulogne? Nay, southward still, was Abbeville
even attainable? All was committed to the shock of an
ever-moving battle. But as the highest goal, the one safe in-
expugnable flank for the Allies, the most advanced, the most
daring, the most precious — worth all the rest, guarding all
the rest — gleamed Antwerp — could Antwerp but hold out.
Antwerp was not only the sole stronghold of the Belgian
nation: it was also the true left flank of the Allied front in
the west. It guarded the whole line of the Channel Ports.
It threatened the flanks and rear of the German armies in
France. It was the gateway from which a British army
might emerge at any moment upon their sensitive and even
vital communications. No German advance to the sea-coast,
upon Ostend, upon Dunkirk, upon Calais and Boulogne,
seemed possible while Antwerp was unconquered.
My own feeling at the outbreak of the war had been that
if the right things were done, Antwerp ought to hold out for
360 THE WORLD CRISIS
two or even three months, that is to say, until we knew the
result of the main collision of the armies on all the fronts —
French, Russian, Austrian. I rested my thought on Metz
and Paris in 1870-71, Plevna in 1878, Port Arthur in 1904.
The fall of Namur unsettled these foundations. Still Antwerp,
even apart from its permanent fortifications, was a place of
great strength, fortified by rivers and inundations, and de-
fended by all that was best in the Belgian nation and by prac-
tically its whole Field Army.
I was from the beginning very anxious to do everything
that could be done out of our slender resources to aid the
Belgian King and nation to maintain their stronghold, and
such small items as the Admiralty could spare in guns and
ammunition were freely sent. The reports which we received
from Antwerp and the telegrams of the Belgian Government
already at the beginning of September began to cause me
deep concern. So also did the question of the Scheldt, whose
free navigation both for troops and munitions seemed vital
to the Belgian people.
I thought that Antwerp should be made to play its part
in the first phase of the war by keeping as many German
troops as possible out of the great battle. If the Belgian Army
defending the city could be strengthened by British troops,
not only would the defence be invigorated, but the Germans
would be continually apprehensive of a British inroad upon
them from this direction, the deadliness of which Lord
Roberts's strategic instinct had so clearly appreciated. It
was true that we had no troops in England fit to manoeuvre
in the field against the enemy. But the defence of the forti-
fied lines of Antwerp was a task in which British Territorial
troops might well have played their part. Accordingly on
September 7 I sent a memorandum to the Prime Minister,
Sir Edward Grey and Lord Kitchener emphasising the im-
portance of Antwerp, particularly from the naval stand-
point:—
.Scale 1 = 1,000.000
10 0 10 20
30 40
ANTWERP
Zcebrugge
.
and Hie
BUnkenberghiyQi*'*
Belgian Coast*
Osteixde^g?
1914
Middelkerkc^JT^ 1 ^J
■j-^tSy i eu po rtVj«<^\^ 1
t.telles ' //l^
DuT&erque^gjgjp
** jh^ur"^-^/7 / ^\ J
nL<
,-^::::;-::^^~^^^^^ 1
1 flpi ^^^^^Dixmude
y\_^ 1
Calais^^
V B y H >
C.Blanc Nez/^ f&T^^Y
1 V /\X «f «\ ^t^L
^^O^nXH*'
<\M Jkr^
r\ N^. f J»V ^V^ Lwvf in«rcX 1
ASr^JS
~3^\W/ 1 17«»,m^oudt
' Hhee^i'ngKe^S^L V^
W/ %* -J r\ \
■**^2?1.^J|
7' £-»
^^a^J^
1 Nut y^ \ «j
4*^ St. OmefQJt^,^ V-#7
ourcoiire^a^^
==^^^^=5y^ ^WebrouCJ^T®,
""" ~* — L ^^"^T^l^ 11 II
^
^^^*~=^J^^
y"^ j) / ^i ^t^^
^^memi^^^KK^
^17 /7\
/
*/lS !i3i— -^=s3^>K Kervi
^^i»^^\\JrwK^^^ &^*^ ^vr
/
f
jw >^ ^-^>\ «>50^
~M \ \P»
•
/
"VygW ^ 1 ^^ i«KL^-A
V J J 1 \ ,mr*T'j
/\\ \"
\i
^sS| ft ^^^S^^A
y \ \
^V W y^^V /^V»T*«
:/ /?
V^v / \j/^7^
/ ^Si
^
7 V
. V \ j^v Ji5r7T\
\ ^*a*'
?f
•7 !!
^ \
/ ^-^A 1
"1*^
^^S^f--^*^5S5=^A«St Pol
^
if Hi
^^\*
^
/ Ai\
^* — Y\A
j^ylx jts&l
•^*"V— — ylN
<
2m
K 1 1/
''^f ^0
C^^^^ Doun^OT^^^
/ 1 f\ r
J
^ v^. ^ *
-»
X 7^*.
1 1/ >^ \ 1
y^ v >^s^
« ^^r / JJ*
*^\i/ /^ 1 /
i^- \ ^
^A ="* — / .<f<r
Ny^rt ^.f f,r 3La
ANTWERP 361
'The Admiralty view the sustained and effective defence of
Antwerp as a matter of high consequence. It preserves the
life of the Belgian nation: it safeguards a strategic point
which, if captured, would be of the utmost menace.'
In order to save Antwerp, two things were necessary: first,
effective defence of the fortress line; and second, free unin-
terrupted communication with the sea. The first was toler-
ably well provided for by the Belgian Army which could
easily be reinforced by British Territorial troops. But the
second essential, the free communication with the sea, was a
larger matter, and in it were involved our relations with the
Dutch. I proposed that we should request the Dutch Gov-
ernment to give a free passage up the Scheldt to Antwerp for
whatever troops and supplies were needed. I pointed out
further that it was impossible to try to supply an army at
Antwerp by Ostend and Ghent; that the appeals which the
Belgians were then making to us to send 25,000 troops to co-
operate with an equal number of Belgian troops for the pur-
pose of keeping open the line Antwerp-St. Nicholas-Ghent-
Bruges-Ostend was a counsel of despair.
'It involves practically a flank position for a line of supply
protected by forces large enough to be hit hard and perfectly
powerless against any determined German attack which it is
thought worth while to deliver. At any moment a punch up
from Brussels by a German division or larger force would rup-
ture the line, and drive the troops trying to hold it to be dis-
armed on neutral Dutch territory or into the sea.'
I dwelt on the disadvantages to the Allies of a neutrality
which kept the Rhine open for Germany and closed the
Scheldt to Antwerp.
As these questions are still of some delicacy I have thought
it better to summarise rather than reprint my memorandum.
But I draw the reader's attention to the date — September 7.
I still think that strong representations to the Dutch Gov-
362 THE WORLD CRISIS
eminent might well have induced them to grant this relief
to Antwerp and the Belgian nation in their agony. The orig-
inal guarantee of Belgian neutrality was given to the Gov-
ernment of the Netherlands, and it would have been a natural
and legitimate demand that they should put no needless ob-
stacle in the way of its fulfilment. The sympathies of Hol-
land for the sufferings of Belgium were naturally restrained
by the fear of sharing her fate. But a neutral Holland was
of far more use to Germany than a hostile, a conquered, or
even an allied Holland. Once Holland was attacked by or al-
lied to Germany we could close the Rhine, and if we were
in alliance with Holland, the Texel and other Dutch islands of
enormous strategic importance would become available for
the forward action of the British Navy. We should in fact
have that oversea base without which a British naval offensive
was impossible. I do not therefore believe that if Holland
had agreed to open the Scheldt for the succour of Antwerp,
Germany would have declared war upon her. There would
have been a long argument about interpretations of neu-
trality in which the Germans, after their behaviour, would
have started at a great disadvantage. I still think that if
Holland could have said to Germany l the English are threat-
ening us with a blockade of the Rhine if we do not open the
Scheldt/ Germany would have accepted the lesser of two
evils.
The Foreign Secretary did not, however, feel able to put this
grave issue to the Dutch Government. Neither did Lord
Kitchener wish to use the British Territorial Divisions in the
manner proposed, and while adhering to my own opinion I
certainly do not blame him. He would not send any Terri-
torials into Antwerp, nor was anything effective done by the
Allies for the city during the whole of September. From the
moment when German Main Headquarters had extricated
and reformed their armies after the failure at the Marne, the
capture of Antwerp became most urgently necessary to them.
ANTWERP 363
Accordingly on the afternoon of September 9, as is now known,
the German Emperor was moved to order the capture of that
city. Nothing was apparent to the Allies until the 28th. The
Belgian and German troops remained in contact along the
fortress line without any serious siege or assaulting operations
developing. But on the 28th the Germans suddenly opened
fire upon the forts of the Antwerp exterior lines with 17-inch
howitzers hurling projectiles of over a ton.
Almost immediately the Belgian Government gave signs of
justified alarm. British intelligence reports indicated that
the Germans were seriously undertaking the siege of Antwerp,
that their operations were not intended as a demonstration to
keep the Belgian troops occupied or to protect the lines of
communication. Information had come from Brussels that
the Emperor had ordered the capture of the town, that this
might cost thousands of lives, but that the order must be
obeyed. Large bodies of German reserve troops were also
reported assembling near Liege. In view of all these reports
it was evident that the role of our small British force of marines,
omnibuses, armoured cars, aeroplanes, etc., operating from
Dunkirk was exhausted. They had no longer to deal with
Uhlan patrols or raiding parties of the enemy. Large hostile
forces were approaching the coastal area, and the imposture
whereby we had remained in occupation of Lille and Tournai
could be sustained no longer.
Lord Kitchener was disquieted by the opening of the bom-
bardment upon the Antwerp forts. He immediately sent (on
September 29) a staff officer, Colonel Dallas, into the city to
report direct to him on the situation. On the evening of
October 1 this officer reported that: —
'The Belgian War Minister considered the situation very
grave. Did not think that resistance to the German attack
could be maintained by defensive measures only within the
fortress. That the only way to save Antwerp from falling
was by a diversion from outside on the German left flank.
364 THE WORLD CRISIS
That the French had offered a division and that he looked for-
ward to co-operation by an English force also if that could be
arranged.'
The minister had also said
'That a Belgian cavalry division and some volunteers, and
possibly two divisions of the Belgian Field Army would be
able to assist in the operation which would be most effective
in the neighbourhood of Ghent.'
The Commander of the Antwerp fortress also considered the
situation grave, and while Colonel Dallas was with him a mes-
sage arrived to say that Fort Ste. Catherine had fallen, that
the German troops had pressed forward between it and the
adjoining work, and had occupied the Belgian infantry trenches
at this point.
Colonel Dallas further reported that according to the Bel-
gian headquarters the German Army in Belgium comprised —
'Siege army, consisting of the 3rd Reserve Army Corps, 1 di-
vision of marines, 1 Ersatz reserve division, 1 brigade of Land-
sturm, 2 regiments of pioneers, 1 regiment of siege artillery.'
And that 'The troops of the Military Government of Brussels
consist of a weak Landwehr brigade and some Bavarian Land-
sturm, number unknown.'
The Belgian Field Army was about 80,000 strong, in addi-
tion to which there were some 70,000 fortress troops. Four
divisions of the Belgian Army were defending the southern
portion of the outer perimeter of the Antwerp defences, with
the 5th Division in reserve, and one weak division was at
Termonde. A cavalry division of about 3,600 sabres was
south-west of Termonde guarding communications between
Antwerp and the coast. Ghent was held by some volunteers.
On the night of October 1, Sir F. Villiers reported that
'On southern section of the outer line of forts German
attacks continued to-day, and in the afternoon the enemy's
ANTWERP 365
troops disabled fort Wavre, Ste. Catherine and adjoining
works, and occupied Belgian trenches at this point.'
The Belgian troops were, however, still holding out on the
Belgian side of the River Nethe.
Lord Kitchener now showed himself strongly disposed to
sustain the defence or effect the relief of Antwerp, and to use
the regular forces he still had in England for this purpose,
provided the French would co-operate effectively. Early in
the afternoon of October 2 he moved Sir Edward Grey to send
the following telegram to the British Ambassador at Bor-
deaux:—
'The French Government should be informed that mili-
tary advisers here consider that in view of the superior forces
Germany has in the field there, the dispatch of a French Terri-
torial division with the additions proposed in ten days' time,
together with the force we are prepared to send, would not be
able effectively to force the Germans to raise the siege of Ant-
werp.
'Unless something more can be done they do not advise the
dispatch of the force. We are sending some heavy artillery
with personnel to assist Belgians.
'Situation at Antwerp is very grave, and French Govern-
ment will fully realise the serious effect on the campaign that
would be entailed by its loss.
' Unless the main situation in France can be decided favour-
ably in a short time, which would enable us to relieve Antwerp
by detaching a proper force, it is most desirable that General
Joffre should make an effort and send regular troops to region
of Dunkirk, from which post they could operate in conjunction
with our reinforcements to relieve Antwerp.
'We can send some first-line troops, but not sufficient by
themselves to raise the siege of Antwerp, and we cannot send
them to co-operate with any but French regulars.
'If General Joffre can bring about a decisively favourable
action in France in two or three days the relief of Antwerp
may be made the outcome of that, but if not, unless he now
sends some regular troops the loss of Antwerp must be con-
templated.'
366 THE WORLD CRISIS
All he was able to send to Antwerp was the following: —
'Be very careful not to raise hopes of British and French
forces arriving quickly to relieve Antwerp. The matter has
not been decided, as the Territorial division offered by France
in ten days' time would, in my opinion, be quite incapable of
doing anything towards changing the situation at Antwerp.
I have represented this. Unless a change is made, I consider
it would be useless to put in our little force against the very
superior German forces in the field round Antwerp.'
He then entered in some detail upon the few guns he was
sending, giving particular directions about the use of the two
9'2's.
Up to this point I had not been brought into the affair in
any way. I read, of course, all the telegrams almost as soon
as they were received or dispatched by Lord Kitchener, and
followed the situation constantly. I warmly approved the ef-
forts which Lord Kitchener was making to provide or obtain
succour for Antwerp, and I shared to the full his anxieties. I
saw him every day. But I had no personal responsibility,
nor was I directly concerned. My impression at this time was
that the situation at Antwerp was serious but not immediately
critical; that the place would certainly hold out for a fortnight
more; and that meanwhile Lord Kitchener's exertions or the
influence of the main battle in France would bring relief. So
much was this the case that I proposed to be absent from the
Admiralty for about eighteen hours on the 2nd~3rd October.
I had planned to visit Dunkirk on October 3 on business
connected with the Marine Brigade and other details sent
there at General Joffre's request. At 1 1 o'clock on the night
of the 2nd I was some twenty miles out of London on my way
to Dover when the special train in which I was travelling sud-
denly stopped, and without explanation returned to Victoria
Station. I was told on arrival I was to go immediately to
Lord Kitchener's house in Carlton Gardens. Here I found
shortly before midnight besides Lord Kitchener, Sir Edward
ANTWERP 367
Grey, the First Sea Lord, and Sir William Tyrrell of the For-
eign Office. They showed me the following telegram from our
Minister, Sir Frederick Villiers, sent from Antwerp at 8.20
p.m. and received in London at 10 p.m. on October 2 : —
The Government have decided to leave to-morrow for Os-
tend, acting on advice unanimously given by Superior Council
of War in presence of the King. The King with field army
will withdraw, commencing with advanced guard to-morrow
in the direction of Ghent to protect coast-line, and eventually
it is hoped to co-operate with the Allied armies. The Queen
will also leave.
It is said that town will hold out for five or six days, but it
seems most unlikely that when the Court and Government are
gone resistance will be so much prolonged.
Decision taken very suddenly this afternoon is result of
increasingly critical situation. I have seen both Prime Minis-
ter and Minister for Foreign Affairs, who maintain that no
other course was possible, in view of danger that the King's
Government and field army will be caught here.
I saw that my colleagues had received this news, which
they had already been discussing for half an hour, with con-
sternation. The rapidity with which the situation had de-
generated was utterly unexpected. That the great fortress
and city of Antwerp with its triple line of forts and inunda-
tions, defended by the whole Belgian Field Army (a force cer-
tainly equal in numbers to all the German troops in that
neighbourhood), should collapse in perhaps forty-eight hours
seemed to all of us not only terrible but incomprehensible.
That this should happen while preparations were in progress
both in France and England for the relief or succour of the
city, while considerable forces of fresh and good troops un-
doubtedly stood available on both sides of the Channel, and
before General Joffre had even been able to reply to Lord
Kitchener's telegram, was too hard to bear. We looked at
each other in bewilderment and distress. What could have
368 THE WORLD CRISIS
happened in the last few hours to make the Belgians despair?
Our last telegram from Colonel Dallas, received that after-
noon, had said: ' Situation unchanged during night and Ger-
mans have not made further progress. Great slaughter of
Germans reported and corresponding encouragement to Bel-
gians, who are about to undertake counter-attack in neigh-
bourhood of Fort Ste. Catherine., And now a message at
10 p.m. announced immediate evacuation and impending
fall!
Those who in years to come look back upon the first con-
vulsions of this frightful epoch will find it easy with after
knowledge and garnered experience to pass sagacious judg-
ments on all that was done or left undone. There is always
a strong case for doing nothing, especially for doing nothing
yourself. But to the small group of Ministers who met that
midnight in Lord Kitchener's house, the duty of making sure
that Antwerp was not cast away without good cause while
the means of saving it might well be at hand was clear. I
urged strongly that we should not give in without a struggle:
and we decided unitedly upon the following telegram to Sir
F. Villiers:—
October 3, 19 14, 12.45 a-m-
The importance of Antwerp being held justifies a further
effort till the course of the main battle in France is deter-
mined. We are trying to send you help from the main
army, and, if this were possible, would add reinforcements
from here. Meanwhile a brigade of Marines will reach you
to-morrow to sustain the defence. We urge you to make one
further struggle to hold out. Even a few days may make
the difference. We hope Government will find it possible to
remain and field army to continue operations.
On the other hand, the danger of urging the Belgian Gov-
ernment to hold out against their considered judgment with-
out a full knowledge of the local situation was present in every
mind, and even if the forces for the relieving army were to
ANTWERP 369
come into view, there was much to be arranged and decided
before precise dates and definite assurances could be given.
We were confronted with the hard choice of having either
to take decisions of far-reaching importance in the utmost
haste and with imperfect information, or on the other hand
tamely to let Antwerp fall.
In these circumstances, it was a natural decision that some
one in authority who knew the general situation should travel
swiftly into the city and there ascertain what could be done
on either side. As I was already due at Dunkirk the next
morning, the task was confided to me: Lord Kitchener ex-
pressed a decided wish that I should go; the First Sea Lord
consented to accept sole responsibility in my absence. It
was then about half-past one in the morning. I went at once
to Victoria Station, got into my train which was waiting, and
started again for Dover. A few minutes before I left, Lord
Kitchener received the answer to his telegram of the 2nd from
the British Ambassador in Bordeaux. Sir Francis Bertie said
that before he could carry out the instructions sent him about
Antwerp, he had received a letter from the French Foreign
Minister stating that with the shortest delay possible two
Territorial Divisions, complete with artillery and cavalry,
would be sent to Ostend for the relief of the fortress.
This was to be without prejudice to what the French Govern-
ment expected to do very soon in respect of 'a contemplated
combined movement, French, British and Belgian, on the ex-
treme left of General Joffre's armies which indirectly would
have the effect of causing German troops in the neighbourhood
of Antwerp to retreat, and so effect its relief. ' The French
Government, he said, could not go back on their decision to
employ Territorials. The French Foreign Minister declared
that the Territorials were good troops, better in some respects
than some of the Regulars, and that they were sending two
divisions complete, with artillery and cavalry, instead of one.
Sir Francis Bertie added that the French Government had re-
37o THE WORLD CRISIS
ceived reports from its Attache in Antwerp stating that
' though the military situation there was not good, it could
not be regarded as really 'bad. The Germans had suffered
severe losses in the attacks which they had made on some of
the outer works. Those attacks had not been simultaneous,
which fact indicated that the Germans were not in great force,
had only a limited siege train and not more than two army
corps before Antwerp.'
Meanwhile a telegram was also sent (1.15 a.m. October 3)
by Sir Edward Grey to the Belgian Government saying that
I would arrive on the morning of the 3rd.
'It is hoped that the First Lord of the Admiralty, who is
fully acquainted with our views, may have the honour of an
audience with the King before a final decision as to the de-
parture of the Government is taken.'
On this the Belgian Council of War, sitting at dawn on
the 3rd, suspended the order for the evacuation of the city.
'I communicated at once with Minister of War/ tele-
graphed Sir F. Villiers, October 3, 6.37 a.m. 'He summoned
a meeting of Ministers, who, after deliberation, informed me
that, awaiting arrival of First Lord they had decided to post-
pone departure. Audience with King for Mr. Churchill will
be arranged for at as early an hour as possible.'
Lord Kitchener now threw nimself into the task of con-
centrating and organising a relieving Army. He telegraphed
at 9.40 a.m. on October 3 asking the French War Minister
to make all preparations to send the proposed two divisions
with cavalry and artillery complete as soon as possible and
to let him know how soon they could be dispatched. He
was asked in reply whether he would prefer one Territorial
Division with a complete brigade of Fusiliers Marins. He
replied that he preferred the two divisions, and that the ques-
ANTWERP 371
tion of time was of the greatest importance and urgency.
He was told, however, that it had been decided to send the
Fusiliers. Marins after all. He replied that whichever was
most convenient to the French should be sent, so long as it
was sent with the least delay possible. He telegraphed to
his Staff Officer in Antwerp, Colonel Dallas, at 2.15 p.m.
October 3 : —
'What force in your opinion would suffice ? Give full de-
tails of what troops are most required to deal with the situation
in co-operation with the Belgian Field Army.
1 The French Government say they will send two divisions
with full complement of cavalry and artillery, but I do not
yet know when they will be available. If a corps of our troops,
under Sir John French, together with the 7th Division, and
cavalry division from here, [were] concentrated at Lille in or-
der to attack the right flank of the main German Army and
drive it back, would this action, if accomplished in about four
or five days, in your opinion, relieve the situation at Antwerp
quickly enough to prevent the fall of the place, or must any
troops employed to relieve Antwerp be sent there via Zee-
brugge, and, if so, can you give me approximately the longest
time we can have to get troops there, so that I can inform the
French Government ?'
At 7.35 on the same afternoon the composition of the French
contingent was received from the British Ambassador: —
'87th Territorial Division from Havre, under General Roy,
consisting of 12 battalions of infantry, 2 groups of artillery
(90-millimetre guns), 2 squadrons of reserve cavalry (Dra-
goons), now being formed at Dunkirk, 1 engineer company,
headquarters and staff and usual services attached to a di-
vision.
'The Fusiliers Marins brigade, under command of Rear-
Admiral Ronarc'h, will be composed of two regiments of
Fusiliers Marins (6,000), 86 mitrailleuses manned by seamen
(260), 1 regiment of Zouaves (2,000). Total of contingent
about 23,000 men.
372 THE WORLD CRISIS
'The Havre division will embark there on 5th October, and
should be landed at Dunkirk 7 th October.
' The Fusiliers Marins brigade will be sent to Dunkirk by
land instead of by sea. It will arrive at Dunkirk at about
same time as the Territorial division, namely, 7th October. '
I did not reach the city till after 3 p.m., and after consulting
with Colonel Dallas I was visited by the Belgian Prime Min-
ister. Monsieur de Broqueville was a man of exceptional
vigour and clarity both of mind and speech. He had been
called to the helm of the Belgian State at the moment of the
decision not to submit to wrongful aggression. He explained
to me the situation with precision. General de Guise, the
commander of the fortress, added his comments. The outer
forts were falling one by one. Five or six shells from the enor-
mous German howitzers were sufficient to smash them to their
foundations, to destroy their defenders even in the deepest
casemates, and to wreck the platforms of the guns. Now the
forts of the inner line were being similarly attacked, and there
was no conceivable means of preventing their destruction one
after another at the rate of about a fort a day. The army was
tired and dispirited through having been left so long entirely
upon its own resources without ever a sign of the Allies for
whom they had risked so much. Material of every kind —
guns, ammunition, searchlights, telephones, entrenching ma-
terials— was scanty. The water supply of the city had been
cut off. There were many rumours of German sympathisers
in its large population. At any moment the front might be
broken in under the heavy artillery attack which was then in
progress. But this was only half the danger. The life and
honour of the Belgian nation did not depend on Antwerp, but
on its army. To lose Antwerp was disastrous; to lose the
army as well was fatal. The Scheldt was barred by a severe
interpretation of neutrality. The only line of retreat was by
a dangerous flank march parallel to the Dutch frontier and the
ANTWERP 373
sea-coast. Two Belgian divisions and the cavalry division
were staving off the Germans from this only remaining line of
retreat. But the pressure was increasing and the line of the
Dendre was no longer intact. If Ghent fell before the Belgian
Army made good its retreat, nothing would be saved from the
ruin.
In these circumstances they had decided first to withdraw
to what was called the entrenched camp on the left bank of
the Scheldt, that is to say, towards their right; and, secondly,
in the same direction through Ghent towards the left flank of
the Allied armies. These orders had been suspended in con-
sequence of the telegram from the British Government.
I then exposed Lord Kitchener's plan and stated the num-
bers of the French and British troops already available for
the assistance of the Belgian Army. I emphasised the impor-
tance of holding the city and delaying the Germans as long
as possible without compromising the retreat of the army. I
pointed out that the issue of the battle for the seaward flank
still hung in the balance, and that the main armies were draw-
ing nearer to Belgium every day. I asked whether the re-
lieving forces mentioned, if actually sent, would influence their
decision. They replied that this was a new situation; that
had this help been forthcoming earlier, events might have
taken a different course. Even now, if their line of retreat
were safeguarded by the arrival of Allied troops in the neigh-
bourhood of Ghent, they were prepared to continue the re-
sistance. I thereupon drew up, with their approval and
agreement, the following telegram to Lord Kitchener: —
Antwerp, October 3, 1914, 6.53 p.m. {received 9.45 p.m.)
1 Subject to confirmation on both sides, I have made follow-
ing arrangement with M. de Broqueville, Prime Minister: —
' Every preparation to be made by Belgian Government now
for a resistance of at least ten days, and every step taken with
utmost energy. Within three days we are to state definitely
whether we can launch big field operation for their relief or
374 THE WORLD CRISIS
not, and when it will probably take effect. If we cannot give
them a satisfactory assurance of substantial assistance within
three days, they are to be quite free to abandon defence if they
think fit. In this case, should they wish to clear out with
field army, we (although not able to launch the big operation)
are to help their field army to get away by sending covering
troops to Ghent or other points on line of retreat. Thus, any-
thing they will have lost in time by going on defending Ant-
werp with all their strength will be made up to them as far as
possible by help on their way out.
'Further, we will meanwhile help their local defence in all
minor ways, such as guns, marines, naval brigades, etc.
' 1 have put the terms high to avoid at all costs our under-
taking anything we could not perform, and also to avoid
hurry in our saying what troops we can spare for big opera-
tions. You will be able, as your telegram No. 7 (to Colonel
Dallas) indicates, to do much better than this, and to give
decided promise within three days, but the vital thing is that
Belgian Government and army should forthwith hurl them-
selves with revived energy into the defence.
'Attack is being harshly pressed at this moment, and half
measures would be useless, but Prime Minister informs me
that they are confident they can hold out for three days,
pretty sure they can hold out for six, and will try ten.
'This arrangement, if adopted, will give time necessary for
problem to be solved calmly.
'Two thousand marines are arriving this evening.
'I am remaining here till to-morrow.
'I have read this telegram to Belgian Prime Minister, who
says that we are in full agreement, subject to ratification by
Council of Ministers which is now being held.
'If you clinch these propositions, pray give the following
order to the Admiralty: Send at once both naval brigades,
minus recruits, via Dunkirk, into Antwerp, with five days'
rations and 2,000,000 rounds of ammunition, but without
tents or much impedimenta.
'When can they arrive?'
I had been met on arrival by Admiral Oliver, the Director
of the Naval Intelligence Division. This officer had been sent
by the Admiralty on September 29 to see what could be done
ANTWERP 375
to disable the large quantity of merchant shipping which lay
in the Scheldt, so that if the city fell it could not be used by
the Germans for embarking troops to invade England. He
was a great stand-by in this time of stress. Night and day
he laboured on the ships. With the assistance only of a Bel-
gian sapper officer, four privates and a Belgian boy scout, he
inserted explosive charges between the cylinders of thirty-eight
large vessels, and by this means ruptured the propelling
machinery so that not one of them was fit to go down the
Scheldt during the whole of the German occupation.
While waiting for the reply from London that afternoon
and also the next morning, I went out and examined the
front: a leafy enclosed country, absolutely flat; a crescent of
peering German kite balloons; a continuous bombardment;
scarcely anything in the nature of an infantry attack ; wearied
and disheartened defenders. It was extremely difficult to
get a clear view and so understand what kind of fighting was
actually going on. We were, however, at length able to reach
the actual inundations beyond which the enemy was posted.
Entrenching here was impossible for either side, owing to the
water met with at a foot's depth. The Belgian pickets
crouched behind bushes. There was at that moment no rifle
fire, but many shells traversed the air overhead on their way
to the Belgian lines.
Although the artillery fire of the Germans at Antwerp was
at no time comparable to the great bombardments afterwards
witnessed on the Western Front, it was certainly severe. The
Belgian trenches were broad and shallow, and gave hardly
any protection to their worn-out and in many cases inexperi-
enced troops. As we walked back from the edge of these inun-
dations along a stone-paved high road, it was a formidable
sight to see on either hand the heavy shells bursting in salvoes
of threes and fours with dense black smoke near or actually
inside these scanty shelters in which the supporting troops were
kneeling in fairly close order. Every prominent building —
376 THE WORLD CRISIS
chateau, tower or windmill — was constantly under fire;
shrapnel burst along the roadway, and half a mile to the left
a wooded enclosure was speckled with white puffs. Two or
three days at least would be required to make sound breast-
works or properly constructed and drained trenches or rifle
pits. Till then it must be mainly an affair of hedges and of
houses; and the ineffective trenches were merely shell traps.
Antwerp presented a case, till the Great War unknown, of
an attacking force marching methodically without regular
siege operations through a permanent fortress line behind ad-
vancing curtains of artillery fire. Fort after fort was wrecked
by the two or three monster howitzers; and line after line of
shallow trenches was cleared by the fire of field guns. And
following gingerly upon these iron footprints, German in-
fantry, weak in numbers, raw in training, inferior in quality,
wormed and waddled their way forward into 'the second
strongest fortress in Europe/
As the fire of the German guns drew ever nearer to the city,
and the shells began to fall each day upon new areas, the
streams of country folk escaping from their ruined homes
trickled pitifully along the roads, interspersed with stragglers
and wounded. Antwerp itself preserved a singular calm.
The sunlit streets were filled with people listening moodily
to the distant firing. The famous spires and galleries of this
ancient seat of wealth and culture, the spacious warehouses
along the Scheldt, the splendid hotels 'with every modern
convenience/ the general air of life, prosperity and civilisa-
tion created an impression of serene security wholly contra-
dicted by the underlying facts. It was a city in a trance.
The Marines did not arrive until the morning of the 4th,
and went immediately into the line. When I visited them the
same evening they were already engaged with the Germans in
the outskirts of Lierre. Here, for the first time, I saw German
soldiers creeping forward from house to house or darting across
the street. The Marines fired with machine-guns from a bal-
ANTWERP 377
cony. The flashes of the rifles and the streams of flame pul-
sating from the mouth of the machine-guns lit up a warlike
scene amid crashing reverberations and the whistle of bullets.
Twenty minutes in a motor-car, and we were back in the
warmth and light of one of the best hotels in Europe, with
its perfectly appointed tables and attentive servants all pro-
ceeding as usual !
*****
The reply of the British Government reached me on the
morning of the 4th, and I sent it at once to Monsieur de
Broqueville.
Lord Kitchener to First Lord.
'Am arranging Expeditionary Force for relief of Antwerp
as follows: —
'British Force.
1 7th Division, 18,000 men, 63 guns, under General Capper.
Cavalry Division, 4,000 men, 12 guns, under General Byng,
to arrive at Zeebrugge 6th and 7 th October. Naval detach-
ment, 8,000 men already there, under General Aston, also
Naval and Military heavy guns and detachments already
sent. Head-quarter Staff will be subsequently notified.
'French Force.
'Territorial Division, 15,000 men, proper complement of
guns and 2 squadrons, General Roy, to arrive Ostend 6th to
9th October. Fusilier Marins Brigade, 8,000 men, under
Rear- Admiral Ronarc'h. Grand total, 53,000 men. Num-
bers are approximately correct.'
Also one from Prince Louis, 10.30 a.m.: —
'The Naval Brigades will embark at Dover at 4 p.m. for
Dunkirk, where they should arrive between 7 or 8 o'clock.
Provisions and ammunition as indicated in your telegram.'
Monsieur de Broqueville replied: —
AnverSj le 4 octobre, 1914^
J'ai Thonneur de vous confirmer notre accord sur les points
envisages tantot.
378 THE WORLD CRISIS
Comme je vous l'ai dit des notre premiere conversation,
nous entendons, coute que coute, conserver Anvers. C'est
pour nous un devoir national de premier ordre.
Je tiens a vous repeter aussi que, si nous avons ete serieuse-
ment affectes de ne pas voir nos puissants garants repondre
plus tot a nos demandes de secours, notre volonte de lutter
jusqu'a la mort n'a pas ete affaiblie un seul instant. L'appui
des 9,000 fusiliers de marine envoyes par votre Gouvernement
hier et demain est pour la conservation de la place d'Anvers
un appui precieux.
Plus precieux encore est l'envoi de la 7e division, appuyee
par la 3e division de cavalerie.
II serait d'extreme importance que ces troupes soient
dirigees sur Gand avec le maximum de celerite: les heures
ont en ce moment une exceptionnelle valeur.
Les hautes autorites militaires et le Gouvernement tout
entier, consultes par moi, acceptent avec une veritable satis-
faction l'entente qui s'est etablie entre nous.
Le Gouvernement a appris avec un sentiment de veritable
gratitude que, s'il venait a etre fait prisonnier, le Gouverne-
ment de la Grande-Bretagne ne traiterait pas sans son assenti-
ment des questions interessant le sort de la Belgique au mo-
ment ou se negociera la paix.
Je me felicite tout particulierement des relations si sympa-
thiques que je viens d'avoir avec Peminent homme d'Etat
envoye ici par la grande nation si hautement appreciee et
aimee par la Belgique.
The matter had now passed into the region of pure action.
Could Antwerp resist the enemy's attack long enough to
enable the French and British relieving force to come to her
aid? Secondly, if this succeeded, could nine or ten Allied
divisions at Antwerp and Ghent hold the Germans in check
until the left wing of the main armies, advancing daily from
the south, could join hands with them? In that case the Al-
lied lines in the west might be drawn through Antwerp, Ghent
and Lille. All this turned on a few days, and even on a few
hours.
Judged by the number of troops available on both sides,
ANTWERP 379
the chances of the Allies appeared good. On paper they were
nearly twice as strong as the enemy. But the Belgian Army
had been left without aid or comfort too long. The daily
destruction of their trusted forts, the harsh and unceasing
bombardment of a vastly superior artillery, their apprehen-
sions for their line of retreat, the cruel losses and bufferings
they had suffered since the beginning of the war, had de-
stroyed their confidence and exhausted their strength.
The prime and vital need was to maintain the defence of
Antwerp against the unceasing artillery attack to which its
whole southern front was exposed. The position behind the
river was capable of being made a strong one. It was, po-
tentially, stronger in many respects than the line of the Yser,
along which a fortnight later this same Belgian Army, in spite
of further losses and discouragements, was to make a most
stubborn and glorious defence. But despondency in the face
of an apparently irresistible artillery, and the sense of isola-
tion, struck a deadly chill.
Meanwhile, however, help was hurrying forward. The
Marines were already in the line. Armoured trains with naval
guns and British bluejackets came into action on the morn-
ing of the 4th. The two Naval Brigades reached Dunkirk
that night, and were due to enter Antwerp on the evening
of the 5th. At the special request of the Belgian Staff they
were to be interspersed with Belgian divisions to impart the
encouragement and assurance that succour was at hand.
The British 7th Division and 3rd Cavalry Division, carried
daringly across the water upon personal orders from Prince
Louis in the teeth of submarines, began to disembark at Os-
tend and Zeebrugge from the morning of the 6th onward.
The French division was embarking at Havre. Admiral Ro-
narc'h and his 8,000 Fusiliers Marins were already entrained
for Dunkirk. If only Antwerp could hold out. . . .
Meanwhile, also, it must be remembered, Sir John French
was secretly withdrawing the British Army from the Aisne
380 THE WORLD CRISIS
and moving round behind the French front to the neighbour-
hood of St. Omer with the intention of striking at Lille and
beating in the German right. Every day that large German
forces were detained in front of Antwerp helped and covered
the detrainment and deployment of his army and increased
its chances of success. But every day became graver also
the peril to the Belgian Army of being cut off if, after all, the
Germans should be the victors in the main battle.
The anxieties and uncertainties of this tremendous situa-
tion had to be supported by the Belgian chiefs in addition to
those of the actual German attack battering on the crumbling
Antwerp front and its exhausted defenders. That they were
borne with constancy and coolness, that the defence was pro-
longed for five momentous days, and that although the Ant-
werp front was broken in before effective help could arrive,
the Belgian Field Army was safely extricated, was a memorable
achievement.
The attitude of the King and Queen through these tense
and tragic days was magnificent. The impression of the
grave, calm soldier King presiding at Council, sustaining his
troops and commanders, preserving an unconquerable maj-
esty amid the ruin of his kingdom, will never pass from my
mind.
Meanwhile Lord Kitchener and Prince Louis continued to
give the necessary orders from London.
I now found myself suddenly, unexpectedly and deeply
involved in a tremendous and hideously critical local situa-
tion which might well continue for some time. I had also
assumed a very direct responsibility for exposing the city
to bombardment and for bringing into it the inexperienced,
partially equipped and partially trained battalions of the
Royal Naval Division. I felt it my duty to see the matter
through. On the other hand, it was not right to leave the
Admiralty without an occupant. I therefore telegraphed
on the 4th to the Prime Minister offering to take formal mili-
ANTWERP 381
tary charge of the British forces in Antwerp and tendering
my resignation of the office of First Lord of the Admiralty.
This offer was not accepted. I have since learned that Lord
Kitchener wrote proposing that it should be. But other
views prevailed: and I certainly have no reason for regret
that they did so. I was informed that Sir Henry Rawlinson
was being sent to the city and was requested to do my best
until he arrived.
October 5 was a day of continuous fighting. The situation
fluctuated from hour to hour. I print the telegrams of this
day in their sequence: —
10.18 a.m., October 5.
I telegraphed to Lord Kitchener: —
'Line of the Nethe is intact. Marine Brigade holding
important sector north-west of Lierre, has been briskly
engaged during the night, with about seventy casualties so
far. It seems not unlikely that the German attack will be
directed on this point, as passage of river is easier there. I
am making sure that they are properly supported by detach-
ment of artillery. General Paris is doing very well.
'Later. Infantry attack indicated now appears to be de-
veloping. '
12.22 p.m.
'It is my duty to remain here and continue my direction
of affairs unless relieved by some person of consequence, in
view of the situation and developing German attack. Pros-
pects will not be unfavourable if we can hold out for next
three days. We have a good deal of ground to sell, if it is
well disputed, even if Nethe River is forced.'
Lord Kitchener to First Lord:— 445 P"m*
'I expect Rawlinson will reach Antwerp to-day. It is
most necessary that Belgians should not give way before the
forces now on the sea arrive for their support. You know
date of arrival of troops at Ostend and Zeebrugge. I cannot
accelerate anything owing to difficulties of navigation. Prince
Louis is doing all he can. Are any of the guns we sent in
action ? Our 9* 2 on line to Lierre ought to be useful. I hope
Belgians realise the importance of holding Termonde so that
382 THE WORLD CRISIS
relieving force may act promptly on the German left flank.
The arrival of our troops should be kept very secret; by
moving at night a surprise might be possible in the early
morning. '
445 p.m.
First Lord to Lord Kitchener: —
' Attack has been pressed. Marines have stood well, with
some loss, but, on their right, a regiment has fallen back
under shell fire, and some German infantry to west of Lierre
are across Nethe. General Paris has ordered four Belgian
battalions and his reserve battalion to join another Belgian
brigade to drive them back and reoccupy positions. This is
now in progress. Every effort is being made to gain time. At
9 p.m. to-night I am to attend Council of Ministers. I can
get no news of time of arrival of naval brigades. They will
be wanted to-morrow for certain.'
Lord Kitchener to First Lord: — ' P'
' I hear the Marine Fusilier Brigade had not arrived as ex-
pected at Dunkirk to-day by train. I have in consequence
telegraphed to French Government as follows: —
'"As the Marine Fusilier Brigade is moving by train, and
their arrival at Antwerp is urgently required, please ask
Minister of War to continue their journey by train to Ant-
werp."
'You might, I think, inform Belgian authorities, so as to
have facilities for this force of 8,000 to proceed to wherever
you think they would be most usefully employed without
stopping at Ostend, and if they have not passed Dunkirk
they might be warned of their destination.'
First Lord to Lord Kitchener: — *4 P'm*
'We now hold all our positions along the Nethe, our
counter-attack having been successful. Germans will prob-
ably throw bridges in night at Lierre. On outskirts of Lierre
we are in contact with Germans. I have just returned from
advanced trenches and find marines cheerful and well dug in.
' General Paris does not think that he has lost more than
150 men killed and wounded.
'I presume you keep Sir John French informed.'
ANTWERP 383
Admiralty to First Lord:— 7*15 p,m*
'Sir H. Rawlinson just leaving Dunkirk for Antwerp via
Bruges, where he stays to-night. Dunkirk reports naval
brigades arrive Antwerp 1 a.m. Tuesday. First six transports,
containing 10,000 troops, 2,000 horses, should arrive Zee-
brugge from 4 a.m. onwards; 9,000 troops, 2,500 horses, arrive
partly at Ostend, mainly at Zeebrugge, Wednesday morning;
2,500 cavalry, 2,500 horses, arrive partly Ostend, partly Zee-
brugge, Thursday morning. '
Lord Kitchener to Colonel Dallas: — *4^ p*
' You have been appointed as General Staff Officer on Expe-
ditionary Force. Warn everybody to keep movement of
troops absolutely secret. Try and bring off a complete or par-
tial surprise on enemy's left; for this purpose movements of
troops from sea-coast should be as much as possible at night.
Am sending flying squadron, which will, I hope, protect troops
from too inquisitive enemy's aircraft. Sir Henry Rawlinson
has been appointed to chief command and will shortly arrive
Antwerp.
'All movements going as arranged.'
In the evening I went to General Paris' Headquarters on
the Lierre road for the purpose of putting him in command
of the other two Naval Brigades about to arrive. The fire
along this road was now heavier. Shrapnel burst overhead
as I got out of the car and struck down a man at my feet.
As we discussed around the cottage table, the whole house
thudded and shook from minute to minute with the near
explosions of shells whose flashes lit the window panes. In
such circumstances was it that General Paris received from
the representative of the Admiralty the command of the
Royal Naval Division which he was destined to hold with so
much honour until he fell grievously wounded in his trenches
after three years' war. This was the most important mili-
tary command exercised in the great war by an officer of the
Royal Marines.
384 THE WORLD CRISIS
The general result of the fighting on the 5 th raised our
hopes. The counter-attack by one British and nine Belgian
battalions drove the enemy back. All the positions that had
been lost were regained, and the line of the Nethe was almost
re-established. At midnight at the Belgian headquarters Gen-
eral de Guise received in my presence by telephone a favour-
able report from every single sector. The enemy had, how-
ever, succeeded in maintaining a foothold across the river,
and it seemed certain they would throw bridges in the night.
General de Guise therefore resolved to make^, further coun-
ter-attack under the cover of darkness in the hope of driving
the enemy altogether across the river. At 1 a.m. I telegraphed
as follows: —
Antwerp, October 6, 1 a.m.
First Lord to Lord Kitchener and Sir E. Grey: —
'All well. All positions are held along the Nethe. I hope
you will not decide finally on plan of operations till I can give
you my views. I have met Ministers in Council, who re-
solved to fight it out here, whatever happens.
'No 9/2's have arrived yet, even at Ostend.,
It was 2 o'clock before I went to bed. I had been moving,
thinking and acting with very brief intervals for nearly four
days in Council and at the front in circumstances of unde-
fined but very direct responsibility. Certainly the situation
seemed improved. The line of the Nethe was practically
intact and the front unbroken. The Naval Brigades, already
a day behind my hopes, were arriving in the morning. By
land and sea troops were hastening forward. All the various
personalities and powers were now looking the same way and
working for the same object. France and Britain, the Ad-
miralty and the War Office, the Belgian Government and
the Belgian Command were all facing in the same direction.
Rawlinson would arrive to-morrow, and my task would be
concluded. But what would the morrow bring forth? I was
now very tired, and slept soundly for some hours.
ANTWERP 385
All through the night the righting was continual, but no
definite reports were available up till about 9 o'clock. At
the Belgian Headquarters I was told that the Belgian night
attack had miscarried, that the Germans were counter-at-
tacking strongly, that the Belgian troops were very tired
and the situation along the Nethe obscure. General Paris
and the Marine Brigade were also heavily engaged. The
Naval Brigades had arrived and detrained and were now
marching to their assigned positions in the line. But where
was the line ? It was one thing to put these partially trained
and ill-equipped troops into a trench line, and quite another
to involve them in the manoeuvres of a moving action.
Solidly dug in with their rifles and plenty of ammunition,
these ardent, determined men would not be easily dislodged.
But they were not capable of manoeuvre. It seemed to me
that they should take up an intermediate position until we
knew what was happening on the front. General Paris was
involved in close fighting with his brigade, and had not been
able to take over command of the whole force. It was neces-
sary, therefore, for me to give personal directions. I motored
to the Belgian Headquarters, told General de Guise that these
new troops must have fixed positions to fight in, and would
be wasted if flung in piecemeal. I proposed to stop them
about four miles short of their original destination as a sup-
port and rallying line for the Belgian troops who were falling
back. He agreed that this was wise and right, and I went
myself to see that the orders were carried out.
The moment one left the city gates the streams of wounded
and of fugitives betokened heavy and adverse fighting. Shells
from the enemy's field artillery were falling frequently on
roads and villages which yesterday were beyond his range.
We were by no means sure at what point the flow of refugees
would end and the wave of pursuers begin. However, by
about midday the three Naval and Marine Brigades were
drawn up with the Belgian reserves astride of the Antwerp-
Lierre road on the line Contich-Vremde.
386 THE WORLx^ v,iv^
In this position we awaited the next development and ex-
pected to be almost immediately attacked. The Germans
to our relief did not molest the retirement of the three Bel-
gian divisions. They waited to gather strength and to bring
up and use again the remorseless artillery upon which they
were mainly relying. As no German infantry appeared and
no heavy bombardment began, the Naval Brigades moved
forward in their turn and took up positions nearer to where
the enemy had halted. I remained in the line on the Lierre
road. Here at about 5 o'clock Sir Henry Rawlinson joined
me.
The General took, as might be expected, a robust view of
the situation, and was by no means disposed to give up the
quarrel either on the Antwerp front or on the line of com-
munications, which were already being more severely pressed.
In fact I found in this officer, whom I had known for many
years, that innate, instinctive revolt against acquiescing in
the will of the enemy which is an invaluable quality in mili-
tary men. These sentiments were also shared by Colonel
Bridges, former British military attache in Belgium, who
had arrived from Sir John French. At 7 o'clock a Council of
War was held in the Palace under the presidency of the King.
We affirmed the readiness and ability of the British Govern-
ment to execute punctually and fully the engagements into
which we had entered two days earlier. But the Belgian
chiefs were convinced that even if the Antwerp front along
the line of the Nethe could be restored, the danger to their
communications had become so great that they must with-
out delay resume the movement of their army to the left bank
of the Scheldt, which had been interrupted three days previ-
ously. Here they conceived themselves able to join hands
with any Anglo-French relieving force while at the same time
securing their own retreat on Ghent, which they had already
on September 4 reinforced by a brigade. It was not for
us to contest their view, and events have shown that they
ANTWERP 387
were right. The arrangements set out in the following tele-
gram were made: —
Antwerp, October 6, 10.37 P-m-
First Lord to Lord Kitchener: —
1 Germans attacked our position along the Nethe early
this morning. Belgian troops on the right of Marine brigade
were overpowered. General retirement with some loss was
effected to a lightly entrenched position on the line Contich-
Vremde, where enemy are not for the moment pressing. Ger-
mans will be enabled to bombard city to-morrow owing to lost
ground. In view of this and of complete exhaustion and
imminent demoralisation of Belgian Army, Rawlinson, who
has arrived, has, with my full agreement and that of Belgian
General Staff, ordered a general retirement to inner line of
forts. The three naval brigades will hold intervals between
forts and be supported by about a dozen Belgian battalions.
On this line, which is very strong against infantry attack, our
troops can certainly hold out as long as the city will endure
bombardment. Had naval brigades arrived 24 hours earlier,
we could probably have held line of the Nethe. They have
not been engaged, and marines have not lost more than 200
men.
'This evening Rawlinson and I attended a council of war
presided over by the King. We suggested an attempt to re-
establish Anglo-Belgian forces on line of the Nethe by employ-
ing 7th Division in a counter-attack in 48 hours' time, but
they had all clearly made up their minds that their army was
not in a fit condition to co-operate in any offensive movement.
Accordingly we have arranged with them: —
'(1.) That while the town endures bombardment General
Paris with naval division and Belgian support will defend
inner line forts to the utmost.
'(2.) That the rest of the Belgian Field Army shall be im-
mediately withdrawn across the Scheldt to what they call the
entrenched camp of the left bank. This area is protected by
the Scheldt, various forts and entrenchments, and large inun-
dations, and here they hope to find time to recover and re-
form. From this position they will aid to the best of their
ability any relieving movement which may be possible from
the west.
388 THE WORLD CRISIS
'(3.) Rawlinson will organise relieving force at Ghent and
Bruges and prepare to move forward as soon as possible.
1 But I shall hope to-morrow to convince you that it should
be strengthened for the operation.
'We are all agreed that in the circumstances there is no
other course open.
'I return with Rawlinson to-night to Bruges, and early
to-morrow morning shall be in London.
' Aviation park and heavy guns will be moved from Ant-
werp/
General Rawlinson and I left the city together that night,
and after an anxious drive over roads luckily infested by
nothing worse than rumour, I boarded the Attentive at Ostend
and returned to England.
So far as the personal aspect of this story is concerned, I
cannot feel that I deserve the reproaches and foolish fictions
which have been so long freely and ignorantly heaped upon
me. I could not foresee that the mission I undertook would
keep me away from the Admiralty for more than forty-
eight hours, or that I should find myself involved in another
set of special responsibilities outside the duties of the office
which I held. No doubt had I been ten years older, I should
have hesitated long before accepting so unpromising a task.
But the events occurred in the order I have described; and
at each stage the action which I took seemed right, natural
and even inevitable. Throughout I was held in the grip of
emergencies and of realities which transcended considerations
of praise or blame.1
1 But see Lord Esher: 'One night he (Kitchener) was in bed asleep,
when Mr. Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, bursting into
the room, pleaded for the War Minister's permission to leave at once
for Antwerp. In spite of the late hour, Sir Edward Grey arrived in
the middle of the discussion, and while he was engaging Lord Kitchener's
attention, Mr. Churchill slipped away. He was next heard of when a
telegram from Antwerp was put into Lord K.'s hands, in which his
impetuous colleague asked bravely to be allowed to resign his great
ANTWERP 389
But, after all, it is by the results and as a whole that the
episode will be judged; and these as will be shown were cer-
tainly advantageous to the Allied cause.
After the departure of the Belgian Field Army the further
defence of the remaining lines of Antwerp was left to the
fortress troops, the 2nd Belgian Division, and the three Brit-
ish Naval Brigades, who held on their front the equivalent of
more than five complete German divisions, to wit: the 5th
Reserve, 6th Reserve, 4th Ersatz and Marine Division, and
the 26th, 37th, and 1st Bavarian Landwehr Brigades.
At midnight on the 7th the Germans, having advanced
their artillery, began to bombard the city and the forts of
the inner line. The forts melted under the fire, and a great
proportion of the civil population fled through the night,
lighted by conflagrations, over the bridges of the Scheldt to
the open country, along the roads towards Ghent or into Hol-
land. The enemy's attack was pressed continuously, and the
enceinte of the city was considered to be untenable by the
evening of the 8th. The Belgian Division and the British
Naval Brigades evacuated Antwerp that night, crossed the
Scheldt safely, and began their retreat by road and rail on
Ghent and Ostend. Two naval airmen,1 as a Parthian shot,
blew up after long flights a Zeppelin in its shed at Diisseldorf
and bombed the railway station at Cologne. German patrols,
after many precautions, entered Antwerp towards evening on
office, to be given command of a Naval Brigade, and pleading that
reinforcements should be hurried out to those "forlorn and lonely
men," as he called them, who were vainly trying to hold on to the Ant-
werp lines. Lord K. was not upset, but he was not unmoved, etc.
. . .' — The Tragedy of Lord Kitchener, p. 67.
It is remarkable that Lord Esher should be so much astray; for
during the war I showed him the text of the telegrams printed in this
chapter and now made public for the first time. We must conclude
that an uncontrollable fondness forbade him to forsake fiction for fact.
Such constancy is a defect in an historian. W. S. C.
1 Commanders Marix and Spenser-Grey.
39Q THE WORLD CRISIS
the 9th, and on the 10th the stouthearted Governor, who
had retired to one of the surviving forts, capitulated.
The resistance of the city had been prolonged by five
days.
CHAPTER XVI
THE CHANNEL PORTS
The Purpose of the Antwerp Effort — The Belgian Army effects its
Retreat — Loss and Gain — Ten Precious Days — Onslaught of the
German Reinforcements — The Struggle for the Channel Ports —
Labours of the Admiralty — Achievements of the Transport De-
partment— Correspondence with Sir John French — General Joffre
requests Naval Support — Admiral Hood's Operations on the
Belgian Coast — Commodore Tyrwhitt destroys the German Tor-
pedo Boats — The German Armies reach Salt Water — Beginning
of the Battle of the Yser — The Inshore Squadron — 'One Flank
the Germans cannot turn' — Further Correspondence with Sir
John French — The Crisis of the Battle — The German Advance
Stemmed — Effect of Antwerp on the Main Decision.
THE object of prolonging the defence of Antwerp was,
as has been explained, to give time for the French and
British Armies to rest their left upon that fortress and hold
the Germans from the seaboard along a line Antwerp- Ghent-
Lille. This depended not only upon the local operations but
on the result of the series of outflanking battles which marked
the race for the sea. A decisive victory gained by the French
in the neighbourhood of Peronne, or by the British beyond
Armentieres and towards Lille would have opened all this
prospect. High French authorities have concluded that a
more rapid and therefore no doubt more daring transference
of force from the right and centre of the French front to its
left, 'looking sixty kilometres ahead instead of twenty-five/
and generally a more vigorous attempt to outflank the Ger-
mans following immediately upon the victory of the Marne
and the arrest of the armies at the Aisne, might well have
shouldered the Germans not only away from the sea, but even
out of a large part of occupied France. In the event, however,
391
392 THE WORLD CRISIS
and with the forces employed, the French and British did not
succeed in turning the enemy's flank. The battles at Albert,
La Bassee and Armentieres produced no decisive result;
Peronne and Lille could not be reached and the fighting lines
continued simply to prolong themselves to the north-west.
The retention of Antwerp would have rewarded the victory
of the main armies with a prize of the utmost value. Its ex-
tended resistance diminished the consequences of their failure.
Everything at Antwerp had depended on a victory to the
southward. And this victory had been denied. Nevertheless,
as will now be shown, the effort was fruitful in a remarkable
degree.
The fall of Antwerp released the besieging army. A marine
division marched into the city on the ioth.1 The rest of the
German divisions were already streaming south and west in
hot pursuit, and hoped for interception of the Belgian Army.
But a surprise awaited them.
On the night of the 9th the German forces who had crossed
the Dendre river had come in contact with French Fusiliers
Marins at Melle and Meirelbeke, and during the ioth they
found themselves in presence of British regular troops of un-
known strength, whose patrols were feeling their way forward
from Ghent to meet them. The 7th Division and the 3rd
Cavalry Division had come upon the scene in accordance
with the fourth condition of the Anglo-Belgian agreement of
October 4. The British, French and Belgian forces from
Ghent thus threatened the left flank of any serious German
cutting-off movement northwards to the Dutch frontier.
Uncertain of the size of the army by which they were con-
fronted, and mystified by the indefinite possibilities of land-
ings from the sea, the Germans paused to collect their strength.
1 It was perhaps an unconscious recognition of the naval significance
of Antwerp that all three great Powers — Germany, France and Britain
— used in its attack and defence Naval Brigades formed since the out-
break of war
THE CHANNEL PORTS 393
They knew that the bulk of the British Army had already
left the Aisne. Where was it? Where would it reappear?
What were these British regulars, who stood so confidently
in their path? On the 12th when they considered themselves
strong enough to advance upon Ghent, the whole of the Bel-
gian Field Army had passed the dangerous points in safety,
only one single squadron being intercepted. Of this com-
plicated operation the victorious Germans became specta-
tors.
Only weak parties of Germans ventured beyond Lokeren
during the night of the 9th-ioth to molest the retreat of
the Antwerp troops. The 2nd Belgian Division and two out
of the three Naval Brigades came through intact. But the
railway and other arrangements for the rear brigade were mis-
understood, and about two and a half battalions of very tired
troops, who through the miscarriage of an order had lost some
hours, were led across the Dutch frontier in circumstances
on which only those who know their difficulties are entitled
to form a judgment.
If the Belgian Field Army had begun its withdrawal on
October 3, as originally intended, it could probably have got
safely without aid to Ghent and beyond. But the fortress
troops, numbering many thousands, to whom it had been
throughout resolved to confide the last defence of Antwerp,
must in any case have been driven into surrender to the in-
vader or internment in Holland once the Field Army had
gone. The prolongation of the defence and the delay in the
departure of the Field Army neither bettered nor worsened
their fortunes. They, therefore, do not enter into any calcu-
lation of the loss and gain attendant on the attempted opera-
tion of relief. So far as actual results are concerned, the
damage caused by the bombardment of the city, which was
not extensive, and the internment of two and a half British
Naval battalions, on the one hand, must be weighed against
the gain of five days in the resistance and the influence exer-
394; THE WORLD CRISIS
cised on subsequent events by the 7th Division and 3rd Cav-
alry Division on the other.
At the time the British Government decided to send help
to Antwerp the total German field force in Northern Belgium
had been correctly estimated at four or five divisions. But
before the city capitulated and while the British troops were
still at Ghent, there began to manifest itself that tremendous
unexpected development of German force which from the mo-
ment of Antwerp's fall was launched against the Allied left
and aimed at Calais.
Besides the liberated Siege Army and the troops which
had threatened the Antwerp communications, no fewer than
four fresh Army Corps (XXIInd, XXIIIrd, XXVIth and
XXVIIth), newly formed in Germany and concentrating in
Belgium, were already at hand. And in front of this formi-
dable army there stood from October 10 to October 21 only
the wearied Belgians, the Fusiliers Marins, and the British
3rd Cavalry and 7th Divisions. The caution of the German
advance may perhaps have been induced by their uncer-
tainty as to the whereabouts and intentions of the British
Army, and their fear that it might be launched against their
right from the sea flank. But, however explained, the fact
remains, and to it we owe the victory of the Yser and Ever-
Glorious Ypres.
A simple examination of dates will reveal the magnitude
of the peril which the Allied cause escaped. Antwerp fell
twenty-four hours after the last division of the Belgian Field
Army left the city. Had this taken place on October 3rd or
4th, the city would have surrendered on the 4th or 5th. No
British 4th Corps1 or Fusiliers Marins would have been at
Ghent to cover the Belgian retreat. But assuming that the
Belgian Army had made this good unaided, the same marches
would have carried them and their German pursuers to the
Yser by the 10th. There would have been nothing at all in
1 Rawlinson's Force was so styled.
THE CHANNEL PORTS 395
front of Ypres. Sir John French could not come into action
north of Armentieres till the 15th. His de trainmen ts at St.
Omer, etc., were not completed till the 19th. Sir Douglas
Haig with the 1st Corps could not come into line north of
Ypres till about the 21st. Had the German Siege Army been
released on the 5th, and followed by their great reinforce-
ments already available advanced at once nothing could have
saved Dunkirk, and perhaps Calais and Boulogne. The loss
of Dunkirk was certain and that of both Calais and Boulogne
probable. Ten days were wanted, and ten days were won.
We had now without respite to meet the great German
drive against the Channel ports. The six divisions released
from the siege of Antwerp, and the eight new divisions, whose
apparition had been so unexpected to the British and French
Staffs, rolled southward in a double-banked wave. The Bel-
gian Army trooped back in a melancholy procession along the
sea-shore to the Yser. General Rawlinson, with the 7 th
Division and the 3rd Cavalry Division, extricating himself
skilfully from large German forces — how great was not then
known — and lingering at each point to the last minute with-
out becoming seriously engaged, found himself by October
15 in the neighbourhood of a place called Ypres.1 Meanwhile
Sir John French, detraining at St. Omer, and hopefully be-
lieving that he was turning the German right, struck through
Armentieres towards Lille, and sent imperative orders to
Rawlinson, over whose head the storm was about to break, to
advance in conformity and seize Menin. The French forces
intended for the relief of Antwerp and the beginnings of
larger French reinforcements endeavoured to close the gap
between Rawlinson and the Belgians. The dykes were opened
1 The heavy losses of the 7th Division have often been attributed
to their attempt to relieve Antwerp. In fact, however, these losses
did not begin until after they had joined the main army.
396 THE WORLD CRISIS
and large inundations began to appear. In this manner was
formed a thin, new, loosely organised, yet continuous allied
front from the neighbourhood of La Bassee to the sea at the
mouth of the Yser; and upon this front, which grew up and
fixed itself at every point in and by the actual collision of hos-
tile forces, was now to be fought the third great battle in the
West.
These events involved the Admiralty at many points. The
position of Rawlinson's troops in the presence of vastly su-
perior forces was precarious, and for some days we stood
ready to re-embark them. We laboured to salve everything
possible from the Belgian wreck. The Royal Naval Division
must be brought back to refit, re-organise and resume its
interrupted training. The Admiralty details — aeroplanes,
armoured trains, armoured cars, motor omnibus transport,
etc. — with which I had been endeavouring during the pre-
vious weeks to conceal our nakedness in the vital coastal area,
could now be merged in the arriving British armies.
It would not have been possible to deal with these com-
plications— themselves only one subsidiary part of our task
— unless Prince Louis and I, working in complete accord, had
had the power to give orders covering the whole business
which were unquestioningly obeyed. Yet some of the orders
which I was forced to give to the Admiralty Transport De-
partment left me with misgivings that we were asking more
than they could do. Fortunately, a few weeks before, I had
taken the step of appointing in the place of the retired Ad-
miral who usually directed this cardinal machine the young
civilian Assistant Director of Transports, whose abilities in
conference and on paper were distinguished. Often in these
weeks and in the succeeding months I had to turn to Mr.
Graeme Thomson's department with hard and complex de-
mands. Never did they fail. October 10 was the climax of
their strain. I cannot do better than quote the minute I
wrote at the time: —
THE CHANNEL PORTS 397
Secretary. 10/10/14.
First Sea Lord.
Director of Transports and others concerned.
1. Between 5,000 and 6,000 men of the R.N. Division are
assembling at Ostend. They will not be ready to embark
until to-morrow, the nth. The whole of these, including
Marines, should sail after dark on the nth for Dover and pro-
ceed to the camp at Deal, all previous orders to the contrary
being cancelled.
2. 1,500 Belgian recruits and volunteers are at Ostend,
and are to be embarked at once for Cherbourg, the French
authorities being informed by telegram.
3. The transportation of the 11,000 Belgian recruits and
reservists at Dunkirk to Cherbourg is to continue without
intermission as rapidly as possible. The Belgians will be
rationed by the Admiralty while on board ship, and the Bel-
gians at Dunkirk will be rationed from the supplies of the R.N.
Division until embarked.
4. All transports are to leave Zeebrugge at once, and all
transports, other than those employed above, which are not
accommodated in safe shelter at Ostend, are to leave in both
cases for convenient British ports.
5. Enough transports to embark the 7 th Division and the
3rd Cavalry Division are to be kept in immediate readiness,
with steam up, for the next forty-eight hours, in Ostend,
Dunkirk, Dover, and the Thames. It is unlikely, having
regard to the military situation, that any re-embarkation will
be required, but we must be continually prepared for it, and
should an emergency arise, both Zeebrugge and Ostend must
be used, notwithstanding any risks. Flotilla dispositions to
be arranged accordingly. General Rawlinson to be informed
that we are holding these ships in readiness, and that he should
communicate direct with the Admiralty by telephone if at
any moment the situation renders his re-embarkation likely.
We are assuming that he could give us twelve hours' notice,
within which time the transports could be counted upon.
6. All Marines and R.N. Division details at Dunkirk are
to be re-embarked and brought back via Dover to Deal.
7. Colonel Osmaston's Marine Artillery are to remain at
Dunkirk for the present.
8. The armoured trains and naval ratings working them,
398 THE WORLD CRISIS
and all available aeroplanes and armed motor-cars, except
those now at Dunkirk under the command of Commander
Samson, are placed under the orders of General Rawlinson.
9. The three monitors are to be held in readiness, with
steam up, to cover a re-embarkation at Ostend or Zeebrugge,
should it become necessary. General Rawlinson is to be told
to telephone or telegraph if at any time he thinks such naval
protection will be required.
10. The Transport Department will provide whatever ships
are necessary to carry the stores, ammunition, and materiel
of the Belgian field army. The transports standing by for
the 7th Division and the 3rd Cavalry Division are a prior
claim on our resources. But as there is no doubt that we can
meet the two, the Transport Department is to get into direct
telephonic communication with the Belgian authorities and
arrange forthwith for the beginning of the embarkation of
these stores. For the embarkation of stores, as apart from
troops, Zeebrugge may be used equally with Ostend.
n. 8,000 to 10,000 Belgian wounded are to be evacuated
from Ostend to England as speedily as possible. The Trans-
port Department is to make proposals and preparations for
their movement, while at the same time the necessary arrange-
ments for their reception in this country are being concerted
by the medical authorities.
12. All motor transports of the R.N. Division, excluding
armed and other motor-cars under Commander Samson
actually employed, are to be collected at Dunkirk under
Colonel Dumble, who is to reorganise them as quickly as pos-
sible, and will receive further instructions on that subject.
w. s. c.
It was with a feeling of relief and of admiration that I saw all
these immense demands smoothly and punctually complied
with.
While in Antwerp I had been in constant communication
with Sir John French both through Colonel Bridges and by
aeroplane. On October 5 he had written, ' Thank you so
much for writing so fully and clearly to me from Antwerp.
If the place is to be saved you have saved it by your prompt
action. As a matter of principle I hate putting mobile troops
THE CHANNEL PORTS 399
inside a fortress, but in this case it is very likely that the
appearance of a large force inside the place may have a great
moral effect. But the situation ought to be most carefully
watched. . . .' The Field Marshal proceeded to complain of
the exclusion by Lord Kitchener of the forces under General
Rawlinson from the main British army. What would happen
if and when he joined up with them ? Other points of differ-
ence arose between the Commander-in-Chief and the Secre-
tary of State. 'I shall do the best I can/ the former con-
tinued, Ho bring relief to the place at the earliest possible
moment and am arranging to concentrate in the North as
quickly as circumstances will allow. The Germans are push-
ing out their flank defence towards the West and South-
West. . . .' He expressed a wish that we could meet.
I replied to this on October 11 when the fate of Antwerp
was already decided. Using my old and intimate friendship
with the Field Marshal I laboured as always to smooth the
differences between him and Lord Kitchener.
I consider that Kitchener has been thoroughly loyal to you,
and has done and is doing everything in human power to
support you. It would be disastrous to the cause and ruin-
ous to all if there were any breakdown in true comradeship
between you and Kitchener. Military staffs always tend to
make mischief between principals, and try to set their caps
at each other.
The fall of Antwerp was a great and untimely injury to the
Allied cause. I do not agree with the policy which aban-
doned it *; and I fear you will now have the army which was
before Antwerp to meet almost immediately. But I care for
nothing but the future in war. I clear my heart of all use-
less reflections and sterile controversies. It is vain to look
backwards, and I turn my gaze with hope to the re-entry of
the British army into the decisive centre of the struggle and
pray for the victory.
I am arranging the omnibuses and armoured cars for you
as quickly as possible Rawlinson has got a very good naval
1 i.e. The absence of a greater French effort.
400 THE WORLD CRISIS
armoured train which I have attached to him, but which
you had better take over when he joins up.
The destruction of the Zeppelin and its shed was a gallant
feat of arms.
Naval affairs at the moment imperatively keep me here —
Alas! I hope you will not allow JorTre to deprive you of
Dunkirk as your advanced base and fortified camp. In view
of embarkation facilities Calais or Boulogne ought to be en-
trenched too — so that you have both. But we all feel Dun-
kirk is the right place, and belongs to you.
The wave of [German] reinforcements from the East, and
the slow development of the Russian pressure, makes the
situation rather grim just now.
I hope greatly to see you soon. Only five hours from your
lines !
I earnestly trust the day goes well. But anyhow we will
compel the end to do so.
You will want the big army I expect before your task is
finished.
On October 16 General Joffre telegraphed to Lord Kitchener
as follows: —
'Now that the operations extend up to the coast of the
North Sea between Ostend and the advanced defences of
Dunkirk, it would be important for the two Allied Navies to
participate in these operations by supporting our left wing
and acting with long-range guns on the German right wing.
The Commander of the Naval Forces would then act in con-
cert with General Foch through the Governor of Dunkirk/
This duty we instantly accepted.
First Lord to Sir John French.
October 17, 1914.
* Monitors were delayed by weather, but will be in position
from daylight 18th; meanwhile eight destroyers should have
arrived on the flank between 4 and 5 p.m. 17th, and two scout
cruisers an hour later. They have been told to communicate
with Colonel Bridges on the quays of Nieuport.
THE CHANNEL PORTS 401
We are sending two battleships mounting eight 12-inch
guns to Dunkirk roadstead to-morrow to cover the fortress
and its coast approaches.
We set to work forthwith to support the Allied left flank.
I entrusted this operation, which required an officer of first
quality, to Admiral Hood, till then my Naval Secretary. He
was now appointed to the Dover Command, while I took in
his stead Admiral Oliver. On the 18th the three ex-Brazilian
monitors, renamed Humber, Mersey and Severn, escorted by
four destroyers, arrived at Dunkirk and the memorable series
of naval operations on the Belgian Coast began.
There was no difficulty in finding plenty of ships of differ-
ent classes to cover the flank of the army. Besides the three
monitors, a large proportion of the destroyers from Dover
were readily available. There were many old battleships,
and these at certain states of the tide could get into suitable
positions for bombarding. In addition there was the Scout
class, seven of which were available, all happily newly rearmed
with the very best 4-inch guns. But Admiralty reserves
of ammunition had been based upon the needs of purely naval
actions, which are few and far between, and not many of which
all ships survive. Bombarding the German positions on the
Belgian Coast week after week, and possibly for months, made
demands upon our stores of a totally different character. We
had to pick ships primarily for the class of ammunition they
fired; ships that could use up old ammunition and ships whose
value was so small that we could afford to spend all their am-
munition. As October wore on we scoured the dockyards
for every little vessel that carried a gun of any kind. Even
the smallest gunnery tenders, 250 ton gunboats forty years old,
were pressed into service, and in one way cr another the fire
was continuously maintained.
It was evident that these operations would have to be
carried on under unceasing submarine attack. Moreover,
402 THE WORLD CRISIS
we had to be prepared for a sudden dash by German cruisers
and destroyers. We trusted to Commodore Tyrwhitt with
the Harwich Striking Force either to protect us from this
or to exact retribution on the return journey. On the 17th
the Germans, torn between the will to wound and the fear
to strike, broke all the commandments of the text books by
sending a feeble force of four small destroyers from the Ems
down the Dutch Coast. They were almost immediately de-
stroyed by the Commodore, the British ships engaged being
the light cruiser Undaunted and the destroyers Lance, Lennox,
Legion and Loyal.
From the middle of October onwards the German hosts
could look upon salt water. First Zeebrugge was occupied,
then Ostend, then mile by mile the sand-dunes and golf courses
and gay villas of that pleasure coast were devoured by invad-
ing war. In his first contact with the new element the land
monster committed several imprudences. Apparently con-
temptuous of the power of ships' guns, he deployed batteries
of artillery on the open beach, and opened fire on our Scouts
and destroyers. These experiments were not repeated. A
Swedish writer, Dr. Sven Hedin, at that time with the
German armies, belauding them and bowing obsequiously be-
fore what he had convinced himself was world-conquering
power, has described a scene in the restaurant of the best
Ostend hotel. The room was crowded with hungry officers of
the invading army, just marched in, all sitting down to ex-
cellent fare.
'A destroyer had just detached itself from the rest and
was making at full speed for Ostend, parallel with the coast,
as close as possible to the shore. Presently another destroyer
appeared, following in the wake of the first. What could they
want, these ruffians ? Strong language was heard — it was a
piece of consummate impudence to come steaming right under
our noses like this. Evidently they were reconnoitring — but
what insolence, they must have known that we had occupied
THE CHANNEL PORTS 403
Ostend! Aha! they suspect that there are submarines and
destroyers in the inner harbour, and want to see whether they
can detect anything from outside! . . . Astounding in-
solence. Two small German guns are hurried up. " Are they
going to shoot ?" I asked. "Oh, yes, they are going to shoot
all right." . . . The first shot rang out. . . . Directly the
German shots had been fired, the two destroyers swung round
to port and at the same moment opened fire. Their guns
seemed to flash out straight at us.' . . .
The results were instantaneous. The restaurant, which
had been 'one of the most elegant in Europe/ was blasted
into a smoking shambles of ruin and death.
In this manner the German Army and the British Navy
first came into contact with one another.
Here are a few of our messages at that time: —
October 17, 19 14, 1.2 p.m.
Admiralty to Rear- Admiral Hood, Dover.
Most important to send the scouts at once and some de-
stroyers to Dunkirk to work along the coast to Nieuport to
support the Belgian left, now being attacked by the Germans;
also monitors as soon as weather permits.
Acknowledge.
7.20 p.m.
Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Hood, H.M.S. 'Attentive.'
Belgian Army is on line River Yser left bank, from Nieu-
port to Dixmude, with advanced posts on E. bank at Lombart-
zyde Rattevalle and Mannekensvere.
King is at La Panne, the last village on French coast
The role of ships is as follows: —
Firstly, to prevent any disembarkation of German troops
between Nieuport and La Panne and to South-West.
Secondly to fire against enemy, which are advancing on
Nieuport.
404 THE WORLD CRISIS
8. 20 p.m.
Admiralty to Commodore Tyrwhitt, H.M.S. 'Maidstone.,'
Harwich.
The first German attempt to send destroyers down the
Broad Fourteens being so successfully defeated may cause a
larger number to be sent next time: be ready to meet them.
We are sending scouts and destroyers to support the Belgian
left at Nieuport.
Two battleships are leaving Portland to-night for Dover,
four more destroyers are being sent to escort them. There-
fore, if you can spare four destroyers, send them temporarily
for Dover patrol to arrive at daylight.
October 19.
Rear- Admiral Hood to Admiralty.
Engagement continues at Nieuport. I believe that naval
bombardment has done harm to enemy.
6-inch ammunition is urgently required for monitors, and
must be sent as soon as possible, otherwise they will be use-
less
October 21, 10.55 P-m-
Rear- Admiral Hood to Admiralty.
Fired to-day n hours continuously, could see no improve-
ment in situation. Patrolling coast every night. Monitors
expended 600 6-inch shells daily. In Foresight alone 1,100
shells fired to-day, and even then unable to comply with all
demands.
October 22.
Rear- Admiral Hood, Dunkirk, to First Lord.
I have returned for a few hours to Dunkirk, at the request
of Colonel Bridges, to confer on future movements.
I have enough ships.
Firing has been less to-day.
In the event of a sudden northerly gale, the mom tors and
Bustard would be lost. This is a justifiable risk if they are
doing valuable work, and is much less than submarine risk.
Communique.
On the 1 8th instant requests for naval assistance were made
to the Admiralty by the Allied Commanders. In consequence
a naval flotilla, mounting a large number of powerful long
THE CHANNEL PORTS 405
range guns, came into action at daybreak on the 19th off the
Belgian Coast, supporting the left of the Belgian Army and
firing against the right of the German attack, which they were
by their position able to enfilade. The Germans replied by
shells from their heavy guns, but owing to the superior range
of the British Marine Artillery practically no damage has
been done. The three monitors, which were building in
British ports for Brazil and were acquired on the outbreak
of war, have proved particularly well suited to this class of
operation. A heavy bombardment of the German flank has
been maintained without intermission since the morning of
the 19th and is being continued to-day. Observation is ar-
ranged from the shore by means of naval balloons, and all
reports indicate that substantial losses have been inflicted
upon the enemy and that the fire is well directed and effec-
tive against his batteries and heavy guns. Yesterday a heavy
explosion, probably of an ammunition wagon, followed upon
a naval shot. The naval losses have so far been very small
considering the damage done and the important assistance
rendered to the Belgian left flank. All reports received by
the Admiralty show the courage and determination with
which the Belgian Army, animated by the King in person, is
defending the last few miles of Belgian soil. The naval opera-
tions are under the command of Rear-Admiral the Hon.
Horace L. A. Hood, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.
October 23, 1.5 a.m.
Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Hood.
From First Lord.
* Vital to sustain Belgian Army with effective Naval Artil-
lery support to-morrow.
Arrange details with Bridges.
Am sending Gunnery School tenders to Dunkirk; draw upon
them as you need.
Recognise importance to Navy of dominating Belgian
Coast; make the most of your opportunity.
October 23.
Rear-Admiral Hood to First Lord.
Thanks for message. All going well.
Will bombard Ostend. Belgian Head-quarters granted
permission.
Am quite satisfied that our firing has done good.
406 THE WORLD CRISIS
24/10/14.
Communique.
All yesterday the monitors and other vessels of the British
bombarding flotilla fired on the German right, which they
searched thoroughly and effectively in concert with the opera-
tions of the Belgian Army. All German attacks on Nieuport
were repulsed. Much damage was done to the enemy by
naval fire which enfilades the German line, and enemy's pris-
oners taken yesterday and the day before testify to the heavy
losses they have suffered from this cause. Fire was also
opened in the afternoon on the German batteries near Ostend.
Admiral Hood now has a fine flotilla of vessels very suitable
for this work and at the same time not of great naval value.
During the day our ships were persistently attacked by an
enemy's submarine, and torpedoes were fired without success
at Wildfire and Myrmidon. Other British vessels again at-
tacked the submarine. The naval aeroplanes and balloons
aided in the direction of the fire. The weather continued fine
and favourable. No loss was sustained by the flotillas yes-
terday.
October 26, 12.21 a.m.
Rear- Admiral Hood to Admiralty.
Am off Nieuport. All well here. Have not succeeded so
well to-day owing to long range of German batteries, which
are not yet located by me. Aeroplanes reconnoitre the place
when weather permits, and, if located, shall attack batteries
with guns I can muster. Portion of shell on board here proves
bigger guns.
Noon.
Admiralty to Senior Naval Officer, Dover.
Urgent. Order Venerable1 to raise steam at once ready to
proceed to support Allied left off Nieuport. Report how
soon she can be ready to proceed.
Four destroyers must accompany her.
October 27, 11.30 p.m.
First Lord to Rear- Admiral Hood.
Certainly go on, husband ammunition till good targets
show, but risks must be run and Allies' left must be supported
1 A battleship.
THE CHANNEL PORTS 407
without fail by the Navy. You have all done very well, and
on land the line has been maintained. Keep it up.
October 28, 1.37 a.m,
Rear- Admiral Hood to Admiralty.
The Belgian authorities begged me to fire more rapidly.
Deliberate firing will not produce more results as it is un-
marked. I understand that 48 hours of clinging to Nieu-
port may achieve decisive results. If I am to order the firing
to be deliberate, I shall not be able to do what the Belgian
army requires.
October 28, 4.34 p.m.
Rear-Admiral Hood to Admiralty.
Have continued bombardment against increasing opposi-
tion. Captain of Falcon and five men killed and several
wounded. Wildfire hit on the water line and sent in for re-
pairs. Brilliant one killed and several wounded. Rinaldo
eight wounded. . . . Submarine sighted — all destroyers now
chasing [her]. Venerable has just grounded on sand-bank out
of gunfire. Tide rising, fine weather. She will be off in
half an hour.
October 29, 1 a.m.
First Lord to Rear -Admiral Hood.
Save ammunition where possible, but don't lose any chance
of hitting the enemy. Give your ships the following mes-
sage: 'The inshore flotilla and squadron have played an
appreciable part in the great battle now proceeding. You
have shown the Germans that there is one flank they cannot
turn.'
You have full discretion to go ahead.
Meanwhile the British Army was heavily engaged. Sir
John French wrote to me October 21: —
I began this letter two days ago. I had to stop in the
middle of a sentence and hadn't a single minute to go on
with it. We have been hard pressed the last two days. The
enemy has received considerable reinforcements and a big
battle has been raging all along our front from a point 10
408 THE WORLD CRISIS
miles North of Ypres to La Bassee, which is W.S.W. of Lille.
We have given way now and then in places and recovered
the ground again — and on the whole have lost nothing (ex-
cept unfortunately, men and officers !) although the enemy
has attacked with the utmost vigour.
I have been all along the line but the ground is so flat and
the buildings so numerous that it is impossible to see much
of the infantry work. I have this moment got a wire from
the ist Corps that they have captured 350 prisoners this
afternoon. . . .
He ended by some very friendly expressions about Kitchener
and my part in clearing up misunderstandings; also with
some kind words about Antwerp.
26/10/14.
Mr. Churchill to Sir John French.
(Private and Secret.)
I am touched and honoured by the kindness of your letter
written from the field of Armentieres. It was a disappoint-
ment to have to give up my visit but the press of events here
was decisive.
Antwerp was a bitter blow to me, and some aspects of it
have given a handle to my enemies, and perhaps for a time
reduced my power to be useful. From minute to minute one
does not know that some fine ship will not be blown up by
mine or submarine.1 Great good fortune has attended us so
far. Out of twenty-five submarine attacks only five have been
effective, and only on ships of no value. But every recon-
naissance ordered, carries with it the risk of a disproportion-
ate loss. And if an atmosphere of distrust and malice is cre-
ated— as is deliberately and laboriously being done — an un-
lucky incident might produce a most unpleasant state of feel-
ing. . . . However, I am resolved not to be drawn by any
impatience from those carefully considered plans of the naval
war which I revealed to you in July, which are the result of
three years' study, and with which Jellicoe is in the fullest
accord. These plans will not produce any feat of eclat, but
1 A curious coincidence or foreboding. Almost at that moment the
Audacious was moving to her doom.
THE CHANNEL PORTS 409
they will keep England safe and prosperous, and enable her
in good time to put in the field an army which will definitely
and finally turn the scale.
Kitchener is strangely alarmed about invasion, and on the
C.I.D. we have witnessed an absolute reversal of roles — the
W.O.1 declaring the country not safe and an invasion of
250,000 a possibility, and the Admiralty reassuring them, or
trying to. You know how carefully I have examined that
position, and how I have never minimised the risks. But
now that we are face to face with realities, I am not alarmed,
and my policy is that you should be reinforced by any ef-
fective division that can be formed and maintained; and' that
the Navy will prevent any invasion of a serious character.
The Prime Minister is solid as a rock; but waves of nervous-
ness pass over others, and may result in some retardation of
your reinforcements.
We are making extraordinary efforts to grapple with the
submarine menace which tends to drive our great ships so
far away, and during November we shall, I believe, have got
the better of it, and have secured all our anchorages by net-
work and other means. Then we shall be able to give a
greater assurance to those who need it.
But my dear friend, I do trust you realise how damnable
it will be if the enemy settles down for the winter along lines
which comprise Calais, Dunkirk or Ostend. There will be
continual alarms and greatly added difficulties. We must
have him off the Belgian Coast, even if we cannot recover
Antwerp.
I am getting old ships with the heaviest guns ready, pro-
tected by barges with nets against submarines, so as to dis-
pute the whole seaboard with him. On the 31st instant
Revenge, four i3^-inch guns, will come into action if required,
and I have a regular fleet of monitors and ' bomb-ketches '
now organised which they all say has hit the Germans hard,
and is getting stronger every day.
If you could again passage off to the left, I could give you
overwhelming support from the sea, and there you will have
a flank which certainly they cannot turn.
You have on your front gained a fine success in hurling
back the whole weight of the German right. All your mes-
1 War Office.
410 THE WORLD CRISIS
sages are so good — cool, resolute and informing. They will
make a good page of military history. My heart is with you
in the army.
Sir John French to Mr. Churchill.
October 28.
'Your letters are always a great help and strength to me.
Thank you indeed for the last one. I wish you would try and
take a less gloomy view of what those people chatter about.
What does it matter. . . .' I tried hard to retain a hold on
the Belgians and with them to operate alone on the northern
flank; but the French sent Foch and a Mission. As the Bel-
gians were practically the guests of France, using their ter-
ritory and Calais as a base, I had no alternative but to grace-
fully 'submit.'
I am, however, on the very best terms with Foch, who is
doing splendid work. . . .
He added —
The fighting is still severe — I've been at two points of the
line to-day — but it is certainly slackening.
The Germans will never get further west.
This is only a hurried line written in the watches of the
night.
No words written after the event can convey half so truth-
ful or half so vivid an impression as these unstudied letters
and brief operative telegrams flashing to and fro. Reading
them again I feel once more the battle going on, the exhausted
Belgians clinging desperately to the last few miles of soil left
to their nation, their dauntless King and Queen amid the
shells at Furnes; the French troops hastening up, but only in
driblets; the heroic Fusiliers Marins holding Dixmude till
not a fifth were left alive; our little ships barking away along
the coast with the submarines stabbing at them from under-
neath and heavier metal opening on them every day from the
shore; inundations slowly growing, a shield of merciful water
rising inch by inch, hour by hour, between the fainting Bel-
gian line and the cruel monster who had come upon them; and
THE CHANNEL PORTS 411
all the time our own men fighting against appalling odds, ten
days, twenty days, thirty days, from Ypres to Armentieres;
nothing to send anyone, not a man, not a musket. Each night
Colonel Bridges spoke to me on the telephone from the Bel-
gian Head-quarters at Furnes. Each night we felt it might
be the last time he would speak from that address. It was
only very gradually towards the end of October that one
began to feel that the French and Belgian troops were getting
a firm grip of the line of the Yser, and that Sir John French
could write, 'The Germans will never get further west.' But
three more weeks of agony ensued before the decision at
Ypres finally declared itself in favour of the British Army.
We are, I feel, entitled to treat the Antwerp episode as an
integral and vital part of this tremendous battle for the
Channel Ports. If we had not made our belated effort to
prolong its defence, the whole after course of events would
have been different, and could hardly have been better. But
for the time gained at Antwerp and the arrival in such a
forward situation of the British and French forces assigned
so hurriedly for its relief, the impulsion of the Allied Armies
towards the sea — already less than was required — must have
been sensibly weakened. The great collision and battle with
the German right would have taken place all the same. Per-
haps the same result would have been achieved. But where?
Where would the line have been drawn when the armies set-
tled down into trenches frcm which they were not appreciably
displaced for more than four years? At the very best the
water defences, Gravelines — St. Omer — Aire, would have been
secured. Dunkirk and its fine harbour would have become
another nest of submarines to prey on our communications in
the Channel; and Calais would have been exposed to a con-
stant bombardment. The complications of these evils — the
least that could be expected — must have reacted formidably
412 THE WORLD CRISIS
upon the whole subsequent fortunes of the Allied Armies in
France.
If this be true — and history must pronoun ce — the men
who were responsible for the succour of Antwerp will have
no reason to be ashamed of their effort. Hazard and uncer-
tainty pervade all operations of war. It is idle to pretend
that Lord Kitchener or anyone else foresaw all the conse-
quences that flowed from the decisions of October 4. The
event was very different from both hopes and expectations.
But rarely in the Great War were more important results
achieved by forces so limited and for losses so small, as those
which rewarded this almost forlorn enterprise; nor is there in
modern times, a more remarkable example of the flexibility,
the celerity, and the baffling nature of that amphibious power
which Britain alone wields, but which she has so often neg-
lected.
CHAPTER XVII
THE GRAND FLEET AND THE SUBMARINE ALARM
October and November, 1914
'Silence is the secret of war.'
Prior.
The Grand Fleet and the Submarine Alarm — The Harbour Peril —
Anti-Submarine Defences — Unwarranted Reproaches — Corre-
spondence with Sir John Jellicoe — Telegrams — Sir David Beatty's
Letter of October 17 — Exertions of the Admiralty — Decisions of
November 2 — The Loss of the Audacious — Suppression of the
News — The Hard Days of October and November, 19 14 — Public
and Political Unrest — 'What is the Navy doing?' — Retirement
of Prince Louis of Battenberg — The Return of Lord Fisher —
Fisher and Wilson — Rear-Admiral Oliver becomes Chief of the
Staff— The New Admiralty War Group— The Perpetual Clock—
The Port and Starboard Lights.
A LL the anxieties recorded in the last chapter faded before
■* *■ our preoccupations about the Fleet. Indeed, the alarums
and excursions on the Belgian Coast were at times almost a
relief compared to the stress of our prime responsibilities.
Everything depended upon the Fleet, and during these same
months of October and November the Fleet was disquieted
about the very foundations of its being. There lay the mighty
ships; every man, from stoker to Admiral, was ready to die
at his duty at any moment; no personal or individual fear
found foothold. Still, at the summit from which we watched,
one could feel a new and heart-shaking sensation. The Grand
Fleet was uneasy. She could not find a resting-place except
at sea. Conceive it, the ne plus ultra, the one ultimate sanc-
tion of our existence, the supreme engine which no one had
dared to brave, whose authority encircled the globe — no
413
414 THE WORLD CRISIS
longer sure of itself. The idea had got round — 'the German
submarines were coming after them into the harbours.'
On the South Coast no one would have minded. You could
go inside the Portland breakwater and literally shut the door.
On the East Coast no such absolutely sealed harbour existed.
But Scapa was believed to be protected by its currents from
submarine attack. Destroyers no doubt could attack it — if
they cared to run the very serious risk of the long daylight
passage, to and fro, across the North Sea: but no one, we had
believed, could take a submarine submerged through the in-
tricate and swirling channels. Now, all of a sudden, the
Grand Fleet began to see submarines in Scapa Flow. Two or
three times the alarm was raised. The climax came on Octo-
ber 17. Guns were fired, destroyers thrashed the waters, and
the whole gigantic Armada put to sea in haste and dudgeon.
Of course there never was a German submarine in Scapa.
None during the whole war achieved the terrors of the pas-
sage. One was destroyed in the outer approaches towards
the end of November in circumstances which remained a
mystery to the enemy. At the very end of the war in Novem-
ber, 1918, after the mutiny of the German fleet, a German
submarine manned entirely by officers seeking to save their
honour, perished in a final desperate effort. Thus none ever
penetrated the lair of the Grand Fleet. But nevertheless the
mere apprehension of submarines attacking the sleeping ships
on which all else reposed, was sufficient in the winter of 19 14
to destroy that sense of security which every Fleet demands
when in its own war harbours.
Up till the end of September, 1 914, no one seriously contem-
plated hostile submarines in time of war entering the war
harbours of either side and attacking the ships at anchor. To
achieve this the submarine would have to face all the immense
difficulties of making its way up an estuary or inlet amid shoal
water and intricate navigation, submerged all the time and
with only an occasional glimpse through the periscope; sec-
GRAND FLEET AND SUBMARINE ALARM 415
ondly while doing this, to avoid all the patrolling craft which
for many miles kept watch and ward on the approaches;
thirdly, to brave the unknown and unknowable terrors of
mines and obstructions of all sorts, with which it must be as-
sumed the channels would become increasingly infested. It
was thought that these deterrents would prove effectual.
Looking back on the events in the light of after-knowledge,
we can see now that this assumption was correct. There is
no recorded instance of a German submarine having pene-
trated into any British war harbour. The British submarine
service was certainly not inferior in enterprise to the Germans,
and from the very first hours of the War our boats were in
the Heligoland Bight; but no British submarine officer at-
tempted actually to penetrate a German war harbour or run
actually into the mouths of the Elbe, the Jade, the Weser
or the Ems. The nearest approaches to such an enterprise
were the numerous passages of the Dardanelles made by the
British submarines, beginning at the end of December with
the heroic exploits of Commander Holbrook. For these feats
the submarines were able to start only a few miles from the
mouth of the Dardanelles and, diving along a very deep
channel over two miles wide, succeeded again and again in
entering the Sea of Marmora. This was not comparable to
penetrating a British war harbour or river-mouth; and it
did not occur until experience of the war capabilities of sub-
marines had much increased.
During August and September the Admiralty made most
strenuous efforts to increase the protection of our bases in
Scotland and upon the East Coast by mounting guns, by post-
ing guardships, by placing obstructions, by preparing booms,
by laying torpedo nets. But the danger against which these
defences were designed in those months, was primarily not the
submarine, but a regular attack by enemy destroyers on the
fleet or squadrons at anchor, or, secondly, a raid by cruisers
upon bases in the temporary absence of the fleet. It was
4i 6 THE WORLD CRISIS
not until the middle or end of September that increasing
knowledge and evidences of the power of the largest sub-
marines under war conditions, fostered the idea that the Ger-
man submarines might actually enter our northern war
harbours at the Forth, at Cromarty, and at Scapa Flow.
Once this idea took root, it became a grave preoccupation.
Precautions taken against a rush of torpedo boats, were clearly
insufficient to stop a vessel which might dive under booms
and past protecting guns.
Reproach has been levelled at the Admiralty for not hav-
ing accurately measured this danger before the war and taken
proper precautions against it. It would have been very dif-
ficult, even had the danger been foreseen, to find out under
peace conditions what actually would or would not stop a
submarine. No one in peace time could have ordered a sub-
marine crew to run such awful risks. It would have been a
matter of enormous expense to create a vast system of booms
with deep nets and other obstructions for the defence of all
our northern harbours. I should have had the very greatest
difficulty in coming to the Cabinet and Parliament with such
a demand during 1913 and 1914. Not only was every penny
of naval expenditure challenged, but this particular expendi-
ture would have been clearly of a most alarmist character,
would have been taken to indicate the imminence of war, and
would have been stigmatised as a provocation to the only
Power to whom it could have relation. Still, if the Sea Lords
and the Naval Staff had recommended solidly and as a matter
of prime importance the provision of these great obstructive
works in the Humber, at the Forth, at Cromarty, and at Scapa,
it would have been my duty to go forward. But no such
recommendation was made to me or pressed upon me by the
naval experts in the years preceding the War, no doubt for
the reasons which I have described, namely that they did not
think the danger had yet assumed a sufficiently practical
form to justify such extraordinary measures. It certainly
GRAND FLEET AND SUBMARINE ALARM 417
does not lie with anyone who was a member of the then Board
of Admiralty to level such reproaches.
Sir John Jellicoe's book, although no doubt not intended
for such a purpose, has been made a foundation for several
reflections upon our pre-war arrangements in this respect.
He recounts the dangers to which his Fleet was subjected;
but had he, either as Controller or Second Sea Lord, foreseen
these dangers, he would of course have warned his colleagues
and his chief. It is clear therefore that if the Admiralty is to
be criticised in this respect, it would be unfair to cite him as
an authority.
Moreover, this submarine danger was one which did not
in fact materialise at the outbreak of war. Six months later
the position was different. The enterprise and the skill of
submarine commanders had greatly grown, and all sorts of
possibilities never previously envisaged came successively into
view. But by that time the submarines had to face a very
different set of obstructions. By the time they were con-
vinced of the possibility, the possibility had disappeared.
It seemed real enough, however, in the month of October,
1 914. The booms and obstructions which were everywhere
being improvised were not complete or only partially in posi-
tion, while the danger had begun to take full shape in the
minds both of the Fleet and of the Admiralty. There was
nothing to be done but to await the completion of the booms
and obstructions, and meanwhile to keep the Fleet as far as
possible out of harm's way. It really only felt safe when it
was at sea. There, steaming in the broad waters, the Grand
Fleet was herself again: but this involved a great strain on
officers, men and machinery and a large consumption of fuel.
On September 30 Sir John Jellicoe wrote to me on the gen-
eral Fleet position. He pointed out that Germany had got a
lead over us in oversea submarines, that we always expected
that the preliminary stages of a modern naval war would be
a battle of the small craft, and that the question of keeping
418 THE WORLD CRISIS
heavy ships out of the North Sea altogether, until the small
craft menace had been reduced, had been frequently dis-
cussed. He thought it suicidal to forego our advantageous
position in big ships by risking them in waters infested by
submarines. He was of opinion that the submarine had a
very limited sphere of action, could not hurt our oversea
commerce (at that time this was true), nor could they help
their own ships to get in. He proposed therefore to use the
Battle Fleet far to the North, spread to intercept trade. We
had not nearly sufficient cruisers to form the double line that
was really necessary to stop all ships during the short days
and long nights. It was perfectly easy, he said, to run through
the line at night, as its approximate positions soon got known
and could not be much varied. But with the Battle Fleet
helping in waters free from the submarine danger, one could
make much more certain. This, however, entailed giving up
the idea of southerly Battle Fleet movements. He suggested
that the French submarines as well as our own should be
employed on the probable paths of the German submarines.
He emphasised the importance of fitting a number of our
trawlers with wireless installations. He desired me to show
this letter to the First Sea Lord and to know whether we were
in agreement with his views, whether steps would be taken
to establish a trawler patrol, and whether the idea of utilis-
ing the Grand Fleet effectively to shut up the Northern
entrance to the North Sea was approved. He concluded by
urging the hastening of the submarine defences for Scapa.
In reply I wrote, on the day of my return from Antwerp : —
October 8, 1914.
I am in full agreement with your letter. No change in
principle is required in the naval policy to which we have
steadily adhered since 191 1. The main point is to secure the
safety of the British Fleet during the long and indefinite period
of waiting for a general action. The phase in which raids up
to 10,000 or 20,000 men were dangerous or would have had
GRAND FLEET AND SUBMARINE ALARM 419
an object has passed. A very considerable, though no doubt
incomplete, watch over the Heligoland debouches is being
maintained by our oversea submarines. It is not necessary,
as manoeuvre experience had suggested, to traverse the waters
of the North Sea with the Battle Fleet with any degree of
frequency. Such movements should only be undertaken for
some definite, grave and primary purpose. Occasional sweeps
by cruisers in different directions, and avoiding anything like
routine patrolling, are all that is necessary in present circum-
stances. In order to secure the greatest amount of rest and
security for the Fleet, and the maintenance of the highest
efficiency both of the steaming and fighting of its ships, you
are justified in using occasional anchorages even more remote
than Scapa and Loch Ewe; but on this you should make pro-
posals officially. You need not fear that by these withdrawals
you will miss a chance of bringing the German Battle Fleet
to action. If that ever comes out it will be with some definite
tactical object — for instance, to cover the landing of an in-
vading force, to break the line of blockade to the northward
in order to let loose battle-cruisers on to the trade routes, or
simply for the purpose of obtaining a naval decision by fight-
ing a battle. In the first two of these cases you would have
the time to come round and meet or intercept them before
their operation was completed; in the third instance, their
wishes would be the same as yours.
The Committee of Imperial Defence have again considered
the question of invasion in the light of the experience of the
first two months of the war. The War Office have pointed
out that although no troops can be spared by Germany in
the present active state of the land war on all frontiers, it
is possible that in the winter a deadlock may arise in both
the Eastern and Western theatres, when the Germans might
find it possible or useful to create a diversion by attempting
to throw a regular invading army across the North Sea. In
the Admiralty opinion the difficulties of such a task have been
in no wise diminished by anything we have learnt since the
war began. We think it is useless to discuss such matters in
general terms, and we are sure that a detailed study of a con-
crete plan of landing, say, 150,000 men will prove fatal to
such ideas. In this connection it must be remembered that
the war has shown the absolute reliance of the Germans upon
420 THE WORLD CRISIS
their artillery, without which they would cease to be formi-
dable. The landing of great quantities of artillery and the
maintenance of an ammunition supply, are operations which,
even if every other part of the enemy's plan had succeeded,
could not be maintained without giving ample time for the
intervention of your Fleet in decisive force. Further, if the
Germans could spare 150,000 of their best troops for the in-
vasion of England during a deadlock, a similar number would
be released from our side, and it is obvious that even pushing
this argument to its most extreme conclusion, we could trans-
port our men back across the Channel with the command of
the sea much more swiftly and surely than the Germans could
bring theirs across the much wider distances of the North Sea
in the face of a greatly superior naval force. All that would
have resulted from the success of this most perilous operation
on the part of Germany, would be to transfer the fighting of
a certain number of Army Corps from the Continent to the
British islands, under circumstances unfavourable in the ex-
treme to the Germans, and favourable in every way to our
troops; with the certainty that the Germans could not be
reinforced, while we could be reinforced to almost any extent,
and that unless the Germans were immediately successful
before their ammunition was expended, the whole force to
the last man must be killed or made prisoners of war. I there-
fore see no reason why this contingency, any more than that
of raids, should force the Battle Fleet to keep a station of
danger during the winter months. The power of the superior
Fleet is exerted with equal effect over the longer distances,
and in fact pervades all the waters of the world.
With regard to anchorages you have only to make your
proposals and we will do our best to equip with anti-sub-
marine nets, lights, and guns the places which you may wish
to use. It is of importance that these should be varied, abso-
lute safety lying much more in the uncertainty attending the
movements of the Grand Fleet than in any passive or fixed
defence of any particular place. We must not be led into
frittering away resources by keeping half a dozen anchorages
in a state of semi-defence, and so far as possible we must or-
ganise a movable defence of guardships, trawlers, patrolling
yachts, minesweepers, destroyers with towing charges, and
seaplanes, which can move while the Fleet is at sea and pre-
pare the new resting-place for its reception.
GRAND FLEET AND SUBMARINE ALARM 421
The employment of a portion or occasionally of the whole
of the Battle Fleet, to supplement the Northern Blockade
from time to time is a matter on which you must be the judge.
A large part of your time must necessarily be spent cruising
at sea, and this being so the cruising should be made as use-
ful as possible. Here, again, anything in the nature of routine
or regular stations would be dangerous, and would, after a
while, draw upon you, even in remote northern waters, the
danger of submarine attack.
The enemy in my judgment pursues a wise policy in de-
clining battle. By remaining in harbour he secures for Ger-
many the command of the Baltic, with all that that implies,
both in threatening the Russian flank and protecting the Ger-
man Coast, and in drawing supplies from Sweden and Nor-
way. This is an immense advantage to the Germans, and is
the best use to which in present circumstances they can turn
their Fleet. It is to secure the eventual command of the Bal-
tic that British naval operations must tend. I have already
pointed out, in the papers which I showed you, the three al-
ternative conditions1 [the defeat of the German Fleet: the
breaking of the Kiel Canal: or the effective blocking in of
the Heligoland Bight] under which this would be possible,
and I hope that proceeding on the assumption that one of
these conditions exist you will make a study of the actual
method by which the entrance to the Baltic could be effected
when the time arrives.
These general conclusions governed our policy during the
next few months. But as October wore on our anxieties were
steadily aggravated. The tension grew. Telegrams and let-
ters tell their own tale.
October 15.
First Lord to Sir John Jellicoe.
Personal. You are invited to give your opinion secretly
on every aspect of the Naval situation at home and abroad
and we welcome warmly any scheme you may put forward.
Your proposals about mining are being attentively con-
sidered.
1 This will be discussed in the second volume. The alternatives are
here only mentioned to explain the context.
422 THE WORLD CRISIS
The general aspect of the war is grim.
The Russian pressure is not what we expected, and an-
other avalanche of [German] reinforcements is approaching
the western theatre.
On October 17 Sir John Jellicoe telegraphed that a Ger-
man submarine had been reported entering Scapa at 5 p.m.
the previous day. Although he thought the report false, he
took the whole Fleet to sea forthwith. He appealed urgently
for submarine obstructions as he had 'no safe base at pres-
ent, and the only way to coal ships is to shift the coaling an-
chorages constantly which seriously dislocates the organisa-
tion of supply.' On the 18th he stated that Scapa Flow
could not be used till the Submarine Defence was placed.
On the 19th he asked the Admiralty whether he should risk
the submarine menace at Scapa Flow or move the Fleet to
remote bases on the west coast of Scotland or Ireland 'more
than 300 miles from the Pentland Firth.' He added, 'It
cannot be stated with absolute certainty that submarines
were inside Scapa Flow, although Captain D, 4th Destroyer
Flotilla, is positive H.M.S. Swift was fired at inside. I am
of opinion that it is not difficult to get inside at slack water.'
Another very serious warning reached me almost simultane-
ously:—
Sir David Beatty to First Lord.
H.M.S. Lion,
(Private.) October 17, 1914.
I take the opportunity of an officer going to London in
charge of signal books, to write you of what goes on. I
have written you before, or rather to Hood for you. I think
it is right that you should know how things generally affect
the Fleet. I trust that you will take this as it is written, in
fact I know you will, as being written with only one idea of
service to the country. I write as I do because I know that
the plain truth at times such as these is the only thing worth
hearing, and because you are the one and only man who can
GRAND FLEET AND SUBMARINE ALARM 423
save the situation. Even at such times, official documents,
requisitions and demands, are of little value; they are met at
once I admit, but without understanding the time value of all
that lies behind them.
At present we feel that we are working up for a catastrophe
of a very large character. The feeling is gradually possessing
the Fleet that all is not right somewhere. The menace of
mines and submarines is proving larger every day, and ade-
quate means to meet or combat them are not forthcoming,
and we are gradually being pushed out of the North Sea, and
off our own particular perch. How does this arise ? By the
very apparent fact that we have no Base where we can with
any degree of safety lie for coaling, replenishing, and refitting
and repairing, after two and a half months of war. This
spells trouble. It is a perfectly simple and easy matter to
equip Scapa Flow, Cromarty, and Rosyth, so that vessels
can lie there undisturbed to do all they want, and for as long
as they want, provided material and men are forthcoming.
The one place that has put up any kind of defence against
the submarine is Cromarty, and that is because at Cromarty
there happens to be a man who grapples with things as they
are, i.e., Commander Munro,1 and because they have trained
artillerymen to man their guns. That was one of the best
day's work you ever did when you insisted on taking the de-
fences there in hand. At Rosyth it appeared to me in Sep-
tember when there, that to deny access to submarines and
destroyers was a fairly simple task; it was an awkward place
to get into, but when once in, it ought to be, and could be,
very easily made a safe asylum for vessels in need of rest, re-
pair, fuel, etc. At Scapa, something has been done towards
blocking the many entrances, but that is all. I am sure that
all the brain and intellect at the Admiralty could devise a
scheme or method of defence which would make the anchor-
age practically safe, and which could be done in a fortnight.
No seaman can dispute that these three bases could have been
made absolutely safe from submarine attack during the two
and a half months that the war has been in progress. As it is,
1 This energetic and practical officer, whom I had employed during
the previous eighteen months to supervise the fortification of Cromarty,
had already designed a type of anti-submarine boom which he was
actually installing at Cromarty.
424 THE WORLD CRISIS
we have been lulled into a sense of false security, because we
have not been attacked before; but I can assure you that it
has literally been recognised by all that it was only a question
of time when we should have this sense rudely shattered. . . .
The situation as it is, we have no place to lay our heads.
We are at Loch Na Keal, Isle of Mull. My picket boats are
at the entrance, the nets are out and the men are at the guns,
waiting for coal which has run low, but ready to move at a
moment's notice. Other squadrons are in the same plight.
We have been running now hard since 28th July; small de-
fects are creeping up which we haven't time to take in hand.
Forty-eight hours is our spell in harbour with steam ready to
move at four hours' notice, coaling on an average 1,400 tons
a time; night defence stations. The men can stand it, but
the machine can't, and we must have a place where we can
stop for from four or five days every now and then to give the
engineers a chance. Such a place does not exist, so the
question arises, how long can we go on, for I fear very much,
not for long, as the need for small repairs is becoming insistent.
The remedy is to fix upon a base and make it impervious
to submarine attack; as I have pointed out I am firmly con-
vinced this can be done. . . .
You might be told that this idea of making the entrances
secure is chimerical. This is not so; and I will guarantee
that if the Fleet was instructed to defend the entrances to
the ports named, and was provided with the material, they
could and would devise not one but several methods which
would satisfy most requirements, and which would keep out
submarines. If the Fleet cannot spare the time and labour,
turn it over to Commander Munro and give him a free hand
and what labour he requires, and he will do it in a fortnight.
I think you know me well enough to know that I do not
shout without cause. The Fleet's tail is still well over the
back. We hate running away from our base and the effect
is appreciable. We are not enjoying ourselves. But the
morale is high and confidence higher. I would not write thus
if I did not know that you with your quick grasp of detail and
imagination would make something out of it.
Meanwhile, however, the Admiralty, particularly the First
and Fourth Sea Lords, had been labouring since the end of
GRAND FLEET AND SUBMARINE ALARM 425
September to devise and make the necessary protective struc-
tures. By dint of extraordinary exertions the first instalment
of these was already approaching completion, and on October
20 Prince Louis was in a position to telegraph to the Com-
mander-in-Chief : —
The defences for Scapa will leave Dockyards on 24th Oc-
tober.
In the meantime Admiralty approve Battle Squadrons
remaining on the West Coast and if you prefer they can pro-
ceed as far as Berehaven.
In order to prevent being dogged by submarines a false
course should be steered until a sufficient offing is made.
Battle- Cruisers and Cruisers will have to remain north to
cover exits from North Sea. Cromarty appears to be a safe
base for some of them.
October 23, 2 a.m.
Admiralty to Sir John Jellicoe.
From First Lord.
Private and Personal. Every effort will be made to secure
you rest and safety in Scapa and adjacent anchorages. Net
defence hastened utmost, will be strengthened by successive
lines earliest. If you desire, Cabinet will I think agree de-
clare area 30 miles east Kinnaird Head to 30 miles north Shet-
lands and down to 30 miles South of Hebrides prohibited to
all ships not specially licensed by Admiralty or you.
All vessels whatever Flag should be dealt with in this area
as you desire.
I wish to make absolute sanctuary for you there. I also
propose proclaiming all Scotland north of Caledonian Canal
including all Islands and Inverness prohibited area; you can
do what you think necessary for safety of Fleet.
Use your powers under Defence of Realm Act and ask for
anything you want in men, money or material. You must
have a safe resting place: tell me how I can help you.
Sir John Jellicoe replied with suggestions for closing
certain areas, and for the placing of obstructions and contact
mines.
426 THE WORLD CRISIS
Secretary. ^ , ,
First Sea Lord. October H, igH.
Third Sea Lord.
Fourth Sea Lord.
Naval Secretary.
Every nerve must be strained to reconcile the Fleet to
Scapa. Successive lines of submarine defences should be
prepared, reinforced by Electric Contact mines as proposed
by the Commander-in-Chief. Nothing should stand in the
way of the equipment of this anchorage with every possible
means of security. The First Lord and the First Sea Lord
will receive a report of progress every third day until the work
is completed and the Commander-in-Chief satisfied.
W. S. c.
On receipt of Sir John Jellicoe's memorandum I convened
all the authorities and after prolonged discussion issued the
following directions, which since they show the variety of
problems affecting the Grand Fleet at this juncture may be
printed in extenso for those interested in details: —
Decisions of November 2, 1914.1
Secretary and all concerned.
1. The Fourth Sea Lord will give directions for 48 trawlers
armed with guns, and 3 yachts fitted with guns and wireless,
to be collected from the various trawler patrols and placed
at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet.
These trawlers, etc., are to be at Scapa Flow, reporting to Ad-
miral Colville there, by the 5th November.
2. Third Sea Lord will report what rafts and barges there
are which could be fitted with torpedo nets to afford protec-
tion to ships from submarine attack, and when they can be
ready.
3. Chief of the Staff will direct the Admiral of Patrols to
provide 12 additional destroyers from the patrol flotillas to
repair at once to Scapa Flow and join the Flag of the Com-
mander-in-Chief.
4. Twelve armed merchant cruisers of small size have been
ordered to strengthen the Northern patrol. It is necessary
that these should join the Grand Fleet within a week, and
1 1 have slightly abridged this minute.
GRAND FLEET AND SUBMARINE ALARM 427
any circumstances likely to cause delay must be immediately
brought to notice of First Sea Lord.
5. The Naval Secretary and the Secretary have informed
the Commander-in-Chief of his powers under the Defence of
the Realm Act, when the area to the north of the Caledonian
Canal, including all islands and the town of Inverness, has
been proclaimed a prohibited area within the meaning of the
Act. The Secretary will draft a letter forthwith to the War
Office, asking for the proclamation as from the 3rd Novem-
ber, of the whole of this area.
6. The warning as to the closing of the North Sea, issued
to-night by the Admiralty, is to be studied by departments
concerned. The Additional Civil Lord should deal with ques-
tions arising out of it affecting trade and fishery interests in
this country. Captain Webb should consider its working
from the point of view of commerce; he will also consider
what additional measures must be taken to increase the
Examination Service on account of the increased traffic in
the Channel which will result from the warning, consulting
Chief of the Staff as may be necessary for military security.
The Additional Civil Lord should also deal with the subject
from the point of view of existing arrangements as to contra-
band.
7. The War Office should be asked immediately to develop
for the Navy a system of lookouts on commanding points
around the coast in the prohibited area in the North of Scot-
land and on the islands, connected as far as possible by tele-
phone, in order that the movements of suspicious vessels, and
also intelligence collected from the land, may be constantly
reported. Admiral Coast Guards and Reserves will co-
operate.
8. The censorship of postal and telegraph offices in the
prohibited area, and the exclusion of all alien-born postal
servants, and the services of a sufficient detective force at
points used by the Fleet, must be undertaken forthwith.
Secretary will propose the necessary measures in consultation
with the War and Home Offices.
10. Fourth Sea Lord and Naval Secretary will take the
necessary steps to provide, with the minimum delay, heavy
booms for Scapa and Loch Ewe, as asked for by the Com-
mander-in-Chief.
428 THE WORLD CRISIS
ii. The Assistant Director of Torpedoes will arrange to
send lines of Electric Contact mines during the next 10 days
to Scapa Flow, to be disposed of under the orders of the Com-
mander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet.
12. A bi-weekly report is to be made to the First Lord and
First Sea Lord of the actual progress to date of all works now
under construction for the protection of harbours against sub-
marine and torpedo attack, and all unexpected circumstances
which tend to delay the work are to be reported as they occur.
13. The Chief of the Staff will report on the general ques-
tion of adding to the number of mines in our minefield.
14. A second light cruiser squadron for the patrol of the
North Sea is approved. It will be formed by dividing the
existing light cruiser squadron and adding Sapphire and
Blanche from the 3rd Battle Squadron. The Chief of the
Staff to make detailed proposals. Naval Secretary to pro-
pose a Commodore".
15. Eight light-draught, seaworthy vessels for fleet sweepers
have been taken up and should be completed with all speed.
16. The Director of the Air Division should, in consultation
with the Commander-in-Chief, establish an additional tem-
porary seaplane station at some convenient point on the
Scottish coast facing the Hebrides, for the better patrol and
reconnaissance of that area.
17. A general order should be issued to the Fleet that no
cruiser or larger vessel is to stop for the purpose of boarding
or challenging any merchant ship. This work is to be in-
variably performed by auxiliary merchant cruisers, torpedo
craft, and trawlers. Cruisers and larger vessels, wishing to
turn back merchant ships, should fire a shot across their bows
and make signals.
18. The Chief of the Staff should draft the necessary or-
der to the patrolling lines of cruisers to turn back merchant
ships, from the 5th November onwards, from the danger
area. The orders should be submitted before being sent.
19. The reconstitution of the battle-cruisers into two
squadrons: —
(1) Tiger, Princess Royal, Lion;
(2) New Zealand, Inflexible, Invincible; is authorised.
22. Sir John Jellicoe's proposal in regard to the entry of
defended ports and the unsuitability of the proposed arrange-
GRAND FLEET AND SUBMARINE ALARM 429
ments are to be reported on by the War Staff, and submitted
to the Board for adoption.
24. Third Sea Lord and Fourth Sea Lord should report
whether it is possible to postpone the lining of destroyers
during the next two months, as Commander-in-Chief states
that they cannot be spared from duty.
25. The Assistant Director of Torpedoes will report upon
the need of establishing W.T. stations at St. Kilda and the
other places in question. Only small installations are re-
quired.
26. The docking of ships at Home ports and partial refit,
one at a time, may be permitted, beginning from the end of
this month.
27. A report should be furnished on the state of the 3rd
Battle Squadron repair ship.
28. Steps are to be taken to increase the pumping power
of the Orion class and later types by adding a bilge suction
to the main circulating pumps. A report should be furnished
by Third Sea Lord as to what this involves in time and money.
w. s. c.
The Commander-in-Chief, in accordance with the Admiralty
authorisation, withdrew at the end of October to the north
coast of Ireland for a few days' rest and gunnery practice.
By extraordinary ill-luck, the arrival of the Fleet off Loch
Swilly coincided with the visit of a German minelayer to
those waters. The minelayer had no idea of catching the
Fleet or that British warships would be in those waters. Her
objective was the Liverpool trade route, but the shot aimed
at a crow brought down an eagle.
On October 27th Prince Louis hurried into my room with
the grave news that the Audacious had been struck by mine
or torpedo North of Loch Swilly, and that it was feared she
was sinking. In the afternoon the Commander-in-Chief tele-
graphed urging that every endeavour should be made to keep
the event from being published; and that night, in reporting
that the Audacious had sunk, he repeated his hope that the
loss could be kept secret. I saw great difficulties in this but
43o THE WORLD CRISIS
promised to bring the matter before the Cabinet. Meanwhile
I telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief, October 28th, 12.30
a.m. : —
'I am sure you will not be at all discouraged by Audacious
episode. We have been very fortunate to come through three
months of war without the loss of a capital ship. I expected
three or four by this time, and it is due to your unfailing vigi-
lance and skill that all has gone so well. The Army too has
held it own along the whole line, though with at least 14,000
killed and wounded. Quite soon the harbours will be made
comfortable for you. Mind you ask for all you want.'
Measured by military standards, the Audacious was the
first serious loss we had sustained. She was one of those vital
units in which we never were at that time more than six or
seven to the good, and upon which all strategic calculations
were based both by friend and foe. When I brought the ques-
tion of keeping her loss secret before the Cabinet, there was
a considerable division of opinion. It was urged that public
confidence would be destroyed if it were thought that we
were concealing losses, that it was bound to leak out almost
immediately, and that the Germans probably knew already.
To this I replied that there was no reason why the Germans
should not be left to collect their own information for them-
selves, that the moment they knew the Audacious was sunk
they would proclaim it, and that then we could quite easily
explain to the public why it was we had preserved secrecy.
I cited the effective concealment by Japan of the loss of the
battleship Yashima off Port Arthur in 1904. If Sir John
French had lost an Army Corps, every effort would be made
to conceal it from the enemy. Why then should the Navy
be denied a similar freedom? Lord Kitchener strongly sup-
ported me; and our views were eventually accepted by the
Cabinet.
The Press were asked by the Admiralty to abstain from
GRAND FLEET AND SUBMARINE ALARM 431
making any reference to the event. Some newspapers com-
plied with an ill grace. It was represented that hundreds of
people knew already, including all the passengers of the liner
Olympic which had passed the sinking vessel; that German spies
in England would certainly convey the news to Germany in a
few days, and that, anyhow, long accounts of the sinking with
actual photographs, would be despatched by the next mail to
the United States, whence the news would be immediately tele-
graphed to Germany. We, however, remained obdurate,
watching the German Press very carefully for the slightest
indication that they knew. Meanwhile it was thought clever
by certain newspapers to write articles and paragraphs in
which the word ' audacious' was frequently introduced,
while I was much blamed. I found it necessary to issue
a secret appeal, which, aided by the loyal efforts of the News-
paper Press committee, certainly had some effect. In the up-
shot it took more than five weeks before the German Ad-
miralty learned that the Audacious had been sunk, and even
then they were by no means convinced that they were not
the victims of rumour.
Says Admiral Scheer: —
'The English succeeded in keeping secret for a consider-
able time the loss of this great battleship, a loss which was
a substantial success for our efforts at equalisation. . . .
The behaviour of the English was inspired at all points by
consideration for what would serve their military purpose.
... In the case of the Audacious we can but approve the
English attitude of not revealing a weakness to the enemy,
because accurate information about the other side's strength
has a decisive effect on the decisions taken.'
I do not remember any period when the weight of the War
seemed to press more heavily on me than these months of
October and November, 1914. In August one was expecting
432 THE WORLD CRISIS
the great sea battle and the first great battles on land; but
our course was obvious, and, when taken, we had only to
wait for decisions. All September was dominated by the
victory of the Marne. But in October and November the
beast was at us again. The sense of grappling with and being
overpowered by a monster of appalling and apparently inex-
haustible strength on land, and a whole array of constant,
gnawing anxieties about the safety of the Fleet from sub-
marine attack at sea and in its harbours, oppressed my mind.
Not an hour passed without the possibility of some disaster
or other in some part of the world. Not a day without the
necessity of running risks.
My own position was already to some extent impaired.
The loss of the three cruisers had been freely attributed to
my personal interference. I was accused of having overridden
the advice of the Sea Lords and of having wantonly sent the
squadron to its doom. Antwerp became a cause of fierce re-
proach. One might almost have thought I had brought about
the fall of the city by my meddling. The employment of such
untrained men as the Naval Brigades was generally censured.
The internment in Holland of three of their battalions was
spoken of as a great disaster entirely due to my inexcusable
folly. One unhappy phrase — true enough in thought — about
' Digging rats out of holes,' which had slipped from my tongue
in a weary speech at Liverpool, was fastened upon and pil-
loried. These were the only subjects with which my name was
connected in the newspapers. My work at the Admiralty —
such as it was — was hidden from the public. No Parliamen-
tary attack gave me an opportunity of defending myself. In
spite of being accustomed to years of abuse, I could not but
feel the adverse and hostile currents that flowed about me.
One began to perceive that they might easily lead to a prac-
tical result. Luckily there was not much time for such reflec-
tions.
The Admiralty had entered upon the War with command-
GRAND FLEET AND SUBMARINE ALARM 433
ing claims on public confidence. The coincidence of the test
mobilisation with the European crisis, was generally attributed
to profound design. The falsification one after another of
the gloomy predictions that we should be taken unawares,
that the German commerce destroyers would scour the seas,
and that our own shipping, trade and food would be endan-
gered, was recognised with widespread relief. The safe trans-
portation of the Army to France and the successful action in
the Heligoland Bight were acclaimed as fine achievements.
But with the first few incidents of misfortune a different note
prevailed in circles which were vocal. The loss of the three
cruisers marked a turning-point in the attitude of those who
in the evil times of war are able to monopolise the expression
of public opinion. As the expectation of an imminent great
sea battle faded, the complaint began to be heard, 'What is
the Navy doing ? ' It was perhaps inevitable that there should
be a sense of disappointment as week succeeded week and
the tremendous engine of British naval power seemed to be
neither seen nor heard. There was a general opinion that we
should have begun by attacking and destroying the German
Fleet. Vain to point to the ceaseless stream of troops and
supplies to France, or to the world-wide trade of Britain pro-
ceeding almost without hindrance. Impossible, in the hear-
ing of the enemy, to explain the intricate movement of rein-
forcements or expeditions escorted across every ocean from
every part of the Empire, or to unfold the reasons which ren-
dered it impossible to bring the German Fleet to battle. There,
was our little Army fighting for its life, and playing to British
eyes almost as large a part as that of France; and meanwhile
our great Navy — the strongest in the world — lay apparently
in an inertia diversified only by occasional mishap.
Eaten bread is soon forgotten. Dangers which are warded
off by effective precautions and foresight are never even re-
membered. Thus it happened that the Admiralty was incon-v^
siderately judged in this opening phase. To me, who saw the
434 THE WORLD CRISIS
perils against which we had prepared and over which we had
triumphed, and who felt a sense of profound thankfulness for
the past and absolute confidence for the future, these mani-
festations of discontent seemed due only to lack of under-
standing and to impatience pardonable in the general stress of
the times. But they were none the less disquieting. Nor was
it easy to deal with them. The questions could not be argued
out in public or in Parliament. No formal indictment was ever
preferred; nor could one have been fully answered without in-
jury to national interests. We had to endure all this carping in
silence. A certain proportion of losses at sea was inevitable
month by month; and in each case it was easy to assert that
some one had blundered. In most cases, indeed, this was
true. With a thousand ships upon the sea and a thousand
hazards, real or potential, every day to menace them, acci-
dents and mistakes were bound to happen. How many were
made, for which no forfeit was claimed by Fortune ! There
was never an hour when risks against which no provision
could be made were not being run by scores of vessels, or
when problems of novelty and difficulty were not being set to
sea captains, scarcely any of whom had ever been tried in war.
Was it wonderful that we fell occasionally into error, or even
into loss? 'Another naval disaster. Five hundred men
drowned. What are the Admiralty doing?' While all the
time the armies reeled about in the confusion of the mighty
battles, and scores of thousands were sent, often needlessly
or mistakenly, to their deaths: while all the time every
British operation of war and trade on the seas proceeded
without appreciable hindrance.
This censorious mood produced a serious development in
the case of Prince Louis. In the first flush of our successful
mobilisation and entry upon the War, no comment had been
made upon his parentage. But now the gossip of the clubs
and of the streets began to produce a stream of letters, signed
and anonymous, protesting in every variety of method and
GRAND FLEET AND SUBMARINE ALARM 435
often in violent terms against one of Teutonic birth filling
the vital position of First Sea Lord. This was cruel; but it
was not unnatural, and I saw with anxiety and distress the
growth of very widespread misgiving. I gathered also from
occasional remarks which he made that this atmosphere was
becoming apparent to the First Sea Lord. He was thus com-
ing to be placed in the invidious position of having to take
great responsibilities and risks day by day without that sup-
port in public confidence to which he was absolutely entitled,
and with the certainty that accidents would occur from time
to time. I was therefore not surprised when, towards the
end of October, Prince Louis asked to be relieved of his bur-
den. The uncomplaining dignity with which he made this
sacrifice and accepted self-effacement as a requital for the
great and faithful service he had rendered to the British na-
tion and to the Royal Navy was worthy of a sailor and a Prince.
The correspondence which passed between us has already
been made public, but is here inserted for completeness.1
I had now to look for a successor, and my mind had already
turned in one direction and in one direction alone.
1 Dear Mr. Churchill, — '
I have lately been driven to the painful conclusion that at this
juncture my birth and parentage have the effect of impairing in some
respects my usefulness on the Board of Admiralty. In these circum-
stances I feel it to be my duty, as a loyal subject of His Majesty, to
resign the office of First Sea Lord, hoping thereby to facilitate the task
of the administration of the great Service, to which I have devoted
my life, and to ease the burden laid on H.M. Ministers.
I am,
Yours very truly,
Louis Battenberg,
Admiral.
My dear Prince Louis- 0dober 2?> I9I4-
This is no ordinary war, but a struggle between nations for life or
death. It raises passions between races of the most terrible kind. It
effaces the old landmarks and frontiers of our civilisation. I cannot
further oppose the wish, you have during the last few weeks expressed
436 THE WORLD CRISIS
Lord Fisher used to come occasionally to the Admiralty,
and I watched him narrowly to judge his physical strength
and mental alertness. There seemed no doubt about either.
On one occasion, when inveighing against some one whom he
thought obstructive, he became so convulsed with fury that
it seemed that every nerve and bloodvessel in his body would
be ruptured. u However, they stood the strain magnificently,
and he left me with the impression of a terrific engine of
mental and physical power burning and throbbing in that
aged frame. I was never in the least afraid of working with
him, and I thought I knew him so well, and had held an
equal relationship and superior constitutional authority so
long, that we could come through any difficulty together. I
therefore sounded him in conversation without committing
myself, and soon saw that he was fiercely eager to lay his
to me, to be released from the burden of responsibility which you have
borne thus far with so much honour and success.
The anxieties and toils which rest upon the naval administration
of our country are in themselves enough to try a man's spirit; and
when to them are added the ineradicable difficulties of which you
speak, I could not at this juncture in fairness ask you to support them.
The Navy of to-day, and still more the Navy of to-morrow, bears
the imprint of your work. The enormous impending influx of capital
ships, the score of thirty-knot cruisers, the destroyers and submarines
unequalled in modern construction which are coming now to hand,
are the results of labours which we have had in common, and in which
the Board of Admiralty owes so much to your aid.
The first step which secured the timely concentration of the Fleet
was taken by you.
I must express publicly my deep indebtedness to you, and the pain
I feel at the severance of our three years' official association. In all
the circumstances you are right in your decision. The spirit in which
you have acted is the same in which Prince Maurice of Battenberg
has given his life to our cause and in which your gallant son is now
serving in the Fleet.
I beg you to accept my profound respect and that of our colleagues
on the Board. j remain
Yours very sincerely,
Winston S. Churchill.
GRAND FLEET AND SUBMARINE ALARM 437
grasp on power, and was strongly inspired with the sense of a
message to deliver and a mission to perform. I therefore de-
termined to act without delay. I sought the Prime Minister
and submitted to him the arguments which led me to the con-
clusion that Fisher should return, and that I could work with
no one else. I also spoke of Sir Arthur Wilson as his principal
coadjutor. I was well aware that there would be strong,
natural and legitimate, opposition in many quarters to Fisher's
appointment, but having formed my own conviction I was
determined not to remain at the Admiralty unless I could do
justice to it. So :n the end, for good or for ill, I had my way.
October 30.
First Lord to Sir John Jellicoe.
Prince Louis has resigned on grounds of parentage, to my
deep regret. The King has approved Lord Fisher as First
Sea Lord. He will assume office to-morrow afternoon. I
expect Sir Arthur Wilson will be associated with Admiralty
for special duties. Loss of Audacious has nothing to do with
these events. There will be no change in Naval War policy
as set out in your war orders. Please telegraph whether you
think Grand Fleet could prudently take four or five days'
rest in Portland Harbour.
October 30.
Sir John Jellicoe to First Lord.
Secret and personal.
I have made present base secure against submarine attack
and think it better to remain here than to go to Portland.
I propose to send out our squadrons one at a time next
week to fire at rocks off coast of Ireland, as target practice
is very necessary and towing targets is difficult in present
weather and possibly unsafe.
The decision to recall Lord Fisher to the Admiralty was
very important. He was, as has been here contended, the
most distinguished British Naval officer since Nelson. The
originality of his mind and the spontaneity of his nature
freed him from conventionalities of all kinds. His genius was
438 THE WORLD CRISIS
deep and true. Above all, he was in harmony with the vast
size of events. Like them, he was built upon a titanic scale.
But he was seventy-four years of age. As in a great castle
which has long contended with time, the mighty central mass
of the Donjon towered up intact and seemingly everlasting.
But the outworks and the battlements had fallen away, and
its imperious ruler dwelt only in the special apartments and
corridors with which he had a lifelong familiarity. Had he
and his comrade, Sir Arthur Wilson, been born ten years later,
the British naval direction at the outbreak of the Great War
would have reached its highest state of perfection, both at
the Admiralty and afloat. The new figures which the struggle
was producing — Beatty, Keyes, Tyrwhitt — had not yet at-
tained the authority which would have made them acceptable
to the Navy in the highest situations. Fisher and Wilson
had outlived their contemporaries and towered above the
naval generation which had followed them. It was to these
two great old men and weather-beaten sea-dogs, who for more
than half a century had braved the battle and the breeze,
and were Captains afloat when I was in my cradle, that the
professional conduct of the naval war was now to be con-
fided.
It was clear, however, to me, who knew both these Ad-
mirals-of-the-Fleet quite well and had had many opportuni-
ties in the previous three years of hearing and reading their
views, that the day-to-day organisation of our Staff machinery
would have to be altered. This necessitated a change in the
Chief of the War Staff. In Admiral Sturdee the Navy had
a sea officer of keen intelligence and great practical ability —
a man who could handle and fight his ship or his squadron
with the utmost skill and resolution. But he was not a man
with whom Lord Fisher could have worked satisfactorily at
the supreme executive centre. Happily, there was no difficulty
in agreeing upon his successor.
Since Antwerp, Admiral Oliver had been my Naval Secre-
GRAND FLEET AND SUBMARINE ALARM 439
tary. During the year before the War he had been Director
of Naval Intelligence. In this capacity I had had to rely
continually upon him, as upon Captain Thomas Jackson
before him, for all the facts and figures upon which the con-
troversy about British and German naval strength depended.
His accuracy in detail and power of continuous and tenacious
mental toil were extraordinary. He combined with capacious
knowledge an unusual precision of mind and clarity of state-
ment. His credentials as a sea officer were unimpeachable.
He had been Navigating Commander to Sir Arthur Wilson,
and every one in the Navy knew the story of how in the 1901
Naval manoeuvres these two had taken the Channel Fleet
from off Rathlin's Island at the North of Ireland through the
Irish Channel to the Scillies in thick mist without sighting
land or lights, and without being inclined to make a single
remark to each other. On the third day the mist lifting sud-
denly revealed the Scilly Islands to the astonished Fleet,
which had already dropped anchor in the roads.
I was very glad when Lord Fisher proposed to me that he
should be made Chief of the Staff, and when he offered also
to give me in exchange, for my Private Office, his own per-
sonal assistant, Commodore de Bartolome. Everything thus
started fair. We reformed the War Group, which met at
least once each day, as follows: First Lord, First Sea Lord,
Sir Arthur Wilson, Admiral Oliver and Commodore de Bar-
tolome (the last named representing the younger school of sea
officers), together with the invaluable Secretary, Sir Graham
Greene. Sir Henry Jackson was also frequently summoned,
but not so continuously as to impose an accountable respon-
sibility upon him.
Lord Fisher's age and the great strain to which he was now
to be subjected made it necessary for him to lead a very care-
ful life. He usually retired to rest shortly after 8 o'clock,
awaking refreshed between four and five, or even earlier. In
these morning hours he gave his greatest effort, transacting
440 THE WORLD CRISIS
an immense quantity of business, writing innumerable letters
and forming his resolutions for the day. Indeed, his methods
corresponded closely to the maxims of the poet Blake:
' Think in the morning; act in the noon; eat in the evening;
sleep in the night.' But I never heard him use this quota-
tion. As the afternoon approached the formidable energy
of the morning gradually declined, and with the shades of
night the old Admiral's giant strength was often visibly ex-
hausted. Still, judged from the point of view of physical
and mental vigour alone, it was a wonderful effort, and one
which filled me, who watched him so closely, with admira-
tion and, I will add, reassurance.
I altered my routine somewhat to fit in with that of the
First Sea Lord. I slept usually an hour later in the morning,
being called at eight instead of seven, and I slept again, if
possible, for an hour after luncheon. This enabled me to work
continuously till one or two in the morning without feeling
in any way fatigued. We thus constituted an almost un-
sleeping- watch throughout the day and night. In fact, as
Fisher put it, 'very nearly a perpetual clock.' Telegrams
came in at the Admiralty at all hours of the day and night,
and there was scarcely an hour when an immediate decision
could not be given, if necessary, by one or the other of us
always awake.
This arrangement was also convenient from the point of
view of business. The First Lord completed everything with
which he was concerned before going to bed, and three hours
later the First Sea Lord addressed himself to the whole .budget,
and I, awaking at eight, received his dawn output. I had not
previously seen the pulse of the Admiralty beat so strong and
regular.
We made the agreement between ourselves that neither of
us should take any important action without consulting the
other, unless previous accord had been reached. To this
agreement we both scrupulously adhered. We had thus
GRAND FLEET AND SUBMARINE ALARM 441
formed, for the first time, an overwhelmingly strong control
and central authority over the whole course of the naval war,
and were in a position to make our will prevail throughout
the fleets and all branches of the naval administration, as
well as to hold our own against all outside interference. I
had for a long time been accustomed to write my minutes
in red ink. Fisher habitually used a green pencil. To quote
his words, 'it was the port and starboard lights.' As long
as the port and starboard lights shone together, all went well.
We had established a combination which, while it remained
unbroken, could not have been overthrown by intrigue at
home or the foe on the sea.
CHAPTER XVIII
CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS
October, November and December, 19 14
1 111 fared it then with Roderick Dhu,
That on the field his targe he threw,
Whose brazen studs and tough bull hide
Had Death so often dashed aside.
For train'd abroad his arms to wield
Fitz James's blade was sword and shield.'
Scott, 'The Lady of the Lake,' Canto V, XV.
The Mystery of Admiral von Spee — First Threat to South American
Waters — His Apparition at Somoa — His Second Disappearance —
Renewed Threat to South America — Rear-Admiral Cradock Or-
dered to Concentrate — The Relative Forces — Importance of the
Battleship Canopus — The First Combination against Admiral von
Spee — Rear-Admiral Cradock's Disquieting Telegram — His Cruise
up the Chilean Coast without the Canopus — Certain News of the
Enemy's Arrival — Admiralty Measures — News of the Action of
Coronel — The Meeting of the Squadrons — The British Attack
the Germans — Destruction of the Good Hope and Monmouth — ■
Escape of the Glasgow — Reflections upon the Admiralty Examined
— An Explanation of Rear-Admiral Cradock's Action — The Al-
ternatives Open to the German Squadron — Second Combination
against Admiral von Spee — Battle-cruisers Invincible and Inflex-
ible Ordered to South America — Arrangements with the Japanese
Admiralty — Development of the Second Combination — British
Naval Resources at their Utmost Strain — Konigsberg Blockaded
and the Emden Sunk — Relief in the Indian Ocean — Accelerated
Despatch of the Battle-Cruisers — What Admiral von Spee Found
at the Falklands — News of the Battle and of Victory — The Ac-
tion— Total Destruction of the German Squadron — End of the
German Cruiser Warfare — End of the Great Strain.
AS has already been described, Admiral von Spee, the Ger-
■**■ man Commander-in-Chief in the Far East, sailed from
Tsingtau (Kiauchau),1 in the last week of June, with the
1 Throughout this chapter the map facing page 476 and the table of
ships on page 478 will be found useful.
442
CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS 443
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and on August 5, immediately
after the British declaration of war, these two powerful ships
were reported as being near the Solomon Islands. They were
subsequently reported at New Guinea on the 7th August, and
coaling at the Caroline Islands on the 9th. After this they
vanished into the immense Pacific with its innumerable islands,
and no one could tell where they would reappear. As the days
succeeded one another and grew into weeks, our concern on
their account extended and multiplied. Taking the Caroline
Islands as the centre, we could draw daily widening circles,
touching ever more numerous points where they might sud-
denly spring into action. These circles were varied according as
the Germans were credited with proceeding at most economi-
cal speed, at three-quarter speed, or at full speed; and the
speed at which they would be likely to steam depended upon
the nature of the potential objective which in each case might
attract them.
We have seen how the mystery of their whereabouts af-
fected the movements of the New Zealand and Australian
convoys, and what very anxious decisions were forced upon
us. We have seen how the uncertainty brooded over the
little expedition from New Zealand to Samoa: how glad we
were when it arrived safely and seized the island : how prompt
we were — providentially prompt — to snatch every vessel
away from the roadstead of Samoa the moment the troops
and stores were landed. When at length more than five weeks
had passed without any sign of their presence, we took a com-
plete review of the whole situation. All probabilities now
pointed to their going to the Magellan Straits or to the West
Coast of South America. The Australian convoy was now
provided with superior escort. Not a British vessel could
be found in the anchorage at Samoa. The old battleships
were already on their way to guard the convoys in the Indian
Ocean. There was nowhere where they could do so much
harm as in the Straits of Magellan. Moreover, we thought
444 THE WORLD CRISIS
we had indications of German coaling arrangements on the
Chilian coast. There were rumours of a fuelling base in the
Magellan Straits, for which diligent search was being made.
There was certainly German trade still moving along the
Western Coast of South America.
Accordingly, on the 14th September, the Admiralty sent
the following telegram to Rear-Admiral Cradock, who com-
manded on the South American Station: —
Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Cradock, H.M.S. "Good Hope."
September 14, 5.50 p.m.
The Germans are resuming trade on West Coast of South
America, and Scharnhorst and Gneisenau may very probably
arrive on that coast or in Magellan Straits.
Concentrate a squadron strong enough to meet Scharnhorst
and Gneisenau, making Falkland Islands your coaling base,
and leaving sufficient force to deal with Dresden and Karlsruhe.
Defence is joining you from Mediterranean, and Canopus is
now en route to Abrolhos.1 You should keep at least one
County class and Canopus with your flagship until Defence
joins.
When you have superior force, you should at once search
Magellan Straits with squadron, keeping in readiness to re-
turn and cover the River Plate, or, according to information,
search as far as Valparaiso northwards, destroy the German
cruisers, and break up the German trade.
You should search anchorage in neighbourhood of Egg
Harbour and Golfo Nuevo. . . .2
Two days later all uncertainties, and with them our anxie-
ties, vanished, and news was received that both Scharnhorst
and Gneisenau had appeared off Samoa on the 14th Septem-
ber. There was nothing for them to hurt there. The empty
roadstead mocked their power. The British flag flew on shore,
and a New Zealand garrison far too strong for any landing
1 The rocks of Abrolhos off the Brazilian Coast were our secret coal-
ing base in these waters.
2 Details relating to colliers, supply ships and mails have been
omitted, unless of significance to the account.
CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS 445
party snarled at them from behind defences. Thus informed
of the fate of their colony, the German cruisers put to sea
after firing a few shells at the Government establishments.
A week later, the 22nd, they were at Papeete, which they
bombarded, destroying half the town and sinking the little
French gunboat Zelee which was in harbour. They left the
same morning, steering on a Northerly course. We did not
hear of this till the 30th. Then once again silence descended
on the vast recesses of the Pacific.
We could now begin drawing our circles again from the
beginning, and at any rate for several weeks we need not
worry about these ships. Accordingly the Admiralty tele-
graphed to Admiral Cradock, on the 16th September, telling
hum the new situation and that he need not now concentrate
his cruisers, but could proceed at once to attack German
trade in the Straits of Magellan and on the Chilian coast.
Nothing more happened for a fortnight. On October 4,
wireless signals from the Scharnhorst were heard by Suva wire-
less station, and also at Wellington, New Zealand. From this
it appeared that the two vessels were on the way between
the Marquesas Islands and Easter Island. Evidently the
South American plan was in their mind. We passed our in-
formation to Admiral Cradock with the following telegram: —
Admiralty to Rear- Admiral Cradock. (October 5.)
It appears from information received that Gneisenau and
Scharnhorst are working across to South America. A Dresden
may be scouting for them. You must be prepared to meet
them in company. Canopus should accompany Glasgow,
Monmouth and Otranto, and should search and protect trade
in combination.
On the 8th (received 12th) Admiral Cradock replied as
follows: —
1 Without alarming, respectfully suggest that, in event of
the enemy's heavy cruisers and others concentrating West
446 THE WORLD CRISIS
Coast of South America, it is necessary to have a British force
on each coast strong enough to bring them to action.
' For, otherwise, should the concentrated British force sent
from South-East Coast be evaded in the Pacific, which is
not impossible, ( ? and) thereby ( ? get) behind the enemy,
the latter could destroy Falkland, English Bank, and Abrol-
hos coaling bases in turn with little to stop them, and with
British ships unable to follow up owing to want of coal, enemy
might possibly reach West Indies.'
And on the same day (received nth) he reported evidences
of the presence of the Dresden in South American waters: —
Following intelligence re Scharnhorst and Gneisenau has
been received. Evidence found by Good Hope revisiting
Orange Bay on 7th October that Dresden had been there nth
September, and there are indications that Scharnhorst and
Gneisenau may be joined by Niirnberg, Dresden, and Leipzig.
I intend to concentrate at Falkland Islands and avoid divi-
sion of forces. I have ordered Canopus to proceed there, and
Monmouth, Glasgow, and Otranto not to go farther north than
Valparaiso until German cruisers are located again. . . .
With reference to Admiralty telegram No. 74, does Defence
join my command ?
This was an important telegram. It showed a strong proba-
bility that the enemy was concentrating with the intention
to fight. In these circumstances we must clearly concentrate
too. I now looked at the Staff telegram of 5th October, and
thought it was not sufficiently explicit on the vital point, viz.,
concentration for battle. In order that there should be no
mistake, I wrote across the back of Admiral Cradock's tele-
gram received on the 12th October the following minute: —
First Sea Lord.
In these circumstances it would be best for the British ships
to keep within supporting distance of one another, whether
in the Straits or near the Falklands, and to postpone the cruise
CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS 447
along the West Coast until the present uncertainty about
Scharnhorst-Gneisenau is cleared up.
They and not the trade are our quarry for the moment.
Above all, we must not miss them.
w. s. c.
The First Sea Lord the same evening added the word ' Set-
tled/
On the 14th October, I discussed the whole situation which
was developing with the First Sea Lord, and in accordance
with my usual practice I sent him a minute after the con-
versation of what I understood was decided between us.
First Sea Lord.
I understood from our conversation that the dispositions
you proposed for the South Pacific and South Atlantic were
as follows: —
(1) Cradock to concentrate at the Falklands Canopus,
Monmouth, Good Hope and Otranto.
(2) To send Glasgow round to look for Leipzig and attack,
and protect trade on the West Coast of South America as
far north as Valparaiso.
(3) Defence to join Carnarvon in forming a new combat
squadron on the great trade route from Rio.
(4) Albion to join the flag of C.-in-C. Cape for the pro-
tection of the Luderitz Bay expedition.
These arrangements have my full approval.
Will you direct the Chief of the Staff to have a statement
prepared showing the dates by which these dispositions will
be completed, and the earliest date at which Scharnhorst and
Gneisenau could arrive in the respective spheres.
I presume Admiral Cradock is fully aware of the possi-
bility of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau arriving on or after the
17th instant in his neighbourhood; and that if not strong
enough to attack, he will do his utmost to shadow them, pend-
ing the arrival of reinforcements.
The following telegram was sent to Admiral Cradock at
the same time: —
448 THE WORLD CRISIS
Admiralty to Rear- Admiral Cradock, October 14.
Concur in your concentration of Canopus, Good Hope, Glas-
gow, Monmouth, Otranto, for combined operation.
We have ordered Stoddart in Carnarvon to Montevideo as
Senior Naval Officer north of that place.
Have ordered Defence to join Carnarvon.
He will also have under his orders Cornwall, Bristol, Orama
and Macedonia.
Essex is to remain in West Indies.
On the 1 8th Admiral Cradock telegraphed: —
'I consider it possible that Karlsruhe has been driven West,
and is to join the other five. I trust circumstances will enable
me to force an action, but fear that strategically, owing to
Canopus, the speed of my squadron cannot exceed 12 knots.'
Thus it is clear that up to this date the Admiral fully in-
tended to keep concentrated on the Canopus, even though
his squadron speed should be reduced to 12 knots. Officially
the Canopus could steam from 16 to 17 knots. Actually in
the operations she steamed 15^.
Let us now examine the situation which was developing.1
The Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau were drawing near the
South Coast of America. On the way they might be met by
the light cruisers Leipzig, Dresden and Niirnberg. The squad-
ron which might thus be formed would be entirely composed
of fast modern ships. The two large cruisers were powerful
vessels. They carried each eight 8-inch guns arranged in
pairs on the upper deck, six of which were capable of fir-
ing on either beam. Both ships being on permanent foreign
service were fully manned with the highest class of German
crews; and they had in fact only recently distinguished them-
selves as among the best shooting ships of the whole German
Navy. Against these two vessels and their attendant light
cruisers, Admiral Cradock had the Good Hope and the Mon-
1 The table of ships on page 478 will be found useful.
CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS 449
mouth. The Good Hope was a fine old ship from the Third
Fleet with a 9' 2-inch gun at either end and a battery of six-
teen 6-inch guns amidships. She had exceptionally good
speed (23 knots) for a vessel of her date. Her crew consisted
mainly of reservists, and though she had good gunlayers she
could not be expected to compare in gunnery efficiency with
the best manned ships either in the British or German Navies.
The Monmouth was one of the numerous County class against
which Fisher had so often inveighed — a large ship with good
speed but light armour, and carrying nothing heavier than a
battery of fourteen 6-inch guns, of which nine could fire on
the beam. These two British armoured cruisers had little
chance in an action against the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.
No gallantry or devotion could make amends for the disparity
in strength, to say nothing of gunnery. If brought to battle
only the greatest good fortune could save them from destruc-
tion. It was for this reason that the moment the Admiralty
began to apprehend the possibility of the arrival of the Scharn-
horst and Gneisenau on the South American station, we sent
a capital ship to reinforce Admiral Cradock. Our first in-
tention had been to send the Indomitable from the Darda-
nelles, and at one time she had already reached Gibraltar on
her way to South America when increasing tension with
Turkey forced her to return to the Dardanelles. As we did
not conceive ourselves able to spare a single battle-cruiser
from the Grand Fleet at that time, there was nothing for it
but to send an old battleship; and by the end of September
the Canopus was already steaming from Abrolhos rocks through
the South Atlantic.
With the Canopus, Admiral Cradock's squadron was safe.
The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau would never have ventured
to come within decisive range of her four 12 -inch guns. To
do so would have been to subject themselves to very serious
damage without any prospect of success. The old battleship,
with her heavy armour and artillery, was in fact a citadel
45Q THE WORLD CRISIS
around which all our cruisers in those waters could find ab-
solute security. It was for this reason that the Admiralty
had telegraphed on 14th September: 'Keep at least Canopus
and one County class with your flagship ' ; and again, on the
5th October: ' Canopus should accompany Glasgow, Mon-
mouth and Otranto' It was for this reason that I was glad
to read Admiral Cradock's telegram: 'Have ordered Canopus
to Falkland Islands, where I intend to concentrate and avoid
division of forces/ on which I minuted: 'In these circum-
stances it would be best for the British ships to keep within
supporting distance of one another, whether in the Straits or
near the Falklands'; and it was for this same reason that
the Admiralty telegraphed on the 14th October: 'Concur in
your concentration of Good Hope, Canopus, Monmouth, Glas-
gow, Otranto for combined operation. . . .'
It was quite true that the speed of the Canopus was in fact
only fifteen and a half knots, and that as long as our cruisers
had to take her about with them they could not hope to catch
the Germans. All the Canopus could do was to prevent the
Germans catching and killing them. But that would not be
the end of the story; it would only be its beginning. When
the Germans reached the South American coast after their
long voyage across the Pacific, they would have to coal and
take in supplies: they were bound to try to find some place
where colliers could meet them, and where they could refit
and revictual. The moment they were located, either by one
of our light cruisers or reported from the shore, the uncer-
tainty of their whereabouts was at an end. We could in-
stantly concentrate upon them from many quarters. The
Japanese battleship Hizen and cruiser Idzumo, with the Brit-
ish light cruiser Newcastle, were moving southward across the
Northern Pacific towards the coast of South America — a force
also not capable of catching the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau,
but too strong to be attacked by them. On the East Coast
of South America was Rear- Admiral Stoddart's squadron
CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS 451
with the powerful modern armoured cruiser Defence, with
two more County class cruisers, Carnarvon (y 5-inch guns)
and Cornwall, the light cruiser Bristol, and the armed mer-
chant cruisers Macedonia and Orama. All these ships could
be moved by a single order into a common concentration
against the German squadron the moment we knew where
they were; and meanwhile, so long as he kept within sup-
porting distance of the Canopus, Admiral Cradock could
have cruised safely up the Chilean coast, keeping the Ger-
mans on the move and always falling back on his battle-
ship if they attempted to attack him. The Good Hope and
Monmouth steaming together were scarcely inferior in de-
signed speed to the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and these
last had been long at sea. Admiral Cradock could, therefore,
have kept on observing the Germans, disturbing them, pro-
voking them and drawing them on to the Canopus. More-
over, in the Glasgow he had a light cruiser winch was much
superior in speed to the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and su-
perior both in strength and speed to any one of the German
light cruisers concerned.
I cannot therefore accept for the Admiralty any share in
the responsibility for what followed. The first rule of war J
is to concentrate superior strength for decisive action and ^
to avoid division of forces or engaging in detail. The Ad-
miral showed by his telegrams that he clearly appreciated
this. The Admiralty orders explicitly approved his asser-
tion of these elementary principles. We were not, therefore,
anxious about the safety of Admiral Cradock's squadron. A
more important and critical situation would arise, if in cruis-
ing up the West Coast of South America with his concentrated
force Admiral Cradock missed the Germans altogether, and
if they passed to the southward of him through the Straits
of Magellan or round the Horn, refuelling there in some secret
bay, and so came on to the great trade route from Rio. Here
they would find Admiral Stoddart, whose squadron when
452 THE WORLD CRISIS
concentrated, though somewhat faster and stronger than the
Germans, had not much to spare in either respect. It was
for this reason that I had deprecated in my minute of the
1 2th October Admiral Cradock's movement up the West Coast
and would have been glad to see him remaining near the
Straits of Magellan, where he could either bar the path of
the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau, or manoeuvre to join forces
with Admiral Stoddart. However, I rested content with the
decisions conveyed in the Admiralty telegram of the 14th
October, and awaited events.
Suddenly, on the 27th October, there arrived a telegram
from Admiral Cradock which threw me into perplexity: —
Rear- Admiral Cradock to Admiralty.
Good Hope. 26th October, 7 p.m. At sea.
Admiralty telegram received 7 th October. With reference
to orders to search for enemy and our great desire for early
success, I consider that owing to slow speed of Canopus it is
impossible to find and destroy enemy's squadron.
Have therefore ordered Defence to join me after calling for
orders at Montevideo.
Shall employ Canopus on necessary work of convoying
colliers.
We were then in the throes of the change in the office of
First Sea Lord, and I was gravely preoccupied with the cir-
cumstances and oppositions attending the appointment of
Lord Fisher. But for this fact I am sure I should have re-
acted much more violently against the ominous sentence:
i Shall employ Canopus on necessary work of convoying col-
liers.' As it was I minuted to the Naval Secretary (Admiral
Oliver) as follows: —
'This telegram is very obscure, and I do not understand
what Admiral Cradock intends and wishes.'
I was reassured by his reply on the 29th October: —
CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS 453
1 The situation on the West Coast seems safe. If Gneisenau
and Scharnhorst have gone north they will meet eventually
Idzumo, Newcastle, and Hizen moving south, and will be forced
south on Glasgow and Monmouth who have good speed and
can keep touch and draw them south on to Good Hope and
Canopus, who should keep within supporting distance of each
other.'
The half fear which had begun to grow in my mind that
perhaps the Admiral would go and fight without the Canopus
which I thought was so improbable that I did not put it on
paper, was allayed. It would, of course, be possible for him
to manoeuvre forty or fifty miles ahead of the Canopus and
still close her before fighting. To send the Defence to join
Admiral Cradock would have left Admiral Stoddart in a hope-
less inferiority. Indeed, in a few hours arrived Admiral Stod-
dart's protest of the 29th October: —
' I have received orders from Admiral Cradock to send De-
fence to Montevideo to coal, obtain charts, and to await fur-
ther orders.
Submit I may be given two fast cruisers in place of De-
fence, as I do not consider force at my disposal sufficient. . . .'
The Admiralty Staff had, however, already replied in ac-
cordance with all our decisions: —
Admiralty to Rear- Admiral Cradock.
(Sent October 28, 1914, 6.45 p.m.)
Defence is to remain on East Coast under orders of Stod-
dart.
This will leave sufficient force on each side in case the hos-
tile cruisers appear there on the trade routes.
There is no ship available for the Cape Horn vicinity.
Japanese battleship Hizen shortly expected on North Amer-
ican coast; she will join with Japanese Idzumo and Newcastle
and move south towards Galapagos.
454 THE WORLD CRISIS
But neither this nor any further message reached Admiral
Cradock. He had taken his own decision. Without waiting
for the Defence, even if we had been able to send her, and
leaving the Canopus behind to guard the colliers, he was al-
ready steaming up the Chilean coast. But though he left
the inexpugnable Canopus behind because she was too slow,
he took with him the helpless armed merchant cruiser Otranto,
which was scarcely any faster. He was thus ill-fitted either
to fight or run.
He telegraphed to us from off Vallenar at 4 p.m. on 27th
October (received 1st November, 4.33 a.m.) : —
'Have received your telegram 105. Have seized German
mails. Monmouth, Good Hope and Otranto coaling at Valle-
nar. Glasgow patrolling vicinity of Coronel to intercept Ger-
man shipping rejoining flag later on. I intend to proceed
northward secretly with squadron after coaling and to keep
out of sight of land. Until further notice continue telegraph-
ing to Montevideo.'
And at noon on 29th October (received 1st November,
7.40 a.m.) : —
1 Until further notice mails for Rear- Admiral Cradock, Good
Hope, Canopus, Monmouth, Glasgow, Otranto, should be for-
warded to Valparaiso.'
The inclusion of the Canopus in the middle of the latter
message seemed to indicate the Admiral's intention to work
in combination with the Canopus even if not actually con-
centrated. These were the last messages received from him.
On the 30th October Lord Fisher became First Sea Lord.
As soon as he entered the Admiralty I took him to the War
Room and went over with him on the great map the positions
and tasks of every vessel in our immense organisation. It
took more than two hours. The critical point was clearly in
South American waters. Speaking of Admiral Cradock's
CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS 455
position, I said, 'You don't suppose he would try to fight
them without the Canopus?' He did not give any decided
reply.
Early on the 3rd November we got our first certain news
of the Germans.
Consul-General, Valparaiso, to Admiralty. {Sent 5.20 p.m.,
2nd November. Received 3.10 a.m., yd November.)
Master of Chilean merchant vessel reports that on 1st No-
vember 1 p.m. he was stopped by Nilrnberg 5 miles off Cape
Carranza about 62 miles north of Talcahuano. Officers re-
mained on board 45 minutes. Two other German cruisers
lay west about 5 and 10 miles respectively. Master believes
one of these was Scharnhorst. On 26th October, 1 p.m. Leip-
zig called at Mas-a-Fuera having crew 456 and 10 guns, 18
days out from Galapagos. She was accompanied by another
cruiser name unknown. They bought oxen and left same
day. On 29th October unknown warship was seen in lat.
33 south, long. 74 west, steaming towards Coquimbo.
Here at last was the vital message for which the Admiralty
Staff had waited so long. Admiral von Spee's squadron was
definitely located on the West Coast of South America. He
had not slipped past Admiral Cradock round the Horn as
had been possible. For the moment Admiral Stoddart was
perfectly safe. With the long peninsula of South America
between him and the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, there was
no longer any need for him to keep the Defence. She could
join Cradock for what we must hope would be an early battle.
After surveying the new situation we telegraphed to Admiral
Stoddart as follows: —
{Sent 6.20 p.m., yd November.)
Defence to proceed with all possible dispatch to join Ad-
miral Cradock on West Coast of America. Acknowledge.
This telegram was initialled by Admiral Sturdee, Lord
Fisher and myself. We telegraphed at the same time to the
Japanese Admiralty: —
456 THE WORLD CRISIS
Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Niirnberg, Leipzig, Dresden have
been located near Valparaiso coaling and provisioning. This
squadron is presumably concentrated for some serious opera-
tion. We are concentrating Glasgow, Good Hope, Canopus,
Monmouth, and Defence on the S.W. coast of South America,
hoping to bring them to battle. . . . We hope that the
Japanese Admiralty may now find it possible to move some
of their squadrons eastward in order to intercept the German
squadron and prevent its return to Asiatic or Australian wa-
ters. . . . We indicate our views in order to obtain yours and
to concert common action.
We also telegraphed to Admiral Cradock once more reiter-
ating the instructions about the Canopus: —
{Sent 6.55 p.m., yd November.)
Defence has been ordered to join your flag with all dispatch.
Glasgow should find or keep in touch with the enemy. You
should keep touch with Glasgow concentrating the rest of
your squadron including Canopus. It is important you should
effect your junction with Defence at earliest possible moment
subject to keeping touch with Glasgow and enemy. Enemy
supposes you at Corcovados Bay. Acknowledge.
But we were already talking to the void.
When I opened my boxes at 7 o'clock on the morning of
November 4, I read the following telegram: —
Maclean, Valparaiso, to Admiralty. (Sent November 3, 19 14,
6.10 p.m.)
Have just learnt from Chilean Admiral that German Ad-
miral states that on Sunday at sunset, in thick and wicked
weather, his ships met Good Hope, Glasgow, Monmouth, and
Otranto. Action was joined, and Monmouth turned over and
sank after about an hour's fighting.
Good Hope, Glasgow and Otranto drew off into darkness.
Good Hope was on fire, an explosion was heard, and she is
believed to have sunk.
Gneisenau, Scharnhorst and Niirnberg were among the Ger-
man ships engaged.
CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS 457
The story of what had happened, so far as it ever can be
known, is now familiar; it is fully set out in the official his-
tory, and need only be summarised here. Arrived on the
Chilean coast, having refuelled at a lonely island, and hearing
that the British light cruiser Glasgow was at Coronel, Admiral
von Spee determined to make an attempt to cut her off, and
with this intention steamed southward on November 1
with his whole squadron. By good fortune the Glasgow left
harbour before it was too late. Almost at the same mo-
ment, Admiral Cradock began his sweep northward, hoping
to catch the Leipzig, whose wireless had been heard repeat-
edly by the Glasgow. He was rejoined by the Glasgow at
half-past two, and the whole squadron proceeded northward
abreast about fifteen miles apart. At about half-past four the
smoke of several vessels was seen to the northward, and in
another quarter of an hour the Glasgow was able to identify
the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and a German light cruiser. The
Canopus was nearly 300 miles away. Was there still time to
refuse action ? Undoubtedly there was. The Good Hope and
Monmouth had normal speeds of 23 knots and 22*4 respectively
and could certainly steam 21 knots in company that day.
The Glasgow could steam over 25 v The Scharnhorst and
Gneisenau had nominal speeds of 23*2 and 23*5; but they
had been long in southern seas and out of dock. On the knowl-
edge he possessed at that moment Admiral Cradock would
have been liberal in allowing them 22 knots. Rough weather
would reduce speeds equally on both sides. Had he turned
at once and by standing out to sea offered a stern chase to the
enemy, he could only be overhauled one knot each hour.
When the enemy was sighted by the Glasgow at 4.45, the
nearest armoured ships were about 20 miles apart. There
were scarcely two hours to sundown and less than three to
darkness.
But the Otranto was a possible complication. She could
only steam 18 knots, and against the head sea during the
458 THE WORLD CRISIS
action she did in fact only steam 15 knots. As this weak,
slow ship had been for some unexplained reason sent on ahead
with the Glasgow, she was at the moment of sighting the enemy
only 17 miles distant. Assuming that Admiral von Spee could
steam 22 knots, less 3 for the head sea, i.e. 19, he would over-
haul the Otranto 4 knots an hour. On this he might have
brought her under long-range fire as darkness closed in. To
that extent she reduced the speed of the British squadron
and diminished their chances of safety. This may have
weighed with Admiral Cradock.
We now know, of course, that in spite of being cumbered
with the Otranto he could, as it happened, easily and certainly
have declined action had he attempted to do so. At the
moment of being sighted, Admiral von Spee had only steam
for 14 knots, and had to light two more boilers to realise his
full speed. Further his ships were dispersed. To concentrate
and gain speed took an hour and a half off the brief daylight
during which the British ships would actually have been in-
creasing their distance. Moreover, in the chase and battle
of the Falklands the greatest speed ever developed by the
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau did not exceed 20 knots in favour-
able weather. There is therefore no doubt he could have got
away untouched.
But nothing was farther from the mind of Admiral Cradock.
He instantly decided to attack. As soon as the Glasgow had
sighted the enemy, she had turned back towards the flagship,
preceded by the Monmouth and the Otranto all returning at
full speed. But Admiral Cradock at 5.10 ordered the squadron
to concentrate, not on his flagship the Good Hope, the farthest
ship from the enemy, but on the Glasgow, which though re-
treating rapidly was still the nearest. At 6.18 he signalled
to the distant Canopus: 'I am now going to attack enemy.'
The decision to fight sealed his fate, and more than that the
fate of the squadron.
To quote the log of the Glasgow, 'The British Squadron
CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS 459
turned to port four points together towards the enemy with
a view to closing them and forcing them to action before
sunset, which if successful would have put them at a great
disadvantage owing to the British squadron being between
the enemy and the sun.' The German Admiral easily evaded
this manoeuvre by turning away towards the land and keep-
ing at a range of at least 18,000 yards. Both squadrons
were now steaming southward on slightly converging courses
— the British to seaward with the setting sun behind them,
and the Germans nearer the land. And now began the
saddest naval action in the war. Of the officers and men
in both the squadrons that faced each other in these stormy
seas so far from home, nine out of ten were doomed to perish.
The British were to die that night: the Germans a month
later. At 7 o'clock the sun sank beneath the horizon, and
the German Admiral, no longer dazzled by its rays, opened
fire. The British ships were silhouetted against the after-
glow, while the Germans were hardly visible against the dark
background of the Chilean coast. A complete reversal of
advantage had taken place. The sea was high, and the main
deck 6-inch guns both of the Monmouth and of the Good Hope
must have been much affected by the dashing spray. The
German batteries, all mounted in modern fashion on the upper
deck, suffered no corresponding disadvantage from the rough
weather. The unequal contest lasted less than an hour. One
of the earliest German salvos probably disabled the Good
Hope's forward 9* 2-inch gun, which was not fired throughout
the action. Both she and the Monmouth were soon on fire.
Darkness came on and the sea increased in violence till the
Good Hope, after a great explosion, became only a glowing
speck which was presently extinguished; and the Monmouth,
absolutely helpless but refusing to surrender, was destroyed
by the Nurnberg, and foundered, like her consort, with her
flag still flying. The Otranto, an unarmoured merchantman,
quite incapable of taking part in the action, rightly held her
460 THE WORLD CRISIS
distance and disappeared into the gloom. Only the little
Glasgow y which miraculously escaped fatal damage among
the heavy salvos, continued the action until she was left alone
in darkness on the stormy seas. There were no survivors
from the two British ships: all perished, from Admiral to
seaman. The Germans had no loss of life.
Quoth the Glasgow in her subsequent report: —
c. . . Throughout the engagement the conduct of officers
and men was entirely admirable. Perfect discipline and cool-
ness prevailed under trying circumstances of receiving con-
siderable volume of fire without being able to make adequate
return. The men behaved exactly as though at battle prac-
tice; there were no signs of wild fire, and when the target was
invisible the gunlayers ceased firing of their own accord. Spirit
of officers and ship's company of Glasgow is entirely unim-
paired by serious reverse in which they took part, and that
the ship may be quickly restored to a condition in which she
can take part in further operations against the same enemy
is the unanimous wish of us all.'
This as it happened they were not to be denied.
Surveying this tragic episode in the light of after knowl-
edge, the official historian has blamed the Admiralty on vari-
ous grounds: first, for dividing the available force into two
inadequate squadrons under Admiral Cradock and Admiral
Stoddart; secondly, for a lack of explicitness in the wording
of the Staff telegrams. I cannot admit that the first charge
is in any way justified. It would, of course, have been much
simpler to have concentrated the squadrons of Admiral Crad-
ock and Admiral Stoddart in the Straits of Magellan and
awaited events. But until we knew for certain that the Ger-
man cruisers were coming to South America, there was a great
disadvantage in denuding the main trade route from Rio of
all protection. Suppose we had done this and Admiral von
Spee had remained, as he could easily have done, for many
weeks at Easter Island, or anywhere else in the Pacific, the
CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS 461
whole of the Plate trade would then, for all we knew, have
been at the mercy of the Karlsruhe or of any other German
commerce destroyer. At least six different courses were open
to von Spee, and we had, while our resources were at the fullest
strain, to meet every one of them. Suppose for instance he
had gone northward to the Panama Canal and, passing swiftly
through, had entered the West Indies: of what use would be
our concentration in the Straits of Magellan ? The reasoning
and state of mind which would have led to such a concentra-
tion would have involved a virtual suspension of our enter-
prises all over the world. We could not afford to do that.
We decided deliberately in October to carry on our protection
of trade in every theatre in spite of the menace of the unlocated
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and to do this by means of squad-
rons which, though they would not be homogeneous in speed
and class, were in every case if held together capable of righting
the enemy with good prospects of success. This was true of
the Anglo- Japanese squadron. It was true of the escort of
the Australian convoy. It was true of Admiral Stoddart.
Most of all was it true of Admiral Cradock. The last word
in such an argument was surely spoken by Admiral von
Spee. 'The English,' he wrote the day after the battle,
'have here another ship like the Monmouth; and also it seems
a battleship of the Queen type, with 12-inch guns. Against
this last-named we can hardly do anything. If they had
kept their forces together we should, I suppose, have got the
worst of it.'
So far as the clarity of the Staff telegrams is concerned, no
doubt here and there the wording of naval messages had not
been sufficiently precise, and this fault ran through much of
the Naval Staff work in those early days; but on the main
point nothing could have been more emphatic, nor, indeed,
should any emphasis have been needed. It ought not to be
necessary to tell an experienced Admiral to keep concentrated
and not to be brought to action in circumstances of great
462 THE WORLD CRISIS
disadvantage by superior forces. Still, even this was done,
and in telegram after telegram the importance of not being
separated from the Canopus, especially sent him for his pro-
tection, was emphasised.
Lastly, the official historian has represented the new de-
cision to reinforce Cradock by the Defence as a reversal by
Lord Fisher of the mistaken policy hitherto pursued.
'By the time it (Admiral Cradock's telegram of 31st) reached
the Admiralty the new Board was installed with Lord Fisher
as First Sea Lord, and one of their first acts was an effort to
improve the precarious position in which Admiral Cradock
found himself. The Defence was immediately ordered to join
him.' l
This is unjust both to Prince Louis and to Admiral Sturdee.
It was not possible to order the superior concentration until
the enemy had been located, and such concentration would
have been ordered by any Board the moment the uncertainty
was cleared up. The official historian would not have fallen
into this error in a work distinguished for its care and industry,
if he had mentioned the telegram from the Consul-General,
Valparaiso, which was received on the morning of the 3rd, or
if he had noticed that although the position in South Ameri-
can waters was known to Lord Fisher on the 30th October,
no fresh dispositions were made or could be made until the
whereabouts of the enemy was clearly ascertained. Then
and not till then could we strip Admiral Stoddart or in-
form Admiral Cradock that the Defence was hurrying to
join him.
So far as Admiral Cradock is concerned, 1 cannot do better
than repeat the words which I wrote at the time and which
commanded the recorded assent both of Lord Fisher and of
Sir Arthur Wilson.
1 Official History of the War : Naval Operations, Vol. I, p. 344.
CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS 463
Draft of an answer to a Parliamentary question not subse-
quently put.
Sir, — As I have already said, I did not think it conve-
nient to go into this matter, but since it is pressed I will state
that the Canopus was sent from St. Vincent to join Ad-
miral Cradock's flag on September 4th, as soon as the possi-
bility of the arrival of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau on the
West Coast of South America could be taken into account.
On October 12 th Admiral Cradock telegraphed to the Ad-
miralty that the indications showed the possibility of Dresden,
Leipzig, and Number g joining Scharnhorst and Gneisenau;
and that he had ordered Canopus to Falkland Islands, where
he intended to concentrate and avoid division of forces; and
on October 14th the Admiralty approved specifically by tele-
gram Admiral Cradock's proposed concentration of Good
Hope, Monmouth, Canopus, Glasgow, and Otranto for com-
bined operations. The squadron thus formed was amply
strong enough to defeat the enemy if attacked by them. It
was not fast enough to force an engagement; but in view of
the uncertainty as to which part of the world the enemy's
squadron would appear in, it was not possible at that time
to provide another strong fast ship at that particular point.
Admiral Cradock was an experienced and fearless officer,
and we are of opinion that feeling that he could not bring
the enemy immediately to action as long as he kept with the
Canopus, he decided to attack them with his fast ships alone,
in the belief that even if he himself were destroyed in the ac-
tion, he would inflict damage upon them which in the circum-
stances would be irreparable, and lead to their certain sub-
sequent destruction. This was not an unreasonable hope;
and though the Admiralty have no responsibility for Admiral
Cradock's decision they consider that it was inspired by the
highest devotion, and in harmony with the spirit and tradi-
tions of the British Navy.
We had now to meet the new situation. Our combinations,
such as they were, were completely ruptured, and Admiral
von Spee, now in temporary command of South American
waters, possessed a wide choice of alternatives. He might
turn back into the Pacific, and repeat the mystery tactics
464 THE WORLD CRISIS
which had been so baffling to us. He might steam northward
up the West Coast of South America and make for the Panama
Canal. In this case he would run a chance of being brought
to battle by the Anglo- Japanese Squadron which was moving
southward. But of course he might not fall in with them, or,
if he did, he could avoid battle owing to his superior speed.
He might come round to the East Coast and interrupt the
main trade route. If he did this he must be prepared to fight
Admiral Stoddart; but this would be a very even and hazard-
ous combat. Admiral Stoddart had against the two armoured
German ships three armoured ships, of which the Defence,
2l later and a better ship than either of the Germans, mounted
four 9/ 2-inch and ten f 5-inch guns, and was one of our most
powerful armoured- cruiser class. Lastly, he might cross the
Atlantic, possibly raiding the Falkland Islands on his way,
and arrive unexpectedly on the South African coast. Here
he would find the Union Government's expedition against the
German colony in full progress and his arrival would have
been most unwelcome. General Botha and General Smuts,
having suppressed the rebellion, were about to resume in a
critical atmosphere their attack upon German South-West
Africa, and a stream of transports would soon be flowing with
the expedition and its supplies from Cape Town to Luderitz
Bay. Subsequently or alternatively to this intrusion, Ad-
miral von Spee might steam up the African coast and strike
at the whole of the shipping of the expedition to the Cam-
eroons, which was quite without means of defending itself
against him.
All these unpleasant possibilities had to be faced by us.
We had to prepare again at each of many points against a
sudden blow; and, great as were our resources, the strain
upon them became enormous. The first step was to restore
the situation in South American waters. This would cer-
tainly take a month. My minute of inquiry to the Chief of
the Staff, written an hour after I had read the first news of
CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS 465
the disaster, will show the possibilities which existed. It
will be seen that in this grave need my mind immediately
turned to wresting a battle-cruiser from the Grand Fleet which,
joined with the Defence, Carnarvon, Cornwall and Kent, would
give Admiral Stoddart an overwhelming superiority.
4/11/14.
Director of Operations Division.
1. How far is it, and how long would it take Dartmouth
and Weymouth to reach Punta Arenas, Rio, or Abrolhos re-
spectively, if they started this afternoon with all dispatch ?
2. How long would it take —
(a) Kent to reach Rio and Abrolhos ?
(b) Australia (1) without, and (2) with Montcalm to
reach Galapagos via Makada Islands, and also
Idzumo and Newcastle to reach them ?
(c) The Japanese 2nd Southern Squadron to replace
Australia at Fiji ?
(d) Defence, Carnarvon and Cornwall respectively to
reach Punta Arenas ?
(e) Invincible to reach Abrolhos, Rio, Punta Arenas ?
(/) Hizen and Asama to reach Galapagos or Esquimalt P1
w.s.c.
But I found Lord Fisher in a bolder mood. He would take
two battle-cruisers from the Grand Fleet for the South Amer-
ican station. More than that, and much more questionable,
be would take a third — the Princess Royal — for Halifax and
later for the West Indies in case von Spee came through the
Panama Canal. There never was any doubt what ought to
be sent. The question was what could be spared. We mea-
sured up our strength in home waters anxiously, observing
that the Tiger was about to join the 1st Battle-Cruiser Squad-
ron, that the new battleships Benbow, Empress of India and
Queen Elizabeth were practically ready. We sent forthwith
the following order to the Commander-in-Chief: —
1 All the ships in small capitals fought eventually in the battle of the
Falkland Islands.
466 THE WORLD CRISIS
{November 4, 1914, 12.40 p.m.)
Order Invincible and Inflexible to fill up with coal at once
and proceed to Berehaven with all dispatch. They are ur-
gently needed for foreign service. Admiral and Flag-Captain
Invincible to transfer to New Zealand. Captain New Zealand
to Invincible. Tiger has been ordered to join you with all
dispatch. Give her necessary orders.
I also telegraphed personally to Sir John Jellicoe as
follows: —
{November 5, 12.5 a.m.)
From all reports received through German sources, we fear
Cradock has been caught or has engaged with only Monmouth
and Good Hope armoured ships against Scharnhorst and
Gneisenau. Probably both British vessels sunk. Position of
Canopus critical and fate of Glasgow and Otranto uncertain.
Proximity of concentrated German squadron of 5 good
ships will threaten gravely main trade route Rio to London.
Essential recover control.
First Sea Lord requires Invincible and Inflexible for this
purpose.
Sturdee goes Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic and
Pacific.
Oliver, Chief of Staff. Bartolome, Naval Secretary.
Apparently we had not at this stage decided finally to send
the Princess Royal. Sir John Jellicoe rose to the occasion
and parted with his two battle-cruisers without a word. They
were ordered to steam by the West Coast to Devonport to fit
themselves for their southern voyage. Our plans for the
second clutch at von Spee were now conceived as follows1: —
(1) Should he break across the Pacific; he would be dealt
with by the very superior Japanese 1st Southern Squadron,
based on Suva to cover Australia and New Zealand, and com-
posed as follows: — Kurama (battleship), Tsukuba and Ikoma
(battle-cruisers), Chikuma and Yahagi (light cruisers). At
Suva also were the Montcalm and Encounter. Another strong
1 Here the reader should certainly look at the map facing page 476,
which deals directly with this situation.
CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS 467
Japanese squadron (four ships) was based on the Caroline
Islands.
(2) To meet him, should he proceed up the West Coast of
South America, an Anglo- Japanese Squadron, comprising
Australia (from Fiji), Hizen, Idzumo, Newcastle, was to be
formed off the North American Coast.
(3) Should he come round on to the East Coast, Defence,
Carnarvon, Cornwall, Kent were ordered to concentrate off
Montevideo, together with Canopus, Glasgow and Bristol,
and not seek action till joined by Invincible and Inflexible,
therafter sending the Defence to South Africa.
(4) Should he approach the Cape station, he would be
awaited by Defence and also Minotaur (released from the Aus-
tralian convoy, after we knew of von Spee's arrival in South
American waters), together with the old battleship Albion,
and Weymouth, Dartmouth, Astrcea and Hyacinth, light cruis-
ers: the Union Expedition being postponed for 14 days.
(5) Should he come through the Panama Canal, he would
meet the Princess Royal, as well as the Berwick and Lancaster,
of the West Indian Squadron, and the French Conde.
(6) Cameroon s were warned to be ready to take their ship-
ping up the river beyond his reach.
(7) Should he endeavour to work homewards across the
South Atlantic, he would come into the area of a new squadron
under Admiral de Robeck to be formed near the Cape de
Verde Islands, comprising the old battleship Vengeance, the
strong armoured cruisers Warrior and Black Prince and the
Donegal, Highflyer, and later Cumberland.
Thus to compass the destruction of five warships, only two
of which were armoured, it was necessary to employ nearly
thirty, including twenty-one armoured ships, the most part
of superior metal, and this took no account of the powerful
Japanese Squadrons, and of French ships or of armed mer-
chant cruisers, the last-named effective for scouting.
I telegraphed to the Japanese Admiralty as follows: —
468 THE WORLD CRISIS
British Admiralty to Japanese Admiralty.
November 5, 1914.
In consequence of unsuccessful action off Chili and definite
location of German squadron, we have ordered concentration
off Montevideo of Defence, Kent, Carnarvon and Cornwall.
These will be joined with all dispatch by Invincible and In-
flexible battle-cruisers from England, and Dartmouth light
cruiser from East Africa, and remainder of defeated squadron
from Chili. This assures the South Atlantic situation. We
now desire assistance of Japan in making equally thorough ar-
rangements on Pacific side. We propose for your considera-
tion and friendly advice the following: — Newcastle and Idzumo
to go south in company to San Clemente Island off San Diego,
California, there to meet Hizen from Honolulu. Meanwhile
Asama will be able to effect internment or destruction of
Geier. We also propose to move Australia battle-cruiser from
Fiji to Fanning Island. By the time these moves are com-
plete, probably by November 17, we may know more of
Scharnhorst and Gneisenau movements and a further concen-
tration of Australia and Asama with Hizen, Idzumo and New-
castle will be possible either at San Clemente or further to
the south, further movements depending on the enemy.
We should also like a Japanese squadron to advance to
Fiji to take the place of the Australia and so guard Australia
and New Zealand in case the Germans return.
With regard to the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific, it
is now known that Emden is the only enemy ship at large.
We therefore hope that the Japanese squadrons and vessels
not involved in the eastward movement will draw westward
into the vicinity of Sumatra and the Dutch East Indies in
order to block every exit and deny every place of shelter up
to the 90th meridian of east longitude.
British Admiralty are combining in Indian waters in search
of Emden the following light cruisers: — Weymouth, Gloucester,
Yarmouth, Melbourne, Sydney, and the armoured cruiser
Hampshire and Russian cruiser Askold. These ships will be
ready by the middle of November. Thus by concerted action
between the Allied fleets the Emden should be speedily run
down.
CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS 469
Japanese Admiralty to British Admiralty. November 7, 19 14.
Secret and Private.
'Japanese Admiralty give their consent generally to stra-
tegical scheme proposed and beg to withdraw the proposal
of November 6, put forward through Admiral Oguri to the
British War Staff. Measures will be taken in vicinity of Su-
matra and Dutch East Indies as asked. First Southern
Squadron will be dispatched to Fiji, but Japanese Admiralty
think that it may be necessary for them to extend their sphere
of operations to the Marquesas Islands. With reference to
the movements of the Hizen and Asama, Japanese Admiralty
will carry out your wishes as far as possible, bearing in mind
necessity of watching the Geier until her ( ? disposition) is
settled, but the Hizen will be dispatched at once.
'With reference to the Hizen, Asama and Idzumo, Japanese
Admiralty request British Admiralty to make arrangements
necessary for their supply of coal, etc.'
Meanwhile it had been necessary to provide, as far as pos-
sible, for the safety of the surviving ships of Admiral Crad-
ock's squadron and to move the reinforcing ships.
Admiralty to H.M.S. Kent.
(November 4, 1914.)
Urgent. Proceed to the Abrolhos Rocks with all dispatch
and communicate via Rio. It is intended you shall join Ad-
miral Stoddart's squadron.
Admiralty to Rear-Admiral Stoddart, Carnarvon.
(November 4, 1914.)
In view of reported sinking of Good Hope and Monmouth
by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau off Coronel, November 1, ar-
moured ships on S.E. Coast America must concentrate at
once. Carnarvon, Cornwall should join Defence off Monte-
video. Canopus, Glasgow, Otranto have been ordered if pos-
sible to join you there. Kent from Sierra Leone also has been
ordered to join your flag via Abrolhos. Endeavour to get
into communication with them. Enemy will most likely
come on to the Rio trade route. Reinforcements will meet
you shortly from England.
Acknowledge.
47o THE WORLD CRISIS
From Admiralty to Canopus,
{November 4, 1914.)
In view of reported sinking of Good Hope and Monmouth
by Schamhorst and Gneisenau on 1st November you should
make the best of your way to join Defence near Montevideo.
Keep wide of track to avoid being brought to action by su-
perior force.
If attacked, however, Admiralty is confident ship will in
all circumstances be fought to the last as imperative to damage
enemy whatever may be consequences.
Admiralty to 'Glasgow,'
1 Otranto f
(November 4, 19 14.)
You should make the best of your way to join Defence near
Montevideo. Keep wide of track to avoid being brought to
action by superior force.
Admiralty to Governor, Falkland Islands.
(November 5, 19 14.)
German cruiser raid may take place. All Admiralty colliers
should be concealed in unfrequented harbours. Be ready to
destroy supplies useful to enemy and hide codes effectively on
enemy ships being sighted. Acknowledge.
In a few days we learned that her continuous fast steaming
had led to boiler troubles in the Canopus, and we had to
direct her to the Falklands.
Admiralty to Canopus.
(November 9, 1914, 3.10 a.m.)
You are to remain in Stanley Harbour. Moor the ship so
that the entrance is commanded by your guns. Extemporise
mines outside entrance. Send down your topmasts and be
prepared for bombardment from outside the harbour. Stimu-
late the Governor to organise all local forces and make de-
termined defence. Arrange observation stations on shore,
by which your fire on ships outside can be directed. Land
guns or use boats' torpedoes to sink a blocking ship before
CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS 471
she reaches the Narrows. No objection to your grounding
ship to obtain a good berth.
Should Glasgow be able to get sufficient start of enemy to
avoid capture, send her on to the River Plate; if not, moor
her inside Canopus.
Repair your defects and wait orders.1
The strain upon British naval resources in the outer seas,
apart from the main theatre of naval operations, was now
at its maximum and may be partially appreciated from the
following approximate enumerations: —
Combination against von Spee, 30 ships.
In search of the Emden and Konigsberg, 8 ships.
General protection of trade by vessels other than the above,
40 ships.
Convoy duty in the Indian Ocean, 8 ships.
Blockade of the Turco-German fleet at the Dardanelles,
3 ships.
Defence of Egypt, 2 ships.
Miscellaneous minor tasks, 11 ships.
Total, 102 ships of all classes.
We literally could not lay our hands on another vessel of
any sort or kind which could be made to play any useful part.
But we were soon to have relief.
Already on October 30 news had reached us that the Konigs-
berg had been discovered hiding in the Rufigi River in Ger-
man East Africa, and it was instantly possible to mark her
down with two ships of equal value and liberate the others.
On November 9 far finer news arrived. The reader will re-
member for what purposes the Sydney and Melbourne had
been attached to the great Australian convoy which was now
crossing the Indian Ocean. On the 8th, the Sydney, cruising
1 All the above telegrams had to be sent by various routes and most
were repeated by several routes, as of course we could not communicate
direct across these great distances. But I omit the procedure to
simplify the account.
472 THE WORLD CRISIS
ahead of the convoy, took in a message from the wireless sta-
tion at Cocos Island that a strange ship was entering the Bay.
Thereafter, silence from Cocos Island. Thereupon the large
cruiser Ibuki increased her speed, displayed the war flag of
Japan and demanded permission from the British Officer in
command of the convoy to pursue and attack the enemy.
But the convoy could not divest itself of this powerful pro-
tection and the coveted task was accorded to the Sydney.
At 9 o'clock she sighted the Emden and the first sea fight in
the history of the Australian Navy began. It could have
only one ending. In a hundred minutes the Emden was
stranded, a flaming mass of twisted metal, and the whole of
the Indian Ocean was absolutely safe and free.
In consideration of all the harm this ship had done us with-
out offending against humanity or the laws of sea war as we
conceived them, we telegraphed: —
Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief , China.
November n, 1914.
1 Captain, officers and crew of Emden appear to be entitled
to all the honours of war. Unless you know of any reason to
the contrary, Captain and officers should be permitted to re-
tain swords.'
These martial courtesies were, however, churlishly repaid.
The clearance of the Indian Ocean liberated all those vessels
which had been searching for the Emden and the Kbnigsberg.
Nothing could now harm the Australian convoy. Most of
its escort vanished. The Emden and the Konigsberg were
accounted for, and von Spee was on the other side of the globe.
The Minotaur had already been ordered with all speed to the
Cape. All the other vessels went through the Red Sea into
the Mediterranean, where their presence was very welcome
in view of the impending Turkish invasion of Egypt.
Meanwhile the Invincible and Inflexible had reached Devon-
port. We had decided that Admiral Sturdee on vacating the
CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS 473
position of chief of the staff should hoist his flag in the In-
vincible, should take command on the South American sta-
tion, and should assume general control of all the operations
against von Spee. We were in the highest impatience to get
him and his ships away. Once vessels fall into dockyard
hands, a hundred needs manifest themselves.
On November 9, when Lord Fisher was in my room, the
following message was put on my table: —
The Admiral Superintendent, Devonport, reports that
the earliest possible date for completion of Invincible and
Inflexible is midnight 13 th November.
I immediately expressed great discontent with the dock-
yard delays and asked, ' Shall I give him a prog ? ' or words
to that effect. Fisher took up the telegram. As soon as he
saw it he exclaimed, ' Friday the 13th. What a day to
choose ! ' I then wrote and signed the following order, which
as it was the direct cause of the battle of the Falklands may
be reproduced in facsimile.1
The ships sailed accordingly and in the nick of time. They
coaled on November 26 at Abrolhos, where they joined and
absorbed Admiral Stoddart's squadron (Carnarvon, Corn-
wall, Kent, Glasgow, Bristol and Orama) and despatched De-
fence to the Cape, and without ever coming in sight of land
or using their wireless they reached Port Stanley, Falkland
Islands, on the night of Dec. 7. Here they found the Canopus
in the lagoon, prepared to defend herself and the colony in
accordance with the Admiralty instructions. They immedi-
ately began to coal.
*****
After his victory at Coronel, Admiral von Spee comported
himself with the dignity of a brave gentleman. He put aside
the fervent acclamations of the German colony of Valparaiso
1 See opposite page 474.
474 THE WORLD CRISIS
and spoke no word of triumph over the dead. He was under
no delusion as to his own danger. He said of the flowers which
were presented to him, 'They will do for my funeral.' Gen-
erally, his behaviour would lead us to suppose that the in-
ability of the Germans to pick up any British survivors was
not due to want of humanity; and this view has been accepted
by the British navy.
After a few days at Valparaiso he and his ships vanished
again into the blue. We do not know what were the reasons
which led him to raid the Falkland Islands, nor what his fur-
ther plans would have been in the event of success. Pre-
sumably he hoped to destroy this unfortified British coaling
base and so make his own position in South American waters
less precarious. At any rate, at noon on December 6 he set
off to the eastward from the Straits of Magellan with his five
ships; and about 8 o'clock on December 8 his leading ship
(the Gneisenau) was in sight of the main harbour of the Falk-
lands. A few minutes later a terrible apparition broke upon
German eyes. Rising from behind the promontory, sharply
visible in the clear air, were a pair of tripod masts. One
glance was enough. They meant certain death.1 The day
was beautifully fine and from the tops the horizon extended
thirty or forty miles in every direction. There was no hope
for victory. There was no chance of escape. A month be-
fore, another Admiral and his sailors had suffered a similar
experience.
*****
At 5 o'clock that afternoon I was working in my room at
the Admiralty when Admiral Oliver entered with the follow-
ing telegram. It was from the Governor of the Falkland Isl-
ands and ran as follows: —
'Admiral Spee arrived at daylight this morning with all his
ships and is now in action with Admiral Sturdee's whole fleet,
which was coaling. ,'
1 Only Dreadnoughts had tripods.
h
435
rtl "<,\
Vj
<> h<irT
//
&
A/*-**-
JU. /*■*,«■«/«
^
^C . * >L3— <■
/2 5'^.v-. '« 111
Facsimile of Admiralty's Instructions to the Commander-in-Chief at Devonport
CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS 475
We had had so many unpleasant surprises that these last
words sent a shiver up my spine. Had we been taken by
surprise and, in spite of all our superiority, mauled, unready,
at anchor? 'Can it mean that?' I said to the Chief of the
Staff. 'I hope not/ was all he said. I could see that my
suggestion, though I hardly meant it seriously, had disquieted
him. Two hours later, however, the door opened again, and
this time the countenance of the stern and sombre Oliver wore
something which closely resembled a grin. 'It's all right,
sir; they are all at the bottom.' And with one exception so
they were.
When the leading German ships were sighted far away on
the distant horizon, Admiral Sturdee and his squadron were
indeed coaling. From the intelligence he had received he
had convinced himself that the Germans were at Valparaiso,
and he intended to sail the next day in the hopes of doubling
the Horn before the enemy could do so. More than two
hours passed after the enemy first came in sight before he
could raise steam and get under way. The first shots were
fired by the 12-inch guns of the Canopus from her sta-
tionary position on the mudbanks of the inner harbour.
The Gneisenau had continued to approach until she saw the
fatal tripods, whereupon she immediately turned round and,
followed by one of her light cruisers, made off at full speed
to join her main body. In a few moments the whole of the
German squadron was steaming off in a westerly direction
with all possible speed. At 10 o'clock, the Kent, Carnarvon
and Glasgow having already sailed, Admiral Sturdee came
out of the harbour in the Invincible, followed by the Inflexible
and Cornwall', while the light cruisers, one of whom (the Bris-
tol) had her engines actually opened up, hurried on after as
fast as possible.
The whole five ships of the German squadron were now
visible, hull down on the horizon about fifteen miles away.
476 THE WORLD CRISIS
The order was given for general chase, but later on, having
the day before him, the Admiral regulated the speeds, the
battle-cruisers maintaining only about 20 knots. This, how-
ever, was quite sufficient to overhaul the Germans, who after
their long sojourn in the Pacific without docking were not
able to steam more than 18 knots in company. Even so, the
Leipzig began to lag behind, and shortly before 1 o'clock, the
Inflexible opened fire upon her at 16,000 yards. Confronted
with having his ships devoured one by one, von Spee took a
decision which was certainly in accordance with the best tradi-
tions of the sea. Signalling to his light cruisers to make their
escape to the South American coast, he turned with the Scharn-
horst and Gneisenau to face his pursuers. The action which
followed was on the British side uneventful. The German
Admiral endeavoured more than once to close to ranges at
which his powerful secondary armament of 5'9's could play
their part. The British held off just far enough to make this
fire ineffective and pounded their enemy with their 12-inch
guns. At this long range, however, it took a considerable
time and much ammunition to achieve the destruction of the
German cruisers. The Scharnhorst, with the Admiral and
all hands, sank at 4.17 p.m., her last signal to her consort
being to save herself. Gneisenau continued to fight against
hopeless odds with the utmost fortitude until 6 o'clock when,
being in a completely disabled condition, she opened her sea-
cocks and vanished, with her flag still flying, beneath the icy
waters of the ocean. The British ships rushing to the spot
and lowering every available boat were able only to save 200
Germans, many of whom died the next day from the shock
of the cold water. When both the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau
had sunk, the Inflexible had only thirty and the Invincible
only twenty-two rounds left for each of their 12-inch guns.
Meanwhile, the other British cruisers had each selected
one of the flying German light vessels, and a series of chases
ensued. The Kent (Captain Allen) overtook and sunk the
£«st fivm Greenwich 20"
CORONEL AND THE FALKLANDS 477
Nurnberg by an effort of steaming which surpassed all pre-
vious records and even, it is stated, her designed speed.
The Nilrnberg refused to surrender, and as she foundered by
the head, the victors could see a group of men on her up-
lifted stern waving to the last the German flag. The
Leipzig was finished off by the Glasgow and the Cornwall.
The Dresden alone for the time made good her escape. She
was hunted down and destroyed three months later in the
roadstead of Mas-a-Fuera.
Thus came to an end the German cruiser warfare in the
outer seas. With the exception of the Karlsruhe, of which
nothing had been heard for some time and which we now
know was sunk by an internal explosion on November 4, and
the Dresden soon to be hunted down, no German ships of war
remained on any of the oceans of the world. It had taken
four months from the beginning of the war to achieve this
result. Its consequences were far-reaching, and affected simul-
taneously our position in every part of the globe. The strain
was everywhere relaxed. All our enterprises, whether of war
or commerce, proceeded in every theatre without the slightest
hindrance. Within twenty-four hours orders were sent to a
score of British ships to return to Home Waters. For the
first time we saw ourselves possessed of immense surpluses
of ships of certain classes, of trained men and of naval sup-
plies of all kinds, and were in a position to use them to the
best advantage. The public, though gratified by the an-
nihilating character of the victory, was quite unconscious of
its immense importance to the whole naval situation.
o
o o o o
.s.s .s.s
CSOs CSQv
oowo ooin
ooo ooso
iii
^3
o
o
u
H
CO
g
D
s
5
iZ
fcd
CO
i
CO
lo
N*
*
co M
N
X
H
CO
—
U
Jfl
cj.s.
3 .S-
o
o w S
gj tf U
-J 20
rsf) n-S ^.5 -S
Os ^ Os so f*» o *0
4©
CN SO ** SO
sO
0.S.5.S.S
^ SO 't sO-*
« §
« 8
CO o
U
"o
£ 5
< a;
« -s ^
m r jj
S ^ -S
o 4. §
M 2
2 "8
« "S
< 2
t^so C
a s
I
> .
^ • • . . . . . :a •
S - "
3 « s
55 ' * I 1
o o
■* "* ** ij ^ ©
© p>i ©
a^c3o>
«
2
rr
a.
o
h
• »
0
>
s
ij
8
OS
ft
0
h
i
0
a:
z
p£
0
-d
o
M
Q
u
u
£
3
Q
So
478
o ft
£2
JJ
I!
c
(9
Q
CHAPTER XIX
WITH FISHER AT THE ADMIRALTY
November and December, 19 14
'. . . . that pale, that white-faced shore,
whose foot spurns back the ocean's roaring tides
That water-walled bulwark, still secure
And confident from foreign purposes.'
King John. Act II, Sc.i.
German Dreadnoughts off Yarmouth — What does it mean — Anti-
climax— Inroads upon the Grand Fleet — The Drain of Refits —
Sir John Jellicoe's Protests — Admiralty and Commander-in-
chief — The Dreadnought Margin — The Third Battle Squadron
to Rosyth — The Admiralty Insist on their view — The Destroyer
Distribution — A Real Difficulty — A Wearing Discussion — The
actual Facts of Relative Strength — British Readiness to Accept
Battle — The Attempted Seaplane Raid on Cuxhaven — The
Grand Fleet sweeps South — The Invasion Alarm — Moon and
Tides — Further Intervention on the Belgian Coast — Immense
Relief of the Falklands Victory — Lord Fisher's View — Corre-
spondence between us — Lord Fisher and Admiral Sturdee —
Admiral Oliver's foresight — Growing Power of the Fleet — New
Construction — Submarines — Fisher's Great Impulse — The Bat-
tle Cruisers Repulse and Renown — Monitors — The Great Pro-
gramme— Full Speed Ahead.
LORD FISHER had barely taken up his duties in the
' Admiralty, when an incident occurred which seemed to
indicate the ending of the period of German inactivity in the
North Sea which had succeeded the action of August 28 in the
Heligoland Bight. Early in the morning of November 3, the
unusual signal was made to the Admiralty that several Ger-
man battle-cruisers or battleships had been sighted off Gorles-
ton on the Norfolk coast by the mine-sweeping gunboat
Halcyon and that she was engaged with them. Almost imme-
479
480 THE WORLD CRISIS
diately afterwards heavy shells were reported to be bursting
in the water and on the beach near Yarmouth. The First Sea
Lord and I reached the War Room from our bedrooms in a few
minutes. The question was, What did it mean ? It seemed
quite certain that German battle cruisers would not be sent
to throw shells at an open town like Yarmouth. Obviously
this was a demonstration to divert the British Fleet from
something else which was going to happen — was already per-
haps happening. Was it a German raid into the Channel, or
a serious attempt by the German Navy to intervene upon the
Belgian coast while the land battle was still raging ? Was it
a descent on the British coast at Sunderland or Blyth ? We
had no means of judging. The last thing it seemed possible
to believe was that first-class units of the German Fleet would
have been sent across the North Sea simply in order to disturb
the fisher-folk of Yarmouth. By other signals our destroyers,
Leopard and Lively, who were patrolling in the neighbourhood
of Yarmouth, also reported that they were engaged , and added
that they were proceeding to attack the enemy. Where were
our main forces ? The Commander-in-Chief was for the first
time in the war at the Admiralty, whither he had been sum-
moned to confer with the new First Sea Lord. The Grand
Fleet was at Lough Swilly in the North of Ireland. The 3rd
Battle Squadron was steaming through the Irish Channel. No
part of the Grand Fleet was nearer than Beatty and his battle
cruisers: and these were as far off as Cromarty. Whatever
happened, we could not fight a general action with our main
Fleet till late on the following day. Meanwhile the Harwich
striking force, the Dover flotillas, Admiral Hood's forces off
the Belgian coast and Admiral Burney's Channel Fleet must
do the best they could. If the German demonstration off Yar-
mouth was the prelude or concomitant to a serious attempt to
break into the Channel, the very greatest naval events would
follow. The contingency, as the reader is aware, had always
been faced, and we were well aware that we should have to
WITH FISHER AT THE ADMIRALTY 481
wait for our revenge till the next day. Meanwhile there was
nothing to be done but to put all the fleets and flotillas on
guard and in motion with the double object of resisting to the
utmost a German attack to the southward and intercepting
as speedily as possible from the North the return of the enemy.
Several hours of tension passed ; and then gradually it became
clear that the German battle cruisers were returning home at
full speed, and that nothing else was apparently happening;
and the incredible conclusion forced itself upon us that the
German Admiralty had had no other purpose in hand than
this silly demonstration off Yarmouth beach.
This anticlimax was fatiguing. The experience of bracing
ourselves to the most tremendous events, and then finding
nothing happen, was one which we were compelled more than
once to undergo at the Admiralty.
*****
The new First Sea Lord was even more sure of the superi-
ority of the British line of battle over the enemy than I was,
and in this his views contrasted very sharply with those of
the Commander-in-Chief. In full agreement with Sir Arthur
Wilson, he proposed on his assumption of office to bring the
Third Battle Squadron (the King Edwards) down to Portland
to increase our security against a German incursion into the
Channel; and he moved the Fifth Battle Squadron (the
Formidables) with the two Lord Nelsons to Sheerness to pro-
vide battleship support for the Harwich Striking Force, and
to give an additional security against raid or invasion. These
movements were no sooner determined than news of the Bat-
tle of Coronel was received (November 4) , and we were forced
to make far more serious inroads upon Sir John Jellicoe's com-
mand. The battle cruisers Inflexible and Invincible were sent
as described to the Falklands: and Lord Fisher, as we have
seen, demanded the Princess Royal for the Atlantic.
This last order produced continuous protests from Sir John
Jellicoe, and led to an interchange of telegrams and letters in
482 THE WORLD CRISIS
which the Commander-in-Chief dwelt upon every aspect of
his dangers and weakness and the Admiralty, while insisting
on their decision, endeavoured to reassure and placate him.
Our Dreadnought margin in home waters at the outbreak
of war had been just sufficient. Every ship was ready and in
good order. We did not feel that we could spare one. But
after the first two months we were compelled to send ships
one at a time from each Battle Squadron down to their home
ports on the South Coast for refit. A regular system of refits,
as was foreseen, had to be instituted. This involved the per-
manent absence of two or three of the most important vessels
from the Grand Fleet. The enemy, on the other hand, lying
in his main base, could always in theory be credited with hav-
ing all his ships available at his selected moment for battle.
Before, however, the drain of refits came upon us we had suc-
ceeded in reinforcing the Fleet by five fine ships, so that we
began the war at our maximum possible strength and always,
except for the briefest intervals, held or improved on that
number.
The requirements of the Commander-in-Chief were, how-
ever, hard to meet. The strategy on which we were all
agreed, involved keeping the Grand Fleet in distant northern
waters and required very large forces of destroyers and other
light craft for its local security, and for its service in battle.
On the other hand, while no properly defended war harbour
had yet been created capable of holding the entire fleet,
various other bases had to be effectively guarded and
patrolled, for which separate flotillas must be supplied. If at
any time from any cause, two or three ships were absent from
the Grand Fleet for a week or two, the Commander-in-Chief
drew severe comparisons between the German Fleet and his
own. He was a master of this kind of argument. From
his own side he deducted any ship which had any defect, how-
ever temporary, however small — even defects which would
not have prevented her from taking her place in the line in
^y
WITH FISHER AT THE ADMIRALTY 483
an emergency. He sometimes also deducted two or three of
the most powerful battleships in the world which had newly
joined his command because they were not trained up to the
full level of efficiency of the others; and these were absolutely
blotted out as if they were of no value whatever.1 He next
proceeded to deal with the enemy. He always credited them
with several ships more than we now know they had, or were
then thought likely to have. In October, 19 14, he gave cre-
dence to a suggestion that the four German Dreadnoughts of
the Konig class had been completely re- armed with 14-inch
guns. In 191 5 the size of these guns had advanced to 15-inch.
I was on both occasions compelled to set up expert committees
to demolish these baseless suppositions. Unable to deny that
the British line of battle could fire a broadside double in
weight to that of the Germans, he developed a skilful argu-
ment to prove that this advantage was more than counter-
acted by other disadvantages arising from the superior dis-
placement of contemporary German ships. He dwelt on this
even at a period when his fleet had been reinforced by seven
or eight additional units of enormous power without any cor-
responding accession to the enemy's strength.
One must admit, nevertheless, that the withdrawal of the
Princess Royal inflicted a very serious injury upon the Battle
Cruiser Squadron, and that Sir David Beatty might have had
to fight an action without any margin of superiority during
her absence. In this matter, however, Lord Fisher entered
the lists in person.
First Sea Lord to Commander-in-Chief.
Personal. ,T ,
November 12, 19 14.
I want to make it clear to you what the Scharnhorst Squad-
ron means as regards our dispositions.
1. We have not heard of them since November 4.
2. They may adopt the following courses: —
(a) Go through Panama Canal, smash our West Indian
1The Grand Fleet, by Sir John Jellicoe, p. 31.
\S
484 THE WORLD CRISIS
Fleet and release all the armed German liners from
New York — hence the Princess Royal.
(b) Go to south-east coast of America and stop our vital
food supplies — hence the two Invincibles.
(c) Go to the Cape and raid the Army base at Walfish
Bay — hence the Minotaur to reinforce Albion.
(d) Go to Duala and relieve the Germans, destroying our
ships and military expedition — hence the Warrior,
Black Prince and three Edgar Quinets.
I hope to send Bartolome to you to-morrow with informa-
tion which is too secret to be written or telegraphed.
The secret information pointed to the possibility of the
Germans endeavouring to slip one or two of their battle cruis-
ers into the Atlantic to help the return to Germany of the
Schamhorst and Gneisenau and incidentally to release all their
fast liners in New York. Lord Fisher became vehemently
impressed with this idea, and certainly the period was one of
extreme strategic tension when some enterprise by the enemy
seemed especially to be expected.
Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief.
November 13, 1914.
Since war began you have gained two Dreadnoughts on bal-
ance, and will have by 20th twenty-seven superior units to
twenty. We intend Princess Royal to rejoin you as soon as
Schamhorst is dealt with.
During the next month you should suspend sending ships
away for refit, doing the best you can at Scapa. If notwith-
standing the above you feel the need of reinforcements we
should propose to meet you by stationing the eight King Ed-
wards at Rosyth, where they would be well placed to join you
for general action or to attack an invading force.
This would avoid necessity of stationing cruisers there for
the present.
If you agree the eight King Edwards will be ordered to sail
to-night.
The Commander-in-Chief in reply asserted that the twenty-
seven units quoted included three ships, two of which had
WITH FISHER AT THE ADMIRALTY 485
never fired a gun and the third was only partially trained. He
deprecated the Third Battle Squadron being stationed at
Rosyth, as without being covered by cruisers or sea-going de-
stroyers, it would run a great risk from mines and submarines
outside the limits of the port defence. He suggested that it
was preferable to keep them at Cromarty closely adjacent to
the main base where they would be covered by the cruisers of
the Grand Fleet and by the Destroyer Flotilla stationed at
Cromarty.
The Admiralty, however, insisted on the Third Battle
Squadron being stationed at Rosyth.
Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief.
November 16, 1914.
. . . The importance of preventing the enemy from mak-
ing a serious attack on our coast and getting away without
being engaged makes it imperative to have a force nearer the
probable points of attack than either Scapa Flow or Cro-
marty, which are practically the same distance off. The coast
has been so denuded of destroyers for the sake of strengthen-
ing the force with you (amounting now to seventy-one de-
stroyers) that there is only a skeleton force of patrol vessels
available on the East Coast, amounting to three Scouts,
twenty-three Destroyers, twelve Torpedo Boats, between the
Naze and St. Abbs Head, a distance of 300 miles. In these
circumstances we are reluctantly compelled to decide on the
King Edwards and the Third Cruiser Squadron going to Ro-
syth, and you should detach half a flotilla of the seventy-one
destroyers at Scapa Flow to act with them. We are sending
you a carefully compiled table of comparative strength of
your Fleet and the German High Sea Fleet, which makes it
clear that without the Third Battle Squadron you have such
a preponderance of gun power that with equal gunnery effi-
ciency a successful result is ensured. . . .
The Admiralty have in mind the importance of getting back
the Princess Royal as soon as the situation admits. Your
proposals as to mining have been carefully considered, but
the work done by our submarines in the Bight has been of
486 THE WORLD CRISIS
such importance that it is undesirable to add to their dangers
by laying mines whose positions must be very uncertain. The
Germans have no difficulty in sweeping any channel they wish
when they want to bring any of their ships out, and do so
daily. It would be very difficult for us to lay fresh lines in any
channels they sweep on account of the dangers to the mine-
layers from our own mines.
This and preceding telegrams expressed the deliberate
views of the First Sea Lord and Sir Arthur Wilson, and I was
in the fullest agreement with them.1
The Commander-in-Chief, however, urged that the 71
destroyers mentioned by the Admiralty included 10 which
were absent refitting, and pointed out with justice that the
40 destroyers of the Harwich flotillas had been omitted from
those at the disposition of the Admiralty. He asked particu-
larly for reconsideration of the order to detach half a flotilla
with the Third Battle Squadron. Without these additional
12 destroyers he stated that the safety of the Dreadnought
Battle Fleet was seriously endangered; a submarine attack
on Scapa Flow was quite feasible and ' as I am directed to use
this base, I trust I shall not be held responsible for any dis-
aster that may occur.' He concluded by pointing out that
the relative strength of the High Sea Fleet and the Grand
Fleet could not be decided without reference to the cruiser and
destroyer strength of the two fleets: his comparative weakness
in these essentials counterbalanced, he declared, any battle-
ship superiority he possessed and made him anxious to be
concentrated.
Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief.
November 17, 1914.
We have carefully reviewed the position and given fullest
consideration to your wishes. We are confident that your
fleet with its cruisers and flotillas is strong enough for the defi-
nite task entrusted to it. In view of the grave needs we have
1See Appendix D., p. 566.
WITH FISHER AT THE ADMIRALTY 487
to meet elsewhere we cannot reinforce you at present, nor
alter our dispositions.
The 3rd Battle Squadron, 3rd Cruiser Squadron and eight
destroyers should proceed to Rosyth as ordered. You have,
of course, full discretion to move your Fleet in any way neces-
sary to provide for its safety and enable you to meet the
enemy, and are not tied to Scapa. Every effort is being made
to accelerate the completion of the submarine defences.
The destroyer question was one of real difficulty. Al-
though we had more than double the seagoing strength of the
German flotillas, we had so much to guard, that we could not
provide a superior force kept always intact in the hand of the
Commander-in-Chief for a great Fleet action. 'I know per-
fectly well/ wrote Sir John Jellicoe on December 4 to Lord
Fisher, ' that the First and Third Flotillas [from Harwich] will
not join me in time.' . . . The Germans, he declared, would
have eight flotillas comprising 88 torpedo boat destroyers, all
of which would certainly be ready at the selected moment.
'They have five torpedoes each: total 440 torpedoes — unless
I can strike at them first.1 He himself might, he claimed, fall
as low as 32 or even 28. 'You know/ he added, ' the difficulty
and objections to turning away from the enemy in a Fleet
action: but with such a menace I am bound to do it, unless
my own torpedo boat destroyers can stop or neutralise the
movement. ' There was no doubt that all the Commander-
in-Chief's thought fitted together into one consistent whole
and was the result of profound study and reflection. Lord
Fisher, however, remained obdurate. 'I think we have to
stand fast/ he wrote to me, enclosing Sir John Jellicoe's letter.
'The Tyrwhitt mob and our oversea submarines are our sole
aggressive force in the South.' He proposed however to put
one of the Harwich flotillas in the Humber. 'We wait your
return before action1 — Humber and Harwich each 290 miles
from Heligoland — but the complete flotilla at the Humber is
1 1 was in France for thirty-six hours. — W. S. C.
488 THE WORLD CRISIS
very much nearer Jellicoe, and so a salve to him in reply to
enclosed. As A. K. Wilson observed a moment ago, both he
and I would probably have written exactly the same letter
as Jellicoe trying to get all we could! Yours till death, F.'
This was a wearing discussion, and no one can blame the
Commander-in-Chief for expressing his anxieties and endeav-
ouring to keep his command up to the highest strength. I
always tried to sustain him in every possible way. His power-
ful orderly brain, his exact and comprehensive knowledge,
enabled him to develop and perfect in this first year of the
war the mighty organisation of the Grand Fleet. He bore
with constancy the many troubles and perplexities of the
early months. His fine sailorlike qualities made him always
ready night or day to take his whole gigantic Fleet to sea,
and he was never so happy as when he was at sea. Even when
I did not share his outlook, I sympathised with his trials.
The opinions of Lord Fisher at this period upon the margin of
strength required for the Grand Fleet were, as will be seen, in
sharp contrast with those he expressed at a later period dur-
ing the operations at the Dardanelles. Personally I always
considered our line of battle amply superior; nor did I be-
lieve the Germans would be able to bring out at a given
moment all the 88 torpedo boats with which Sir John Jellicoe
always credited them. We now know the actual forces which
the enemy assembled on December 16 of this same year, on
the occasion when the whole High Sea Fleet made almost the
most ambitious sortie into the North Sea which its history
records. There were 13 Dreadnought battleships and 4 battle
cruisers, total 17 Dreadnoughts instead of the 20 which were
completed and which the Admiralty counted as available;
and 53 torpedo boats in place of the Commander-in-Chief's
88. Against this Sir John Jellicoe had (until refits were re-
opened at the end of November) 27 superior units (subject to
what he says about them); and as many of the 71 destroyers
as were fit for sea on any given day. The Germans also took
WITH FISHER AT THE ADMIRALTY 489
to sea on December 16 a squadron of 8 pre-Dreadnoughts,
and against this our Third Battle Squadron, which had been
rightly restored to the Grand Fleet, was a proper and superior
provision. This balance of strength represents the period of
our greatest strain in Home waters and all over the world.
At this, as at all other times, the Admiralty would have
welcomed a general battle. An attack by seaplanes launched
from carrying ships upon the Zeppelin sheds near Cuxhaven,
was planned by us for November 22. On the 20th we tele-
graphed to Sir John Jellicoe: —
'Our reliable German information and also our telegram
No. 338 to you shows, firstly, concentration of German cruis-
ers, battle cruisers and battleships in Weser and Elbe; and
secondly, disposal of their submarines to hunt in the Shetlands
and English Channel. In these favourable circumstances the
aerial attack on Cuxhaven Zeppelin sheds, which we had
previously planned and considered desirable in itself, might
easily bring on a considerable action in which your battle
cruisers and the Grand Fleet might take part without undue
risk from German submarines.
'We suggest for your consideration Tyrwhitt and aero-
planes attacking on Monday at daybreak, with you support-
ing him from the northward with whatever force is necessary,
if the enemy respond to the challenge. Further, if it should
prove, as some reliable information indicates, that the enemy
is preparing an offensive raid or sortie himself, our movement
would bring on a collision at the outset unexpected and dis-
concerting to him.'
The Commander-in-Chief, after some discussion, preferred
Tuesday daybreak for the attack, as the longer notice would
enable him to finish certain repairing work. The Admiralty
plans were altered accordingly. We telegraphed on the 21st: —
'We consider the present a good occasion for a sweep south-
ward by the Grand Fleet. The seaplane attack is incidental
and subsidiary, though very desirable in itself. It may bring
49Q ■ THE WORLD CRISIS
on an action now that the German Fleet is concentrated near
Wilhelmshaven, and their cruisers and battle cruisers are
active. It will frustrate any offensive movement they may
intend, as reported. . . . Tuesday, 24th, at 5.30 a.m., will be
the time/
No result was, however, achieved. Sir John Jellicoe brought
the Battle Fleet down into the centre of the North Sea about
180 miles from Heligoland, with the battle-cruisers about 40
miles nearer. But in the weather prevailing the seaplanes
could hardly get off the water; and the Germans remained
unaware of our movements and without any plans of their
own. The episode shows however the underlying confidence
of the Admiralty and of the Commander-in-Chief in the
strength of the Grand Fleet even during this time of strain.
To add to the distractions of this hard month of Novem-
ber, 1 9 14, an invasion scare took a firm hold of the military
and naval authorities. It was argued by the War Office that
the lull on the fighting fronts would enable the Germans to
spare large numbers of good troops — 250,000 if necessary —
for the invasion of Great Britain. Lord Kitchener directed
all defensive preparations to be made, and Lord Fisher threw
himself into the task with gusto. Although, as the reader is
aware, I was sceptical on this subject, I felt that the precau-
tions were justifiable, and would at any rate add interest to
the life of our coast and Home defence forces. I therefore
allowed myself to succumb to the suppressed excitement
which grew throughout the highest circles, and did my ut-
most to aid and speed our preparations. We stationed as
described the 3rd Battle Squadron at the Forth, brought
the 2nd Fleet to the Thames, disposed the old Majestic bat-
tleships in the various harbours along the East Coast, ar-
ranged block ships to be sunk, and laid mines to be exploded,
at the proper time in the mouths of our undefended harbours;
while the whole coastal watch, military, aerial and marine,
throbbed with activity. The Army arrangements were com-
WITH FISHER AT THE ADMIRALTY 491
plicated by the fact that some of the divisions which were
sufficiently trained to be used to repel the invaders, had lent
their rifles to those that were undergoing training, and these
rifles had to be collected and redistributed as a part of the
procedure prescribed for the supreme emergency. To such
expedients were we reduced! However, the Germans re-
mained absolutely quiescent; the tides and moon, which for
some days before November 20 were exceptionally favourable
to nocturnal landings, ceased to present these conditions, and
the sense of some great impending event gradually faded
from our minds.
Lord Fisher to Mr. Churchill.
7 a.m. , November 21, 1914.
An angel's sleep ! In Heaven from 9 till now !
It was kind of you not to wake me with Grey's credible
witness !
Let us entreat and urge Kitchener to send a hundred
thousand men at once to Flanders, and warn Joffre not to
be ' two divisions too few and two days too late ! ' Kitchener's
balance of 160,000 men will amply suffice and the 'Ides of
March' have passed! The waning moon and dawning tide
[dawn high-tide] will not recur till days following December
10. Do write to him accordingly, or shall I?
It has been a splendid 'dress rehearsal,' tell him, and very
reassuring — his mass of men and his mobile guns ! We must
press him to send 100,000 men to Flanders. . . .
On November 20 General Joffre asked for further naval
co-operation on the Belgain coast.
'General Foch,' he stated, 'reports that for some little
time the French or English ships have no longer been par-
ticipating in the action of our forces in the neighbourhood
of Nieuport. On account of very violent bombardment by
the enemy in this region, it would be advantageous if the
ships could attack the numerous German batteries estab-
lished to the east of the mouth of the Yser. I should be glad
if you would notify the Ministry of Marine, and the Ad-
492 THE WORLD CRISIS
miralty, of this situation, in order to obtain a more active
co-operation on the part of the squadron between Nieuport
and Ostend.'
We were able to send the old battleship Revenge, whose
guns had been specially re-mounted for long range fire, and
several smaller vessels under Admiral Hood, and the naval
bombardment of the German right was effectively resumed.
' The conditions on the coast/ Hood, however, reported on
the 22nd, 'are quite different from what they were during
the first few days. To-day there was a heavy fire from guns
I could not locate or damage. No troops are ever visible.
The inundation has stopped their movement. '
To the situation of strain and effort which gripped us dur-
ing November came the welcome relief of the victory at the
Falklands. Lord Fisher received it with a moderated satis-
faction.
1 We cannot/ he wrote to me on December 10, 'but be over-
joyed at the Monmouth and Good Hope being avenged ! But
let us be self-restrained — not too exultant! — till we know details I
Perhaps their guns never reached us! (We had so few casual-
ties !) We know their gunnery was excellent ! Their third
salvo murdered Cradock! So it may have been like shooting
pheasants: the pheasants not shooting back! Not too much
glory for us, only great satisfaction. Not a battle for a Poet
Laureate ! Let us wait and hear before we crow! Then again,
it may be a wonder why the cruisers escaped — if they have
escaped — I hope not, for we had such a preponderating force —
such numbers ! {How the Glasgow must have enjoyed it !) Any-
how, don't let us encourage ourselves in too many joy mes-
sages till we know more/
But I made haste to ascribe to him all the credit that was
his due.
December 10.
This was your show and your luck.
I should only have sent one Greyhound1 and Defence. This
would have done the trick.
battle cruiser.
WITH FISHER AT THE ADMIRALTY 493
But it was a niggling coup. Your flair was quite true.
Let us have some more victories together, and confound all
our foes abroad — and (don't forget) at home.
This delighted the Admiral, and in his reply (December 11)
he threw a friendly light upon other fields of activity than
those with which this chapter has been concerned.
Your letter pleasant! There is another quite lovely scheme!
I am to be praised so as to get 'swelled head' and think myself
ignored by you, and to be in your shoes ! It is all too sweet
for words ! It is palpably transparent ! I was told of this
yesterday ! It really is curious why they so hate you ! I
think I told you what G said, that though he abhorred me,
yet ... I have splendid friends in the Tory camp !
A cause of difference, however, soon arose between us. The
First Sea Lord was displeased with Sir Dove ton Sturdee for
not having succeeded in destroying the German light cruiser
Dresden with the rest, and he searchingly criticised that Admi-
ral's dispositions after the action. He wished to leave Admiral
Sturdee in South American waters till the Dresden was hunted
down. As it was imperative that the Invincible and Inflexible
should come home at once, such a decision would have entailed
transferring Admiral Sturdee's flag to the Carnarvon, and
leaving him with a command scarcely suited to his rank and
standing, and woefully out of harmony with his recent achieve-
ment. I was obliged to veto this proposal, and Lord Fisher
was for some time much vexed at my decision.
The First Sea Lord also made the disquieting suggestion
that the Germans might slip a battle cruiser like the DerJ-
flinger through our blockade in the long winter nights and
fall upon the returning Invincible and Inflexible, who had fired
away three-quarters of their ammunition. I was greatly dis-
turbed at this, and hastened to the Chief of the Staff. But
Admiral Oliver was not often found improvident. He had
already several weeks before sent the battleship Vengeance
494 THE WORLD CRISIS
with a quarter outfit for both vessels to St. Vincent, where it
awaited them.
In spite of their anxieties, November and December were
months of rapidly growing power to the Navy. The variety
and scope of Admiralty business extended continually, and
the number of important directions to be given increased every
week. The reader who is further interested should study in
the Appendix the selection of First Lord's Minutes which I
have thought it worth while to print.1 From these original
documents, conceived under the pressure of events, a truer
idea can be formed of what was passing than from much
description.
In no part of our work did Lord Fisher and I act together
in greater harmony than in the realm of new construction.
The first task of the Admiralty in naval construction on the
outbreak of war was to accelerate the completion of all the
warships which were building in Great Britain, and according
to the schemes we had had prepared before the war, extreme
priority was to be assigned to vessels which could be finished
within six months. On this basis we proceeded during the
first three months. When it became clear that the war would
not be ended one way or the other by the first main decisions
on land, and that the sea battle was indefinitely deferred, I
extended this original period, and we adopted the principle
'Every thing that can be finished in 191 5, and nothing that
can't/
This brought very large numbers of vessels into the accel-
erated class and, of course, opened the way for a considerable
new construction of submarines, destroyers and even light
cruisers. There had already been ordered when Lord Fisher
arrived at the Admiralty a score of new destroyers and sub-
marines, in addition to all the pre-war vessels under accelerated
construction.
1 Appendix E.
WITH FISHER AT THE ADMIRALTY 495
The yards were therefore full of work, and care was needed
not to impede current construction by new orders. Lord
Fisher, however, brought a very great surge of impulse to
this sphere of our activities. It was a moment when megalo-
mania was a virtue. Some progress had already been made
on two of the British battleships of the programme of 1914-15.
The First Sea Lord at once demanded to make them into
battle-cruisers, sacrificing two more guns in each in order to
get the immense speed for which he thirsted. I agreed to
this, although it involved some delay; and the Repulse and
the Renown were redesigned accordingly.
The construction of submarines was more urgent. I was
not alarmed about the immediate position, although all sorts
of rumours were afoot.
Naval Intelligence Division. ,T ,
to November 7, 1914.
With reference to your report of yesterday, apparently
attaching credence to a statement that from 100 to 200 small
submarines have been manufactured secretly in Germany,
have you considered how many trained officers and personnel
this important flotilla would require ? What evidence is there
at your disposal to show that the Germans have trained this
number of submarine captains and officers? I have always
understood that their flotilla of submarines before the war did
not exceed 27. There is no personnel that requires more care-
ful training than the submarine personnel. All the experience
of. our officers shows that a submarine depends for its effective-
ness mainly upon its captain. The function of the Intelli-
gence Division is not merely to collect and pass on the Mun-
chausen tales of spies and untrustworthy agents, but carefully
to sift and scrutinise the intelligence they receive, and in
putting it forward to indicate the degree of probability which
attaches to it. It appears to me impossible that any large
addition to the German submarine force can be made for many
months to come. Even if the difficulties of material were
overcome those of personnel would impose an absolute limit.
It is very likely that a few small portable submarines have been
prepared for coast work. W S r
496 THE WORLD CRISIS
But the future already contained its menaces. I greeted
Fisher on his arrival with the following minutes, the first two
of which were addressed to his predecessor: —
Secretary.
Third Sea Lord. ^ , ,
October 13, 1914.
Please state exactly what is the total submarine programme
now sanctioned by the Cabinet or under construction in the
various yards. What measures can be adopted for increasing
the number of submarines ? Is it possible to let further con-
tracts for submarines on a fifteen months' basis? It is indis-
pensable that the whole possible plant for submarine con-
struction should be kept at the fullest pressure night and day.
w. s. c.
Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Naval Secretary. 0c/ofer ^ ^^
Please propose without delay the largest possible programme
of submarine boats to be delivered in from 12 to 24 months
from the present time. You should assume for this purpose
that you have control of all sources of manufacture required
for submarines, that there is no objection to using Vickers'
drawings, and that steam engines may be used to supplement
oil engines. You should exert every effort of ingenuity and
organisation to secure the utmost possible delivery. As soon
as your proposals are ready, which should be in the next few
days, they can be considered at a conference of the Sea Lords.
The Cabinet must be satisfied that the absolute maximum out-
put is being worked to in submarines. We may be sure that
Germany is doing this. Third Sea Lord's department must
therefore act with the utmost vigour, and not be deterred by
the kind of difficulties which hamper action in time of peace.
W. S. c.
Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Third Sea Lord. ^ . ,
October 30, 1914.
More important than the deliveries of battleships is the
acceleration of light cruisers and submarines. With regard
WITH FISHER AT THE ADMIRALTY 497
to light cruisers, it ought not to take more than one year to
construct Castor, Inconstant, Cambria and Canterbury. What
is the present position of these ships ? Have they been begun
yet ? Proposals should be made which secure their delivery
before the end of 191 5.
2. Proposals should also be made to accelerate Royalist,
Cleopatra, Champion, and Carysfort, Conquest, and Calliope,
so as to obtain deliveries in February. This will only be pos-
sible by working night and day in three 8-hour shifts on all
these vessels, arranging with other firms not concerned in their
construction to lend the necessary men.
3. All the "M" Class destroyers to be delivered in August,
1 91 5, should be pushed forward into April and May. There
is surely no reason why this cannot be done. Firms who will
undertake to complete their vessels by this date could be imme-
diately given another order for a repeat ship, so that there
would be no fear of dislocation of their business. Let me have
proposals on this.
4. Submarines F2, F3, G6, G8, G15, G9, G7, Gio, to G13,
and G 1, to G 5, all ought to be delivered before the end of 191 5.
There is an extraordinary gap after G4, when for 6 months we
do not receive a single new submarine, and in 1 2 months we
only receive 2. This is shocking, and must be bridged at all
costs.
Pray let me have further proposals after such conferences as
may be necessary with the firms concerned.
Lord Fisher hurled himself into this business with explosive
energy. He summoned around him all the naval constructors
and shipbuilding firms in Britain, and in four or five glorious
days, every minute of which was pure delight to him, he pre-
sented me with schemes for a far greater construction of sub-
marines, destroyers and small craft than I or any of my
advisers had ever deemed possible. Mr. Schwab was at that
time passing through England on his return to the United
States. We invited him to the Admiralty; and he undertook
to build twenty-four submarines — twelve in Canada and
twelve in the United States — the bulk of which were to be
498 THE WORLD CRISIS
completed in the hitherto incredibly short period of six months.
I arranged a system of heavy bonuses for early delivery.
These large negotiations were completed and the subsequent
work was carried out with wonderful thoroughness and punc-
tuality by the immense organisation of the Bethlehem Steel
Company. One evening, as Lord Fisher, Mr. Schwab and I
sat round the octagonal table in the Admiralty, after a long
discussion on the submarine contracts, we asked Mr. Schwab,
'Have you got anything else that will be of use to us?' He
thereupon told us that he had four turrets carrying two 14-
inch guns each which had almost been completed for the
Greek battleship Salamis then building in Germany for Greece.
We set our hearts on these; and I had an idea. The reader
will remember the three small monitors building for Brazil,
which although no one could see any use for them at the time,
I had decided to take over at the outbreak of war. The
operations on the Belgian Coast had shown their value. I
suggested to Lord Fisher that we should buy these 14-inch
turrets and build monitors to carry them. The Admiral was
delighted with the plan, and in a few hours he was closeted
with his constructors designing the vessels. In all our cor-
respondence we referred to them as the Styx class .
iiSSlad. DeCembe' »■ W
We ought without delay to order more 'Styx* class for
heavy in-shore work. There are, for instance, the four reserve
13.5-inch guns of the Audacious, which should certainly be
mounted in new monitors. It should also be possible to draw
from the reserve of 1 5-inch guns, and to make in a short time
15-inch or 18-inch howitzers. We require now to make ships
which can be built in 6 or 7 months at the outside, and which
can certainly go close in shore and attack the German Fleet
in its harbours. These are special vessels built for a definite
war operation, and we must look to them in default of a general
action for giving us the power of forcing a naval decision at the
latest in the autumn of 191 5.
WITH FISHER AT THE ADMIRALTY 499
Our thought is proceeding independently on the same lines.
I propose, as a basis of discussion, that in addition to the 4
Schwab monitors, we prepare 8 more at a cost of not more than
£700,000 apiece. These vessels should be armed either with
i3*5-inch or 15-inch guns, two or four in each as convenient.
Or, alternatively, they should be armed with four 18-inch
howitzers in separate cupolas sunk low on their heavily-
armoured turtle backs. They should draw 8 feet at most, and
be propelled entirely by internal combustion at a speed not
exceeding 10 knots; no funnels; three or four alternative
telescopic masts for fire observation; strong crinolines 20 feet
away all round to make them immune from mine or torpedo,
etc* • • ■ W. S. C.
We soon embarked on an extensive scheme of monitor build-
ing.
Besides making four monitors to carry the American 14-
inch gun turrets, we took two spare 15-inch gun turrets which
had been prepared for two of the furthest-off new battleships
(now converted into battle-cruisers), and [eight 12-inch gun
turrets out of four ' Majesties,' which we laid up; and with
these and the American guns we armed no less than fourteen
monitors, namely, two with two 15-inch guns, four with two
14-inch guns, and eight with two 12-inch guns apiece. Lord
Fisher then went on and pulled the 9* 2-inch guns out of the
old 'Edgars' and mounted them in fourteen small monitors,
drawing 6 feet 6 inches of water; and ten 6-inch guns1 were
mounted in still smaller monitors drawing 5 feet 11 inches.
We also built later on twelve large river gunboats capable of
being transported by rail for service on the Danube, if we ever
got there, and twelve small river gunboats, or baby monitors,
for service on the Tigris and the Euphrates. The bulk of the
large monitors were constructed in Belfast with extraordinary
celerity by Harland & Wolff and their sturdy ardent men. We
xTwo had had to be removed from each of the five 'Queen Eliza-
beths,' owing to spray interference.
500 THE WORLD CRISIS
also prepared 240 lighters with steel shields and internal com-
bustion engines for landing troops under fire.
Thus in the autumn of 1914, under various programmes
culminating in the great Fisher impetus, we set on foot the
following enormous Fleet, all due to complete by the end of
Battleships and Battle cruisers of the greatest power 7
Light cruisers . . . . . . .12
Destroyers of the largest class and leaders . . 65
Oversea submarines . . . . . .40
Coastal submarines . . . . . .22
Monitors —
Heavy ........ 18
Medium . . . . . . . 14
Light . . . . . . .5
Sloops and smaller anti-submarine vessels . . 107
Motor launches ....... 60
Ex-lighters with internal combustion engines . 240
This tremendous new Navy, for it was nothing less, was a
providential aid to the Admiralty when more than two years
later the real German submarine attack began. Its creation
on such a scale is one of the greatest services which the nation
has owed to the genius and energy of Lord Fisher. Probably
Fisher in all his long life never had a more joyous experience
than this great effort of new construction. No man knew
better than he how to put war thought into a ship. Ship-
building had been the greatest passion of his life. Here were
all the yards of Britain at his disposal and every Treasury
barrier broken down.
Of the battle-cruisers Repulse and Renown, and still more of
the light battle-cruisers Courageous, Furious and Glorious,
to which I consented four months later in circumstances which
will be narrated in their place, it must be said that they were
an old man's children. Although possessing many marvellous
qualities never hitherto combined in a ship of war, they were
light in the bone; and the Navy always considered them want-
WITH FISHER AT THE ADMIRALTY 501
ing in the structural strength and armour which the new con-
ditions of war more than ever required. None the less, their
parent loved them dearly and always rallied with the utmost
vehemence when any slur was cast upon their qualities.
I presided over all this process in November and December
with the greatest admiration for the First Sea Lord, but with
some misgivings on the score of expense. I was not yet satis-
fied that the war would be prolonged beyond 191 5, and I did
not wish to draw away from the armies men or material which
might be needed in their service. Not until April, 191 5, when
the failure of Russia as a decisive factor became final, did
I authorise a further extension of view to December 31, 1916,
and agree to plans for additional new construction being made
within that limit. Meanwhile I endeavoured to satisfy Lord
Fisher as best I could. I pointed out to him repeatedly that
from some points of view a ship finished twelve months before
the end of the war was worth twelve times as much as a ship
finished one month before its end, and urged continuously that
vessels nearest completion must in no way suffer. He was,
however, very difficult to feed. In a day he would sketch the
design of a capital ship. In a week he would devour a pro-
gramme and come back asking for more. A tit-bit like an
18-inch experimental gun which I suggested he should make,
was snapped up the moment it was mentioned. 'I will put
it in a light cruiser and drive her 40 knots/ he cried. 'Hit
how you like, when you like, where you like.' This was his
theme; but what about his doctrine 'Armour is vision'?
However, I backed him up all I could. He was far more often
right than wrong, and his drive and life-force made the Admi-
ralty quiver like one of his great ships at its highest speed.
CHAPTER XX
THE BOMBARDMENT OF SCARBOROUGH AND
HARTLEPOOL
December 16, 1914
1 All comes out even at the end of the day, and all comes out still more
even when all the days are over.' v
Naval Intelligence — The Captured German Signal Book — Directional
Wireless — Sir Arthur Wilson's Task — His Conclusions of De-
cember 14 — Orders to the Fleets — December 16: Bombardment of
Scarborough and Hartlepool — Favourable Position of the British
Forces — The Visibility Fails — Groping in the Mist — The German
High Sea Fleet at Sea — Disappointment — A forlorn Hope — What
had Happened — The Dawn Situation — A Fateful Hour — Flight
of the German Fleet — The British Sweep to the West — The Brush
with the Enemy's Light Cruisers — Mischance — von Hipper dodges
to the North — Escape of the German Battle Cruisers — The Admi-
ralty Communique — Public Discontent.
OUR Intelligence service has won and deserved world-
wide fame. More than (perhaps any other Power, we
were successful in the war in penetrating the intentions of the
enemy. Again and again the forecasts both of the military
and of the naval Intelligence Staffs were vindicated to the
wonder of friends and the chagrin of foes. The three suc-
cessive chiefs of the Naval Intelligence Division, Captain
Thomas Jackson, Rear-Admiral Oliver, and lastly Captain
Reginald Hall, were all men of mark in the service, and con-
tinuously built and extended an efficient and profound organ-
isation. There were others — a brilliant confederacy — whose
names even now are better wrapt in mystery. Our informa-
tion about German naval movements was principally obtained
502
SCARBOROUGH AND HARTLEPOOL 503
(1) from the reports of secret agents in neutral and enemy
countries and particularly in Germany, (2) from the reports
of our submarines, which lay far up in the Heligoland Bight in
perilous vigilance, and (3) from a special study we had made
of the German wireless. In this we were for a time aided by
great good luck.
At the beginning of September, 1914, the German light
cruiser Magdeburg was wrecked in the Baltic. The body of a
drowned German under-officer was picked up by the Russians
a few hours later, and clasped in his bosom by arms rigid in
death, were the cypher and signal books of the German Navy
and the minutely squared maps of the North Sea and Heligo-
land Bight. On September 6 the Russian Naval Attache came
to see me. He had received a message from Petrograd telling
him what had happened, and that the Russian Admiralty with
the aid of the cypher and signal books had been able to decode
portions at least of the German naval messages. The Russians
felt that as the leading naval Power, the British Admiralty
ought to have these books and charts. If we would send a
vessel to Alexandrov, the Russian officers in charge of the books
would bring them to England. We lost no time in sending a
ship, and late on an October afternoon Prince Louis and I
received from the hands of our loyal allies these sea-stained
priceless documents. We set on foot at once an organisation
for the study of the German wireless and for the translating of
the messages when taken in. At the head of the organisation
was placed Sir Alfred Ewing the Director of Naval Education,
whose services to the Admiralty in this and other matters were
of the first order. The work was of great complexity, as of
course the cypher is only one element in the means of preserv-
ing the secrecy of a message. But gradually during the begin-
ning of November our officers succeeded in translating intel-
ligible portions of various German naval messages. They were
mostly of a routine character. 'One of our torpedo boats will
be running out into square 7 at 8 p.m./ etc. But a careful
504 THE WORLD CRISIS
collection of these scraps provided a body of information from
which the enemy's arrangements in the Heligoland Bight could
be understood with a fair degree of accuracy. The Germans,
however, repeatedly changed their codes and keys and it was
only occasionally and for fitful periods that we were able to
penetrate them. As the war went on they became increas-
ingly suspicious and devised measures which were completely
baffling. While, however, this source of information lasted, it
was obviously of the very greatest value.
The German official history shows itself at last well-informed
upon this subject (p. 194): 'Even if doubt were to exist that
the British Admiralty were in possession of the whole secret
cyphering system of the German Fleet, it has been cleared
away by the reliable news from Petrograd, that after the
stranding of the Magdeburg off Odensholm the secret papers
of that ship, which had been thrown overboard, were picked
up by the Russians and communicated to their Allies. '
Lastly, largely through the foresight of Admiral Oliver, we
had begun setting up directional stations in August, 19 14. We
thus carried to an unrivalled and indeed unapproached degree
of perfection our means of fixing the position and, by successive
positions, the course of any enemy ship that used its wireless
installation.
'The English/ says Scheer (p. 73) 'received news through
their "directional stations" which they already had in use, but
which were only introduced by us at a much later period. . .
. . In possessing them the English had a very great advan-
tage in the conduct of the war as they were thus able to obtain
quite accurate information of the locality of the enemy as soon
as any wireless signals were sent by him. In the case of a
large fleet; whose separate units are stationed far apart and
communication between them is essential, an absolute cessa-
tion of all wireless intercourse would be fatal to any enter-
prise. '
But between collecting and weighing information, and draw-
SCARBOROUGH AND HARTLEPOOL 505
ing the true moral therefrom, there is very often an unbridged
gap. Signals have been made, the wireless note of a particular
ship is heard, lights are to be shown on certain channels at
certain hours, ships are in movement, sweeping vessels are
active, channels are buoyed, lock-gates are opened — what
does it all mean ? At first sight it all appears to be only ordi-
nary routine. Yet taking the items together may lead to a
tremendous revelation. Suffice it to say that all these indi-
cations, from whatever sources they emanated, were the sub-
ject of a special study by Sir Arthur Wilson, and he had the
solemn duty of advising our War Group upon them.
The silence of the North Sea remained unbroken until the
afternoon of Monday, December 14. At about 7 o'clock Sir
Arthur Wilson came to my room and asked for an immediate
meeting with the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Staff. It
took only a few minutes to gather them. He then explained
that his examination of the available intelligence about the
enemy indicated the probability of an impending movement
which would involve their battle-cruisers and perhaps — though
of this there was no positive evidence — have an offensive char-
acter against our coasts. The German High Sea Fleet, he
stated definitely, appeared not to be involved. The indica-
tions were obscure and uncertain. There were gaps in the
argument. But the conclusion reached after hearing Sir
Arthur Wilson was that we should act as if we knew that our
assumptions and suppositions were true. It was decided not
to move the whole Grand Fleet. A great deal of cruising had
been imposed on the Fleet owing to the unprotected state of
Scapa, and it was desirable to save wear and tear of machinery
and condensers as much as possible. Moreover the risks of
accident, submarine and mine, which were incurred every time
that immense organisation was sent to sea, imposed a certain
deterrent upon its use except when clearly necessary.
This decision, from which the Commander-in-Chief did not
dissent, was, in the light of subsequent events, much to be
506 THE WORLD CRISIS
regretted. But it must be remembered that the information
on which the Admiralty was acting, had never yet been tested;
that it seemed highly speculative in character, and that for
whatever it was worth, it excluded the presence at sea of the
German High Sea Fleet. Orders were therefore given imme-
diately for the battle-cruisers and the 2nd Battle Squadron,
with a light cruiser squadron and a flotilla of destroyers, to
raise steam and to proceed to sea at such hours and at such
speeds as to enable them to be in an intercepting position at
daylight the next morning. Orders were sent to Commodore
Tyrwhitt's Harwich Force to be at sea off Yarmouth, and to
Commodore Keyes, to place our eight available oversea sub-
marines in a position off Terschelling to guard against a south-
ward raid. The coastal forces were also put upon the alert.1
Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief.
December 14, 1914. Sent 9.30 p.m.
Good information just received shows German 1st Cruiser
Squadron with Destroyers leave Jade River on Tuesday
morning early and return on Wednesday night. It is apparent
from the information that the Battleships are very unlikely to
come out.
The enemy force will have time to reach our coast.
Send at once leaving to-night the Battle Cruiser Squadron
and Light Cruiser Squadron supported by a Battle Squadron
preferably the Second.
At daylight on Wednesday morning they should be at some
point where they can make sure of intercepting the enemy on
his return.
Tyrwhitt with his Light Cruisers and Destroyers will try
to get in touch with enemy off British coast and shadow him
keeping Admiral informed.
From our information the German 1st Cruiser Squadron
consists of 4 Battle-Cruisers and 5 Light Cruisers and there
will possibly be three flotillas of Destroyers.
Acknowledge.
1 See map to face page 518.
SCARBOROUGH AND HARTLEPOOL 507
Admiralty to Commodore 'T' Harwich.
December 15, 1914. Sent 2.5 p.m.
There is good probability of German Battle-Cruisers,
Cruisers and Destroyers being off our coast to-morrow about
daybreak.
One M Class Destroyer is to patrol vicinity of North Hinder
Lightship from midnight until 9 a.m. A second M Class
Destroyer is to patrol a line extending 15 miles south mag-
netic from a position lat. 530 o' N., long. 30 5' E. from mid-
night until 9 a. m.
The duty of these Destroyers is to look out for and report
the enemy and trust to their speed to escape.
If the weather is too bad, they are to return to Harwich.
Report their names.
The 1st and 3rd Flotillas with all available Light Cruisers
are to be under way off Yarmouth before daylight to-morrow
ready to move to any place were the enemy may be reported
from, whether it is to the northward or southward.
Their duty is to get touch with the enemy follow him and
report his position to the Vice- Admiral 2nd Battle Squadron
and Vice-Admiral 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.
The 2nd Battle Squadron, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 3rd
Cruiser Squadron and Light Cruiser Squadron will be in a
position in N. lat. 540 io' E. long. 30 o' at 7.30 a.m. ready to
cut off retreat of enemy.
Should an engagement result your Flotillas and Light
Cruisers must endeavour to join our Fleet and deal with
enemy Destroyers.
If the weather is too bad for Destroyers use Light Cruisers
only and send Destroyers back. Acknowledge.
All measures having been taken on the chance of their being
necessary, we awaited during thirty-six hours the events of
Wednesday morning with a doubting but expectant curiosity.
On the morning of December 16 at about half -past eight I was
in my bath, when the door opened and an officer came hurrying
in from the War Room with a naval signal which I grasped with
dripping hand. l German battle-cruisers bombarding Hartle-
pool. ' I jumped out of the bath with exclamations. Sym-
508 THE WORLD CRISIS
pathy for Hartlepool was mingled with what Mr. George
Wyndham once called 'the anodyne of contemplated retalia-
tion.' Pulling on clothes over a damp body, I ran downstairs
to the War Room. The First Sea Lord had just arrived from
his house next door. Oliver, who invariably slept in the War
Room and hardly ever left it by day, was marking the positions
on the map. Telegrams from all the naval stations along the
coast affected by the attack, and intercepts from our ships in
the vicinity speaking to each other, came pouring in two and
three to the minute. The Admiralty also spread the tidings
and kept the Fleets and flotillas continuously informed of all
we knew.
Everything was now sent to sea or set in motion. The 3rd
Battle Squadron (King Edwards) from the Forth was ordered
to prevent the enemy escaping to the Northward. As a fur-
ther precaution, (though, unless the Germans were driven far
to the North, this could hardly be effective in time,) the Grand
Fleet itself was after all brought out. Commodore Tyrwhitt
and his cruisers and destroyers of the Harwich Striking Force
were directed to join Sir George Warrender, who commanded
the Second Battle Squadron, and was the senior Admiral with
the intercepting force. The weather was, however, too rough
for the destroyers, and only the light cruisers could proceed.
Lastly, later in the day Commodore Keyes who was in the
Lurcher — one of our latest destroyers and had also with him
the destroyer Firedrake, was told to take his submarines from
his preliminary station off Terschelling into the Heligoland
Bight and try to catch the enemy returning.
The bombardment of open towns was still new to us at that
time. But, after all, what did that matter now ? The war
map showed the German battle-cruisers identified one by one
within gunshot of the Yorkshire coast, while 150 miles to
eastward between them and Germany, cutting mathematically
their line of retreat, steamed in the exact positions intended,
four British battle-cruisers and six of the most powerful battle-
SCARBOROUGH AND HARTLEPOOL 509
ships in the world forming the 2nd Battle Squadron. At-
tended and preceded by their cruiser squadrons and flotilla,
this fleet of our newest and fastest ships all armed with the
heaviest gun then afloat, could in fair weather cover and watch
effectively a front of nearly 100 miles. In the positions in
which dawn revealed the antagonists, only one thing could
enable the Germans to escape annihilation at the hands of an
overwhelmingly superior force. And while the great shells
crashed into the little houses of Hartlepool and Scarborough,
carrying their cruel message of pain and destruction to unsus-
pecting English homes, only one anxiety dominated the
thoughts of the Admiralty War Room.
The word 'Visibility' assumed a sinister significance. At
present it was quite good enough. Both Warrender and
Beatty had horizons of nearly ten miles: near the coast fight-
ing was actually in progress at 7,000 yards. There was noth-
ing untoward in the weather indications. At 9 a.m. the
German bombardment ceased, and their ships were soon out
of sight of land, no doubt on their homeward voyage. We
went on tenter-hooks to breakfast. To have this tremendous
prize — the German battle-cruiser squadron whose loss would
fatally mutilate the whole German Navy and could never be
repaired — actually within our claws, and to have the event all
turn upon a veil of mist, was a wracking ordeal. Meanwhile
telegraph and telephone were pouring the distress of Hartle-
pool and Scarborough to all parts of the Kingdom, and by half-
past ten, when the War Committee of the Cabinet met, news
magnified by rumour had produced excitement. I was im-
mediately asked how such a thing was possible. ' What was
the Navy doing, and what were they going to do ? ' In reply
I produced the chart which showed the respective positions
at the moment of the British and German naval forces, and I
explained that subject to moderate visibility we hoped that
collision would take place about noon. These disclosures fell
upon all with a sense of awe, and the Committee adjourned till
the afternoon.
510 THE WORLD CRISIS
At 10.30 the Admiralty learned that the enemy was leaving
our coasts and apprised Admiral Warrender accordingly.
Enemy is probably returning towards Heligoland. You
should keep outside minefield and steer so as to cut him off.
But now already ominous telegrams began to arrive. War-
render soon had horizons of only 7,000 yards; Beatty of only
6,000; some of the light cruisers nearer to the coast already
mentioned 5,000; and later on 4,000 was signalled. Mean-
while no contact. Noon passed, and then 1 o'clock. The
weather got steadily worse. It was evident that the mist
curtains were falling over the North Sea. 3,000 yards visi-
bility, 2,000 yards visibility were reported by ships speaking to
each other. The solemn faces of Fisher and Wilson betrayed
no emotion, but one felt the fire burning within. I tried to do
other work, but it was not much good. Obscure messages
were heard from our fleet. Evidently they were very close to
the enemy, groping for him in a mist which allowed vessels to
be distinguished only within 2,000 yards. We heard War-
render order his priceless ships to steam through the located
German minefield off the Yorkshire coast apparently in an
endeavour to close with something just out of sight, just
beyond his finger-tips. Then all of a sudden we heard Rear-
Admiral Goodenough with the light cruisers report that he had
opened fire upon a German light cruiser at 3,000 yards. Hope
flared up. Once contact was established, would it not drag
all other events in its train ? The prospect of a confused battle
at close range had no terrors for the Admiralty. They had
only one fear — lest the enemy should escape. Even the pro-
posed movement of the 2nd Battle Squadron through the
minefield was received in utter silence.
About half-past one Sir Arthur Wilson said 'They seem to
be getting away from us.' But now occurred a new develop-
ment of a formidable kind. At 1.50 we learned that the High
Sea Fleet was at sea. Up till noon this great Fleet had not
spoken. Once she had spoken and the necessary calculations
SCARBOROUGH AND HARTLEPOOL 511
had been made, which took some time, we could both recog-
nise and locate her. She had already in fact advanced far
into the North Sea. The apparition of the German Fleet,
which as we then supposed was advancing to the support of
the German battle-cruisers, entirely altered the balance of
strength. Our ten great ships steaming together with their
light squadrons and flotillas, were not only the strongest but
the fastest naval force in the world. No equal German force
existed which could at once overtake and overcome them.
On the other hand, they were not capable of meeting the High
Sea Fleet. The German battle cruisers were still separated
from their fleet by 150 miles, but it seemed to us that a running
action begun with the German battle cruisers, might in the
thick weather then prevailing conceivably lead to a surprise
encounter with the main naval power of the enemy. This
was certainly not the wish of the Admiralty. We instantly
warned our squadrons.
Admiralty to 2nd Battle Squadron and 1st Battle Cruiser
Squadron.
(Urgent.) Smt US° P'm- #
High Sea Fleet is out and was in latitude 540 38' N. longi-
tude 50 55' E.1 at 0.30 p.m. to-day, so do not go too far to
Eastward.
These sinister possibilities soon faded like our earlier hopes.
The High Sea Fleet was not, as we imagined, coming out, but
had long been out and was now retiring.
At 3 o'clock I went over and told the War Committee what
was passing; but with what a heavy heart did I cross again
that Horse Guards' Parade. I returned to the Admiralty.
The War Group had re-assembled around the octagonal table
in my room. The shades of a winter's evening had already
fallen. Sir Arthur Wilson then said, in his most ordinary
1 i.e. about 80 miles West of Heligoland.
512 THE WORLD CRISIS
manner, 'Well, there you are, they have got away. They
must be about here by now/ and he pointed to the chart on
which the Chief of the Staff was marking the positions every
fifteen minutes. It was evident that the Germans had eluded
our intercepting force, and that even their light cruisers with
whom we had been in contact had also escaped in the mist.
Said Admiral Warrender in his subsequent report, 'They came
out of one rainstorm and disappeared in another.'
It was now nearly 8 o'clock.
Was it then all over ? I inquired about our submarines.
They had already been collected by Commodore Keyes from
their first position and were now moving on to the German
line of retreat. But whether the enemy's course would come
within their limited range was a matter of luck. Sir Arthur
Wilson then said, 'There is only one chance now. Keyes with
the Lurcher and Firedrake, is with the submarines. He
could probably make certain of attacking the German battle-
cruiser squadron as it enters the Bight to-night. He may tor-
pedo one or even two.' It seemed indeed a forlorn hope to
send these two frail destroyers, with their brave Commodore
and faithful crews, far from home, close to the enemy's coast,
utterly unsupported, into the jaws of this powerful German
force with its protecting vessels and flotillas. There was a
long silence. We all knew Keyes well. Then some one said,
'It is sending him to his death.' Some one else said, 'He
would be the last man to wish us to consider that.' There
was another long pause. However, Sir Arthur Wilson had
already written the following message : —
8.12 p.m.
'We think Heligoland and Amrun lights will be lit when
ships are going in. Your destroyers might get a chance to
attack about 2 a.m. or later on the line given you.'
The First Sea Lord nodded assent. The Chief-of-the-Staff
took it, got up heavily and quitted the room. Then we turned
SCARBOROUGH AND HARTLEPOOL 513
to the ordinary business of the day and also to the decision of
what could be told to the public about the event.
Two days later when I received Admiral Keyes in my room
at the Admiralty, I said, ' We sent you a terrible message the
other night. I hardly expected to see you again.' 'It was
terrible,' he said, 'not getting it till I was nearly home. I
waited three hours in the hopes of such an order, and I very
nearly did it on my own responsibility,' and he proceeded to
reproach himself without need.1
jf: * * * *
So far I have described this episode of December 16 exactly
as it appeared from the War Room of the Admiralty, and as
we understood it at the time. But let us now see in essentials
what had happened.2 No one could tell at what point on our
shores the German attack would fall; and with 500 miles of
coast studded with possible objectives to guard, there could
be no certain solution. The orders issued by the Commander-
in-Chief, however, and the dawn position selected, ably com-
prehended the design of the enemy. In pursuance of these
orders the 2nd Battle Squadron (6 ships) and the Battle
Cruiser Squadron (4 ships), together with the 3rd Cruiser
Squadron, a Squadron of Light Cruisers and a flotilla, steam-
ing down from Scapa, Cromarty and the Forth, arrived at
about 5.30 in the morning of the 16th, two hours and a half
1 It must be explained that in these days the wireless communication
with destroyers and still more submarines was not as perfect as it
became later on. The Firedrake had therefore been stationed in the
morning midway between the submarines and Harwich to pass on
messages. She had late in the afternoon, after the orders to take the
submarines into the Bight had reached her, rejoined Commodore Keyes
and the link was, for the time being, broken.
2 The whole of this operation is described in minute detail in the
official British Naval History, and should be studied with the excellent
charts by those who are interested in its technical aspect. So com-
plicated is the full story that the lay reader cannot see the wood for the
trees. I have endeavoured to render intelligible the broad effects. —
w.s.c.
514 THE WORLD CRISIS
before daybreak, at the Southern edge of the Dogger Bank.
Here in the very centre of the North Sea, almost on a line
drawn from Hartlepool to Heligoland, the advanced screen of
British destroyers became engaged with German destroyers
and light cruisers, and when daylight came they sighted a large
German cruiser identified as the Roon.1 Fighting ensued,
some of our destroyers were hit, and the Germans retreated to
the Eastward. Thereupon Admiral Beatty with his battle
cruisers began to chase the Roon. From this pursuit he was
recalled by the news which reached him and Admiral War-
render from the Admiralty about 9 a.m., that the German
battle cruisers were bombarding Hartlepool and later Scar-
borough. All the British ships at once turned to the West-
ward and steamed abreast in a long line towards the British
coast and the German battle cruisers, whose interception ap-
peared highly probable.
During the war we were puzzled to understand what the
Roon and the German light forces were doing on the edge of
the Dogger Bank at this hour in the morning. It was an ill-
assorted force to be in so exposed a position, and it was not a
force or in a position, which could be of any help to the Ger-
man cruisers raiding the British coasts. Now we know the
answer. The Roon and her cruisers and destroyers were part
of the advanced screen of the German High Sea Fleet who
were out in full force, three squadrons strong, with all their
attendant vessels and numerous flotillas. Admiral von Inge-
nohl in command of the High Sea Fleet had sailed from
Cuxhaven after darkness had fallen on the evening of the 15 th
(between 4 and 5 p.m.) and before dawn on the 16th was
pushing boldly out towards the Dogger Bank in support of his
battle cruisers who, under Admiral von Hipper were already
approaching the British shores. Had von Ingenohl continued
on his course, as was his intention, his scouts would between
8 and 9 o'clock, in the clear weather of that morning in this
1 See map to face page 518, 'The Dawn Situation/
SCARBOROUGH AND HARTLEPOOL 515
part of the North Sea, have come in sight of the British battle
cruisers and the 2nd Battle Squadron coming down from the
North. A meeting was almost certain. What would have
happened? Admiral von Tirpitz proclaims that this was the
one heaven-sent never-recurring opportunity for a battle with
the odds enormously in German favour. 'On December 16/
he wrote a few weeks later, 'Ingenohl had the fate of Germany
in the palm of his hand. I boil with inward emotion whenever
I think of it.' We will examine this claim later. Let us first
follow the event.
Admiral von Ingenohl had already strained his instructions
by going so far to sea. An appeal by him against the ' Muzzling
Order/ which the Emperor had issued after the action of the
Heligoland Bight (August 28), had recently encountered a
rebuff. 'The Fleet must be held back and avoid actions
which might lead to heavy losses.' Such had been the latest
ukase. And here was the Fleet right out in the middle of the
North Sea in the darkness of a December dawn. Suddenly
the flashes of guns, English destroyers reported in action with
the cruisers of his screen, the screen retiring, the destroyers
pursuing — and still two hours before daylight. Von Ingenohl
conceived himself in danger of a torpedo attack in darkness.
At about 5.30 therefore he turned his whole Fleet about and
steamed off South-Eastward, and shortly after 6 o'clock, in-
creasingly disquieted by his hampering instructions, but know-
ing no more of the presence of our squadrons than they of him,
he, in the justly chosen words of the British official historian,
'fairly turned tail and made for home, leaving his raiding force
in the air.' Even so, at 6 o'clock the two Fleets were only about
50 miles apart and their light forces in contact ! Says Scheer,
who was in command of the German 2nd Squadron (p. 71),
' Our premature turning on to an East-South-East course had
robbed us of the opportunity of meeting certain divisions of
the enemy according to the pre-arranged plan, which is now
seen to have been correct.'
516 THE WORLD CRISIS
There was, however, no compulsion upon Admirals War-
render and Beatty to fight such an action. Their squadrons
were moving properly protected by their screen of cruisers
and destroyers. In this part of the sea and at this hour the
weather was quite clear. They would have known what
forces they were in presence of, before they could become
seriously engaged. There would not have been any justifica-
tion for trying to fight the High Sea Fleet of twenty battle-
ships, with six battleships and four battle cruisers, even
though these comprised our most powerful vessels. Nor was
there any need. The British 2nd Battle Squadron could steam
in company at 20 knots, or could escape with Forced Draught
at 21, and only six of von Ingenohl's ships could equal that
speed. As for the battle cruisers, nothing could catch them.
The safety of this force acting detached from the main British
Fleet was inherent in its speed. Admirals Warrender and
Beatty could therefore have refused battle with the German
Fleet, and it would certainly have been their duty to do so.
Still having regard to the large numbers of destroyers at sea
with the German Fleet and the chances of darkness and
weather, the situation at this juncture, as we now know it to
have been, gives cause for profound reflection. That it never
materialised unfavourably was the reward of previous audacity.
The sixteenth of December lay under the safeguard of the
twenty-eighth of August.
We now enter upon the second phase of this extraordinary
day. All four British squadrons with their flotilla between 9
and 10 o'clock were steaming towards the British coasts. The
German raiding cruisers, having finished their bombardments,
were now seeking to return home with the utmost speed.
There were two large minefields which had been laid earlier
in the war by the Germans off the Yorkshire coast, and we,
having located them and considering them as a protection
against raiding, had improved them by laying additional
mines. Between these minefields there was opposite W^hitby
SCARBOROUGH AND HARTLEPOOL 517
and Scarborough a gap about fifteen miles wide. Sir John
Jellicoe, reflecting upon the whole position from the Iron Duke
from afar, formed the opinion that the enemy would either
try to escape to the Northward by steaming up our coast in-
side the minefield or, much more probably, would come
straight out Eastward through the gap opposite Whitby and
Scarborough. He had ordered the 3rd Battle Squadron from
the Forth to close the gap to the Northward and this was
rapidly being effected. At 10.10 he signalled to Sir George
Warrender telling him the position of the gap in the minefields
opposite Whitby and adding c Enemy will in all probability
come out there.' Admirals Warrender and Beatty were al-
ready proceeding on this assumption, which in fact correctly
divined what the Germans were doing.
At n o'clock, therefore, the four German battle cruisers,
with their light cruisers returning independently 60 miles
ahead of them, were steaming due East for Heligoland at their
highest speed. At the same time all our four squadrons were
steaming due West in a broad sweep directly towards them.
The distance between the fleets was about 100 miles, and they
were approaching each other at an aggregate speed of over
40 miles an hour. Across the course of our fleet lay the South-
West patch of the Dogger Bank on which there was not
enough water for battle cruisers, either British or German.
The British sweeping line therefore divided — Beatty and the
light cruisers going North of the patch. Warrender with the
battleships and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron going South of it.
This involved a certain detour and delay in our advance.
The weather, moreover, became very bad. The mist descended
and the sea ran high. The German light cruisers were now
sighted by out Light Cruiser Squadron scouting ahead of
Beatty through the driving mist and rainstorms. The South-
ampton, the most Southerly light cruiser, opened fire and was
answered by the enemy. Hopes on board the Lion rose. Just
at the place and just at the moment when they might expect
518 THE WORLD CRISIS
it, was the enemy's cruiser screen. Clearly the main body
was behind them: probably it was not far behind. But now
Mischance intervened.
The other three British light cruisers, seeing the South-
ampton engaged to the Southward, turned in that direction to
join in the fight and the Birmingham opened fire. This was
not in accordance with the wishes of Admiral Beatty, who
wished to keep his scouts in front of him at the time when
he must expect to be closely approaching the enemy's battle
cruisers, and when the danger of missing them was so great.
He therefore ordered his light cruisers to return to their sta-
tions. The signal, instead of being directed by name to the 2
vessels who were not engaged, was made general to the Light
Cruiser Squadron, and acting on this order the Southampton
and Birmingham both broke off their action with the German
cruiser and resumed their places in the line. The German
light cruisers turned off to the Southward and vanished in the
mist. Contact with them was thus lost.
Meanwhile, however, the battle cruisers on both sides con-
tinued rapidly to approach each other. At 12.15 Admiral von
Hipper warned by his light cruisers that an enemy force was
immediately in front of him, also turned slightly and to the
South-East. Admiral Beatty continued on his course till
12.30. At this moment the two battle cruiser forces were only
25 miles apart and still rapidly closing.1 But now again Mis-
chance! The German light cruisers, deflected away to the
Southward from Beatty, came into contact with the 3rd
Cruiser Squadron in front of Warrender. Fire again was
opened and returned, and again the enemy cruisers were lost
in the thick mist. They reported to von Hipper that on this
path also was a blocking force. Thereupon at 12.45 he made
1 a three-quarters left about turn ' (if I may employ a cavalry
term), and dodged off due North. This by itself would not
1 See map facing this page, ' The Noon Situation. ■
55°
)NS OF
16. 1914.
H
E
Situation before Dawn
A+ B.
War render and Beafty. |U
X @ V ^igb $ta ;5fW
Y
5.4-5 a.m.
Q30/f
Slett £>*c.l5.
Longitude 5° East from Greenwich.
SCARBOROUGH AND HARTLEPOOL 519
have saved him. Had Admiral Beatty held on his original
course for another quarter of an hour, an action at decisive
ranges must have begun before 1 o'clock. But observe what
had happened.
At 12.30 Admiral Beatty had received a signal from Sir
George Warrender at the moment of the second contact with
the German light cruisers, ' Enemy cruisers and destroyers in
sight.' He therefore concluded that the German battle cruisers
had slipped past him to the Southward, and acting in addition
on the sound principle of keeping between the enemy and the
enemy's home at all costs, he too whipped round and steamed
back on his course, i.e., Eastward, for three-quarters of an
hour. At 1. 1 5, hearing that the enemy battle cruisers had
turned North, he too turned North; but contact was never
re-established. Von Hipper succeeded in escaping round the
Northern flank of our squadrons. His light cruisers, so thick
was the weather, made their way through the 3rd Cruiser
Squadron, passing for a few moments actually in sight of
Warrender 's battleships.
Thus ended this heart-shaking game of Blind Man's Buff.
It remains only to mention the action of our British sub-
marines. By 3.30 Commodore Keyes had collected four of his
boats from their station submerged off Terschelling, and in
accordance with Admiralty orders was making for the Heligo-
land Bight. Eventually he succeeded in placing three boats
on the Southern side of Heligoland and one on the Northern.
This solitary boat, under Commander Nasmith, on the morn-
ing of the 17th found itself in the middle of Von Hipper's
squadron and flotillas returning from their raid and fired two
torpedoes at battle cruisers under very difficult conditions and
without effect.
Such was the episode of the Scarborough and Hartlepool
raids. All that we could tell the public was contained in the
following communique which was issued in the morning papers
of December 17.
520 THE WORLD CRISIS
Admiralty, December 16, 9.20 p.m.
This morning a German cruiser force made a demonstra-
tion upon the Yorkshire coast, in the course of which they
shelled Hartlepool, Whitby, and Scarborough.
A number of their fastest ships were employed for this pur-
pose, and they remained about an hour on the coast. They
were engaged by the patrol vessels on the spot.
As soon as the presence of the enemy was reported, a British
patrolling squadron endeavoured to cut them off. On being
sighted by British vessels the Germans retired at full speed,
and, favoured by the mist, succeeded in making good their
escape.
The losses on both sides are small, but full reports have not
yet been received.
The Admiralty take the opportunity of pointing out that
demonstrations of this character against unfortified towns or
commercial ports, though not difficult to accomplish provided
that a certain amount of risk is accepted, are devoid of military
significance.
They may cause some loss of life among the civil popula-
tion and some damage to private property, which is much to
be regretted; but they must not in any circumstances be
allowed to modify the general naval policy which is being
pursued.
Naturally there was much indignation at the failure of the
Navy to prevent, or at least to avenge, such an attack upon
our shores. What was the Admiralty doing? Were they all
asleep ? Although the bombarded towns, in which nearly five
hundred civilians had been killed and wounded, supported their
ordeal with fortitude, dissatisfaction was widespread. How-
ever, we could not say a word in explanation. We had to
bear in silence the censures of our countrymen. We could
never admit for fear of compromising our secret information
where our squadrons were, or how near the German raiding
cruisers had been to their destruction. One comfort we had.
The indications upon which we had acted had been confirmed
by events. The sources of information upon which we relied
SCARBOROUGH AND HARTLEPOOL 521
were evidently trustworthy. Next time we might at least
have average visibility. But would there be a next time? The
German Admiral must have known that he was very near to
powerful British ships, but which they were, or where they
were, or how near he was, might be a mystery. Would it not
also be a mystery how they came to be there ? On the other
hand, the exultation of Germany at the hated English towns
being actually made to feel for the first time the real lash of
war might encourage a second attempt. Even the indignation
of our own newspapers had a value for this purpose. One
could only hope for the best. Meanwhile British naval plans
and secrets remained wrapped in impenetrable silence.
CHAPTER XXI
TURKEY AND THE BALKANS
'Now mark me well — it is provided in the essence of things, that
from any fruition of success, no matter what, shall come forth some-
thing to make a greater struggle necessary/
Walt Whitman, The Open Road.
Britain and Turkey — My correspondence with Djavid, 191 1 — Effect
of requisitioning the Turkish battleships — Nominal transfer of
the Goeben and the Breslau to Turkey — General Situation in the
Balkans — Bulgaria the dominant factor — Venizelos offers a Greek
alliance — Reasons against acceptance — My letter to Mr. Noel
Buxton — Menacing attitude of Turkey — Possibilities of a Greek
military attack upon Gallipoli — Difficulties of Greek intervention
— Search for an army — Withdrawal of the British Naval Mission
in Constantinople — Letter to Sir Edward Grey of September 23
— Alternative considerations — Secret Turco-German treaty of
August 2 — The Turco-German attack on Russia — Ultimatum to
Turkey and declaration of war — The bombardment of the Dar-
danelles forts of November 3 — Impending Turkish attack upon
Egypt — Naval concentration in the Canal — Repulse of the Turk-
ish attack — Arrival of the Australians in Egypt — The prelude to
the Dardanelles — General Survey of the War — The Great Strain
— The Sudden Relief — The End of the Beginning.
TT is now necessary to describe the circumstances attend-
■*■ ing the entry of Turkey into the war. In Turkey, as
in Greece and all the Balkan States except Serbia, there were
two violently conflicting parties — pro- German and pro-En-
tente. The assiduous courting of Turkey by Germany and
the condonation of her most atrocious actions had given the
Germans great advantages at Constantinople. In addition
the profound instinct of the Turk was to be on the opposite
side to his historic and tremendous enemy Russia. Britain,
on the other hand, took no trouble to counteract these formid-
522
TURKEY AND THE BALKANS 523
able tendencies. Large sections of the British Press and pub-
lic denounced the Turk, often with justice, in unmeasured
terms, and no foreign policy based on special relations with
Turkey could have stood for a day in a Liberal House of Com-
mons. Notwithstanding all this, British influence in Turkey
rested on foundations so deep and ancient, and the impression
produced upon the Turkish mind by her obviously disinter-
ested course of action was so strong, that at any rate up till the
beginning of 1914 she would have welcomed a British alliance.
This was the wish not only of the old Turks but of the young
Turks. When in the summer of 1909 I had visited Constan-
tinople, I made the acquaintance of the Young Turk leaders
and passed several days in the company of Djavid, Talaat and
Halil. I also met at the German Manoeuvres of 19 10 Enver
Pasha, with whom I established amicable relations. All
these men seemed animated by a sincere desire to help their
country to reform and revive, and I could not help feeling
much sympathy for them in their difficulties.
In 191 1, when Turkey was attacked by Italy and her Tripoli
Province seized, I received the following letter from Djavid
Bey written on behalf of his friends on the then all-powerful
Committee of Union and Progress: —
Djavid Bey to Mr. Churchill
October 29, 191 1.
My belief in your sincere friendship for Turkey and the
Young Turks leads me to speak of a very important matter
to-day.
After the Constitution in Turkey those that believed in the
beginning of a close friendship between England and Turkey
saw with regret the misunderstanding that prevented it. I
need not speak of its different causes here. Only the true
friends of England in Turkey never ceased from trying to
remove it. The actual circumstances appear to be a good
occasion for success. The attack of one of the Triple Alliance
Powers on our territory has turned the public opinion greatly
against the Triplice. The pro-English statesmen in Turkey
524 THE WORLD CRISIS
and pro-Turkish statesmen in England could profit of this
occasion.
Knowing and believing you to occupy an important and
influential position among our friends in England,. I will beg
you to join our efforts using your influence in bringing out
this friendship. Has the time arrived for a permanent alli-
ance between the two countries ? On what basis could it be
attempted ? Will you please write me your personal views on
the matter ? They will be considered entirely personal and
unofficial. But I will consider myself happy if we can prepare
a possible ground for official purposes.
I commended this matter promptly to Sir Edward Grey,
but the danger of estranging Italy — apart from political
considerations — made it impossible for him to authorize
me to say more than the following: —
Mr. Churchill to Djavid Bey.
Admiralty, November 19, 191 1.
It is a great pleasure to me to receive your letter, the import-
ance of which I fully recognize. So far as the present lament-
able struggle is concerned, we have definitely declared our
neutrality; and it is not to be expected that we shall alter a
policy so gravely decided. My answer therefore to your
question must be that at the present time we cannot enter
upon new political relations. In the future the enormous
interests which unite the two great Mussulman Powers should
keep us in touch. That is our wish; the feeling of British
public opinion, as you will have seen from recent manifesta-
tions of it, opposes no barrier to that wish, if only the Turkish
Government will not alienate it by reverting to the oppressive
methods of the old regime or seeking to disturb the British
status quo as it now exists; and you and your friends, whom I
remember to have met with so much pleasure, should bear in
mind that England, almost alone among European States,
seeks no territorial expansion, and that alone among them she
retains the supremacy of the sea. We earnestly desire to
revive and maintain our old friendship with Turkey, which
while we retain that supremacy should be a friendship of value.
TURKEY AND THE BALKANS 525
I must apologise for the delay in answering your letter,
which was due to the importance of its nature.
In the years which followed the Young Turks looked towards
Germany, and here they were very powerfully swayed by
their military instincts and training. They rightly regarded
Germany as the leading military Power: many of them had
received their military education in Berlin, and they were
spellbound by the splendour and authority of Prussian organ-
isation. They saw the Russian giant ever growing to the
east and to the north. And if England stood aloof, where else
could Turkey find protection except through the German
sword ? I do not see what else we could have expected.
Therefore, from the very beginning of the war I hoped for
nothing from Turkey and apprehended much.
The first events of the war obviously added to the tension
between the two countries. We had found it necessary, as
has been described, to requisition the two Turkish battle-
ships which were building in British yards. The money for
these ships had been largely raised by public subscription in
Turkey, and their sequestration angered not only the Turkish
Government but large numbers of patriotic Turks through-
out the country. Moreover, in the struggles which ensued
in Constantinople and in the Turkish Cabinet between the
Turkish war party and those who favoured neutrality, this
episode seemed to have weight.
I did my best, with the approval of the Cabinet, to allay
the legitimate heartburnings of the Turkish Ministry of
Marine. These efforts were seconded by Admiral Limpus,
the Head of the British Naval Mission to Turkey, whose rela-
tions with the Turks were extremely good and whose mission
had won much esteem. But with the arrival at the Darda-
nelles of the Goeben and the Breslau, a, new and formidable com-
plication arose. These two ships, which had presented them-
selves at the entrance to the Straits about 5 o'clock on the
526 THE WORLD CRISIS
afternoon of August 10, were received by the Turkish authori-
ties. They were piloted through a passage in the minefield
and proceeded to Constantinople. The British Government
had a right to assume that they would be interned and dis-
armed. In view of the delicacy of the situation, however, it
was thought prudent to accept a less drastic solution. The
following minutes tell their own tale. —
Sir Edward Grey. August 12, igH.
"Goeben" and "Breslau"
In all the circumstances, the Admiralty agree that the sale
or transfer of these two vessels to the Turkish flag should be
allowed, provided that the transference is bona fide and per-
manent. The essential condition to insist on is that all the
German officers and men of the crews of both ships must, with-
out exception, be at once repatriated to Germany under parole
not to serve again during the war. We cannot agree to any
exceptions being made, whether of officers or skilled ratings,
or of the ordinary crew. The British Embassy, assisted if
necessary by the English Naval Mission, should assure them-
selves that all the Germans leave at once, and that the ships
are definitely handed over to the Turkish Navy. In these
circumstances, the Admiralty would allow the [British] Naval
Mission to remain, as requested by the Grand Vizier. The
Turks could also be informed that after the war is over, we
should be quite ready in principle, and as far as we can now
foresee, to transfer one or both of the two ships we have re-
quisitioned to their flag, and that we are quite ready to nego-
tiate with them at the present time in regard to payment of
the sums due to Turkey. W S C
Sir Edward Grey. Aw^ust *?' ^
The situation about Goeben and Breslau is extremely unsatis-
factory. Their sale to Turkey is probably itself a breach of
neutrality. The vital condition of the repatriation of the
German complements down to the last man has not taken
place; probably the whole of the German crews are still on
board, and it is admitted that 'experts are to be retained.'
TURKEY AND THE BALKANS 527
Meanwhile, the British Naval Mission has been banished from
the Turkish ships committed to their charge, and forbidden to
go on board the two ex- Germans. As long as the Goeben and
Breslau remain in this condition, and until we know that the
whole of the German crews are definitely repatriated, we have
to keep two British [battle] cruisers, which are urgently needed
elsewhere, waiting with other vessels outside the Dardanelles.
\,This is a situation which cannot continue indefinitely.
w. s. c.
The Turkish position could only be judged in relation to the
general situation in the Balkans; and this could not be under-
stood unless the dominant facts of pre-war Balkan history
were continually borne in mind. The first Balkan war saw
Bulgaria triumphantly bearing the brunt of the attack on
Turkey. While her armies were advancing on Constantinople
against the best troops of the Turkish Empire, the Greeks
and Serbians were overrunning the comparatively weakly-
held regions of Thrace and Macedonia. The Bulgarians,
having fought the greatest battles and sustained by far the
heaviest losses, found themselves finally checked before Con-
stantinople, and, turning round, beheld almost the whole of
the conquered territory in the hands of their Allies. The
destination of this territory had been regulated before the
war by treaty between the four belligerent minor States.
Adrianople had not however surrendered, and in obedience
to the treaty the Serbians came to the aid of the Bulgarian
forces, and played a prominent part in the capture of that
fortress. Both the Serbians and the Greeks utilised the argu-
ment that the war had been prolonged through the need of
reducing Adrianople as a ground for claiming to repudiate in
important particulars the pre-war treaty, and meanwhile they
retained occupation of all the conquered districts in their
possession. The Bulgarians were quick to repay this claim
with violence. They attacked the Greeks and Serbians, were
528 THE WORLD CRISIS
defeated by the more numerous armies of these two Powers,
and in the moment of extreme weakness and defeat were
invaded from the other side by Roumania, who, having taken
no part in the conflict, had intact armies to strike with. At
the same time the Turks advanced in Thrace, and led by
Enver Pasha recaptured Adrianople. Thus the end of the
second Balkan war saw Bulgaria stripped not only of almost
all her share of the territory conquered from the Turks (and
this entirely divided between Greece and Serbia), but even
her native province of the Dobroudja had been wrested from
her by Roumania. The terrible cruelties and atrocities which
had been perpetrated on both sides in the internecine struggle
that followed the expulsion of the Turks had left a river of
blood between the Greeks and Serbians on the one hand and
the Bulgarians on the other.
It is possible that no nation ever contemplated its fortunes
with more profound and desperate resolve than the Bul-
garians at this juncture. All their sacrifices had been use-
less and worse than useless. All the fruits of their conquests
had gone to aggrandise their rivals. They had been, as they
considered, stabbed in the back and blackmailed by Rou-
mania, to whom they had given no provocation of any kind.
They saw the great Powers, England in the van, forbid
the return of the Turk to Adrianople without offering the
slightest attempt to make their words good. They saw not
only Salonika, but even Kavala, seized by the Greeks. They
saw large districts inhabited largely by the Bulgarian race
newly liberated from the Turks pass under the yoke — to them
scarcely less odious — of Serbians and Greeks. It was in these
circumstances that the Bulgarian army, in the words of King
Ferdinand, 'furled its standards' and retired to wait for
better days.
This warlike and powerful Bulgaria, with its scheming
King and its valiant peasant armies brooding over what
TURKEY AND THE BALKANS 529
seemed to them intolerable wrongs, was the dominant factor
in the Balkans in 1914 and 191 5.
On August 19, 1914, Monsieur Venizelos, then Prime Min-
ister of Greece, with the approval which he had, astonishing
to relate, obtained, of King Constantine, formally placed at
the disposal of the Entente powers all the naval and military
resources of Greece from the moment when they might be
required. He added that this offer was made in a special
sense to Great Britain with whose interests those of Greece
were indissolubly bound. The resources of Greece, he said,
were small, but she could dispose of 250,000 troops, and her
navy and her ports might be of some use. This magnanimous
offer, made as it was while all was so uncertain, and even
before the main battle in France had been joined, greatly
attracted me. No doubt on the one hand it was a serious
thing to run the risk of adding Turkey to our enemies. On
the other hand, the Greek Army and Navy were solid factors;
and a combination of the Greek armies and fleet with the
British Mediterranean squadron offered a means of settling
the difficulties of the Dardanelles in a most prompt and effec-
tive manner. The Gallipoli Peninsula was then only weakly
occupied by Turkish troops, and the Greek General Staff
were known to be ready with well-thought-out plans for its
seizure. Moreover, it seemed to me that anyhow Turkey was
drifting into war with us. Her conduct in regard to the
Goeben and Breslau continued openly fraudulent. The pres-
ence of these two vessels themselves in German hands in the
Sea of Marmora offered a means of putting decisive pressure
on the neutrality party in Constantinople. If we were not
going to secure honest Turkish neutrality, then let us, in the
alternative, get the Christian States of the Balkans on our
side. Could we not get them on our side ? Could we not
make a Balkan confederation of Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria
53© THE WORLD CRISIS
and Roumania ? Whatever happened, we ought not to fall
between two stools.
Sir Edward Grey, however, after very anxious considera-
tion, moved the Cabinet to decline Monsieur Venizelos' pro-
posal, as he feared, no doubt with weighty reasons, that an
alliance with Greece meant immediate war with Turkey and
possibly Bulgaria. He feared that it might jeopardise Greece
without our being able to protect her. He was anxious above
all things not to foster a Greek enterprise against Constanti-
nople in such a way as to give offence to Russia. And, lastly,
he hoped that Sir Louis Mallet, who was in close and intimate
relations with the Grand Vizier and the leaders of the Turkish
neutrality party in Constantinople, would after all be able to
keep the peace. Certainly nothing could exceed the skill and
perseverance with which the British Ambassador laboured.
It followed from this that we should maintain the very hand-
some offer we had made in common with France and Russia
at the outbreak of the war to guarantee the integrity of the
Turkish Empire in return for her faithful neutrality. I natur-
ally conformed to the Cabinet decision, but with increasing
misgivings. I still continued to work and hope for a Balkan
confederation. I gave the following letter, of which the
Foreign Secretary approved, to Mr. Noel Buxton, who was
starting for a propaganda tour in the Balkans. Of course in
view of our decision about Turkey, it could refer only to the
common interests of these States against Austria.
August 31, 1 9 14.
It is of the utmost importance to the future prosperity of
the Balkan States that they should act together. This is the
hour when the metal can be cast into the mould. It is only
by reclaiming from Austria territories which belong naturally
to the Balkan races that the means can be provided to satisfy
the legitimate needs and aspirations of all the Balkan States.
Without taking Austrian territory, there is no way by which
any Balkan State can expand except by internecine war.
TURKEY AND THE BALKANS 531
But the application of the principle of nationality to the
Southern Provinces of Austria will produce results so advan-
tageous to the Balkan States that the memory and the con-
sequences of former quarrels could be assuaged for ever.
The creation of a Balkan Confederation comprising Bul-
garia, Serbia, Roumania, Montenegro and Greece, strong
enough to play an effective part in the destinies of Europe,
must be the common dream of all their peoples. The result
of this war is not doubtful. Sooner or later, Germany will be
starved and beaten. Austria will be resolved into its com-
ponent parts. England has always won in the end; and
Russia is unconquerable. England has been the friend of
every Christian State in the Balkans during all their years of
struggle and suffering. She has no interests of her own to
seek in the Balkan Peninsula. But with her wealth and power
she will promote and aid every step which is taken to build
up a strong union of the Christian peoples, like that which
triumphed in the first Balkan War. By acting together in
unity and good faith the Balkan States can now play a deci-
sive part, and gain advantages which may never again be
offered. By disunion they will simply condemn themselves
to tear each other's throats without profit or reward, and
left to themselves will play an utterly futile part in the
destinies of the world.
I want you to make your friends in Greece and in Bulgaria
realise the brilliant but fleeting opportunity which now pre-
sents itself, and to assure them that England's might and
perseverance will not be withheld from any righteous effort
to secure the strength and union of the Balkan peoples.
In the early days of September it seemed highly probable
that Turkey, under the influence of the German advance on
Paris, would make war upon us and upon Greece whatever
we did. I began immediately to prepare for the event.
Mr. Churchill to General Sir Charles Douglas, Chief of the
Imperial General Staff.
Secret September 1, 1914.
I arranged with Lord Kitchener yesterday that two officers
from Admiralty should meet two officers from the Director
532 THE WORLD CRISIS
of Military Operations Department of the War Office to-day
to examine and work out a plan for the seizure by means of
a Greek army of adequate strength of the Gallipoli Penin-
sula, with a view to admitting a British Fleet to the Sea of
Marmora.
In his absence I would ask you to give the necessary di-
rections, as the matter is urgent, and Turkey may make war
on us at any moment.
The meeting can take place either here or at the War
Office as soon as you can arrange with our Chief of Staff. I
will myself explain verbally to the Committee the subject on
which his Majesty's Government desire information.
The Director of Military Operations, General Callwell, re-
plied on the 3rd, on behalf of the General Staff, that the
operation of seizing the Gallipoli Peninsula would be an ex-
tremely difficult one. Sixty thousand men would be required,
thirty thousand of whom should be landed in the first in-
stance, should gain as much ground as possible, should pre-
pare landing stages, and hold their own for a week while the
transports returned to Greece for the second thirty thousand.
On this basis the operation was considered feasible. These
estimates were not excessive, and the Greeks could certainly
provide a considerably larger force if necessary.
Thereupon I telegraphed, with the approval of the Foreign
Office, to Rear-Admiral Mark Kerr, the head of our naval
mission to Greece, as follows: —
September 4.
In event of war with Turkey, with England and Greece as
Allies, Admiralty consider it essential, as a Staff precaution,
that the question of the right war policy to be followed should
be examined, in consultation with Greek General and Naval
Staff, leaving political probabilities to be decided by respect-
ive Governments.
Admiralty give you permission to do this, should you be
approached by the Greek Government. In principle, the
Admiralty views are as follows:
In order to provide unquestionable and decisive superiority
TURKEY AND THE BALKANS 533
over the German and Turkish vessels, the Greek Fleet would
be offered, as reinforcements, a squadron and flotilla, and
the whole of the combined Fleets would be placed under
your command, with the Indomitable as your Flagship.
Should circumstances demand it, you would be reinforced
with any class of vessel necessary and to any extent.
In order that the right and obvious method of attack upon
Turkey (viz. by striking immediately at the heart) may be
carried out, the Greek Army would, under superiority of
sea predominance, have to seize the Gallipoli Peninsula, thus
opening the Dardanelles and enabling the Anglo-Greek Fleet,"
in the Sea of Marmora, to fight and sink the Turco-German
ships, and from there the whole situation can be dominated,
in combination with the Black Sea Fleet of the Russians and
their military forces.
The Admiralty desire that, in consultation with you, the
Greek Naval and Military Experts should immediately exam-
ine this enterprise, and that you should report fully by tele-
graph to the Admiralty what are the general views of the
Greek Government upon it, and what, in their opinion, would
be the force required to carry it out, assuming that safe
transportation is assured. Should we provide the necessary
transports, or in what time and to what extent could Greece
do so ? Have they any alternative suggestions ?
The Rear-AdmiraPs reply reached me through the Foreign
Office on the 9th.
The Greek General Staff have been consulted on the sub-
ject of your telegram, and I agree with them in their opinion
that, if Bulgaria does not attack Greece, the latter can take
Gallipoli with force at their disposal. Greece will not trust
Bulgaria unless she at the same time attacks Turkey with all
her force. They will not accept Bulgaria's guarantee to
remain neutral.
Subject to above conditions, plan for taking Dardanelles
Straits is ready.
Greece can provide necessary transports for troops. A
British squadron of two battle cruisers, one armoured cruiser,
three light cruisers and flotilla of destroyers will be needed
534 THE WORLD CRISIS
to assist. General Staff and myself originally formulated this
plan, but operation has become greater since Turkey has
mobilised and obtained German ships.
He mentioned as an alternative the region of Alexandretta.
On September 6 Monsieur Venizelos told our Minister in
Athens that he was not afraid of a single-handed attack from
Turkey by land as the Greek General Staff were confident of
being able to deal with it. The Greek Government had re-
ceived from Sofia positive assurances of definite neutrality,
but did not trust them. They would, however, be satisfied
with a formal protest by the Bulgarian Government against
a violation of Bulgarian territory by Turkish troops proceed-
ing to attack Greece. If, however, Bulgaria joined Turkey
while Serbia was occupied with Austria, the situation would
be critical. On this I pointed out to the Foreign Secretary
on the same date that a Russian Army Corps could easily be
brought from Archangel, from Vladivostok, or with Japanese
consent from Port Arthur to attack the Gallipoli Peninsula.
' The price to be paid in taking Gallipoli would no doubt be
heavy, but there would be no more war with Turkey. A
good army of 50,000 men and sea power — that is the end of
the Turkish menace.,
But it was easier to look for armies than to find them. Sir
Edward Grey replied by sending me a telegram that had been
received that very morning from Petrograd stating that in
view of the very large number of German troops which were
being transferred from the Western to the Eastern theatre,
Russia was calling up every available man from Asia and the
Caucasus, and was only leaving one Army Corps in the latter.
Greece would therefore, according to the Petrograd telegram,
have to bear the brunt of the war single-handed unless she
could placate Bulgaria by territorial concessions. He added
on the back of my note, 'You will see from the telegram from
St. Petersburg that Russia can give no help against Turkey.
TURKEY AND THE BALKANS 535
I do not like the prospect in the Mediterranean at all, unless
there is some turn of the tide in France.'
It is only by faithful study of this problem that its immense
difficulties are protrayed. Lest it should be thought that I
underrated the gravity of a war with Turkey, it must be re-
membered that I had convinced myself that Turkey would
attack us sooner or later, and that I was also proceeding on
the belief that the German invasion of France would be
brought to a standstill. Both these assumptions proved true.
I do not claim that my view was the wisest, but only to expose
it to historical judgment. The policy emerging from such a
view would of course at this juncture have offered Cyprus to
Greece in compensation for her offering Kavala to Bulgaria.
It would have put the most extreme pressure on Serbia to
make concessions to Bulgaria in Monastir. Whether these
measures would have succeeded at this time I do not pro-
nounce.
By September 9 the behaviour of the Turks about the
Goeben and the Breslau had become so openly defiant that it
became necessary to withdraw the British Naval Mission,
who were exposed to daily insolences at the hands of the
Germans and of the Turkish war party. It was my intention
to appoint the head of the mission, Rear- Admiral Limpus, to
command the squadron watching the Dardanelles, and orders
were sent definitely to that effect. This project was not,
however, pursued, it being thought that it would be unduly
provocative to employ on this station the very officer who
had just ceased to be the teacher of the Turkish Fleet. No
doubt this was a weighty argument, but in bowing to it we
lost the advantages of having at this fateful spot the Admiral
who of all others knew the Turks, and knew the Dardanelles
with all its possibilities. It was a small link in a long chain.
Delay was caused and I had to make fresh arrangements.
On September 21, I telegraphed to Vice- Admiral Carden,
who was in charge of the Malta Dockyard: —
536 THE WORLD CRISIS
Assume command of the squadron off Dardanelles. Your
sole duty is to sink Goeben and Breslau, no matter what flag
they fly, if they come out of Dardanelles. We are not at war
with Turkey but the German Admiral Souchon is now Com-
mander-in-Chief Turkish Navy and Germans are controlling
and largely manning it. Turks have been told that any
Turkish ships which come out with Goeben and Breslau will be
equally attacked by us. You are authorised to act accord-
ingly without further declaration or parley. You must deal
at your discretion with any minor Turkish war vessel which
may come out alone from Dardanelles, either ordering her
back or allowing her to proceed as you may think fit, remem-
bering that we do not want to pick a quarrel with Turkey
unless her hostile intention is clear.
Indomitable will be diverted from convoy off Crete and
ordered to join your squadron. French Commander-in-Chief
has been requested to send 2 battle ships of Patrie class to
reinforce your flag.
The victory of the Marne, although afterwards discounted
by adverse events, checked the developments in the Near
East. Turkey was steadied for the moment, and her attitude
towards Greece became less menacing. This however pro-
duced a corresponding cooling at Athens about joining in
the European war. From the middle of September the con-
ditions throughout the Balkans had declined again from crisis
into suspense. They remained however fundamentally vicious.
I continued increasingly to press as opportunity served for
a policy of uniting the Balkan States without reference to
what might happen in Turkey.
On September 23 I wrote to Sir Edward Grey as follows: —
September 23, 19 14.
Mr. Churchill to Sir Edward Grey.
I must write you a line about Turkey. . . . We are suffer-
ing very seriously from Turkish hostility. Our whole Medi-
terranean Fleet is tied to the Dardanelles. We are daily try-
ing to buy Turkish neutrality by promises and concessions.
TURKEY AND THE BALKANS 537
Meanwhile the German grip on Turkey tightens, and all
preparations for war go steadily forward. But all this would
in itself be of minor consequence but for the fact that in our
attempt to placate Turkey we are crippling our policy in the
Balkans. I am not suggesting that we should take aggressive
action against Turkey or declare war on her ourselves, but we
ought from now to make our arrangements with the Balkan
States, particularly Bulgaria, without regard to the interests
or integrity of Turkey. The Bulgarians ought to regain the
Turkish territory they lost in the second Balkan War, and we
ought to tell them that if they join with Roumania, Greece,
and Serbia in the attack upon Austria and Germany, the
Allied Powers will see that they get this territory at the peace.
We always said that Adrianople should never fall back into
Turkish hands, and the strongest possible remonstrances
were addressed to the Porte by you at the time. There is
therefore nothing wrong or inconsistent in our adopting this
position. If we win the war, we shall be quite strong enough
to secure this territory for Bulgaria, and Turkey's conduct
to us with repeated breaches of neutrality would release us
from any need of considering her European interests. Like
you, I sympathise deeply with Mallet in the futile and thank-
less task on which he is engaged. I do not know what the
result will be, but I am sure it is not worth while sacrificing
the bold and decisive alternative of throwing in our lot
frankly with the Christian States of the Balkans to get the
kind of neutrality which the Turks have been giving us, and
for which we are even asked to pay and be grateful. The
whole tone of the telegrams from Roumania and Bulgaria is
hopeful. I do most earnestly beg you not to be diverted from
the highway of sound policy in this part of the world, both
during the war and at the settlement, by wanderings into the
labyrinth of Turkish duplicity and intrigue. All I am asking
is that the interests and integrity of Turkey shall no longer
be considered by you in any efforts which are made to secure
common action among the Christian Balkan States.
Judged in afterlight these views can hardly be contested.
I have never swerved from them; but the reader should
understand the other arguments by which the Cabinet was
ruled. The loyal desire not to spread the war to regions
538 THE WORLD CRISIS
still uncursed; the dangers in India of a British quarrel with
Turkey; our awful military weakness in 19 14; Lord Kitchen-
er's expressed wish to keep the East as quiet as possible till
the two Indian Divisions were safely through the Suez Canal;
the difficulties of winning the support of Greece, and particu-
larly of King Constantine, without exciting the suspicion and
jealousies of Russia about Constantinople; and, lastly, the
doubts — admittedly substantial — whether Bulgaria and King
Ferdinand could ever, in the absence of substantial military
successes in the main theatres or strong local intervention by
Allied forces in the Balkans, be detached from the Teutonic
system.
When I talked these questions over at the time with Sir
Edward Grey it was upon this last argument that he was
most inclined to dwell. ' Until Bulgaria believes that Germany
is not going to win the war, she will not be moved by any
promises of other people's territory which we may make her.'
The swift overrunning of Northern France by the German
armies, the withdrawal of the French Government to Bord-
eaux, the fall of Antwerp, the tremendous victories of Hin-
denburg over the Russians, were events all of which domi-
nated the Bulgarian equally with the Turkish mind. England,
without an army, with not a soldier to spare, without even
a rifle to send, with only her Navy and her money, counted
for little in the Near East. Russian claims to Constantinople
directly crossed the ambitions both of King Ferdinand and of
King Constantine. In all the Balkans only one clairvoyant
eye, only the genius of Venizelos, discerned the fundamental
moral issues of the struggle, measured justly the relative
powers of the mighty combatants, and appraised at their
true value both the victories of the German Army, and the
Sea Power under which were slowly gathering the latent
but inexhaustible resources of the British Empire.
So the Allies continued to wait and hope at Constantinople,
and the days slipped swiftly by.
TURKEY AND THE BALKANS 539
Not till long after did we learn the blasting secret which
would have destroyed all British and Russian doubts. Al-
ready in the crisis of July the leaders of the Young Turk
party had been in vital negotiation with the Germans, and
on August 2 an alliance had been signed between Germany
and Turkey. Thus all this time we were deceived. Whether
anything that it was in our power to do could have averted
the evils must always remain a disputed question; but that
the evils were not averted is certain. In the end we had all
the evils of both courses and the advantages of no course.
We were forced into a war with Turkey which ultimately
became of enormous magnitude. Greece was thrown into
inextricable confusion. Serbia was overrun. Bulgaria, join-
ing hands with her recent enemies the Turks, became our foe.
And Roumania, when she finally came in isolated upon the
allied side, suffered the direst vengeance at German hands.
A more fearful series of tragedies has scarcely ever darkened
the melancholy page of history.
It must not be thought that the action of Turkey was in-
spired solely by treachery and duplicity. Two parties were
struggling for mastery in the capital, but in view of the
Treaty of Alliance which had been signed on August 2, there
could have been no doubt about the final outcome. More-
over, in the Goeben and Breslau, to say nothing of the Turkish
Fleet, Enver Pasha and the war party had the means to force
the Turkish Government to adhere to the covenants which
they had entered into on her behalf. By the middle of Octo-
ber we learnt that Turkish preparations to invade Egypt
were actually being made. We learned also from a secret
source, that the Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople had
received solemn assurances from Enver that Turkey would
enter the war against the Entente at an early date. At the
end of October, our outposts beyond the Suez Canal had
to be withdrawn in face of gathering Turkish forces; and
finally, about October 27, the Breslau, with the Turkish
54Q THE WORLD CRISIS
cruiser Hamidieh and a division of destroyers, followed by the
Goeben, steamed into the Black Sea, and on the 29th and 30th
bombarded the Russian fortress of Sevastopol, sank a Russian
transport, raided the harbour of Odessa, torpedoed a gunboat,
and, lastly, practically destroyed Novorossisk, its oil tanks
and all the shipping in the port.
On this the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople imme-
diately demanded his passports; and the British Foreign
Office at 8.15 p.m. on October 30, after reciting its many*
griefs against the Turks, especially their invasion of the Sinai
Peninsula and their misconduct about the Goeben, sent an
ultimatum requiring repudiation of these acts and the dis-
missal of the German Military and Naval Missions within
12 hours. The Admiralty conformed to this decision by
telegraphing to all Admirals concerned as follows: —
(October 31, 1914. 12.35 a.m.)
Orders sent Ambassador Constantinople 8.15 p.m. 30th
October to present ultimatum to Turkey expiring at end of
12 hours. Do not yourself commence hostilities without
further orders.
Add to Vice- Admiral Car den (Indefatigable).
You may therefore expect Embassy to be leaving very
shortly.
^Russia declared war on Turkey at the expiry of the ulti-
matum; and the British and French Ambassadors, in com-
pany with their Russian colleague, left Constantinople on
November 1 — the same day on which at the other end of the
world the battle of Coronel was being fought. Naval orders
to commence hostilities were sent, in concert with the For-
eign Office, in conformity with the expiry of the ultimatum.
Admiralty to all ships.
October 31, 1914 (sent 5.5 p.m.)
'Commence hostilities at once against Turkey. Acknowl-
edge.'
TURKEY AND THE BALKANS 541
On November 1 two of our destroyers, entering the Gulf of
Smyrna, destroyed a large armed Turkish yacht which was
lying by the jetty carrying mines; and late that same day
Admiral Carden was instructed to bombard the outer Dar-
danelles forts at long range on the earliest suitable occasion.
This bombardment was carried out on the morning of Novem-
ber 3. The two British battle-cruisers, firing from a range
beyond that of the Turkish guns, shelled the batteries on the
European side at Sedd-el-Bahr and Cape Helles. The French
battleships fired at the Asiatic batteries at Kum Kali and
Orkanieh. About eighty rounds were fired altogether, result-
ing in considerable damage to the Turkish forts, and in several
hundred casualties to the Turks and Germans who manned
them.
The reasons for this demonstration have been greatly can-
vassed. They were simple though not important. A British
squadron had for months been waiting outside the Dardanelles.
War had been declared with Turkey. It was natural that fire
should be opened upon the enemy as it would be on the fronts
of hostile armies. It was necessary to know accurately the
effective ranges of the Turkish guns and the conditions under
which the entrance to the blockaded port could be approached.
It has been stated that this bombardment was an imprudent
act, as it was bound to put the Turks on their guard and lead
them to strengthen their defences at the Dardanelles. At the
Admiralty we did not think it would have this effect: nor were
we wrong. When, three and a half months later (February 19,
19 1 5), Admiral Carden again bombarded these same forts, the
Gallipoli Peninsula was totally unprepared for defence, and
was still weakly occupied; and small parties of Marines were
able to make their way unopposed into the shattered forts and
a considerable distance beyond them. That no harm was done
can therefore be plainly proved. On the other hand, valuable
data were obtained.
We had now to provide against the impending Turkish
542 THE WORLD CRISIS
attack upon Egypt. The First Cruiser Squadron, comprising
the Black Prince, Duke of Edinburgh and Warrior, had been
either employed on escort duties at sea or on guard at Alex-
andria or Port Said. Even before the news of Coronel had
reached us, the increasing strain upon our resources had made
it necessary to replace these fine ships by older smaller ves-
sels. They were now urgently required to form a combat
squadron near the Cap de Verde Islands as part of the second
general combination against von Spee. They were also prom-
ised to the Commander-in-Chief for the Grand Fleet at the
earliest possible moment thereafter. We should have been
hard pressed in these circumstances to find a new and satis-
factory naval force for the defence of the Canal against the now
imminent Turkish attack. The discovery and blocking in of
the Kbnigsberg on 31st October liberated two out of the three
vessels searching for her. But this was not enough. The de-
struction of the Emden on the 9th November was an event of a
very different order. It afforded us immediate relief, and relief
exactly where we required it. The Indian Ocean was now clear.
The battleship Swiftsure from the East Indian station was at
once ordered to the Canal. Of the fast cruisers that had been
searching for the Emden, the Gloucester, Melbourne, Sydney,
Hampshire and Yarmouth were immediately brought home-
wards through the Red Sea into the Mediterranean. I felt
that the Commander-in-Chief in the East Indies must come
himself to the new scene of danger.
Admiralty to Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
November 14, 1914.
Naval operations in the Red Sea and Egypt cannot be di-
rected from India. Your presence in Egypt is imperative.
You should rejoin your flagship Swiftsure at Port Said by the
quickest route at once. Gloucester can take you if she has not
already sailed. Telegraph what date you expect to arrive at
Suez. On arrival you should consult with General Officer
Commanding, Egypt, and work hand in hand with him and
TURKEY AND THE BALKANS 543
with the British authorities. . . . The following ships will be
at your disposal in the Red Sea: Swiftsure, Minerva, Doris,
Proserpine . . . and eight torpedo-boats from Malta. Mea-
sures are also being taken to organise armed launches and im-
provised gunboats for use in the Canal. Telegraph whether
you feel able to discharge the other duties of your command,
namely convoy and Persian Gulf operations, at the same time,
or what temporary arrangements you suggest during your
absence in Egyptian waters.
A few days earlier I had minuted : —
First Sea Lord. Novemher l8' ^
Chief of Staff.
I cannot agree to this. It would be a great waste of a valu-
able ship. Considerably more than a week has passed since I
minuted that Askold should be ordered to the Mediterranean.
There or in Egyptian waters this Russian ship will have a
chance of fighting against Turkey. To send her off to Hong-
Kong is an altogether purposeless errand. Her stores should
go on with the mines or in another vessel which keeps company
with the mines from Vladivostock. No convoy is necessary;
but if it were, the Clio or Cadmus, or some little vessel like
them, could be used. The whole Japanese Navy is in the
Pacific and Indian Oceans. They would quite willingly find a
convoy for the mines and the Askold stores. The whole area
of the sea, from the coast of Chili to the coast of Mozambique,
has been cleared of the enemy. But for vague rumours of a
possible armed merchantman at large, there is not the slightest
menace. We must profit from this situation to the full while
it lasts, and this can only be done by moving every ship that is
of any use promptly into waters where they are required. No
one knows how many ships we shall want in Egypt when the
Turkish invasion begins. There may also be massacres of
Christians in the coast towns of Levant which will require ves-
sels for immediate action there. All the ships out of the
Indian Ocean that can play an effective part ought to be
hurried home. The cruisers ought to steam at least 18 knots.
Nearly all these ships have lost three or four precious days
since the destruction of the Emden was known. ,ir c ^
544 THE WORLD CRISIS
These directions were complied with. I searched the oceans
for every available ship. During the second and third weeks
of November the Swiftsure and the squadron and flotilla men-
tioned above, together with the French Requin and the Rus-
sian Askold, entered the Canal for the defence of Egypt. The
Turkish attack proved however to be only of a tentative char-
acter. Finding themselves confronted with troops and ships,
they withdrew after feeble efforts into the Eastern deserts to
gather further strength.
All this time the great Australasian convoy, carrying the
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, 'A.N.Z.A.C./
has been steaming steadily towards France across the Pacific
and Indian Oceans. Preparations had been made if necessary
to divert them to Cape Town. But before the convoy reached
Colombo General Botha and General Smuts had suppressed
the rebellion in South Africa. The Australians and New
Zealanders therefore continued their voyage to Europe under
the escort of the Ibuki and the Hampshire. By the end of
November their transports were entering the Canal. As the
Turkish invasion of Egypt was still threatening, the need of
resolute and trustworthy troops in Egypt was great, and on
the first day of December Lord Kitchener, in the fateful un-
folding of events, began to disembark the whole Australian
and New Zealand Force at Suez for the double purpose of
completing their training and defending the line of the Canal.
At this point we may leave the Turkish situation for a time.
The German grip was strengthening every day on Turkey.
The distresses of her peoples and the improvement of her mili-
tary organisation were advancing together. Under the guns
of the Goeben and Breslau, doubt, division and scarcity dwelt
in Constantinople. Outside the Straits the British squadron
maintained its silent watch. Greece, perplexed at the attitude
of Britain, distracted by the quarrels of Venizelos and King
TURKEY AND THE BALKANS 545
Constantine, had fallen far from the high resolve of August.
Serbia stoutly contended with the Austrian armies. Roumania
and Bulgaria brooded on the past and watched each other with
intent regard. In Egypt the training of the Australian and
New Zealand Army Corps perfected itself week by week.
Thus, as this act in the stupendous world drama comes to
its close, we see already the scene being set and the actors
assembling for the next. From the uttermost ends of the earth
ships and soldiers are approaching or gathering in the Eastern
Mediterranean in fulfilment of a destiny as yet not understood
by mortal man. The clearance of the Germans from the
oceans liberated the Fleets, the arrival of the Anzacs in Egypt
created the nucleus of the Army, needed to attack the heart
of the Turkish Empire. The deadlock on the Western Front,
where all was now frozen into winter trenches, afforded at once
a breathing space and large possibility of further troops.
While Australian battalions trampled the crisp sand of the
Egyptian desert in tireless evolutions, and Commander Hol-
brook in his valiant submarine dived under the minefields of
Chanak and sank a Turkish transport in the throat of the
Dardanelles, far away in the basins of Portsmouth the dock-
yard men were toiling night and day to mount the fifteen-inch
guns and turrets of the Queen Elizabeth. As yet all was un-
conscious, inchoate, purposeless, uncombined. Any one of a
score of chances might have given, might still give, an entirely
different direction to the event. No plan has been made, no
resolve taken. But new ideas are astir, new possibilities are
coming into view, new forces are at hand, and with them there
marches towards us a new peril of the first magnitude. Rus-
sia, mighty steam-roller, hope of suffering France and prostrate
Belgium — Russia is failing. Her armies are grappling with
Hindenburg and Ludendorff, and behind their brave battle
fronts already the awful signs of weakness, of deficiency, of
disorganisation, are apparent to anxious Cabinets and Coun-
cils. Winter has come and locked all Russia in its grip. No
546 THE WORLD CRISIS
contact with her Allies, no help from them, is possible. The
ice blocks the White Sea. The Germans hold the Baltic.
uThe Turks have barred the Dardanelles. It needs but a cry
from Russia for help, to make vital what is now void, and to
make purposeful what is now meaningless. But as yet no cry
has come.
I cannot close without taking a more general survey of the
naval war.
The reader has now followed through six chapters the steady
increase of strain upon Admiralty resources which marked
in every theatre the months of September, October and No-
vember, 1914. He must understand that, although for the
purposes of the narrative it is necessary to deal in separate
chapters with each separate set of strains and crises, many of
the events were proceeding simultaneously in all theatres at
once, and the consequent strains were cumulative and recipro-
cally reacting on one another, with the result that during
November an extraordinary pitch of intensity was reached
which could not well be prolonged and could not possibly have
been exceeded.
It is worth while to review the whole situation. First, the
transport of troops and supplies to France was unceasing and
vital to our Army. On the top of all this came the operations
on the Belgian Coast, the approach of the enemy to the Chan-
nel ports, and the long-drawn crisis of the great battle of
Ypres-Yser. Secondly, all the enemy's cruisers were still
alive, and a number of hostile armed merchantmen were free
in the outer seas, each threatening an indefinite number of
points and areas and requiring from five to ten times their
numbers to search for them and protect traffic while they were
at large. At the same time the great convoys of troops from
India, from Canada, from Australia, and the collection of the
British regular garrisons from all parts of the world were pro-
TURKEY AND THE BALKANS 547
ceeding; and no less than six separate expeditions, viz., Samoa,
New Guinea, German East Africa, Togoland, the Cameroons
and German South- West Africa, were in progress or at a criti-
cal stage. Upon this was thrust the outbreak of war with
Turkey, the attack upon the Suez Canal, and the operations
in the Persian Gulf.
To meet these fierce obligations we had to draw no less than
three decisive units from the Grand Fleet. This Fleet, which
at the outset of the war was in perfect order, was already
requiring refits by rotation, with consequent reduction of
available strength. Meanwhile, the submarine menace had
declared itself in a serious form, and was moreover exaggerated
in our minds. Although the most vehement efforts were being
made to give security to our fleets in their Northern harbours,
these measures took many weeks, during which anxiety was
continual. Behind all stood the German Fleet, aware, as we
must suppose, of the strain to which we were being subjected,
and potentially ready at any moment to challenge the supreme
decision. With the long nights of winter, the absence of all
regular troops from the country, the then inadequate training
of the Territorial Force and the embryonic condition of the
new Kitchener armies, the fear of invasion revived; and,
although we rejected it in theory, nevertheless we were bound
to take in practice a whole series of precautionary measures.
It. was a formidable time. More than once the thought oc-
curred that the Admiralty would be forced to contract their
responsibilities and abandon to their fate for a time some
important interests, in order that those which were vital might
be secured. In the event we just got through. It may be
claimed that during these months we met every single call
that was made upon us, guarded every sea, carried every
expedition, brought every convoy safely in, discharged all our
obligations both to the Army in France and to the Belgians,
and all the time maintained such a disposition of our main
548 THE WORLD CRISIS
forces that we should never have declined battle had the
enemy ventured to offer it.
Then suddenly all over the world the tension was relaxed.
One after another the German cruisers and commerce des-
troyers were blocked in or hunted down. The great convoys
arrived. The Expeditions were safely landed. Ocean after
ocean became clear. The boom defences of our harbours were
completed. A score of measures for coping with the sub-
marine were set on foot. Large reinforcements of new ships
of the highest quality and of every class began to join the
Fleet. The attack on the Suez Canal was stemmed. The
rebellion in South Africa was quelled. The dangers of inva-
sion, if such there were, diminished every day with the increas-
ing efficiency of the Territorials and the New Armies. The
great battle for the Channel ports ended in decisive and ever
glorious victory. And finally with the Battle of the Falkland
Islands the clearance of the oceans was complete, and soon,
except in the land-locked Baltic and Black Seas and in the
defended area of the Heligoland Bight, the German flag had
ceased to fly on any vessel in any quarter of the world.1
As December passed, a sense of indescribable relief stole
over the Admiralty. We had made the great transition from
peace to war without disaster, almost without mishap. All
the perils which had haunted us before the war, and against
which we had prepared, had been warded off or surmounted
or had never come to pass. There had been no surprise.
The Fleet was ready. The Army had reached the decisive
battlefield in time and was satisfactorily maintained. The
Mine danger had been overcome. We thought we had the
measure of the submarine, and so indeed we had for nearly two
years to come. All the enemy's plans for commerce destruc-
tion and all our alarms about them had come to nought.
1 The Dresden and two armed merchant cruisers were alive for a few
weeks more, but in complete inactivity.
TURKEY AND THE BALKANS 549
British and allied commerce proceeded without hesitation
throughout the world; the trade and food of Britain were
secured; the war insurance dropped to one per cent. A feeling
of profound thankfulness filled our hearts as this first Christ-
mas of the war approached ; and of absolute confidence in final
victory.
The mighty enemy, with all the advantages of prepara-
tion and design, had delivered his onslaught and had every-
where been brought to a standstill. It was our turn now.
The initiative had passed to the Great Amphibian. The
time and the means were at our command. It was for us
to say where we would strike and when. The strength of the
Grand Fleet was, as we believed, ample; and in addition the
whole of those numerous squadrons which hitherto had been
spread over the outer seas now formed a surplus fleet capable
of intervening in the supreme struggle without in any way
compromising the foundation of our naval power.
But these realisations were only permissible as the prelude
to fresh and still more intense exertions. It would indeed be
shameful, so it seemed at least to me, for the Admiralty to rest
contented with the accomplishment of the first and most
hazardous stage of its task and to relax into a supine con-
templation of regained securities and dangers overcome.
Now was the time to make our weight tell, perhaps decisively,
but certainly most heavily, in the struggle of the armies. Now
was the time to fasten an offensive upon the Germans, unex-
pected and unforeseeable, to present them with a succession
of surprising situations leading on from crisis to crisis and from
blow to blow till their downfall was achieved.
Moreover, these same Germans were, of all the enemies in
the world, the most to be dreaded when pursuing their own
plans; the most easily disconcerted when forced to conform
to the plans of their antagonist. To leave a German leisure
to evolve his vast, patient, accurate designs, to make his slow,
550 THE WORLD CRISIS
thorough, infinitely far-seeing preparations, was to court a
terrible danger. To throw him out of his stride, to baffle his
studious mind, to break his self-confidence, to cow his spirit,
to rupture his schemes by unexpected action, was surely the
path not only of glory but of prudence.
Here then ends the first phase of the naval war, and with it
this volume. The first part of the British task is done both
by land and sea. Paris and the Channel Ports are saved, and
the oceans are cleared. It is certain that the whole strength
of the British Empire can be turned into war power and
brought to bear upon the enemy. There is no chance of
France being struck down, before the British Empire is ready;
there is no chance of the British Empire itself being paralysed,
before its full force can be applied to the struggle. The
supreme initiative passes from the Teutonic Powers to the
Allies. Resources, almost measureless and of indescribable
variety in ships, in men, in munitions and devices of war, will
now flow month by month steadily into our hands. What
shall we do with them ? Strategic alternatives on the greatest
scale and of the highest order present themselves to our choice.
Which shall we choose ? Shall we use our reinforced fleets
and great new armies of 191 5, either to turn the Teutonic
right in the Baltic or their left in the Black Sea and the
Balkans ? Or shall we hurl our manhood against sandbags,
wire and concrete in frontal attack upon the German fortified
lines in France ? Shall we by a supreme effort make direct
contact with our Russian ally or leave her in a dangerous
isolation ? Shall we by decisive action, in hopes of shorten-
ing the conflict, marshal and draw in the small nations in the
North and in the South who now stand outside it ? Or shall
we plod steadily forward at what lies immediately in our
front ? Shall our armies toil only in the mud of Flanders, or
shall we break new ground ? Shall our fleets remain con-
TURKEY AND THE BALKANS 551
tented with the grand and solid results they have won, or shall
they ward off future perils by a new inexhaustible audacity.
The answers to these momentous questions will appear as
this tale is carried forward to a further stage.
END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.
APPENDIX A
MEMORANDUM BY THE FIRST LORD ON NAVAL STAFF
TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT
(A.) — Military Education and War Stajf Training.
i. It is necessary to draw a distinction between the measures required to
secure a general diffusion of military knowledge among naval officers and the
definite processes by which Staff Officers are to be trained. The first may be
called 'Military Education/ and the second 'War Staff Training.' They re-
quire to be treated separately, and not mixed together as in the report of the
Committee. Both must again be distinguished from all questions of adminis-
tration, of material, and of non-military education and training. The applica-
tion of fighting power can thus be separated from its development. We are not
now concerned with the forging of the weapon, but only with its use.
Military Education.
2. As early as possible in his service the mind of the young officer must be
turned to the broad principles of war by sea and land. His interest must be
awakened. He must be put in touch with the right books, and must be made
to feel the importance of the military aspect of his profession. The existing
curriculum at Dartmouth and on the cruiser is already too full. And until the
officer has reached the rank of Lieutenant I see no immediate opportunity of
adding to his instruction. But thereafter his 'Military Education' should be
provided for in two ways. First: Every Lieutenant should go through a mili-
tary course of (say) two months during the first four years of his service. The
course to be prepared by the Training Division of the War Staff; aim, thorough-
ness in a simple and strictly limited sphere. The course to conclude by a
standard examination to test only what the pupil remembers of his instruction.
It would be preferable to hold the courses at Greenwich continuously. Thus a
good scheme of instruction adapted to the class of officers and the limits of
time will develop and uniformity will be established; and young officers will be
accustomed to associate Greenwich with the study of war.
All specialist officers, submarine and air service officers included, must go
through this course.
In exceptional circumstances, where exigencies of service do not allow, ex-
tension to within the first six years may be granted.
The course will be obligatory on officers now under two years' service as
Lieutenant. There should be four courses a year; the first to begin October,
1914. It should be voluntary for officers now over two years' service as Lieu-
tenant.
(Let me have calculations about numbers which can be handled during the
first five courses; and make proposals for giving effect to the above scheme in
detail.)
No grading as Assistant War Staff Officers will result from this course, and
no certificate will be given or letters printed after an officer's name. It is a
pure matter of routine, and a necessary qualification of all future naval officers.
The college authorities will, however, keep a register of officers, and report
552
APPENDIX A 553
upon their general aptitudes for staff work and tactical subjects. This will be
of use later in considering claims to compete for entry into the War College.
Secondly, as soon as practicable (if possible, next time) an examination
should be held for entry into the War College for the War Staff Course. This
examination should be competitive. It will be open to all Commanders and
Lieutenant-Commanders, or Lieutenants who will be Lieutenant-Commanders
before the course is completed, whose names are submitted by the Flag officers
under whom they are serving and who are approved as candidates by the Ad-
miralty. A proportion of vacancies will be assigned to each rank. The results
will be published. The object of this examination will be to test ability for
staff work. In the first instance the tests will have to be of a simple character,
but gradually, as the military education of the naval officer develops, they can
be stiffened and extended. The examination will be conducted by the War
College according to principles prescribed by the War Training Division.
Intending candidates will be notified three months in advance of the subjects
in which they should prepare themselves.
When an officer is successful in the competition, but owing to foreign ser-
vice or other exigency cannot at once attend the War Course, he may be al-
lowed to take a vacancy next time.
Captains of ships and War Staff Officers afloat will aid officers to prepare
themselves for this examination.
War Staff Training.
3. The successful candidates will enter the War College at Greenwich as
residents for War Staff training. This course must for the present be limited
to one year, but later it should be extended to eighteen months. As an ex-
amination will be held every six months, there will at the beginning be two
batches under instruction, rising later to three. This will give the necessary
numbers at the College. The period of this course, provided the officer gives
satisfaction, should, in my opinion, count as sea service.
On completing the course, the officers who have qualified may be placed
upon the War Staff List, with the approval of the Admiralty, as at present,
and will then be available for staff employment.
(B.) — Development of the Admiralty War Staff.
1. Two years have passed since this body was instituted, and both the
progress made in the Admiralty and the acceptance of the idea by the Fleet
justify a further advance.
- Three main questions have arisen: —
(1.) The creation of a Trade Division.
(2.) The preparation of Manuals and direction of training generally.
(3.) The detachment of the Mobilisation Department from the War Staff.
I have come to the conclusion that the first essential is the creation of a
War Training Division, under a Director, and equal in importance to the
Operation and Intelligence Divisions. This division will be charged with the
theoretical direction and co-ordination of all tactical and strategical exercises
and instruction whether in the Fleets or at the Colleges. It will, of course, have
nothing to do with the education which fits a cadet to become a naval officer,
or with the training of Specialists of any kind, or with the training which fits a
boy to become an able seaman. All this is in the Administrative sphere and
belongs to the Second Sea Lord. The War Training Division is concerned
only with what the naval officer learns about war, what tactical use the gun-
nery and torpedo experts make of their weapons, and what exercises are pre-
scribed for the Fleets and Squadrons.
554 APPENDIX A
2. Nothing in the work of this division will relieve Flag Officers from their
present duties and responsibilities in the training of their commands. But
henceforward they will work on regularly explored and considered lines, and
within limits which are the result of collective thought and experience; and
henceforward continuity and uniformity will be preserved by a central direc-
tion and co-ordination, which gathers up and authorises the established con-
clusions, without restricting reasonable initiative. It is no answer to the
advocates of such a Division, to say that war training is given by the Command-
ers-in-chief at sea, and that war training is in the department of the First Sea
Lord. The Commanders-in-chief change repeatedly, and with them their per-
sonal instruction changes, very often without leaving a trace behind. The
First Sea Lord cannot possibly prepare manuals of tactical and strategic in-
struction. This work can only be done by a regular department permanently
at work.
3. I propose, therefore, in principle to constitute without delay a War
Training Division of the Admiralty War Staff. This division will be organised
under a Director (D.T.D., short for D.N.T.D.) in three sections, denominated
respectively X, Y, and Z.
The following will be the main distribution of duties: —
(X). Manuals and Exercises.
Preparation and revision of all Training Books and Manuals (other than
technical or administrative) including Signal Books in their tactical aspect.
Preparation of manoeuvre schemes.
Report and criticism of manoeuvres.
Record and criticism of tactical and strategic exercises.
Advice upon the initiation of experiments (other than technical or admin-
istrative), upon the organisation of units, upon War Establishments, and
upon the tactical aspects of New Construction.
Distribution of War Staff publications.
(F). War Colleges: Examinations and Courses.
Supervision of War Colleges and all war educational arrangements.
Examinations and courses in tactical and strategic subjects.
Libraries.
(Z). Historical.
The staff of this new division will be formed in part by reductions from
the Mobilisation and Operations Divisions (some of which latter's work is
taken over) ; and in part by an addition to the Estimates for which Treasury
sanction will be required. As a set-off against this there is the economy of re-
ducing an Admiral by bringing the War College to Greenwich.
Nine or ten officers (some of whom can be retired officers) should suffice with
the necessary clerks and writers.
Let me have proposals on these lines with estimates.
4. The Operations Division will have been to some extent relieved by the
formation of the War Training Division. It must, however, be augmented by
the addition of a new section (the Manning Department) dealing with War
Mobilisation, which will be explained later; and, secondly, by the new Trade
Defence Section. This latter is clearly only a part of the Operations sphere.
It is grouped with Operations because the defence of trade is essentially an of-
fensive operation against the enemy's armed ships.
The Operations Division will, therefore, be organised in four sections — (a),
(6), (c), and (d) — as follows: —
APPENDIX A 555
(a) War Plans.
Distribution of the Fleet.
Schemes of attack of all kinds.
Joint naval and military action.
C.I.D. work.
War Room.
(6) Coast Defence.
Plans for the employment of
Patrol Flotillas.
Air Craft at the Naval Stations.
Coastal submarines.
Organisation of Signal and Wireless Stations.
Examination Service.
Distribution of Intelligence along the coast.
Joint naval and military action in coast defence.
Home Ports Defence Committee.
Overseas Defence Committee.
(c) Trade Defence.
All arrangements for the direction of trade in time of war.
All naval questions connected with food supply.
Armed merchantmen.
Distribution of warships for the control of the trade routes.
International law.
All relations with the Mercantile Marine.
(d) War Mobilisation.
Supervision of the arrangements of the Manning Department for the
mobilisation of the Fleet.
Advice upon the complements of ships.
Attention is drawn to the minute of the Secretary on the proposed issue of
charts and returns to the Trade Division. This necessity is not proved. The
staff of the new section must be reconsidered accordingly.
5. The Intelligence Division requires little change, but should, in principle,
be divided into three sections, as follows: —
(I) Potentially hostile countries.
(m) Friendly countries.
(«) Neutral countries.
Section (I) is to be charged with the new duty of preparing war plans for
the hostile countries separately or in combination against us alone or allied,
showing both —
(1.) What they will probably do against us.
(2.) What would be the worst they could do against us. From time to time
war games will be played between the Intelligence and Operations Divisions.
Section (m) will likewise report on the needs and dangers of the friendly
countries and study the measures best adapted to strengthen them in peace
and war.
These new duties open to the Intelligence Division a large creative and
imaginative sphere, and offer opportunities for the highest tactical and stra-
tegic ability.
6. The Mobilisation Division is not well named. Mobilisation is a small and
infrequent part of the duties of this division. Mobilisation is, indeed, a com-
paratively unimportant feature in our naval system, all the more powerful
vessels being constantly in full commission, and the Second Fleet requiring only
to be 'completed.' The day-to-day provision of complements for ships com-
missioning, and the intricate arrangements connected therewith, constitute the
staple of the work of this Department.
556 APPENDIX A
Further, its duties are almost entirely administrative, and administration
is foreign to the sphere of the War Staff.
I therefore propose that the Mobilisation Division shall be separated from
the War Staff, and shall be called the 'Manning Department.'
A section of the Manning Department will, however, be formed to deal with
War Mobilisation, and this section will work under the D.M.D., but in close
association with the new Training Division of the War Staff.
Thus the whole administrative work connected with the manning of the
Fleet will be left intact under the Second Sea Lord, while, at the same time,
the War Staff will have included in its circle everything necessary to its reflec-
tive and organising duties. I await definite proposals to give effect to this.
7. It is important that every officer serving in the War Staff should look
for recommendation for advancement from the C.O.S. I propose, therefore,
that C.O.S. should be allotted a proportion of recommendations as if he were
a Flag Officer in independent command, and should make them to my Naval
Secretary in the usual way for the half-yearly promotions. C.O.S. will also
initiate all recommendations for War Staff appointments and appointments to
the Naval War College, and all lists of officers for war courses of all kinds will
be proposed by him and submitted through the First Sea Lord to me.
The record books in the Private Office will be sufficient for general purposes,
but a Stajf Register should be formed for recording the War Staff capacities and
services of officers whether at the Admiralty, the Colleges, or afloat, and a copy
of this register will be kept written up to date in the Private Office.
It may be found necessary to add an officer to the personal staff of C.O.S.
8. I attach a skeleton chart of the new organisation.
9. I add the following general observations. The divisions of the War Staff
though separate are parts of one united organisation. Each discharges its own
functions in association with the others. They are not to do each other's work.
The Operations Division is not, for instance, to collect its own data. It is
to accept them from the Intelligence Division. ^ The Training Division is to
accept the conclusions of the Operations Division and propose the Fleet for
their execution. But there must also be unity and free intercourse between
the three Directors. In order to promote and ensure this, C.O.S. will be en-
joined to hold every month a formal Staff meeting with his three Directors and
any of their subordinates who may be required for the discussion of Staff ques-
tions, and the agenda and minutes of these meetings will be submitted through
the First Sea Lord to the First Lord.
(C.)—The Operations Staff Afloat.
I agree with the proposals of the Second Sea Lord as concurred in and
amended by the First Sea Lord. This organisation observes the principle of a
clear division between the thinking and administrative branches.
The Captain for administration should bear the title of Flag Captain. The
Captain of the ship should simply be styled 'The Captain.'
The extra officers for the Intelligence and Operations 'Groups' (Divisions
is too large a word and already taken) can be found from the War Training
Division of the Admiralty War Staff which will cease to exist on mobilisation.
They should go afloat whenever large manoeuvres are in progress, and should
be appropriated by name to their posts in war. The Commander-in-chief
should have no one on his staff in war that he does not know and has not worked
with.
It is desirable that the Commander-in-chief's staff when formed should
work out strategic and tactical exercises together at the War College, Ports-
mouth, or if possible at Greenwich, at least once a year, apart from actual
manoeuvres afloat, in order that each may know his exact function.
APPENDIX A 557
The approved form of the Fleet Flagship Staff is as follows: —
Secretary and clerks. C.-in-C. Captain of the Flagship.
Captain of the Fleet.
(C.O.F.)
I .
Operations
Group.
* 2 Staff Officers.
U "
• In peace.
Flag Captain for Administration.
1
Engineer Fuelling Victualling
Assistant. Assistant. Assistant
(Paymaster
of Flagship).
Intelligence Communications
Group. Group.
* i Staff Officer. * 2 Staff Officers,
t 2 Staff Officers. U "
t In war.
I approve also the Second Sea Lord's proposals for the staffs of Squadron
Flagships.
Skeleton Chart of Admiralty War Staff Organisation.
New additions in heavy type.
(a.) War Plans.
Captain for War Staff
appointments.
First Sea Lord.
The Secretary.
-Chief of Staff-
War Staff
A.C.R. A.O.P. C.-in-Cs. Secretariat.
May i, 1914.
-D.O.D. (b.) Coast Defence.
—(c) Trade Defence.
— (d.) War Mobilisation.
E(l.) Hostile countries,
(m.) Friendly countries
(n.) Neutral countries.
D.T.D.
I — (x.) Manuals and
Exercises.
(y.) War Colleges.
Examinations and
Courses.
1 — (z.) Historical.
W. S. C.
APPENDIX B
BRITISH DREADNOUGHT STRENGTH
BATTLESHIPS
V
a
o
U
Ship.
i
0
s
3
Si
|1
Li
•a
■3
■° a.
Si
<
Armament (excluding guns
below 12 prsJ.
O V ^
-"2 ^
P
tons.
knots.
in.
lb.
I
2
Lord Nelson . .
Agamemnon . .
1906
1906
1 l6,500
18-5
12
f 4 — 12 in., 10 — 9*2 1
\ in., 24 — 12 prs. J
5,300
3
Dreadnought
1906
17,900
20*9
II
10 — 12 in., 24 — 12 prs.
6,800
4
Superb .
1907
1
5
Temeraire .
1907
[ 18,600
20 '75
IO
10 — 12 in., 16 — 4 in.
6,800
6
Bellerophon .
1907
J
7
St. Vincent . .
1908
I
8
Vanguard . .
1909
19,250
2I'0
IO
10 — 12 in., 20 — 4 in.
6,800
9
Collingwood
1908
i
IO
Neptune . . .
1909
I9,900
2l'0
IO
10 — 12 in., 16 — 4 in.
8,500
ii
Colossus .
1910
| 20,000
12
Hercules . .
1910
2I*0
II
10 — 12 in., 16 — 4 in.
8,500
13
Orion . .
1910
14
IS
Thunderer . .
Monarch . .
1911
1911
22,500
21
12
10 — 13*5 in., 16 — 4 in.
12,500
16
Conqueror .
1911
.
17
King George V .
1911
f 23,000
18
19
Centurion .
Ajax .
1911
1912
21
12
10 — 13*5 in., 16 — 4 in.
14,000
20
Audacious .
1912
21
Iron Duke .
1912
\
f 10 — 13*5 in., 12 — 6 ^
\ in., 2—3 in. /
22
Marlborough
1912
| 25,000
21
12
14,000
BUILDING
23
24
Benbow .
Emperor of India
1913
1913
} 25,000
21
12
J 10 — 13*5 in., 12 — 6 I
I in., 2 — 3 in. /
14,000
25
Queen Elizabeth
1913
]
26
Warspite . . .
1913
27
Valiant . . .
—
27,500
25
13
8 — 15 in., 16 — 6 in.,
15,360
28
Barham . . .
—
1
2—3 in.
29
Malaya . . .
—
]
30
Resolution . .
—
31
Ramillies . .
—
32
Revenge .
—
f 25,750
21
13
8 — 15 in., 16 — 6 in.,
I5,36o
33
Royal Sovereign
—
4—3 in.
34
Royal Oak . .
—
J
SHIPS BUILDIN
G IN GREAT
BRIT
AIN FOR FOREIGN POW
ERS
AND REQ
UISITIONED
FOR '
rHE ROYAL NAVY
35
Agincourt . .
—
27,500
22
9
14 — 12 in., 12 — 6 in.,
8 — 3 in., 2 — 3 in. A.A.C.
12,900
36
Erin .
—
23,000
21
12
10 — 135 in., 16 — 6 in.,
2 — 3 in. A.A.C.
14,800
37
Canada . . .
—
28,000
23
9
10 — 14 in., 12 — 6 in.,
2 — 3 in. A.A.C.
16,560
BATTLE CRUISERS
1
Invincible
1907
]
2
Inflexible
1907
17,250
26
7
8 — 12 in., 16 — 4 in.
6,800
3
Indomitable . .
1907
J
4
Indefatigable
1909
18,750
25
7
8 — 12 in., 16 — 4 in.
6,800
5
Lion ....
1910
26,350
28
9
8 — 135 in., 16 — 4 in.
10,000
6
7
Australia
New Zealand
1911
1911
1 18,800
25
7
8 — 12 in., 16 — 4 in.
6,800
8
Princess Royal .
1911
26,350
28
9
8 — 13*5 in., 16 — 4 in.
11,200
9
Queen Mary
1912
27,000
28
9
8 — 135 in., 16 — 4 in.
11,200
BUILDING
10
Tiger . . .
1913
28,000
28
9
8 — 135 in., 12 — 6 in.
11,200
558
APPENDIX B
GERMAN DREADNOUGHT STRENGTH
BATTLESHIPS
V
>
Ships.
T3
u
O *i
5S
Armament (excluding guns
eight of
oadside,
rimary
guns.
r
a
ii
S^1
u
below 12 prs.).
o
U
Q
s
<
£J3*
tons.
knots.
in.
lb.
I
Nassau . .
1908
2
3
Westfalen
Rheinland . .
1908
1908
18,600
19
Il'8l
12 — 11 in., 12 — s*9 in.,
16 — 3*4 in.
5,376
4
Posen
1908
5
Ostfriesland .
1909
6
7
Heligoland .
Thuringen .
1909
1909
22,440
20"5
ii'8i
12 — 12 in., 14 — 5"9 in.,
14— 34 in.
7,232
8
Oldenburg .
1910
0
Kaiser
1911
IO
Friedrich der
Grosse . .
1911
ii
Kaiserin . . .
191 1
24,310
21
13-78
10 — 12 in., 14 — 5*9 in.,
9,040
12
Prinzregent
Luitpold .
1912
12 — 3*4 in., 4 — 13 prs.
13
Konig Albert
1912
14
Grosser Kurfurst
1913
IS
Konig . .
1913
25,390
22
i
10 — 12 in., 14 — 5'9 in.,
9,040
16
Markgraf . .
1913
?
12— 3-4 in., 4 — 13 prs.
BUILDING
Kronprinz .
Ersatz Worth
T . . . .
Ersatz Kaiser
Friedrich III
1914
25,390
28,050
?
10 — 12 in., 14-
12—3*4 in., 4-
-5*9 in.
13 prs.
\ — 15 in., 16 — 5'9 in.
9.040
15,360
?
BATTLE CRUISERS
Blucher .
von der Tann
Moltke . .
Goeben .
Seydlitz . .
Derfflinger .
1908
15,550
25
6
1909
18,700
25
6
1910
1911
1912
1 22,640
24,640
27
27
11
1913
28,000
27
7
12 — 8'2 in., 8 — 59 in.
16 — 3-4 in.
8 — 11 in., 10 — 5*9 in.
16— 3*4 in.
10 — 11 in., 12 — 5'9 in.
12 — 34 in.
10 — 11 in., 12 — 5*9 in.
12 — 3'4 in.
8 — 12 in., 12 — 5'9 in.
12— 3-4 in.
2,204
5,376
6,720
6,720
7.232
BUILDING
Liitzow .
Ersatz Hertha
B9d'g3|K
27
559
\i
8 — 12 in., 12- -59 in.,
12—3-4 in.
7,232
5&>
APPENDIX B
BRITISH AND GERMAN FLEETS IN HOME
WATERS AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR
GERMAN.
10 — 12 inch.
BRITISH.
Grand Fleet.
Iron Duke (10 — 3*5 inch), Fleet
Flagship.
15/ Battle Squadron.
1 Iron Duke (10 — 13*5 inch).
2 Colossus
1 Neptune
3 St. Vincents
1 Bellerophon
2nd Battle Squadron.
:&GeorgeV}— '"inch.
yd Battle Squadron.
8 King Edward VII (4 — 12 inch;
4 — 9' 2 inch).
4th Battle Squadron.
1 Dreadnought \ . ,
2Bellerophons/IO-I2mch-
1 Agincourt (14 — 12 inch).
(One Light Cruiser attached to each
Battle Squadron).
1st Battle Cruiser Squadron.
3 Lions (8 — 13'5 inch).
1 New Zealand (8 — 12 inch).
2nd Cruiser Squadron.
1 Shannon (4 — 9*2 inch; 10 — 7 "5 inch).
3 Achilles (6 — 9 '2 inch; 4 — 7*5 inch).
yd Cruiser Squadron.
4 Antrims (4 — 7*5 inch; 6 — 6 inch).
15/ Light Cruiser Squadron.
3 Birminghams (9 — 6 inch).
:SF0aCoauT°nH-h-.
i Bristol (2 — 6 inch; 10 — 4 inch).
Destroyer Flotillas.
2 Flotillas, each of 20 vessels, with
Light Cruiser Active and Flotilla
Leader Swift.
Harwich Force.
1 Amethyst (12 — 4 inch).
2 Amphions (10 — 4 inch).
35 Destroyers.
High Seas Fleet.
Friedrich der Grosse (10 — 12
inch), Fleet Flagship.
15/ Battle Squadron.
4 Heligolands (12 — 12 inch).
4 Nassaus (12 — 11 inch).
2nd Battle Squadron.
10 Preussens (4 — 11 inch).
3rd Battle Squadron.
4 Kaisers (10 — 12 inch).
Cruiser Squadron.
Battle Cruisers.
2 Moltke (10 — n inch).
1 von der Tann (8 — 11 inch).
1 Derfflinger (8 — 12 inch).
1 Blucher (12 — 8' 2 inch).
Light Cruisers.
1 Rostock
2 Strassburgs \ 12 — 4*1 inch.
3 Mainz.
Destroyer Flotillas.
7 Flotillas, each of 1 1 vessels.
APPENDIX B
56i
BRITISH AND GERMAN FLEETS IN HOME
WATERS AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR— cont.
BRITISH— cont.
Channel Fleet.
$th Battle Squadron.
8 Formidables (4 — 12 inch).
6th Battle Squadron.
2 Lord Nelsons (4 — 12 inch;
10 — o'2 inch).
5 Duncans \
1 Glory / 4'
inch.
7 th Battle Squadron.
4 Majesties (4 — 12 inch).
8th Battle Squadron.
1 Majestic (4 — 12 inch).
5 Glory.
4 Light Cruisers were attached to
the Battle Squadrons.
yth Cruiser Squadron.
5 Cressys (2 — 9*2 inch; 12 — 6 inch).
1 2th Cruiser Squadron.
3Talbots(n— 6 inch).
1 Charybdis (2 — 6 inch; 8 — 47 inch)
(patrolling west end of Channel).
Dover Patrol.
2 Light Cruisers.
22 Destroyers.
nth Cruiser Squadron.
5 Talbots (11 — 6 inch) (on the coast
of Ireland).
10th Cruiser Squadron.
8 Crescents (Northern Patrol).
Patrol Flotillas on East Coast.
3 Light Cruisers.
48 Destroyers.
24 Torpedo Boats.
Submarines.
65, organised in 8 Flotillas, 7
Flotillas for Coast Defence, 1
for Overseas operations.
GERMAN— cont.
Other Vessels in Home Waters.
Battleships.
5 Wittelsbachs.
5 Kaiser Class (old) (5 — 9-4 inch).
2 Brandenburgs (6 — n inch).
Cruisers.
2 Roons (4 — 8*2 inch; 10 — 5*9 inch).
2 Prinz Adalbert (4 — 8*2 inch; 10 — 5*9
inch).
1 Prinz Heinrich (2 — 9 "4 inch; 10 — 5*9
inch).
Light Cruisers.
12 Vessels, with armaments of 10 or
12 — 4*1 inch guns.
Destroyers.
67 available for coast patrol, service
in Baltic, etc.
Submarines.
27 serviceable.
APPENDIX C
MEMORANDUM BY THE FIRST LORD ON TRADE
PROTECTION ON AND AFTER THE OUTBREAK
OF WAR
Written August 23, 1913, Revised April, 1914
1. The first security for British merchant ships must be the superiority of
the British Navy which should enable us to cover in peace, and hunt down and
bring to battle in war, every enemy's warship which attempts to keep the seas.
A policy of vigorous offence against the enemy's warships wherever stationed,
will give immediately far greater protection to British traders than large num-
bers of vessels scattered sparsely about in an attitude of weak and defensive
expectancy. This should be enjoined as the first duty of all British warships.
Enemy's cruisers cannot live in the oceans for any length of time.^ They can-
not coal at sea with any certainty. They cannot make many prizes without
much steaming; and in these days of W.T. their whereabouts will be constantly
reported. If British cruisers of superior speed are hunting them, they cannot
do much harm before they are brought to action. ^ Very few German Town
Class cruisers are assigned to foreign stations for this work. If others are de-
tached from the North Sea, and get out safely, we shall be able to detach a
larger proportion of the similar British cruisers which have been hitherto op-
posing them there. They cannot afford to send away many without crippling
their battle fleet.
2. As for enemy's armed merchantmen or merchantmen converted into
cruisers for commerce destruction, the only answer to that is to have an equal
number of British merchant vessels plying on the trade routes armed and com-
missioned to engage them when met with. The whole of this threat is very
shadowy. Whether the German vessels have their guns on board is extremely
doubtful. Not a scrap of evidence has been forthcoming during the last year
and a half in spite of every effort to procure it. How are they to be converted
on the high seas? Where are they to get rid of their passengers? Are they
to take hundreds of non-combatants with them on what the stronger naval
Power may well treat as a piratical enterprise? Where are they to coal? To
say that we have to maintain a large cruiser fleet to deal with this danger ap-
pears extravagant in the highest degree. All that is needed is to arm a similar
number of British merchant vessels of the right speed and make arrangements
to commission these for their own defence and that of other British ships in
their neighbourhood and on their route. The presence of these vessels plying
always in considerable numbers along the regular trade routes will from the
very outset of the war, and however suddenly it may begin, provide a constant
and immediate counter to enemy armed merchantmen, and probably deter them
from any injurious action.
3. But the best safeguard for the maintenance of British trade in war is the
large number of merchant ships engaged in trading, and the immense number of
harbours in the United Kingdom they can approach by ocean routes. This
makes any serious interruption by enemy's commerce destroyers impossible.
We must rely on numbers and averages. Provided that we can induce all these
562
APPENDIX C 563
ships to put to sea and carry on their business boldly, and provided that they
are warned in time and encouraged to leave the regular trade routes and travel
wide of them, very few captures will be made even in the early days of the war.
4. It is no use distributing isolated cruisers about the vast ocean spaces.
To produce any result from such a method would require hundreds of cruisers.
The ocean is itself the best protection. We must recognise that we cannot
specifically protect trade routes; we can only protect confluences. The only
safe trade routes in war are those which the enemy has not discovered and those
upon which he has been exterminated. There are areas where the trade neces-
sarily converges and narrow channels through which it must pass; and these
defiles or terminals of the trade routes should be made too dangerous for
enemy's commerce destroyers to approach, by employing our older cruisers in
adequate force so as to create an effective sanctuary, control or catchment for
our trading ships. These areas should be judiciously selected so as to husband
our resources, and not with a view to finding^ employment for as many old
cruisers as possible. It may be taken for certain that no enemy's armed mer-
chantman unless possessed of exceptional speed will dare to approach the area
where he may encounter a British cruiser. Many of our old cruisers steam
19 knots. The number of German merchantmen which steam more is not
large. As for the enemy's warships and his few exceptionally fast vessels, they
must be marked down and hunted by fast modern vessels which are concerned
with nothing else but to bring them to action.
5. British attacks on the German trade are a comparatively unimportant
feature in our operations^ and British cruisers should not engage in them to
the prejudice of other duties. Economic pressure will be put on Germany by
the distant blockade of her shores which will cut off her trade, both export and
import, as a whole. If this is effectively done it is of very little consequence to
us whether individual German vessels are captured as prizes, or whether they
take refuge in neutral harbours till the end of the war. It is reasonable to
suppose that German merchant ships, other than those armed and commis-
sioned for warlike purposes, will run for neutral harbours as soon as war breaks
out, and that very few will attempt under the German flag to return home
running the gauntlet of the numerous British fleets operating in the North Sea.
6. Protection will be afforded to British seaborne trade in time of war by
the following measures: —
A. Hunting down of enemy's warships and armed vessels.
Every German cruiser stationed abroad should be covered in peace and
brought to action in war by a superior vessel of superior speed, or alternatively
by two equal vessels having speed advantage.
B. Organised warning of British merchant vessels.
All British armed merchantmen plying on the routes will, on receiving the
warning telegram by wireless, open their secret instructions which direct them
to steam along their regular route warning all unarmed British vessels met
with to leave the trade route, and steam without lights at night, keeping well
away from their usual course, avoiding company, and making their own way
to their port of destination.
7. Similar warnings and directions adapted to each case and each route
will be issued by British Consuls at all ports. These should be prepared before-
hand in the fullest detail and according to a general scheme. For instance, the
British Consul at Buenos Ayres should have separate instructions all ready
prepared for every British ship leaving the port for the United Kingdom.
These instructions will be regularly kept up to date by the Trade Division of the
Admiralty War Staff. They will prescribe for each ship the general course
she is to follow, the portions of the voyage she should endeavour to cover in
darkness, and the areas within which she will find safety. A good wireless
organisation can, of course, deal at once with all vessels so fitted. Thus the
564 APPENDIX C
unarmed trade will, in the first week of the war, be effectively scattered over
immense areas of ocean.
The control and guidance of merchant traffic must, of course, vary with
circumstances. There are two quite different situations to consider. The first
is that which occurs at the moment of a sudden outbreak of war. We must
assume that hostilities begin by surprise, and that the enemy's commerce de-
stroyers, whether warships or armed merchantmen, will begin their attacks
within a very few hours of the first warning being given. None of our Third
Fleet cruisers will be on their stations. The only vessels available will be the
ordinary foreign squadrons and the fast cruisers shadowing individual German
warships, and these will probably not be in positions which have any special
relation to the trade routes. None of the British converted auxiliary merchant
cruisers will be on the routes: the only thing that will be there and that can
be there are the defensive armed merchantmen. In these circumstances it
seems probable that the best course would be to scatter the trade; and it is
in any case essential that we should have the power to do so, and that all
arrangements should be made to that end.
8. When, however, the war has been in progress for some time, and in pro-
portion as our available force increases and we pass from a peace to a war
organisation, it may well be that the scattering of the trade will no longer be
necessary or even desirable, except perhaps locally between special points.
Trading vessels would then be told to return to their regular trade routes;
and this might easily lead to drawing such commerce destroyers as then re-
main into areas where they could be reported, located, and destroyed, by the
British cruisers.
9. The organisation for the control and guidance of the trade should there-
fore be of so complete a character that the trade may be either dispersed about
the ocean or concentrated along particular routes; or in some places dispersed
and in other concentrated; and that changes from one policy to the other can
be made when necessary at any time.
10. The British armed merchantman will only be employed on a strictly
limited service, namely, that of carrying food supplies to the United Kingdom.
They will be forbidden to engage enemy's warships and are to surrender if
overtaken by them. They will not molest or pursue unarmed ships of the
enemy. They will only fire on enemy's armed merchantmen if they are them-
selves attacked or pursued by them.
The result of these arrangements will be that the enemy's armed merchant-
men will either have to scatter in haphazard search for prizes, or run into a suc-
cession of armed British vessels plying the usual route, finding prizes few and
far between on the first course, and nothing but kicks on the other.
n. C. As soon as possible after the outbreak of war a sufficient number
of British merchant ships or liners of high speed, selected and prepared before-
hand, will be converted into auxiliary cruisers and commissioned for the further
policing of the trade routes, and incidentally or if desired to prey on enemy's
commerce. These vessels will be taken over on the same or similar basis as
the Cunarders. They will differ from the armed merchantmen in *B,' in that
their duties will not be limited to self-defence and warning; they will be directly
employed in hunting down enemy's armed merchantmen; they may be used
offensively against enemy's trade; they will not carry on their ordinary business;
they will be wholly taken over by and maintained by the Admiralty; they will
be officered and manned by the Royal Navy, will fly the White Ensign, and
execute the orders of the Admiralty.
12. D. While we have a large supply of older cruisers, they may be employed
in protecting the approaches to the principal trade terminals, and at certain
special points. These cruisers will be additional to any fast modern British
vessels employed on the general service of hunting down individual German
APPENDIX C 565
cruisers. They will neglect no opportunity of engaging enemy's warships or
armed merchantmen. They may be at any time withdrawn from their areas
by the Admiralty for such a purpose. Only the older ships will be employed
on this service; and as they wear out, control will be maintained by a smaller
number of new, fast vessels employed on the general and primary service of
hunting down the enemy's warships.
13. E. The last but indispensable condition of maintaining British food
supplies and British trade in time of war, is that British traders should send
their ships to sea, and from the very beginning of the war press forward boldly
on their regular business. The question of encouraging them to do this by
means of a system of State Insurance under certain restrictions to guard against
fraud, is now being considered by a Sub-Committee of the C.I.D. We have
expressed on behalf of the Board of Admiralty the strongest opinion in favour
of the adoption of such a system, it being essential to all our arrangements that
very large numbers of British vessels, undeterred by a small proportion of cap-
tures, should continue to traverse the seas under the British flag.
In exceptional cases convoys will, if necessary, be organised under escort
of Third Fleet vessels. It is hoped, however, that this cumbrous and incon-
venient measure will not be required.
W. S. C.
April, 1914.
APPENDIX D
MINING
In order to combat the many unwise proposals which were pressed upon
me at this time to squander our small stock of mines, I drew up the following
paper with which I endeavoured to repel the demands from the Cabinet, the
Admiralty and the Fleet. I am aware that these views will be disputed, and
I shall no doubt be told that the experience of the later stages of the war has
disproved them. I still believe, however, that they were sound and truly
applicable to the circumstances of 1914. But I go further and declare that the
reasoning held good all through 1915 and 1916. If I am reminded that as
part of the life and death struggle against the German submarines in 191 7, we
were led into a mining policy on a scale so gigantic as dwarfed every previous
scheme, and if as the result of this huge diversion of our resources a certain
number of German submarines were destroyed, still I assert that these condi-
tions would never have arisen if a proper offensive had been developed by the
Royal Navy, as would have been possible at far less cost. All being said, I
take my stand as I wrote to Fisher on the dictum ■ Mine in Haste and Sweep at
Leisure.'
NOTES BY THE FIRST LORD
Mining is mainly of two kinds, ambush mining and blockade mining.
Ambush Mining.
Ambush mining depends on the whereabouts of the field remaining un-
known. These mines may be scattered about in patches, or short lines in the
neighbourhood of the enemy's ports or of the approaches to your own ports
or landing places on the chance of enemy ships running into them. This chance
is not great. The seas are very large; the area mined, even if on a great scale,
very small. The chances of preserving secrecy long are not great, and most
ambush minefields are soon discovered by merchant ships, or other craft of no
military value, being blown up by them. On the other hand, every patch of
mines soon hampers the movement of the stronger fleet. The position of the
minefields cannot be accurately known. There is very often a tendency for
them to drag with their anchors in tide and sea. Also ships cannot always be
sure of their positions, and very often when out of sight of land, in weather
unsuited to taking observations of the sun, 15, 20, or 30 miles' error in position
may easily arise. The fact that you know generally where your own mines
are and when you are getting near their area, but do not exactly know where
they are, or exactly where you are, tends to paralyse your own movements,
and might easily prevent effective action against or the interception of the
enemy's fleet should it put to sea. The conclusion to be drawn is that ambush
mines should be very sparingly used, chiefly in sight of land, and that not very
566
APPENDIX D 567
much is to be expected from them. The general failure, so far as our present
experience goes, oi the German policy of ambush mining with which they
opened the war illustrates the truth of these conclusions. The only British
warship, apart from the gunboat Speedy (which was actually engaged in fish-
ing up mines), lost by this agency has been the Amphion, and she was drifted
out of her course on to the very minefield whose position she knew and which
she was endeavouring to avoid.
This is not by any means to decry the use of ambush mines as an immediate
part of a concerted tactical combination. It is for this purpose mainly that the
British Fleet mine-layers are organised. To lay mines in the course of an
enemy before or during a battle, or across his homeward path if he has put to
sea, may be operations of the greatest consequence and value, and it would be
most unwise to deplete them of their not too extensive store of mines, which
should be reserved for this purpose, and not squandered on promiscuous and
haphazard uses.
One more class of ambush mines deserves to be noted. A few scattered
about on trade routes and off enemy or neutral ports, if well advertised and
enforced by a few ships actually blown up, may exercise a very effective deter-
rent on neutral commerce which may be of use to the enemy.
Blockade Mining.
It is not possible to blockade a modern fleet by mining, even on a very
large scale, unless superior force is maintained in the neighbourhood of the
minefield to prevent or oppose the mines being removed. In the days when
Admiral Togo mined the debouches from Port Arthur the submarine did not
exist, and it was possible to maintain a close and constant watch on the mine-
fields, so that even if he was unable to stop the enemy removing the mines he
knew when they were doing so, and this perhaps gave some clue to their future
intentions. Even so, the Russian Fleet put to sea whenever they wanted to.
It would not be possible to keep such a watch now without exposing the ves-
sels so engaged to almost certain destruction from the enemy's submarines.
Further, blockade mining is more effective the closer in it is to the enemy's
ports, and therefore the watching vessels would be continually exposed not
only to the attacks of the submarines, but to a greatly superior force of enemy
destroyers and light cruisers. In order to maintain them against this, appro-
priate supports would have to be kept close at hand in proper tactical relation
and brought up as the need arose, with the result that more and more ships
of greater value would be drawn into the most dangerous area of the enemy's
submarine activities, and considerable operations would develop in waters less
suited to us and most favourable to the enemy.
But if the minefield is not watched, the enemy has no difficulty in proceed-
ing to sea at any time he chooses. He will soon learn the existence of the mine-
field, because one or two small craft will be blown up on it. In the British Fleet
the regular mine-sweepers can sweep a clear channel ahead of the Fleet at a
rate of 12 knots an hour through any minefield. The Germans have not used,
as we have, old gunboats converted as mine-sweepers, but have built a special
class of good, fast vessels. It must therefore be assumed that they could
sweep a channel at least as quickly as, and probably quicker than, we could.
They could therefore proceed to sea at any time if they wished to do so, and
with scarcely any delay. Also, if they did not wish immediately to proceed
to sea, they could sweep a channel through the minefield of which they would
know the existence, and which, being in close contact with land where actual
bearings could be obtained, they could follow exactly, and so have continued
means of ingress and egress. We, on the other hand, would not know where
this channel was, and would be prevented from approaching by the known
568 APPENDIX D
existence of our own field. The conclusion is that it is not possible by blockade
mines to stop a fleet from putting to sea, even if that were what we wanted
to do.
Still less is it possible to stop the enemy's submarines from putting to sea,
either by ambush mines or blockade mines. The rise and fall of the tide be-
tween high and low water makes a minefield ineffective against shallow-draft
craft for half the twenty-four hours. The distance of 50 yards, which is the
usual interval between mines, is five times the breadth of a submarine. By
diving to 50 feet, the chance of contact with the mine is removed, and only
the lesser danger of fouling the moorings remains. It is perfectly easy to sweep
a channel for submarines, as for other vessels, at any time. Where there is
any uncertainty about the whereabouts of a minefield, trawlers, or small mer-
chant ships with a very few people on board, can go ahead of the submarines and
pilot them out. If necessary, vessels could be specially prepared as mine-
bumpers, with a kind of cow-catcher apparatus in front of them. We are
experimenting with five different methods of fitting ships for mine-bumping,
and shall very soon have a number of vessels which can go almost with im-
punity into a minefield. British submarines have frequently traversed, wit-
tingly and unwittingly, the German minefields around Heligoland, and German
submarines are probably traversing our southern mined area with indifference,
and impunity, at the present time.
On the other hand, it is a curious truth that your own minefield is a greater
deterrent to your own operations than to those of the enemy. You have put
it down yourself, so you do not want to sweep it up. You know where it is,
though not very accurately. You instinctively try to avoid the waters you
have yourself fouled. Nothing has been more valuable than the searching
and relentless watching maintained in the Heligoland Bight by our submarines
since the beginning of the war. Its vigilance and efficiency have defeated
themselves by forcing the Germans to retire actually inside their basins and
canal, and thus depriving our submarines of any targets. It would be a great
pity to hamper them in their work and expose them to additional dangers for
the sake of such vain and illusory precautions. The weak passive defence
of mines cannot for a moment be compared as a military measure with the
enterprising offensive of submarines.
The above considerations also apply to suggested schemes for shutting
submarines in by a network of mines fastened together by wire. Mine-sweep-
^rs or mine-bumpers would force a channel through this as easily as through
ordinary lines of mines, the only difference being that several being dragged
along by the string would be exploded at the same time. Also it is evident that
the limitations of this form of defence cannot be carried very far on account of
the enormous quantities of material and explosives required. It would be
very difficult and dangerous to lay in close proximity to the enemy's ports
and fleets. The process would be slow; the losses certain, and it could in any
case block only a very small portion of the 100-mile broad mouth of the Heli-
goland Bight. Devices of this character may, however, be useful in defending
one's own harbours, and making anchorages submarine-proof, where we can,
by our superior strength, prevent our arrangements from being interfered with.
A variety of these methods are at present in use, and are being rapidly extended
and developed. The following seven principal expedients are being applied: —
(1) Sinking ships with cement or stone in such a way as to form an abso-
lute breakwater and barrier like the mole of a harbour.
(2) Electrical contact mines strung very closely together, and capable of
being made dangerous or safe by the current being switched on or off.
(3) Barges or piles, with torpedo nets attached to them.
(4) Loose wire nets of very large mesh, not fastened at either end, which
clog round a submarine and entangle it.
APPENDIX D 569
(5) Network arrangement, with explosives attached.
(6) Network arrangements, with upright floating spars, which also en-
tangle the submarine.
(7) Long lengths of fishing nets, particularly Portuguese tunny nets, which
operate in the same way.
As the war progresses, we shall gradually improvise the torpedo-proof har-
bours, of which, except on our southern coast, we are now entirely destitute.
I explained to the Cabinet the quantities of mines which we had in store, and
which were available in the future. The experience of the last three months
seems to justify the partial and limited reliance put by the Admiralty upon
mining as a method of warfare.
w. s. c.
October, 1914.
APPENDIX E
FIRST LORD'S MINUTES
Formation of the Royal Naval Division
Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Second Sea Lord.
In order to make the best possible use of the surplus naval reservists of
different classes, it is proposed to constitute permanent cadres of one marine
and two naval brigades. The marine brigade has already been partially formed
in four battalions, aggregating 1,880 active service men. To this will be added
an approximately equal number of reservists, making the total strength of the
brigade 3,900, organised in four battalions of four double companies of approxi-
mately 250 men. The two naval brigades will also consist of four battalions,
each, if possible, of 880 men, organised in sixteen double companies of 220. The
composition of each battalion should be as follows: —
R.N.V.R 375
R.F.R. (picked, under 30 years of age) .... 313
R.N.R 100
The total numbers required for the two naval brigades would therefore be: —
R.N.V.R 3,000
R.F.R 2,500
R.N.R 1,500
The marine brigade will be commanded by a Colonel, and each battalion by
a Lieutenant-Colonel; each company by a Major and a Captain. The means of
remedying the shortage of junior officers will be dealt with separately. About
fifty new subalterns, R.M., must be entered either permanently or on a three
years' or till the war stops engagement.
Each naval brigade will be commanded by a Captain, R.N.; five of the
battalions by a Commander or naval officer promoted to that rank, and three
by R.N.V.R. Commanders; each company will be commanded by a Lieutenant-
Commander, R.N. or R.N.V.R., or, if these are not forthcoming, by a Major,
R.M. The question of making good deficiencies in these and in the marine
brigade will be dealt with separately. There are, however, available 50
R.N.V.R. Lieutenants, 66 Sub-Lieutenants, and 12 Midshipmen; total, 128.
About 50 more officers would be required.
The use of these brigades need not be considered until the organisation has
advanced sufficiently to allow of their military value to be judged.
The formation of these brigades should be completed so far as resources
allow in the present week. The officers commanding the companies and bat-
talions must be appointed forthwith. The first essential is to get the men drill-
ing together in brigades; and the deficiencies of various ranks in the battalions
can be filled up later. It may ultimately be found possible in the course of the
war to build up all battalions of the marine and naval brigades to the army
strength of 1,070, and the organisation will readily adapt itself to this. All
the men, whether sailors or marines, while training in the three brigades will
be available if required for service afloat, and it must be distinctly understood
that this is the paramount claim upon them; but in the meanwhile they will be
left to be organised for land service. W. S. C.
August 16, 1914.
570
APPENDIX E 571
ACTION OF AUGUST 28
Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Third Sea Lord.
Director of Naval Ordnance.
1. Let me have an estimate of how long it will take to refit for service in
every particular the vessels damaged in the recent action. Careful attention
should be paid to the wishes and suggestions of the officers who fought them,
in order that everything possible can be done to increase their fighting efficiency.
2. The failure of the 4-inch guns in the Arethusa is most serious, and must
be thoroughly investigated. I am informed that it arose both from the break-
ing of the ejector catches, of which there were no spares, and secondly from the
coating of the cartridge cases, which gradually fouled the gun. At one critical
moment only one 4-inch gun could fire, and but for her 6-inch guns the Arethusa
would have been destroyed. I wish to receive a statement showing that an
effective remedy has been provided.
3. Every effort should be made while the ships are refitting to give the offi-
cers and men a few days' leave. The nervous strain of a modern action is
considerable, and a change of scene is required to restore poise and resiliency.
w. s. c.
August 30, 1914.
Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Chief of Staff.
(1) Selections might be made from all the reports of this action, beginning
with some of the submarine reconnaissance reports which the Prime Minister
has repeatedly urged me to publish. All interesting matter which can be made
public without detriment to the future should be collected, circulated to the
Fleet, and published in the newspapers.
(2) The criticism in the Commander-in-Chief's report and various references
to discrepancies in the arrangements which occur in Commodore S's and other
statements must all be kept absolutely secret. Mistakes are always made in
war, but there is no need to weaken confidence by dwelling on them after suc-
cess has been obtained. The Senior Officers concerned in the manoeuvre should,
however, all have the opportunity of studying the full reports in order that every
effort may be made to improve arrangements in the future. Beyond this pro-
foundly secret circle no whisper must go.
(3) I am awaiting your recommendations for honours, promotions, and re-
wards to be accorded to the officers and men who distinguished themselves in
this fortunate and skilful enterprise.
W. S. C.
September 6, 1914.
SEPARATION ALLOWANCES FOR THE NAVY
Financial Secretary.
I have to-day obtained the assent of the Cabinet in principle to the grant-
ing of a separation allowance to the whole Navy at once. The scale should be
the full Army scale less any deductions which should be made on account of
higher pay and allowances the sailor may receive as compared with the soldier.
These details are to be settled, between the Admiralty and the Treasury. I
regard the matter as one of prime importance and urgency.
It is, of course, understood that the present decision only authorises the
payment of a separation allowance during the period of active service, and that
the question of what is to happen in time of peace is not prejudiced.
572 APPENDIX E
I wish you to take up this question in conjunction with the Accountant-
General and the Naval Branch and make me your proposals in the course of
to-morrow. It will be a great fillip to our sailors when this great boon to them
is announced to the Fleet, as I hope it may be, in the next few days. Pray press
it forward by every means in your power, acting with the Treasury and calling
me in where there is a hitch or difficulty.
w. s. c.
September 4, 1914.
Financial Secretary.
The Cabinet decided that evidence of allotment regularly made should de-
cide whether the Separation Allowance should be paid or not, and that legal
marriage is not indispensable. Where it is clear that the woman has been de-
pendent on the man, and the man has recognised this tie by a regular allotment,
the legality of the marriage will be assumed.
w. s. c.
September 19, 19 14.
ENEMY RESERVISTS
Secretary.
Please inquire who was responsible for allowing a merchant ship from Buenos
Ayres with 400 German reservists on board, to pass Gibraltar and to convey
them to Italian ports, whence they left to join their units. How was it that
these men were not arrested and made prisoners of war when passing the Straits ?
w. s. c.
September 5, 1914.
LIFE-BELTS
Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Fourth Sea Lord.
Chief of Staff.
The sinking of the Pathfinder shows how important it is that there should be
more life-belts or life-buoys available on our ships. Many lives would have been
saved in this case if such steps had been taken. I don't like the German system
of going into action with life-belts on, but there certainly ought to be in the boats
and on the deck of British ships something like 100 life-belts or life-buoys which
could be seized and would float overboard if the vessel foundered.
Pray let me have a proposal.
W. S. c.
September 10, 1914.
SUBMARINE HONOURS
Secretary.
Naval Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Since it is difficult to choose which man in a submarine has done specially
well, it is necessary that the decoration should be given to the boat, and that
the men should ballot among themselves to decide who is to have it.
w. s. c.
September 17, 19 14.
APPENDIX E 573
BLOCKADE
Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
A.C.L.
C.O.S. and others.
A standing Admiralty Committee will be formed under the presidency of the
Additional Civil Lord, to be called 'The Restriction of Enemies' Supplies Com-
mittee,' composed as follows: —
One representative of the Trade Division of the War Staff.
One representative of the Foreign Office.
One representative of the Board of Trade.
Mr. Alan Burgoyne, M.P.
Mr. C. Money, M.P.
The duties of this Committee will be to examine and watch continually all
means or routes by which supplies of food or raw material may reach Germany
and Austria; to report weekly all importations or exportations to and from these
countries coming to their knowledge; and to recommend by what methods, finan-
cial, commercial, diplomatic, and military, they may be hampered, restricted,
and, if possible, stopped. Measures should, in the first instance, be recommended
to secure full and accurate information from day to day of all vessels unloading
cargoes which may ultimately reach Germany or Austria at neutral ports, and
the port of Rotterdam especially, as well as the possibility of supplies coming
through a northern part of Sweden or from Sweden itself across the Baltic, or
through Norway and Denmark. Holland must be the subject of the closest
study, it being clearly impossible for the British Government to allow the neu-
tral port of Rotterdam to serve as a base of supplies to the enemy. Trust-
worthy agents in Holland must be obtained or dispatched thither for this pur-
pose. Any possible importation overland through Italy or up the Adriatic
must be included in the survey.
Funds will be forthcoming for any special action required.
The Committee should hold its first meeting on Friday, the 14th, using a
committee room at the Admiralty.
A.C.L. to nominate his own Secretary, and make all further arrangements
to carry this minute into effect.
w. s. c.
August 13, 1914.
MUNITIONS
Lord Kitchener.
Captain Hankey, of the Committee of Imperial Defence, has been to me
with what seems rather a good idea. He suggests that Girouard should be put
at the head of an emergency armament multiplication committee or department,
to set on foot and develop the maximum possible output of guns, rifles, ammuni-
tion, etc. I am sure, myself, that more could be done by the firms than is being
done at present. For instance, after you told me of the pressure you had put
upon them and that their complete limits had been reached, our people went
round and obtained undertakings from the trade to produce 700 rifles a week
more, additional to all that had been ordered by you.
This is only a half-formed idea, and I pass it on to you not as a recom-
mendation, but simply for what it is worth.
w. s. c.
September 3, 1914.
574 APPENDIX E
UNITED STATES NEUTRALITY
Sir Edward Grey.
Please see attached.
I should be so glad if you could see your way to making a strong stand
against this. Even if we ultimately have to give way, the fact that they will
have overruled our protest will, in the existing balance of public opinion in the
United States, make them desirous of being helpful, or at any rate not un-
friendly, on other points at issue.
Our case is clear. The Germans have announced their intention, have en-
deavoured on a large scale, and have partially begun, to arm merchant ships as
commerce destroyers, and they even claim to carry out this process of arming
and equipping in neutral harbours or on the high seas. We have been forced
in consequence of this to arm a number of our ships in self-defence. In doing
this we follow the undoubted law of the seas as it was practised in all the great
wars of the past. We claim that by international law a merchant ship armed
in her own defence, so long as she takes no aggressive action, is entitled to the
full status of a peaceful trading ship. We ask that our ships so armed for this
purpose shall be accorded that status in the neutral ports of the world. We
are quite willing to agree that German merchant ships similarly armed in self-
defence shall be similarly treated. It is only when merchant ships are armed
and commissioned as auxiliary cruisers, not for purposes of self-defence, but for
those of commerce destruction, that we claim they should be treated as ships
of war. And here again we ask no better treatment for ourselves than for the
enemy.
We recognise the natural difficulty to a neutral State, anxious to preserve
a strict impartiality, of discerning whether ships carrying the same armament
are intended for offensive or defensive action. We offer that this question
should be decided by a simple and practical test. If the armed merchant ship
is engaged in ordinary commerce, discharging and taking a regular cargo, and
embarking passengers in the usual way, she should be counted as a trader in
spite of her armament. If, on the other hand, she is not engaged in commerce,
is not doing the ordinary things she would do and has done in times of peace,
but is either carrying special cargoes of coal and stores to belligerent cruisers
on the high seas, or is travelling in ballast, or is not trafficking in her cargo in
the natural way, then we say she should be treated as a ship of war, even if
the Government of the State whose flag she flies declares that she is only armed
and will only fight in self-defence. We must therefore hold a neutral Govern-
ment impeccable if she allows a German armed merchantman, which takes a
regular cargo in the ordinary way, to arm in her ports or leave them for the
high seas, even if subsequently that vessel engages not merely in self-defence,
but in actual aggressive attack. Neutrals who deal with ships according to
the ' Cargo Test ' must be held blameless by us whatever the subsequent careers
of the vessels may be. The issues which remain open after these ships have
put to sea can only be decided between the belligerents.
The second point that I hope you will be able to fight is: no transference
after the declaration of war of enemy's ships to a neutral flag, as agreed upon
in the Declaration of London. We cannot recognise such transferences, which
are plainly, in the nature of things, designed to enable the transferred ship to
obtain under the neutral flag an immunity from the conditions created by the
war.
I would earnestly ask that both these points should be pressed now in the
most direct and formal manner on Powers concerned, and particularly upon
the United States, and that very great pressure should be exerted.
In this connection it may be pointed out that the United States have already
allowed one or more ships, including the Kronprinz Wilhelm, to leave their ports
armed, denuded of cargo, and cleared for action, and that to stop British ships
APPENDIX E 575
of a self -defensive character is showing a partiality to one of the belligerents
incompatible with fair and loyal neutrality. If to this is to be added the at-
tempt which Mr. Bryan has made, by his personal intervention, to take over
the Hamburg-American liners from Germany and run them under the American
flag, it seems to me clear that a situation has arisen which, in the ultimate issues,
ought, in some form or other, to be brought publicly before the people of the
United States. I am under no illusions as to their attitude, but the forces at
work there in the present circumstances are such as to make it impossible for
any Government to load the dice against England, or go openly one inch be-
yond an even neutrality.
_ I venture to suggest to you that this position ought to be fought up to the
point of full publicity, and by every means and influence at our disposal, before
we are forced to consider the various inferior alternatives which no doubt exist.
w. s. c.
August 19, 1914.
Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Admiral Slade.
Chief of Staff.
Captain Webb.
The Cabinet decided this morning that we must abandon, under protest
and as an exception, the running of defensively-armed merchantmen to Ameri-
can ports. We do this on the assumption that we in no way waive the prin-
ciple, but in consideration of the fact that the United States are preventing a
large number of German ships suitable for armament from fitting out. We
must also stipulate that the guns, having been landed from these ships, shall
be returned without their mountings in some other non-military vessel on which
and from which they clearly cannot be used during the voyage.
Pray draft a note to the Foreign Office accordingly.
W. s. c.
September 3, 1914.
THE BRITISH PATROL OFF NEW YORK
Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Chief of Staff.
Admiral Slade.
I have felt uncomfortable about this for some time. Although it is strictly
legal, it must be very galling to the Americans to see their capital port picketed
in this way. Instructions should be given that the patrolling cruisers should
usually keep 8 or 10 miles away, or even farther if possible, and should only
close in occasionally when there is some special need. They should, above all,
be careful never to infringe the 3-mile limit, and should discharge their duties
with tact, remembering how greatly British interests are concerned in the main-
tenance of good relations with the United States. On the other hand, the
closest watch should be kept on shore upon the Hamburg-American liners, and
our cruisers should be given the earliest warning if these are seen to be getting
up steam. It ought to be quite easy to give our cruisers full warning of any
movement. ^ The prevention of these Hamburg-American liners leaving armed
and fuelled is practically the whole duty of our vessels off New York; and as
long as they are in a position to discharge this they need not be too obtrusive
in their other duties.
W. S. c.
October 26, 1914.
576 APPENDIX E
ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES
Dover.
First Sea Lord and others.
It is intolerable that we should be told that Dover is not safe against sub-
marine attack. It is the only military harbour we have except Portland. We
must be able to keep ships there safely. Measures are being taken to close
one of the entrances by sinking two ships. This is urgent and vital, and should
be pressed forward from hour to hour without a moment's pause. The other
entrance should have an anti-submarine net and gate arranged. If the boom
defence has carried away it must be repaired and replaced by night-and-day
exertions. Meanwhile the long barges fitted with nets which have been pre-
pared at Dunkirk should be brought over as soon as the weather allows, and
used either to block the entrance or to give net-protection to ships lying inside.
w. s. c.
November i, 19 14.
HIGH-EXPLOSIVE PRODUCTION
A.C.L.
You must act in this matter and refer to me only when special need arises.
The points to be held in view are clear and simple: —
1. We must have effective Government control of all the explosive works,
so as to attain the maximum output, and ensure our not being hampered by
German influences, which are powerful and subtle in the Explosive Trust.
2. Naval interests must be properly safeguarded, and this can only be either
by the Navy taking Nobels and the other two companies, or by an absolutely
equal representation and control as between the two Departments over the
whole of the explosive factories combined. We cannot be placed in the position
of being overborne by the military authorities, and having our necessary de-
mands set aside.
3. It is, however, our duty to do everything in our power to aid in the
expansion of the Army and the production of war material for the conduct of
the campaign, and at a certain point only State policy can decide whether
naval or military interests are to claim priority.
4. We must make a good bargain for the country; and if these people are
financed by Government money to set up great new works and broaden the
scale of their business, good arrangements should be made to transfer these
works to the Government at the end of the war.
W. s. c.
November 9, 1914.
THE DUMMY FLEET
{Most Secret.)
Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Third Sea Lord.
Director of Naval Construction.
Naval Secretary.
It is necessary to construct without delay a dummy fleet: 10 merchant ves-
sels, either German prizes or British ships, should be selected at once. They
should be distributed among various private yards not specially burdened with
warship building at the present time. They are then to be mocked up to rep-
resent particular battleships of the 1st and 2nd Battle Squadrons. The actual
size need not correspond exactly, as it is notoriously difficult to judge the size
of vessels at sea, and frequently even destroyers are mistaken for cruisers. We
are bearing in mind particularly aerial and periscope observations, where de-
ception is much more easy. It is not necessary that the structures should be
APPENDIX E 577
strong enough to stand rough weather. Very little metal would be required,
and practically the whole work should be executed in wood or canvas. The
ships would move under their own power under favourable conditions of weather
from one base to another, and even when the enemy knows that we have such
a fleet its presence will tend to mystify and confuse his plans and baffle and
distract the enterprise of his submarines. He will always be in doubt as to
which is the real and which is the dummy fleet. An attack upon the dummy
fleet can be made not less dangerous than an attack upon the real fleet by the
proper use of our own submarines and destroyers with towing charges, and
possibly by traps of nets and mines.
The matter is urgent. Three years ago I formed this idea, and deeply re-
gret that I have been so long deterred from putting it into execution. The
Third Sea Lord, Fourth Sea Lord, and Naval Secretary will meet to-day under
the Third Sea Lord, and formulate detailed proposals for immediate action.
The utmost secrecy must be observed, and special measures taken to banish
all foreigners from the districts where the mocking-up is being done. I should
hope to receive the list of ships which are selected for conversion to-morrow
morning, and the list of firms among whom the work will be parcelled out
during the course of that day. Estimates of cost and time should also be made,
but paint, canvas, and woodwork can be quickly done, and I should expect in a
fortnight, or at the outside in three weeks, that 10 vessels will be actually at
our tactical disposal.
w. s. c.
October 21, 19 14.
THE COASTAL PATROL
Secret.
First Sea Lord.
If the system of working the patrol flotillas explained in the enclosed mem-
orandum, has actually been enforced, it is in complete violation not only of the
obvious principles of war, but of all the orders and directions issued on this
subject during the last three years. The word 'distribution' applied to armed
force implies the most vicious ideas. To proceed by dividing the front to be
watched by the number of destroyers available for watching and working out
the number of miles to the destroyers is the negation of good sense and mili-
tary principle.
Ever since the Manoeuvres of 191 2 1 have repeatedly explained the principles
which should govern the working of the patrol flotillas (see attached papers),
and these have been expounded to the C.I.D. and issued to the War Staff with
the full concurrence of the First Sea Lord and the C.O.S. If there has been a
departure from these principles and an adoption of the barbarous method of
1 distributing ' the destroyers along the whole coast in a single row like toy sol-
diers on the kitchen table, this shows a total lack of comprehension.
It must again be repeated : —
1. That the coast, with its cyclists, signal stations, and watchers, is the line
of observation, and the only line of observation, which can certainly report the
arrival of an enemy;
2. That the patrol flotillas, both of submarines and destroyers, instead of
being frittered away on useless cordon and patrolling duties, should be kept
concentrated and ready for action at selected sallyports along the coast, ready
to proceed in force to any point where shore information shows that an enemy
is attempting to land;
3. That there is to be nothing like routine or sentry-go patrolling, except at
the mouths of harbours, and that from time to time occasional good bold re-
connaissances 60, 70, and 80 miles out to seaward should be pushed from each
sallyport by the whole of the boats available, varied occasionally by the prying
scouting of a single destroyer ;
578 APPENDIX E
4. That the prevention of mine-laying can only be done by trawlers, who
must summon help from the nearest patrol centre if necessary.
It must be recognised that nothing in our dispositions prevents an enemy
from approaching the British coasts with transports, and beginning a landing
there, but that if the flotillas are properly handled he should be attacked within
a few hours by submarines and destroyers, and that the numbers and strength
of the forces against him should continually increase until long before any
considerable force can be landed the enemy's transports and escort would be
overwhelmed, and those who are landed hopelessly cut off. The only alter-
native to this policy of letting the enemy begin to land and then attacking him
while his landing is in progress is the close blockade of the Heligoland Bight.
There is much to be said for and against both courses, but the intermediate
course of 'distributing' a weak and thin cordon of patrols at a short distance
from the coast in the hopes of putting up some defensive shield or screen is
utterly futile.
The policy at present approved is to concentrate the flotillas at fixed points
and keep them strong and fresh and fit for action, while relying upon the coast
watch to give early and accurate information of any attack by the enemy. If
this policy be adhered to strictly and simply it will not be found impossible to
spare the 12 destroyers which the Commander-in-Chief needs. It is, however,
to be considered whether they could not better be taken from the two 1st Fleet
Flotillas at Harwich.
w. s. c.
November 7, 1914.
THE RIFLE SHORTAGE
The following course is to be adopted: —
1. As soon as the War Office are ready to hand over the 50,000 Japanese
rifles, the whole of the rifles, long and short, whether used by sailors or marines,
on board H.M. ships at home and abroad, will be collected and brought on
shore to the Royal Naval Ordnance Depots. The Japanese rifles will be issued
to all ships in their place; there will be no rifles of any sort on board H.M.
ships other than Japanese.
2. From the British rifles surrendered by the Fleet, 15,000 short .303 charger
loading rifles will be set aside for the Royal Naval Division, i.e. one rifle for
each of 1 2,000 men, plus 25 per cent for reserve and training. All the rifles now
possessed by the Royal Naval Division will then be surrendered to the Ordnance
Depots in exchange for the 15,000 short .303 British rifles aforesaid. There-
fore the Royal Naval Division will have 15,000 short British .303, and no more.
3. There will then be handed over to the Army 57,800 rifles, of which 9,000
will be short charger loading.
4. The 50,000 Japanese rifles will be issued to the Fleet in the following
proportion: —
One rifle for each marine, and one rifle for every 5 sailors, ships on foreign
service receiving one rifle for every 3 sailors. The rest of the rifles will be issued
as required to trawlers and auxiliaries, and kept in the Royal Marine and Royal
Naval Ordnance Depots.
The Fleet will thus be completely re-armed with the 50,000 Japanese rifles,
and the Royal Naval Division with .303 short rifles ready for field service.
Let me now have calculations worked out on this basis; and draft a letter
accordingly to the War Office.
w. s. c.
November 25, 1914.
INDEX
INDEX
Aboukir, 351, 354
Cruiser. Launched igoo. Displacement
12,000 tons. Speed 21 yi knots. Two 9V,
twelve 6" guns.
Abrolhos, coaling base, 444
Acasla class, 142
Acheron class, 142
Active, 144
Light cruiser. Launched 191 1. Displace-
ment 3 ,440 tons. Speed 2 5 K knots. Ten 4"
guns.
Admiralty, Board of, 256-61
Admiralty Transport Department, 397~98
Aerenthal, Count, 30
Aerial attack and defence, 220-21, 340-44
Aeroplanes, 336-44
Agadir Crisis, 38-67
Agamemnon, 225
Battleship. Launched 1906. Displacement
16,500 tons. Speed 18 }4 knots. Four 12",
ten 9-2" guns.
Airships, 338
Albert, King, 380, 403
Albion, 310, 447, 467, 484
Battleship. Launched 1898. Displacement
12,950 tons. Speed 18 knots. Four 12",
twelve 6" guns.
Algeciras Conference, 25-28
Alger ine, 315
Canadian sloop. Launched 1895. Displace-
ment 1,050 tons. Speed 13 knots. Six 4"
guns.
Allen, Captain, 476
Alsace-Lorraine, 7, 50-1
Americans and the War, 293
Amphion, 264
Light cruiser. Launched 191 1. Displace-
ment 3 ,440 tons. Speed 2 5 K knots. Ten 4"
guns.
Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, 15, 25, 41
Anglo-French military conversations author-
ized by Sir Henry Campbell - Bannerman,
27, 29
Anglo-Persian Oil Convention, 137, 139, 181
Antwerp, 348, 355-9°, 398-9, 408, 411-12
Arethusa, 148, 332
Light cruiser. Launched 1913. Displace-
ment 3,500 tons. Speed 29 knots. Two 6",
six 4" guns.
Ariadne, 332
German light cruiser. Launched 1900. Dis-
placement 2,618 tons. Speed 22 knots. Ten
4-i" guns.
Armoured cars, 344-5
Army mobilized, 234, 247-80
Asama, 465, 468-69
Japanese cruiser. Launched 1898. Dis-
placement 9,885 tons. Speed 22 knots. Four
8", fourteen 6" guns.
Askold, 315-16, 323, 468, 544
Russian light cruiser. Launched 1900. Dis-
placement 5,905 tons. Speed 23 knots.
Twelve 6" guns.
Asquith, H. H., 24, 28-9, 66, 99
— invites Mr. Churchill to Admiralty, 66
Launched 1914.
Speed 25 knots.
Aston, General, 335, 347, 377
Astraa, 467
Light cruiser. Launched 1893. Displace-
ment 4,360 tons. Speed 19 }i knots. Two
6", eight 4-7" guns.
Attentive, 388, 403
Scout. Launched 1904. Displacement 2,670
tons. Speed 25 knots. Nine 4" guns.
Audacious, 408, 429-31, 437, 498
Dreadnought battleship. Launched 191 2.
Displacement 23,000 tons. Speed 21 knots.
Ten 13-5", sixteen 4" guns.
Australia, 262, 314-6, 321-24, 465, 467-8
Australian battle cruiser. Launched 191 1.
Displacement 18,800 tons. Speed 25 knots.
Eight 12", sixteen 4" guns.
Australian Navy: First fight, 471-2
Austria, 29-31, 275
— ultimatum to Serbia, 204
Bacon, Admiral, 74-5, 345
Balfour, Earl, 15, 21-4, 158, 197, 232
Balkan States, 18, 522-51
Ballin, 96, 99, 189, 207-8
— letter to Sir E. Cassel, 112
Barham, 140-1
Dreadnought battleship.
Displacement 27,500 tons.
Eight 15", twelve 6" guns.
Bartolome, see De BartolomS, Commodore
Bayly, Admiral Lewis, 160
Beaconsfield, 4
Beatty, Earl, 87-8, 160, 331-2, 422, 438, 483.
509-10, 514-9
— and submarine alarm, 422-4
Belgium: Neutrality, 234
Bellerophon, 223
Dreadnought battleship.
Displacement 18,600 tons.
Ten 12", sixteen 4" guns.
Benbow, 465
Dreadnought battleship.
Displacement 25,000 tons.
Ten 13-5", twelve 6" guns.
Beresford, Lord Charles, 71-2, 73-5
Bertie, Sir Francis, 369
Berwick, 467
Cruiser. Launched 1902. Displacement
9,800 tons. Speed 23 knots. Fourteen 6"
guns.
Bethlehem Steel Company, 498
Bethmann-Hollweg, 37, 96-7, 103
Birkenhead, Lord, 229
Birmingham, 518
Light cruiser. Launched 191 2. Displace-
ment 5,440 tons. Speed 25 }4 knots. Nine
6" guns.
Bismarck, Prince, 7, 207
Black, Sir Frederick, 138
Black Prince, 269, 312, 467, 484, 542
Cruiser. Launched 1904. Displacement
13,550 tons. Speed 23K knots. Six 9-2",
ten 6" guns.
Blake, Wm., 440
Launched 1907-
Speed 21 knots.
Launched 19 13.
Speed 21 knots.
581
5&2
INDEX
Blanche, 428
Light cruiser. Launched 1909. Displace-
ment 3,350 tons. Speed 25 knots. Ten 4"
guns.
'Blimps,' 338
Blonde, 143-5, 147
Light cruiser. Launched 1910. Displace-
ment 3,350 tons. Speed 25 knots. Ten 4"
guns.
Board of Admiralty, 256-61
Boer War, 12
Borden, Sir Robert, 183, 187
Bosnia, 30-1
Botha, General, 306, 464, 544
Bou6 de Lapeyrere, Admiral, 237
Bowles, Thomas Gibson, 353
Breslau, 526-7, 529, 536, 539, 544
German light cruiser. Launched 191 1. Dis-
placement 4.500 tons. Speed 27 knots.
Twelve 4-1" guns.
Bridgeman, Sir Francis, 82-3, 89, 120, 133
Bridges, Colonel, 386, 400, 404-5, 411
Briggs, Admiral, 83, 144
Brilliant, 407
Light cruiser. Launched 1891. Displace-
ment 3,600 tons. Speed 19 K knots. Two
6", six 4-7" guns.
Bristol, 448, 451, 467, 475, 478
Light cruiser. Launched 1910 Displace-
ment 4,800 tons. Speed 25^ knots. Two
6", ten 4" guns.
British Expeditionary Force, 250, 276-80
British Navy: Assembly at Portland, 191 2,
1 2 1-4; German submarine alarm, 413-41; in
1914-15, 501; leaves for Scapa Flow, 224-27;
mobilised, July, 1914, 201; mobilised, July
1 1- August 4, 228-46; visits Kronstadt and
"iel,_ 198-202; see under names of ships, and
passim.
Bntish ultimatum to Germany, 235-46
Broqueville, M. de, 372-3, 377-8
Budget of 1909, 20
Bulkeley- Johnson, Colonel, 303
Buller, Captain, 308
Biilow, General von, 358
Biilow, Prince, 25
Burmah Oil Companies, 139, 323
Burney, Admiral, 480
Burns, John, 24
Bustard, 404
Gunboat. Launched 187 1. Displacement
254 tons. One 6", one 4-7" gun.
Buxton Noel, 530
Byng, General, 377
Cadmus, 316, 543
Sloop. Launched 1903. Displacement 1,070
tons. Speed 13 knots. Six 4" guns.
Caillaux, M., 65
Calais, 346
Callaghan, Sir George, 83, 225, 231-2
Calliope, 497
Light cruiser. Launched 1914. Displace-
ment 3,750 tons. Speed 29 knots. Two
6", eight 4" guns.
Callwell, General, 532
Cambon, M., 231-2
Cambria, 497
Light cruiser. Launched 191 5. Displace-
ment 3,750 tons. Speed 29 knots. Five 6"
guns.
Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry, 24-9
— authorises Anglo-French military conversa-
tions, 27-9
E
— supports France at Algeciras, 27
Canadian Army, 327-9
Conopus, 310, 444-56, 458, 462-3, 466, 470-1,
473, 475
Battleship. Launched 1897. Displacement
12,950 tons. Speed i8# knots. Four 12",
twelve 6" guns.
Canterbury, 497
Light cruiser. Launched 1915. Displace-
ment 3,750 tons. Speed 29 knots. Five 6"
guns.
Cap Trafalgar, 308
German armed merchant cruiser.
Capper, General, 377
Caprivi, Count, 9
Carden, Admiral, 535, 540-1
Carmania, 308
Armed merchant cruiser.
Carnarvon, 447~8, 451, 465, 467-9, 473, 475,
478, 493. Cruiser. Launched 1903. Dis-
placement 10,850 tons. Speed 22 yi knots.
Four 7-5", six 6" guns.
Carson, Lord, 197-8, 229
Carysjort, 497
Light cruiser. Launched 1914. Displace-
ment 3.750 tons. Speed 29 knots. Two 6",
eight 4" guns.
Cassel, Sir Ernest, 96, 99-100, 112-3, 189
Castelnau, General de, 356, 358
Castor, 497
Light cruiser. Launched 191 5. Displace-
ment 3,750 tons. Speed 29 knots. Five 6"
guns.
Cawdor, Lord, 74
Chamberlain, Joseph, 12, 22
Champion, 497
Light cruiser. Launched 1914. Displace-
ment 3,750 tons. Speed 29 knots. Two 6",
eight 4" guns.
Channel Ports, 395-412
Charles, Archduke, 198
Chatham, 312
Light cruiser. Launched 191 1. Displace-
ment 5,400 tons. Speed 25J? knots. Eight
6" guns.
Chikuma, 316-7, 321, 323, 466
Japanese light cruiser. Launched 1 9 1 1 . Dis-
placement 4,950 tons. Speed 26 knots.
Eight 6" guns.
Chinese Labour cry, 20, 25
Churchill, Lord Randolph, 187
Churchill, Winston Spencer, Agadir crisis, 1911;
letter to Sir E. Grey, 63-4; air defence of
Great Britain, 348; at Antwerp, 372-90; at-
tacks on, 431-2; attends Committee of Im-
perial Defence, 53-8; authorises examination
of letters of spies, 49; Aboukir, Hogue and
Cressy, 352-4; goes to Admiralty, 64; Herr
Ballin and Mr. Churchill, 207-8; letters to
Sir E. Grey, passim; letter to Sir E. Cassel
on German Navy Law, 113; letter to Lord
Fisher on liquid fuel problem, 137-8; letter to
Sir E. Carson on Irish affairs, 196-7; letter to
Prince Louis on his resigning office, 435~6;
letters to Sir John French, 408, and passim;
'Military Aspects of the Continental Prob-
lem,' 1911, 58-62; naval cordite, 48; President
of Board of Trade, 29; proposes Naval War
Staff, 81-4; sends 'warning telegrams' to
Commanders-in-Chief, 218-20; signs order
. . . Battle of Falklands, 473; sends for Lord
Fisher, 75; speech at Belfast, 101; speech at
Glasgow, 101-3; studies military position in
Europe, 49-50; talk with Count Metternich,
INDEX
583
5071; Under Secretary of State for the Col-
onies, 29; and passim.
Cleopatra, 497
Light cruiser. Launched 19 14. Displace-
ment 3,750 tons. Speed 29 knots. Two 6",
eight 4" guns.
Clio, 316, 543
Sloop. Launched 1903. Displacement 1,070
tons. Speed 13 knots. Six 4" guns.
Colville, Admiral, 426
' Commence hostilities against Germany,' 245
Condi, 467
French cruiser. Launched 1902. Displace-
ment 9,856 tons. Speed 21 knots. Two 7'6",
eight 6'4", six 3*9" guns.
Conquest, 497
Light cruiser. Launched 1914. Displace-
ment 3,750 tons. Speed 29 knots. Two 6",
eight 4" guns.
Constantine, King, 529, 538
Convoy system, 310-13, 317, 322-9
Corbett, Sir Julian, 93 (note)
Cordite, 48
Cormoran, German armed merchant cruiser,
316
Cornwall, 448, 451, 465, 467-9, 473, 475, 477-8
Cruiser. Launched 1902. Displacement
9,800 tons. Speed 23 knots. Fourteen 6"
guns.
Coronel and the Falklands, 442-77
Courageous, 500
Cruiser. Launched 1916. Displacement
18,600 tons. Speed 32 knots. Four 15",
eighteen 4" guns.
Cradock, Admiral, 444-66, 492
Cressy, 351-3
Cruiser. Launched 1899. Displacement
12,000 tons. Speed 2i# knots. Two 9' 2",
twelve 6" guns.
Crewe, Lord, 185, 231
Cromarty, 162
Cumberland, 467
Cruiser. Launched 1902. Displacement
9,800 tons. Speed 23 knots. Fourteen 6"
guns.
Cunliffe, Lord, 139
Custance, Sir Reginald, 160
Cuxhaven: attack by seaplanes, 489
Daily Chronicle, 187
Dallas, Colonel, 363-4, 368, 371-2, 374
'Danger Year,' 32
Dartmouth, 312-3, 465, 467-8
Light cruiser. Launched 191 1. Displace-
ment 5,250 tons. Speed 25}? knots. Eight
6" guns.
Dawnay, Hugh, 303
De Bartoloml, Captain, 82, 439, 466, 484
De Robeck, Admiral, 467
Defence, 269, 313, 444, 446-7, 451-6, 462-70,
473,. 439, 492
Cruiser. Launched 1907. Displacement
14,600 tons. Speed 22 K knots. Four 9*2",
ten 75" guns.
Deguise. General, 372, 384-5
Delcasse, 16, 26, 44
Derfflinger, 141
German battle cruiser. Launched 1913.
Displacement 28,000 tons. Speed 27 knots.
Eight 12", twelve sV guns.
Devlin, Mr., 191
Devonshire, Duke of, 22
Dillon, John, 191
Disraeli, 12
Djavid Bey, 523-4
Donegal, 467
Cruiser. Launched 1902. Displacement
9,800 tons. Speed 23 knots. Fourteen 6"
guns.
Donnersmarck, Count, 26
Doris, 543
Light cruiser. Launched 1896. Displace-
ment 5,600 tons. Speed 19^ knots. Eleven
6" guns.
Douglas, Sir Charles, 531
Dreadnought Battle Fleet, 482, 486
Dresden, 307, 444~6, 448, 456, 463, 477~8, 493.
548
German light cruiser. Launched 1907. Dis-
?lacement 3,544 tons. Speed 24 knots,
'welve 4'i" guns.
Dryden, John, 236 (note)
Dual Alliance, 9, 12
Dubail, General, 356, 358
Dublin, 268-72, 275
Light cruiser. Launched 191 2. Displace-
ment 5,400 tons. Speed 25^ knots. Eight
6" guns.
Duke of Edinburgh, 269, 542
Cruiser. Launched 1904. Displacement
13,550 tons. Speed 23 knots. Six 9*2", ten
6" guns.
Dumble, Colonel, 398
Dunkirk, 345-8
Dupleix, 314
French cruiser. Launched 1900. Displace-
ment 7,578 tons. Speed 21 knots. Eight
6-4", four 3 'q" guns.
Dupont, General, 336
Dutch neutrality, 361-2
Eber , 307
German gunboat. Launched 1903. Dis-
placement 977 tons. Speed 13 knots. Eight
3*4" guns
Edgar Quinet, 484
French cruiser. Launched 1907. Displace-
ment 13,780 tons. Speed 23 knots. Four-
teen 7"6" guns.
Elgin, Lord, 24
Emden, 307-9, 312, 316-7, 319, 322-4, 468,
471-2, 542-3
German light cruiser. Launched 1908. Dis-
placement 3,544 tons. Speed 24 knots. Ten
4-1" guns.
Empress of Asia, 316
Armed merchant cruiser.
Empress of India, 465
Dreadnought battleship. Launched 19 13.
Displacement 25,000 tons. Speed 21 knots.
Ten 13*5", twelve 6" guns.
Empress of Japan, 316
Armed merchant cruiser.
Empress of Russia, 316
Armed merchant cruiser.
Enchantress, 122
Admiralty yacht.
Encounter, 316-7, 320, 466
Australian light cruiser. Launched 1903.
Displacement 5,880 tons. Speed 21 knots.
Eleven 6" guns.
Enver Pasha. 523, 528, 539
Esher, Lord, 388
Essex, 448
Cruiser. Launched 1901. Displacement
9,800 tons. Speed 22 # knots. Fourteen 6"
guns.
Euryalus, 351
Cruiser. Launched 1901. Displacement
5»4
INDEX
12,000 tons. Speed 21 K knots. Two 9*2",
twelve 6" guns.
Ewing, Sir Alfred, 503
Falcon, 407
Destroyer. Launched 1899. Displacement
375 tons. Speed 30 knots. One 12-pr., five
6-pr. guns.
Falklands and Coronel, 442-78
Falklands Victory, Fisher's opinion, 491-3
Fearless, 332, 351
Light cruiser. Launched 1912. Displace-
ment 3,440 tons. Speed 25K knots. Ten 4"
guns.
Ferdinand, 538
Firedrake, 219, 508, 512-3
Destroyer. Launched 191 2. Displacement
860 tons. Speed 33 knots. Two 4" guns.
Fisher, Lord, 85, 113, 125-7, 137, 144-5, i79~
80, 259, 354, 436-41, 452, 454, 462, 465, 473.
5io
— appointed First Sea Lcrd, 437; at the Ad-
miralty, 479-501; and Falklands Victory,
493-4; character sketch, 71-8; letter on a
naval programme, 106-9
Foch, Marshal, 358-9, 410, 491
Foresight, 404
Scout. Launched 1904. Displacement 2,850
tons. Speed 25 knots. Nine 4" guns.
Fowler, Sir Henry, 24
Fox, 311, 313, 317
Light cruiser. Launched 1893. Displace-
ment 4,360 tons. Speed 19K knots. Two
6", eight 4' 7" guns.
Franco-German War, 6-8
Franco-Russian Alliance of 1892, 7-10
Frauenlob, 333
German light cruiser. Launched 1902. Dis-
placement 2,657 tons. Speed 21 knots. Ten
4'i" guns.
French, Earl, 240-50, 279, 286, 289, 299-300,
302, 342, 371, 382, 395, 400, 408-n
— differences between French and Kitchener,
398-9, 408
— letter to Mr. Churchill on Lord Kitchener's
visit to Paris, 300-1
French General Staff, 57
Franch Navy, 242. See also under names of
Ships
Furious, 500
Cruiser. Launched 1916. Displacement
19,100 tons. Speed 31 X knots. Two 18",
eight s's" guns.
Geier, 307, 316, 468-9
German light cruiser. Launched 1894. Dis-
placement 1,597 tons. Speed 16 knots.
Eight 4-i" guns.
General Election of 1906, 24
General, German mail steamer, 266
George, David Lloyd, 20, 24, 28-9, 43-7, 282,
292
— speech at Bankers' Association on Agadir
crisis, 43-5
— effect on Germany, 45-6
German alliance with Turkey, 539
German colonial expansion, 6-7, 95
German finance, 1909, 35-6
German merchant ships captured, 326
German Navy, 12-15, 32-4, 36, 51, 333~4, 503
See also names of ships.
German Navy Law, 53-124
German oversea trade, 326
German plan for attacking France, Sir H. Wil-
son's view, 53-67
German spies, 49
German torpedo boats, 487-8
Germany and balance of power, 6-1 1
— and Boer War, 11-2
— declares war on Russia, 231
— invited to join Japanese Alliance, 14
— Moroccan problem, 14
Gerrard, Major, 340
Glasgow, 445-8, 450-1, 453-4, 460, 463, 466,
460-71, 473, 475, 477-8, 492
Light cruiser. Launched 1909. Displace-
ment 4,800 tons. Speed 25 K knots. Two
6", ten 4" guns.
Glorious, 500
Cruiser. Launched 1916. Displacement
18,600 tons. Speed 32 knots. Four 15",
eighteen 4" guns.
Glory, 310, 328
Battleship. Launched 1899. Displacement
12,950 tons. Speed i8# knots. Four 12",
twelve 6" guns.
Gloucester, 267, 269. 271-2, 468, 542
Light cruiser. Launched 1909. Displace-
ment 4,800 tons. Speed 25^ knots. Two
6", ten 4" guns.
Gneisemau, 307-8, 313-6, 320-3, 424, 443-64,
466, 468-70, 474-8, 484
German cruiser. Launched 1906. Displace-
ment 11,420 tons. Speed 22 yi knots. Eight
8V, six 5'g" guns.
Goeben, 219, 222, 236-43, 266-75, 525-7, 529,
535, 539—40, 544
German battle cruiser. Launched 1911.
Displacement 22,640 tons. Speed 26 knots.
Ten n", twelve 5V guns.
Good Hope, 308, 444, 446-54, 456-59, 463, 469-
70, 316, 492
Cruiser. Launched 1901. Displacement
14,100 tons. Speed 23 knots. Two 9'2",
sixteen 6" guns.
Goodenough, Admiral, 510
Goulding, Sir Edward, 229
Grant, Captain Noel, 308
Grant-Duff, Col., 49 (note)
Greene, Sir Graham, 439
Grey, Earl, 24-31, 40-5, 96-9, 105, 115, 155,
186, 189, 191, 197, 204, 207-8, 210-6, 231,
360, 365-6, 370, 384, 524-7, 530, 534, 536
Gun: weight of shell fired, 125-6
Gunnery, 125-31
Haig, Earl, 90, 395
Halcyon, 479
Torpedo gunboat. Launched 1894. Dis-
placement 1,070 tons. Speed 19 knots. Two
4-7" guns.
Haldane, Lord, 24, 48, 66, 103-4, in, 231
— asks for a Naval War Staff, 56
— goes to Berlin, 98-9
— Haldane Plan, 248
Halil Bey, 523
Hall, Captain Reginald, 502
Hamidieh, 540
Turkish light cruiser. Launched 1903. Dis-
placement 3 ,800 tons. Speed 2 2 knots. Two
6", eight 4" 7" guns.
Hampshire, 314, 316-7, 323-4, 468, 542, 544
Cruiser. Launched 1903. Displacement
10,850 tons. Speed 23 knots. Four 75",
six 6" guns.
Hankey, Captain, 49, 172, 220
Harcourt, Sir William, 20
Harland and Wolff, 499
Hartlepool bombardment, 507-9, 520
INDEX
585
'Harwich Striking Force,' 330, 402, 480-1,
506-7
Hase, Commander von, 141 (note)
Hedin, Dr. Sven, 402
Heligoland Bight Action, 331-4
Heligoland exchanged for Zanzibar, 11
Henry, Sir Edward, 47-8
Herzegovina, 30-1
Hicks-Beach, Sir M., 22
Highflyer, 308, 467
Light cruiser. Launched 1898. Displace-
ment 5,600 tons. Speed 20 knots. Eleven
6" guns.
Himalaya, 316
Armed merchant cruiser.
Hindenburg, 538
Hipper, Admiral von, 514, 518-21
Hizen, 453, 465, 467-9
Japanese battleship. Launched 1900. Dis-
placement 12,700 tons. Speed 18 knots.
Four 12", sixteen 6" guns.
Hogue, 351-3
Cruiser. Launched 1900. Displacement
12,000 tons. Speed 21^ knots. Two 9V,
twelve 6" guns.
Holbrook, Commander, 415, 545
Holland and neutrality, 361-2
Hood, Admiral, 255-6, 401, 403-7, 422, 480,
492
Hopwood, Sir Francis. See Southborough,
Lord
Hornby, Admiral, 328
Humber, 401
Monitor. Launched 1913. Displacement
1,250 tons. Speed 1 1 % knots. Two 6", two
4-7" guns.
Hyacinth, 468
Light cruiser. Launched 1898. Displace-
ment 5,600 tons. Speed 20 knots. Eleven
6" guns.
Ibuhi, 316, 321-2, 327, 472, 544
Japanese cruiser. Launched 1907. Dis-
placement 14,620 tons. Speed 22 knots.
Four 12", eight 8", fourteen 4" 7" guns.
Idzumo, 415, 453, 465, 467-9
Japanese cruiser. Launched 1899. Dis-
placement 9,750 tons. Speed 22 knots.
Four 8", fourteen 6" guns.
Ikoma, 466
Japanese cruiser. Launched 1906. Dis-
placement 13,750 tons. Speed 21 knots.
Tour 12", twelve 6", twelve 4*7" guns.
Imperial Defence, Committee of, 173, 221
Inconstant, 497
Light cruiser. Launched 1914- Displace-
ment 3»5°o tons. Speed 29 knots. Two 6",
six 4" guns.
Indefatigable, 140, 239-40, 313, 540
Battle cruiser. Launched 1909. Displace-
ment 18,750 tons. Speed 25 knots. Eight
1 a'7, sixteen 4" guns.
Indomitable, 239-40, 266, 274, 312, 467-8, 533,
536
Battle cruiser. Launched 1907. Displace-
ment 17,250 tons. Speed 25 knots. Eight
12", sixteen 4" guns.
Inflexible, 266, 428, 466-8, 472, 475~8, 481, 493
Battle cruiser. Launched 1907. Displace-
ment 17,250 tons. Speed 25 knots. Eight
12", sixteen 4" guns.
Ingenohl, Admiral von, 515-6
Intelligence Department, 495-6, 502-5
Invasion, 177-8, 288-9, 409, 419, 490
Invincible, 261, 331, 427, 428, 465-8, 475_8,
481, 493
Battle cruiser. Launched 1907. Displace-
ment 17,250 tons. Speed 25 knots. Eight
12", sixteen 4" guns.
Ireland and the European balance, 179-202
Iron Duke, 517
Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1912.
Displacement 25,000 tons. Speed 21 knots.
Ten I3"5", twelve 6" guns.
Isvolsky, M., 30
Italian neutrality, 237, 242
Jackson, Sir Henry, 310-1, 320, 439
Jackson, Admiral Thomas, 439, 502
Jameson Raid, n, 20
Japanese Alliance, 14
Japanese Navy, 468; convoy, 321. See also
names of ships
Japanese ultimatum to Germany, 315
Jellicoe, Lord, 83-4, 146, 179, 232, 276, 278,
331, 408, 417-8, 425-6, 428, 437, 466, 480-9,
517
— opinion of Mr. Churchill, 109
— raids the British coast in 1913, 153-4
— takes command of the Fleets, 233
— and submarine alarm, 417-9, 421
Jerram, Admiral, 314
Joffre, General, 285-6, 298, 301-2, 347, 365-7
400, 491
Jutland, Battle of, 338
Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, 308 >
German armed merchant cruiser.
Karlsruhe, 307-8, 444, 448, 461, 477
German light cruiser. Launched 1912. Dis-
placement 4,820 tons. Speed 27 knots.
Twelve 4V guns.
Keble's Christian Year, 146
Kelly, Captain John, 270-1
Kelly, Captain W. A. Howard, 271
Kent, 465, 467, 473, 475~6, 478
Cruiser. Launched 1901. Displacement
9,800 tons. Speed 23 knots. Fourteen 6"
guns.
Kerr, Admiral Mark, 532-3
Ker saint, 316
French gunvessel. Launched 1897. Dis-
placement 1,223 tons. Speed 15 knots. One
5-5", five 3"9" guns.
Keyes, Commodore, 278, 330, 332, 349, 43°,
506, 508, 512-3, 519
Khaki Election, 20, 24
Kiderlen-Wachter, 39, 46
Kiel Canal, 98
King Alfred, 350
Cruiser. Launched 1901. Displacement
14,100 tons. Speed 23 knots. Two 9*2' ,
sixteen 6" guns.
King Edwards, class of ship, 481, 484-5
Kitchener, Lord, 160, 214, 248, 250-5, 287-9,
294, 299-304, 306-7, 326, 329, 334, 337, 343,
347, 360, 362, 365-73, 377, 381-4, 388-9,
399-400, 408-9, 412, 430, 490, 531, 538
— and British Territorial system, 254; effects
of Mons, 288-9; goes to Paris and Lord
French's comment, 299-304; differences be-
tween Kitchener and French, 399-400, 408;
orders batteries from India, 307; Secretary of
State for War, 250-1
Kluck, General von, 279, 357~8
KSln, 332
German light cruiser. Launched 1909. Dis-
placement 4,280 tons. Speed 27 knots.
Twelve 4'i" guns.
586 INDEX
Komet, 307
German torpedo gunboat. Launched 1892.
Displacement 971 tons. Speed 21 knots.
Four 3*4" guns.
Kffnigsberg, 307-9, 3". 324. 471-2, 542
German light cruiser. Launched 1906. Dis-
placement 3,350 tons. Speed 23 knots. Ten
4'i" guns.
Kruger, President, 11
Kurama, 466
Japanese cruiser. Launched 1907. Displace-
ment 14,620 tons. Speed 22 knots. Four
12", eight 8", fourteen 4" 7" guns.
Lambert, Mr., 183
Lancaster, 328, 467
Cruiser. Launched 1002. Displacement
9,800 tons. Speed 23 knots. Fourteen 6"
guns.
Lance, 402
Destroyer. Launched 1914. Displacement
965 tons. Speed 29 knots. Three 4" guns.
Lanrezac, General, 279, 286, 299
Lansdowne, Marquis of, 14
Law, Mr. Bonar, 229
Legion, 402
Destroyer. Launched 1914. Displacement
965 tons. Speed 29 knots. Three 4" guns.
Leipzig, 307-9, 311, 315, 447-8, 455-7, 463,
776-8
German light cruiser, Launched 1905. Dis-
placement 3,200 tons. Speed 22 K knots.
Ten 4"i" guns.
Lennox, 402
Destroyer. Launched 1914. Displacement
965 tons. Speed 29 knots. Three 4" guns.
Leopard, 480
Destroyer. Launched 1897. Displacement
350 tons. Speed 30 knots. One 12-pr., five
6-pr. guns.
Licensing Bill, 1908, 28
Lichnowsky, Prince, 255
Lighters, 500
Limpus, Admiral, 525, 535
Lindequist, von, 65
Lion, 89, 109, 134, 145-6, 333, 428, 517
Battle cruiser. Launched 1910. Displace-
ment 26,350 tons. Speed 27 knots. Eight
13' 5", sixteen 4" guns.
Liquid fuel, 133-41
Lively, 480
Destroyer. Launched 1900. Displacement
385 tons. Speed 30 knots. One 12-pr., five
6-pr. guns.
London Conference, 1871, 30
Lord Nelson, 261
Battleship. Launched 1906. Displacement
16,500 tons. Speed iSyi knots. Four 12",
ten 9' 2" guns.
Loreburn, Earl (Sir Robert Reid), 24, 42
Louis of Battenberg, Prince, 82-3, 89-90, 120,
162 (note), 183, 201, 242, 259, 287, 313, 350,
377, 380-2, 396, 429, 462, 503
— orders the Fleet not to disperse, 209; letter of
resignation, 435-6
Loyal, 402
Destroyer. Launched 1913. Displacement
965 tons. Speed 29 knots. Three 4" guns.
Lucas, Lord, 250
Ludendorff, General, 282
Lurcher, 219, 333, 5°8, 512
Destroyer. Launched 191 2. Displacement
860 tons. Speed 35 knots. Two 4" guns.
'Luxus Flotte,' 103, 112
Macedonia, 448, 451, 478
Armed merchant cruiser.
McKenna, Mr., 32-3, 44, 68, 74-5, 10a, 125
Macnamara, Dr., 181, 183
Madden. Admiral, 83
'Maestricht Appendix,' 55, 64
Magdeburg, 503-4
German light cruiser. Launched 191 1. Dis-
placement 4,500 tons. Speed 27 knots.
Twelve 41" guns.
Mahan, Admiral, 93 (note)
Maidstone, 404
Depot ship for submarines.
Mainz, 333
German light cruiser. Launched 1909. Dis-
placement 4,232 tons. Speed 25K knots.
Twelve 4V guns.
Majestic, 312, 328
Battleship. Launched 1895. Displacement
14,900 tons. Speed 17 K knots. Four 12",
twelve 6" guns.
Malaya, in, 140-1
Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1914-
Displacement 27,500 tons. Speed 25 knots.
Eight 15", twelve 6" guns.
Mallet, Sir Louis, 530, 537
Mannesmann Brothers, 38
Marine Brigade, 255, 334"5, 343, 347
Manx, Commander, 389 (note)
Marne, Battle of, 299, 357-8
Marsh, Mr., 205 (note)
Marwitz, 359
Maunoury, General, 356-7
Maurice of Battenberg, Prince, 436
Melbourne, Lord, 52
Melbourne, 314, 316-7, 320-3, 327, 468, 471,
542
Australian light cruiser. Launched 1912.
Displacement 5,400 tons. Speed 25 K knots.
Eight 6" guns.
Mensdorf, Count, 256
Mercantile marine, 264
Mersey, 401
Monitor. Launched 1913. Displacement
1,250 tons. Speed n K knots. Two 6", two
4-7" guns.
Metternich, Count, 40, 44-6, 50-2
'Military Aspects of the Continental Problem,
191 1,' by Mr. Churchill, 58-62
Milne, Sir Berkeley, 238-9, 266-75
Minerva, 312, 543
Light cruiser. Launched 1895. Displace-
ment 5,600 tons. Speed 19 K knots. Eleven
6" guns.
Minotaur, 142, 313-4, 316-7, 321-2, 327, 467,
472, 484
Cruiser. Launched 1006. Displacement
14,600 tons. Speed 22 K knots. Four 9" 2",
ten 7-5" guns.
Moltke, H., Count, 7, 12, 51
Monarch, 109
Dreadnought battleship. Launched 191 1.
Displacement 22,500 tons. Speed 21 knots.
Ten 1 3' 5", sixteen 4" guns.
Monitors, 498-500
Monmouth, 308, 445-64, 416, 469, 478, 492
Cruiser. Launched 1901. Displacement
9,800 tons. Speed 22^4 knots. Fourteen 6"
guns.
Mons, 289
Montcalm, 315-6, 320-2, 324, 465-6
French cruiser. Launched 1900. Displace-
ment 9,367 tons. Speed 21 knots. Two7'6",
eight 6'4", four 3V' guns.
Moore, Admiral, 127, 138
INDEX
587
Morley, Lord, 24, 42, 250
Morocco crisis, 25-7, 38-67
Motor omnibuses from London streets, 347
Mousquet, 308
French destroyer. Launched 1902. Dis-
placement 300 tons. Speed 30 knots. One
g-pr., six 3-pr. guns.
Munro, Commander, 423-4
Myrmidon, 406
Destroyer. Launched 1900. Displacement
370 tons. Speed 30 knots. One 12-pr., five
6-pr. guns.
Napoleon, 153, 245
Nasmith, Commander, 519
Naval Brigades, 377-90, 392
Naval Intelligence Division, 495-6, 502-5
Naval Reserves called out, 231
Naval Volunteers, 255
Naval War Staff, 56, 69, 90-3
Neptune, 122
Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1909.
Displacement 19,900 tons. Speed 21 knots.
Ten 12", sixteen 4" guns.
New Guinea Expedition, 322
New Zealand, 319-20
New Zealand Contingent sails, 321-2
New Zealand, 219, 237, 274, 331, 428, 466
Battle cruiser. Launched 191 1. Displace-
ment 18,800 tons. Speed 25 knots. Eight
12", sixteen 4" guns.
Newcastle, 315, 450, 453, 465, 467-8
Light cruiser. Launched 1909. Displace-
ment 4,800 tons. Speed 25^ knots. Two
6", ten 4" guns.
Newspaper Press Committee, 431
Nicholson, Sir William, 50, 249
Nieuport, 406
NUrmberg, 307, 316-7, 319, 446, 448, 455-6.
463, 477-8
German light cruiser. Launched 1906. Dis-
placement 3,396 tons. Speed 23 }4 knots.
Ten 4*1" guns.
Nusa, 307
German Government yacht.
Ocean, 312
Battleship. Launched 1898. Displacement
12,950 tons. Speed i&)4 knots. Four 12",
twelve 6 " guns.
Oguri, Admiral, 469
Oil Problem, 133-41, 179-81
Oliver, Admiral, 374-5, 401, 438, 452, 466, 474,
493- 502, 504, 508
Ollivant, Colonel, 306, 345, 347
Olympic, liner, 431
Omnibuses from London streets, 321
Oram, Sir Henry, 129, 133, 144, 147
Orama, 448, 451, 473
Armed merchant cruiser.
Osmaston, Colonel, 397
Ostend, 404; British destroyers fire on, 402-3
Otranto, 445-447, 450, 454, 456-9. 463. 466,
469-70, 478
Armed merchant cruiser.
Ottley, Sir Charles, 81, 220
Pakenham, Captain, 83, 86-7, 89
Panther, 39, 46
German gunboat. Launched 1901. Dis-
placement 962 tons. Speed 13 knots. Eight
3*4" guns.
Paris, General, 347, 381-3, 385, 387
Pegasus, 308
Light cruiser. Launched 1897. Displace-
ment 2,135 tons. Speed 20 knots. Eight 4"
guns.
Philomel, 323-24
Light cruiser. Launched 1890. Displace-
ment 2,575 tons. Speed 19 knots. Eight
4-7" guns.
Pioneer, 316, 324
Australian light cruiser. Launched 1899.
Displacement 2,200 tons. Speed 20 knots.
Eight 4" guns.
'Plan XVII,' 285-7
Planet, 307
German surveying vessel.
Pohl, Admiral von, 260, 334
Princess Royal, 328, 333, 428, 466-7, 481-5
Battle cruiser. Launched 1911. Displace-
ment 26,350 tons. Speed 27 knots. Eight
13*5", sixteen 4" guns.
Prince Eitel Friedrich, 316
German armed merchant cruiser.
Proserpine, 543
Light cruiser. Launched 1896. Displace-
ment 2,135 tons. Speed 20 knots. Eight 4"
guns.
Protectionist Movement, 20, 22
Psyche, 323-4
Light cruiser. Launched 1898. Displace-
ment 2,200 tons. Speed 20 knots. Eight 4"
guns.
Pyramus, 323-4
Light cruiser. Launched 1897. Displace-
ment 2,135 tons. Speed 20 knots. Eight 4"
guns.
Queen Elizabeth, 137, 140-1, 465, 545
Dreadnought battleship. Launched iqi$.
Displacement 27,500 tons. Speed 25 knots.
Eight 15", twelve 6" guns.
Queen Mary, 141
Battle cruiser. Launched 1912. Displace-
ment 27,000 tons. Speed 27 knots. Eight
13*5", sixteen 4" guns.
Rawlinson, Sir Henry, 303, 381-3, 386-8, 394
Reading, Lord, 291
Redmond, Mr., 191, 197
Reid, Sir Robert. See Loreburn, Earl
Renown, 495, 500
Battle cruiser. Launched 1916. Displace-
ment 26,500 tons. Speed 32 knots. Six 15",
seventeen 4" guns.
Repulse, 495, 500
Battle cruiser. Launched 1916. Displace-
ment 26,500 tons. Speed 32 knots. Six 15",
seventeen 4" guns.
Requin, 544
French battleship. Launched 1885. Dis-
placement 7,200 tons. Speed 14 knots. Two
io"8", six 3'9" guns.
Reshadieh, 222
Turkish battleship building in Great Britain.
Requisitioned for Royal Navy. Renamed
Erin. Launched 1913. Displacement 22,940
tons. Speed 21 y£ knots. Ten 13'5'V six-
teen 6" guns.
Revenge, 409, 492
(old.) (Renamed Redoubtable later.) Bat-
tleship. Launched 1892. Displacement 14,-
000 tons. Speed 17^ knots. Four 13*5".
ten 6" guns.
(new.) Dreadnought Battleship. Launched
1915. Displacement 25,750 tons. Speed 23
knots. Eight 15", fourteen 6" guns.
Rinaldo, 407
Sloop. Launched 1901. Displacement 980
tons. Speed 13 knots. Six 4" guns.
588
INDEX
Ripon, Lord, 24
Roberts, Earl, 248-9, 360
Ronarc'h, Admiral, 371, 377, 379
Roon, 514
German cruiser. Launched 1903. Displace-
ment 9,350 tons. Speed 21 knots. Four
8" 2", ten 5*9" guns.
Rosebery, Lord, and Anglo-French Agreement,
15
Rouvier, M., 26
Roy, General, 371, 377
Royal Fleet Reserve, 255
Royal Flying Corps, 336-7
Royal Naval Air Service, 336-7
Royal Naval Division, 306-7
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, 255
Royalist, 497
Light cruiser. Launched 19 14. Displace-
ment 3,500 tons. Speed 29 knots. Two 6",
six 4" guns.
Russian Army, 55, 298
Russo-Japanese War, 14, 23
— Influence of Russian defeat on German pol-
icy, 14
Saint-Seine, Comte de, 233
Salamis, 498
Greek battle cruiser building in Germany,
1914-
Salisbury, Marquess of, 10, n, 21
Samoa, 321, 444-5
Samson, Commander, 340, 343-4, 398
Samuel, Sir Marcus, 108
Sapphire, 428
Light cruiser, Launched 1904. Displace-
ment 3,000 tons. Speed 22 knots. Twelve
4" guns.
Scapa Flow, 414, 425-6, 485-6, 505
Scarborough bombardment, 507-9, 520
Scharnhorst, 307-8, 313-4. 316-7, 320-4, 443,
445-69. 476-7, 483-4
German cruiser. Launched 1906. Displace-
ment 11,420 tons. Speed 22 K knots. Eight
8"2", six 59" guns.
Scheer, Admiral, 261 (note), 332-4, 431, 504,
515
:heldt, 301,
Schwab, Mr., 497-8
Scheldt, 361, 373
Seaplanes, 336-44
Serbia, 31, 204
Severn, 401
Monitor. Launched 1914. Displacement
1,250 tons. Speed 11K knots. Two 6", two
47" guns.
Shearwater, 315
Canadian sloop. Launched 1901. Displace-
ment 980 tons. Speed 13 knots. Six 4"
guns.
Shells, weight of, 121-2
Slade, Admiral, 139
Smith, F. E. See Birkenhead, Lord
Smith, Sir James M., 205 {note)
Smuts, General, 464, 544
Souchon, Admiral, 265, 269, 275, 536
South African War, 12, 20
Southampton, 517
Light cruiser. Launched 191 2. Displace-
ment 5,400 tons. Speed 25 x/i knots. Eight
6" guns.
Southborough, Lord, 108, 138
Spee, Admiral von, 317-g, 442, 455-8, 460-6,
473-7, 542
Spenser-Grey, Commander, 389 (note)
Spies, 49, 224
Stettin, 333
German light cruiser. Launched 1907. Dis-
placement 3,396 tons. Speed 23 # knots.
Ten 4'i" guns.
Stoddart, Admiral, 448, 452-5, 460-4, 462, 473
Strassburg, 333
German light cruiser. Launched 19 n. Dis-
placement 4,500 tons. Speed 27 knots.
Twelve 4"i" guns.
Sturdee, Admiral, 438, 455, 462, 466, 472-5,
Submarine menace, 409, 413-41, 495-7
Sueter, Commodore, 340, 344
Swift, 143-5, 422
Destroyer leader. Launched 1907. Dis-
placement 1,800 tons. Speed 35 knots. Four
4" guns.
Swiftsure, 312-3, 542-3
Battleship. Launched 1903. Displacement
11,800 tons. Speed 19 yi knots. Four 10",
fourteen 7 "5" guns.
Swinton, Major, 300
Sydney, 314, 316-7, 320-4, 327, 468, 471-2, 542
Australian light cruiser. Launched 191 2.
Displacement 5,400 tons. Speed 25 K knots.
Eight 6" guns.
Talaat Bey, 523
Tanks, 344~5
Tariff Reform, 22
Tennyson-D'Eyncourt, Sir Eustace, 129
Tholens, Lieutenant, 333
Thomson, Graeme, 396
Tiger, 428, 465-6
Battle cruiser. Launched 1913. Displace-
ment 28,000 tons. Speed 28 knots. Eight
13*5", twelve 6" guns.
Tirpitz, Admiral von, 33, 46, 66, 103, 111, 114,
117-8, 140, 188-91, 260, 263, 333, 515
Togo, Admiral, 86, 131
Toul demanded by Germany, 156, 218
Transport Department, 397-8
Tribal class, 142
Triple Alliance, 7, 12, 16
Triumph, 219, 313-7
Battleship. Launched 1903. Displacement
11,800 tons. Speed 19K knots. Four io",
fourteen 7.5" guns.
Troubridge, Admiral, 120, 267, 269, 272-3
Tsuhuba, 466
Japanese cruiser. Launched 1905. Displace-
ment 13,750 tons. Speed 21 knots. Four
12", twelve 6", twelve 4' 7" guns.
Turkey enters the War, 522-51
Turkish alliance with Germany, 266, 530-40
Tweedmouth, Lord, 74
Tyrrell, Sir William, 210, 367
Tyrwhitt, Admiral, 148, 330-2, 349, 352, 404.
506
Undaunted, 402
Light cruiser. Launched 1914- Displace-
ment 3,500 tons. Speed 29 knots. Two 6",
six 4" guns.
Unionist Party supports Government, August,
1914, 215-6, 232
Valiant, 140-1
Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1914-
Displacement 27,500 tons. Speed 25 knots.
Eight 15", twelve 6" guns.
Venerable, 406-7
Battleship. Launched 1899. Displacement
15,000 tons. Speed 18 knots. Four 12",
twelve 6" guns.
INDEX
S89
Vengeance, 467, 493
Battleship. Launched 1899. Displacement
12,950 tons. Speed 18 knots. Four 12"
twelve 6" guns.
Venizelos, M., 529-30, 534, S38, 544
Verdun demanded by Germany, 156, 218
Villiers, Sir F., 364, 367, 370
Von der Marwitz, 359
Warrender, Sir George, 508-10, 512, 514-8
Warrior, 269, 467, 484, 542
Cruiser. Launched 1905. Displacement
I3.SSO tons. Speed 23 knots. Six 9-2", four
7*5" guns.
Warspite, 140-1
Dreadnought battleship. Launched 1913.
Displacement 27,500 tons. Speed 25 knots.
Eight 15", twelve 6" guns.
Watts, Sir Philip, 106, 129, 133, 144, 147
Webb, Captain, 427
Weddigen, Lieutenant, 352
Wemyss, Admiral, 527
Westminster, Duke of, 302
Weymouth, 313, 465, 407-8
Light cruiser. Launched 1910. Displace-
ment 5,250 tons. Speed 24X knots. Eight
6" guns.
Whitby bombardment, 520
White, Sir W., 108
Wildfire, 406-7
Sloop. Launched 1888. Displacement 1,140
tons. Speed 14 knots.
William, Crown Prince, 65
William, German Emperor, 11, 26, 33, 96, 98,
101, 104, 110-2, 216, 334
Wilmot, Sir E., 107
Wilson, Sir Arthur K., 78, 84-6, 146, 159, 437-9,
462, 481, 486, 488, 505, 510-2
— character sketch, 78-81; letter to Mr. As-
quith refusing to undertake office of First Sea
Lord unless under Mr. Churchill, 85; opposes
creation of Naval War Staff, 81; view of the
British plan in event of war, 55
Wilson, Sir Henry, 50, 53, 55, 286
— states his view of the German plan for at-
tacking France, 53-5
Wyndham, George, 508
Yakagi, 466
Japanese light cruiser. Launched ion.
Displacement 4,950 tons. Speed 26 knots.
Eight 6" guns.
Yarmouth, bombardment of, 470-81
Yarmouth, 314, 316-7, 323-4, 468, 542
Light cruiser. Launched 191 1. Displace-
ment 5,250 tons. Speed 24^ knots. Eight
6" guns.
Yashima, Japanese battleship, loss of, 430
Yeomanry Cavalry, 347
Ypres, 411
Zanzibar, n
Zdle, 316, 445
French gunboat. Launched 1899. Dis-
placement 554 tons. Speed 13 knots. Two
39", four 2'5" guns.
Zemchug, 308, 314, 323
Russian light cruiser. Launched 1903. Dis-
placement 3,130 tons. Speed 23 knots.
Eight 4*7" guns.
Zeppelins, 337-40, 400
^~3h
D
521
C5
1923a
Churchill, (Sir) Winston
Leonard Spencer
The world crisis
PLEASE DO NOT REMOVI
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
Live Music
Archive
Librivox
Free Audio
Metropolitan Museum
Cleveland
Museum of Art
Internet
Arcade
Console Living Room
Open Library
American
Libraries
TV News
Understanding
9/11